Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence
The Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences Colloquium Series presents
“Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence”
with John Duffy, Professor of Economics, UC Irvine
Thursday, October 30, 2014
Social Science Plaza A, Room 2112
Duffy considers a model where two players compete for items having diﬀerent common values in a Blotto game. Players have to decide how to allocate their budgets across all items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism. He analyzes two payoﬀ objectives: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoﬀ and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all items. He develops some new theoretical results for the majority rule case and show that the majority rule objective results in qualitatively diﬀerent equilibrium behavior than the total expected payoﬀ objective. He reports the results of an experiment where the two payoﬀ mechanisms are compared and we find strong support for the theoretical predictions.
For further information, please contact Joanna Kerner, firstname.lastname@example.org or 949.824.8651.