The Condorcet Criterion is straightforward:  In an election, if there is a candidate who would beat every other candidate in a head-to-head race, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If such a candidate exists, then she is called a Condorcet winner.  Instead of looking at all pairs of candidates, however, what happens if you look at all triples of candidates, or all quadruples of candidates?  What would be the analogue of a Condorcet winner?  In this talk, Orrison will describe how we extended the idea of a Condorcet winner to include sub-elections involving more than two candidates. He’ll also discuss some natural questions that came up along the way, and he’ll explain why he and researchers were pleasantly surprised by the answers they found. The talk features joint work with Aaron Meyers, Jen Townsend, Sarah Wolff, and Angela Wu. 

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