How should analogical considerations enter inductive reasoning? This question was raised after Rudolf Carnap developed his early systems of inductive logic. Most solution attempts do not have an axiomatic foundation along the lines of W. E. Johnson’s and Carnap’s work. Thus, it is at least to some extent unclear to which inductive problems they are supposed to apply. By taking clues from Bruno de Finetti’s ideas about analogy, Huttegger presents a new analogical inductive logic that is based on rigorous foundations. The axioms of the new theory extend the axioms of Johnson and Carnap in fairly minimal ways, and they allow us to discuss at a precise level the merits and limitations of the resulting system of inductive inference. 


© UC Irvine School of Social Sciences - 3151 Social Sciences Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100 - 949.824.2766