In the recent literature, two opposing ways of thinking about the relationship between Explanationism and Bayesianism have emerged. On one side are authors including van Fraassen and Douven who have tried to accommodate Explanationist intuitions via revisions of the fundamental structural Bayesian requirements of rationality. On the other side are authors including Roche & Sober and Lange who have proposed that Bayesians should understand Explanationism in substantive, confirmation-theoretic terms. Fitelson will begin by explaining the difference between structural vs substantive Bayesian rationality. Then, using this distinction, Fitelson will discuss the two opposing ways of reconciling Explanationism & Bayesianism. In the end, Fitelson will side with those who take Explanationism to be a substantive -- rather than a structural -- Bayesian constraint. Fitelson will also explain why he disagrees with the skeptical arguments of Roche & Sober regarding the prospects of reconciling Explanationism and Bayesianism.


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