Like philosophers, scientists discuss what they think they know and how they think
they know it.How are philosophers' theories of knowledge and scientists' (generally
implicit) theories of knowledge related? Mayo-Wilson outlines several working papers
that address this question. To do so, Mayo-Wilson explains how epistemologists' discussions
of possible worlds might be made precise in classical statistics and he then argues
that classical estimation procedures can be used to form beliefs satisfying modal
conditions that some philosophers argue are
necessary for knowledge (e.g. safety, sensitivity, and adherence).Finally, Mayo-Wilson sketches how similar results can be used to (i) justify an increasing reliance on interval estimation rather than hypothesis tests in the social and medical sciences, (ii) reveal similarities between puzzle cases in epistemology concerning epistemic closure and problems concerning multiple-hypothesis testing in statistics, and (iii) explain how our knowledge of chaotic systems is constrained.Mayo-Wilson closes with a long list of open problems.
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