The Department of Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium Series presents
“An Originalist Theory of Concepts”
with Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
Friday, May 18, 2012
Social and Behavioral Sciences Gateway, Room 1517
The main claim is that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, and not by
their semantic or epistemic properties. This makes concepts available to do non-circular
explanatory work concerning semantic and epistemic issues. Sainsbury shows how the
theory applies to some familiar puzzle cases, like Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of
Paderewski. Much of the material comes from his recently published book co-authored
with Michael Tye: /Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to
Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts/ (OUP).
For further information, please contact Patty Jones, firstname.lastname@example.org or 949-824-1520.