Regionalism
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Abstract
We review and analyze some recent research on regionalism. We begin by discussing how various studies have defined regions and regionalism. Because much of the work has been conducted by economists, we then turn to a summary of the economics of regionalism. However, it is widely held that economic factors alone are insufficient to explain regionalism’s causes and consequences and that political factors are centrally important. We analyze how domestic and international political factors have guided both economic regionalism and security regionalism. We conclude by outlining some avenues for future research, placing particular emphasis on the need to better integrate insights from political economy and international security in the study of regionalism.

INTRODUCTION

During the past few decades, there has been a tremendous surge in regionalism throughout the international system. This growth has been stimulated in large measure by the proliferation of regional institutions, giving rise to substantial scholarly interest in both their sources and consequences. Some of this work has been conducted by economists interested in regionalism’s welfare effects and its impact on the stability of the global economic system. However, there is also a long tradition of work on regionalism in political science. Scholars of international relations and comparative politics have generated a sizable literature on the political economy of regionalism. Researchers have also expressed a lively interest in analyzing international security from a regional perspective.

In this article, we review and analyze some recent research on regionalism, sometimes referred to as “the new regionalism” (Hettne 2005). We begin by explaining that regionalism is usually understood to involve policy coordination through formal institutions. Often—although by no means always—this coordination occurs among states located in close geographic proximity. Because much of the research on regionalism focuses on its economic consequences, we briefly review that body of work. Then we discuss the political economy of regionalism and regionalism in security relations. We conclude by outlining some avenues for future research, placing particular emphasis on the need for work that links these two topics, improving our understanding of the political economy of national security in regional contexts.

DEFINING REGIONS, REGIONALISM, AND REGIONALIZATION

Despite widespread interest in regionalism, we lack consensus on its definition. In part, this is because observers do not agree on what constitutes a region. Regions are frequently defined as groups of countries located in the same geographic space; but where one region ends
and the next begins is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, most researchers agree that a region implies more than just physical proximity, although the additional criteria that should be used have proven controversial. Among some of the best-known studies, for example, Russett (1967) defines a region based on geographic proximity, social and cultural homogeneity, shared political attitudes and political institutions, and economic interdependence. Deutsch et al. (1957) view high levels of interdependence across multiple dimensions—including economic transactions, communications, and political values—as determining whether a group of countries composes a region. Thompson (1973) argues that regions include states that are geographically proximate, interact extensively, and have shared perceptions of various phenomena.

Although geography lies at the heart of most of these definitions, some scholars define regions in nongeographic terms. Behavioral definitions emphasize that political practice and interaction can alter a region’s composition. As Katzenstein (2005, p. 9) puts it, “regions are politically made.” Solingen (1998) subsumes a region’s boundaries to the respective grand strategies of different domestic political coalitions. The scope of a region is thus in the eyes of members of the dominant coalition. Consequently, it is subject to continuous redefinition through expansion into other regions or through domestic coalitional shifts in grand strategy. Other nongeographic definitions that are ideational or social-constructivist stress shared communal identities of states within a region (Risse-Kappen 1995; Katzenstein 1997, 2005).

In light of the ontological disagreement over what constitutes a region, it is no surprise that regionalism is also a contested concept. One source of confusion has been the distinction between regionalism and regionalization. Various political scientists have argued that regionalism is a political process marked by cooperation and policy coordination, whereas regionalization is an economic process in which trade and investment within the region grow more rapidly than the region’s trade and investment with the rest of the world (Haggard 1993, pp. 48–49; see also Gamble & Payne 1996, Breslin & Higgott 2001, Ravenhill 2009). Pempel (2005, pp. 19–20) makes a different but related distinction; he defines regionalization as a bottom-up, societally driven process, whereas regionalism “involves primarily the process of institution creation” and is the intentional product of interstate cooperation.

Katzenstein (2006, p. 1) defines regionalism as institutionalized practices and regionalization as “a process that engages actors.” For Hurrell (1995, pp. 39–40), however, regionalization is a feature of regionalism. Regionalization is “the growth of societal integration within a region and . . . the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction.” This is akin, he argues, to informal integration or “soft regionalism,” which involves increasing population flows, multiple channels, and complex social networks spreading ideas and attitudes. Fawcett (2004, p. 433) defines regionalism as a policy or a project, while defining regionalization as both a project and a process, preceding and flowing from regionalism. Alternatively, Marchand et al. (1999) emphasize the globalizing, restructuring context of regionalization. Regionalization reflects state and nonstate forces reacting in opposition to globalization, whereas regionalism concerns ideas, identities, and ideologies related to a regional project. Munakata (2006) agrees that regionalism involves institutions established by governments to promote regional economic integration but emphasizes the varying degrees of commitment by members. Free trade areas (FTAs) are considered a solid form of regionalism, whereas regional consultative bodies that lack legally binding agreements—even if they promote economic integration—are a looser form.

A wide variety of researchers consider regionalization to be a process driven by economic or social forces and regionalism to be a political process. Yet a multiplicity of
meanings for each of these two terms remains. The boundaries between regionalism and regionalization remain porous. On the one hand, regionalization driven by private actors—economic and otherwise—is often reinforced by states. On the other hand, bottom-up efforts (domestic and transnational) may lead to regionalism as the intended or unintended product of pressures on states. Identifying different sequences of regionalism and regionalization—and their mutual effects—may be a more productive endeavor but it can only be advanced through improvements in the conceptualization and measurement of “region,” “regionalism,” and “regionalization.”

A great deal of research on regionalism has focused on preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), institutions that provide each member-state with preferential access to the other participants’ markets. Many such arrangements involve states in close geographic proximity (e.g., the European Union or Mercosur), but some are not (e.g., the FTAs between the United States and Israel, Chile and South Korea, or Mexico and Japan). In this article, we pay particular attention to PTAs, which involve economic policy coordination and cooperation among member-states. Among the various types of PTAs are arrangements that partially liberalize trade between members; FTAs, which eliminate trade barriers among members; customs unions, which eliminate internal trade barriers and impose a common external tariff on third parties’ products; common markets, which allow free movement of factors of production and finished products across national borders; and economic unions, which are common markets coupled with a currency union. Because all PTAs attempt to coordinate trade policy among members, they are usually analyzed as a group.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that, despite contemporary observers’ particular interest in PTAs formed during the past half century, regionalism is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, four waves of regionalism have taken place over the past two centuries (Mansfield & Milner 1999). The first occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century and was largely a European phenomenon (Pollard 1974, Lazer 1999, Pahre 2008). This wave was associated with the emergence of a liberal international trading system, since PTAs were networked via most-favored-nation clauses. A second wave began in the aftermath of World War I. These arrangements were more economically discriminatory than those formed during the earlier wave. Many observers argue that the PTAs established during the interwar era gave rise to “beggar-thy-neighbor” trade policies, a sharp decline in world trade, and heightened political conflict (Irwin 1993). Since World War II, two additional waves of PTAs have occurred. They have proven more difficult to characterize as either liberalizing or discriminatory than the first two. One took place in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The second began during the 1990s. Over the past two decades, PTAs have become so pervasive that more than half of all international commerce has come to be conducted within these arrangements, and almost every country belongs to at least one. These developments have spurred substantial scholarly interest in both the causes and effects of economic regionalism.

THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONALISM

Much of the research on regionalism has focused on its welfare implications and has been conducted by经济学家. PTAs liberalize trade among members and guarantee them preferential market access. At the same time, they discriminate against third parties. Economists have devoted considerable effort to determining whether the benefits from internal liberalization outweigh the costs of third-party discrimination. In a seminal study on the topic, Viner (1950)
drew the distinction between “trade-creating” and “trade-diverting” customs unions. Trade-creating unions enhance welfare: Liberalization among member-states shifts imports from less efficient producers outside the arrangement to more efficient producers within it. Trade-diverting unions undermine welfare, as the preferences afforded producers inside the arrangement shift imports from more efficient producers outside the arrangement to less efficient producers inside it. Viner and others have demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to make any generalizations about whether PTAs are trade creating or trade diverting. As mentioned, there is widespread agreement that those formed during the nineteenth century tended to be trade creating, whereas those established between World Wars I and II were trade diverting. However, there is little consensus about the PTAs formed since World War II (e.g., Krueger 1999, Bhagwati 2008).

In addition to the trade-creating and trade-diverting effects of PTAs, economists have addressed PTAs’ effects on the terms of trade and their capacity to promote economies of scale. The formation of a PTA typically improves members’ terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world, thereby enhancing their welfare. But it can also lead to “begging thy neighbor” and trade wars between blocs or between a bloc and an economically large country (Krugman 1993, p. 61). Therefore, it is hard to draw any generalizations about the terms-of-trade effects of PTAs. Similarly, by expanding the size of the market to which they have unfettered access, PTAs can help member-state firms to realize economies of scale and thereby promote members’ welfare; however, there is only scattered evidence that most PTAs have actually had this effect (Johnson 1965, Bhagwati 1968).

The issues addressed thus far concern the static welfare effects of PTAs. Economists have also explored their dynamic effects, most notably whether PTAs promote or undermine multilateral openness (Baldwin 2008, Bhagwati 2008). One school of thought holds that PTAs are stepping stones to multilateral liberalization. Various economists have argued that it is possible for countries to form a PTA that harms neither its members nor third parties, and that there are incentives for this arrangement to expand until it culminates in a global free trade system (Kemp & Wan 1976). Others have argued that if members of a PTA participate in multinational negotiations as a bloc rather than as individual countries, the reduction in the number of actors engaged in the negotiations should make it easier to arrive at an acceptable bargain (Krugman 1993). These observers view the proliferation of PTAs as a means to bolster the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trade regime. By contrast, a second school of thought holds that PTAs constitute stumbling blocks to multilateralism and thereby damage the WTO (Duina 2006, Bhagwati 2008). They are concerned that PTAs have a protectionist cast and offset multilateral trade liberalization; that they become enmeshed in conflicts rather than expand in a way that fosters multilateral openness; that there are deep-seated differences among PTAs rooted in factors that inhibit multilateral cooperation; that efforts to form and deepen PTAs will detract from efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements; and that the formation of PTAs decreases the likelihood that multilateral agreements will be enforced.

Taken together, economic analyses of regionalism have produced no consensus on its welfare effects. As for its sources, few economic analyses have been undertaken (Baier & Bergstrand 2004). Instead, virtually all research on the sources of PTAs has emphasized the political economy of regionalism.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS

Pioneering work by Viner (1950), Deutsch et al. (1957), Haas (1958), and Nye (1971) drew attention to political factors shaping regionalism. A growing number of studies have extended this work by focusing on the role of politics in determining whether and when states enter PTAs. The effects of domestic interest groups and political institutions have generated particular interest.

Domestic Politics and PTAs

PTAs are trade-policy instruments. They discriminate against third parties and grant preferential market access to member-states. Like other such instruments, they therefore have distributional implications. Some import-competing sectors may gain from protection aimed at competitors located in nonmember states; some exporters may gain from expanded opportunities for trade with members. At the same time, however, PTAs that are trade diverting generate welfare losses for society as a whole. Further, exporters may fear that the formation of a PTA will prompt states that are key trade partners to form their own preferential arrangements or to retaliate unilaterally, thereby making it more difficult to compete in key markets.

Some have argued that the political clout of these various groups affects both whether states enter PTAs and their welfare effects. In an influential study, Grossman & Helpman (1995), for example, pointed out that the domestic political viability of a PTA is likely to hinge on its degree of discrimination. A trade-diverting arrangement will generate rents for certain interest groups, even though it harms society at large. If these groups are politically powerful, then trade-diverting PTAs are more likely to be established than trade-creating arrangements. Furthermore, politically influential sectors that would be damaged by the PTA can usually be excluded from it, thereby blunting their opposition to the arrangement. This line of research suggests that, from a domestic political standpoint, trade-diverting PTAs are easier to form than trade-creating ones.

However, export-oriented sectors can also benefit from a PTA. Gilligan (1997) maintains that firms in such sectors have a preference for PTAs because they are reciprocal agreements; these firms will generate substantial gains from reciprocal trade liberalization but not from unilateral liberalization. Similarly, Milner (1997), Mattli (1999), and Chase (2005) argue that exporters in industries marked by economies of scale have particular reason to press for PTAs. Membership will furnish them with access to a larger market, thereby helping them reduce production costs and increase profitability. Multinational corporations also have reason to press for PTAs that protect their trading and production networks (Manger 2009).

Hence, establishing a PTA can be a useful trade strategy for governments that want the support of both import-competing and export-oriented sectors. But why have state leaders displayed a particular preference for entering PTAs rather than relying on unilateral or multilateral trade policies? One possibility is that they do so to liberalize overseas commerce when faced with domestic obstacles to reducing trade barriers on a unilateral or multilateral basis. If so, we might expect countries where legislators tend to favor open trade but powerful trade associations and unions seek trade barriers to be more extensively involved in PTAs than are other countries. Further, we need a better understanding of exactly which domestic groups support and oppose PTAs, and why particular groups prefer regional openness to unilateral or multilateral liberalization (Mansfield & Milner 1999).
A related line of research suggests that domestic political institutions are a key influence on PTA formation. Some observers maintain that such arrangements are more easily formed by states with similar economic or political institutions (Nogués & Quintanilla 1993). Comparable domestic institutions may improve the prospects of agreeing on common-regional policies. States with highly dissimilar institutions have much to gain from forming a regional agreement, but the impediments to doing so are substantial. The extent of institutional divergence and the likelihood that a regional arrangement will stimulate institutional change may influence whether states elect to join a PTA (Hurrell 1995). However, we do not know how much institutional similarity is necessary to make a PTA politically feasible. We also need more systematic evidence on whether institutional differences actually dampen the prospects of forming PTAs. Until recently, for example, there has been a dearth of regional trade arrangements in Asia, and this has been attributed to the heterogeneity of political regime types (Katzenstein 1997). However, the past decade has seen a major effort by East Asian states with a wide range of political and economic institutions to enter into trade agreements, partnerships, and monetary swap arrangements—AFTA, ASEAN + 3, China-ASEAN, Japan-ASEAN, Singapore-EFTA, and a proposed EAFTA (East Asia Free Trade Area).1 Finally, we need a better understanding of how regional agreements help members lock in institutional reforms, contingent on domestic support for those changes (Pevehouse 2005).

Aside from institutional homogeneity, other features of the institutional landscape may influence whether states elect to join PTAs. In a set of recent studies, Mansfield & Milner (unpublished manuscript; see also Mansfield et al. 2002, 2007) argue that both regime type and the number of “veto points” help explain decisions to enter PTAs. Heads of state are frequently torn between pressures exerted by special interests and the preferences of society at large. Special interests often press for protectionist trade policies. Although such policies are economically harmful, leaders have incentives to respond to at least some of these pressures because interest groups furnish benefits such as campaign contributions in return. This presents leaders with a dilemma. When an economic downturn occurs, the population may assume it results from the leader granting favors to special interests or engaging in rent-seeking behavior, when in fact the economic circumstances are due to exogenous factors beyond his or her control. Entering a PTA helps to address this problem by committing the leader to an open trade regime with member-states, signaling to voters he or she will not allow trade policy to be shaped by special interests—and that he or she is not responsible for poor economic performance. Moreover, leaders have greater reason to worry about being turned out of office for events beyond their control in countries with greater electoral competition. Therefore, democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than are other countries.2

Furthermore, Mansfield & Milner argue that as the number of veto points in a country rises, the odds of forming a PTA decline. Veto points have the ability to block policy change, and in most countries they must ratify trade agreements and other policy choices. The more of

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1ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; AFTA, ASEAN Free Trade Area; EFTA, European Free Trade Association.
2Pahre (2008) provides an alternative explanation of why democracies sign trade agreements with each other.
these points that exist, the higher the likelihood that at least one of them will have a constituency that is adversely affected by the PTA and will therefore block or delay its ratification. With more veto points, the costs of ratification for political leaders rise as well. Leaders must modify the agreement to fit the preferences of veto points or bribe them into accepting the agreement. Hence, the larger the number of veto points, the less likely leaders are to enter PTAs and the more difficult it is to gain ratification for the trade agreements they do sign.

**International Politics and PTAs**

In addition to domestic politics, many studies have emphasized the effects of international politics on PTA formation. One strand of research has addressed the impact of hegemony, which exists when a single state is willing and able to manage the global economy. Various scholars argue that, absent such a state, the international economic system is likely to falter. States tend to form PTAs in the face of this instability to help ensure that trade relations with key economic partners will not be disrupted (Gilpin 1987, Krasner 1976). Consistent with this argument, the rapid proliferation of PTAs over the past two decades is often attributed to the United States government’s decision to pursue a series of these arrangements in the 1980s, once its economic power declined and negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stalled (Pomfret 1988; Bhagwati 1993, 2008; Krugman 1993). Other leading states responded by forming PTAs of their own. In Baldwin’s (1995; see also Gilpin 1987) opinion, this development combined with the completion of the Single Market in Western Europe to set off a domino effect that produced the latest wave of regionalism.

This episode of PTAs forming in reaction to one another is not an isolated incident. It reflects a general tendency for strategic interaction and diffusion to shape patterns of PTA formation (Oye 1992; Baldwin 1995; Fernández & Portes 1998; Mansfield 1998; Lazer 1999; Pahre 2008; Mansfield & Milner, unpublished manuscript). A PTA’s establishment can threaten the competitiveness of third parties, prompting them to form blocs of their own. Even if states are not economic rivals, the perception that a PTA is generating benefits for members can create a “demonstration effect,” whereby third parties form another arrangement in order to attain similar gains (Pomfret 1988, Yarbrough & Yarbrough 1992). Gruber (2000) claims that even if states do not expect to gain much from PTA membership, they may decide to enter such arrangements if the costs of remaining outside the arrangement outweigh the costs of participating. Furthermore, PTAs sometimes form in reaction to one another because these arrangements have greater clout than their individual member-states in international negotiations (Oye 1992, Fernández & Portes 1998, Mansfield & Reinhardt 2003). Over the past few decades, certain Latin American countries have formed PTAs to enhance their bargaining position with the United States and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The founding members of the European Community (EC) also hoped to improve their leverage in negotiations with the United States (Haggard 1997, Whalley 1998).

Crucial to the international politics of PTAs are the linkages between trade relations and power relations. It is widely recognized that open international trade promotes efficiency. These efficiency gains generate increases in national income that can be used to augment a state’s military power. As such, trade generates security externalities (Gowa 1994). States can address these security externalities by trading more freely with their allies than with their (actual or potential) adversaries. The gains from trade among allies promote their common security by bolstering the alliance’s aggregate political-military power. In contrast, open trade between
adversaries produces negative security externalities. A state engaging in trade with an adversary augments the national income of its trading partner, thereby threatening to undermine its own security. Because PTAs foster open trade among members, such arrangements are especially likely to form among political allies. In PTAs composed of allies, the common security aims of members attenuate the political risks that states benefiting less from the arrangement economically might otherwise face from those benefiting more (Mansfield 1993; Mansfield & Milner, unpublished manuscript, ch. 4).

PTAs also affect power relations by influencing the economic dependence of members (Mansfield & Milner 1999). States that enjoy the greatest economic benefits from a PTA are most vulnerable to its collapse or to disruptions of commercial relations among members, unless they can easily replace those benefits through trade relations with third parties. In several cases, PTAs have been formed to promote such dependence. Viner (1950), for example, explains that among the most important motives for Prussia’s establishment of the Zollverein was a desire to increase its influence over the smaller German states and to minimize Austria’s influence over them. Similarly, some major powers used PTAs to influence regional neighbors during the interwar period (Hirschman 1980 [1945]). Since World War II, stronger states have continued to use PTAs to consolidate their political influence over weaker counterparts. The Soviet Union established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for this purpose, and Russia’s recent regional initiatives appear to have a similar rationale. Various arrangements that the EC established with former colonies of its members, the Caribbean Basin initiative launched by the United States in 1982, and Egypt’s initiatives under President Nasser are also examples (Pomfret 1988, Solingen 1998).

Not only does international politics influence the formation of PTAs, but PTAs also influence key facets of international politics. Political-military relations are chief among them. More than a century ago, Pareto argued that PTAs could promote closer and more peaceful political relations among participants (Machlup 1977). In the immediate aftermath of World War I, Keynes (1919, p. 249) made a similar claim: “A Free Trade Union, comprising the whole of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, Siberia, Turkey, and (I should hope) the United Kingdom, Egypt and India, might do as much for the peace and prosperity of the world as the League of Nations itself.” The view that PTAs can dampen hostilities between member-states continued to generate scholarly interest in the post–World War II era, and many preferential groupings have been formed over the past 60 years with an eye to stimulating both peace and prosperity (Nye 1971, Fernández & Portes 1998).

Consistent with these claims, some empirical studies have concluded that PTAs do inhibit political-military conflict among participants (Nye 1971, Mansfield & Pevehouse 2000, Bearce 2003). Most states enter PTAs expecting to derive economic benefits. Conflict between member-states threatens to scuttle these anticipated gains by damaging the PTA and economic relations between participants. PTAs also inhibit antagonism by establishing a forum for bargaining and negotiation among members, thereby facilitating the resolution of interstate tensions prior to the outbreak of open hostilities (Nye 1971). Furthermore, PTAs facilitate the construction of focal points that forestall conflicts by shaping states’ standards of acceptable behavior and facilitating the identification of deviations from such behavior.
That PTAs reduce political-military tensions among members indicates that economic and security regionalism can be tightly linked, a point that has not received sufficient attention to date. We now turn to a fuller discussion of the origins and forms of security regionalism. There has been wide variation in the nature of security institutions across conceptual and epistemological paradigms. An extensive literature focuses on alliances, institutions that can be restricted to a specific geographic area but can also link extra-regional major powers to actors within a region. In the post–World War II era, the United States spearheaded alliances that linked it to Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization); Asia (bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan); the Middle East (the failed Central Treaty Organization/Baghdad Pact, and formal or informal bilateral alliances with pre-1979 Iran, some Persian Gulf countries, Egypt since the 1970s, and others); and Latin America (the Rio Treaty stipulated that an attack against one state was to be considered an attack against all). The Warsaw Pact created an alliance of communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe led by the Soviet Union. Security regionalism, however, also involves political forms that fall short of alliances. States within a region have created collective security mechanisms, security regimes, zones of relative peace, cooperative security dialogues, and zones free of weapons of mass destruction. They have done so because of the shared interests of dominant political coalitions among countries within the region (Solingen 1998), economic interdependence or shared democratic institutions (Gleditsch 2002), or common understandings across transnational security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957, Adler & Barnett 1998, Checkel 2005). The diversity of forms in regional security cooperation has given rise to a deeper interest in regional institutional design, or in the formal and informal features and characteristics of regional institutions (Solingen 2005a, 2008; Acharya & Johnston 2007). But what are the underlying sources of institutionalized regional security cooperation, whatever form it takes?

**Domestic Politics and Security Regionalism**

It is not possible to explain the nature of regional cooperation without an adequate understanding of the preferences and capabilities of the relevant domestic actors (Haggard 1997). Regional institutions have different effects on different segments of society (Kahler 2000). Military and state security bureaucracies have an incentive to resist more legalized international institutions, whereas firms and investors prefer the establishment of clear rules to enforce liberalization. For Moravcsik (1998) and Solingen (1998, 1999, 2008), the preferences and composition of the ruling coalition within a state are crucial to explaining why the state pursues regional strategies. The coalition-members’ preferences are aggregated through institutions that vary considerably across regions.

In this regard, economic cooperation and security cooperation are inextricably linked. Political leaders worldwide rely on material and ideal aspects of internationalization (i.e., increased economic openness) to broker coalitions across the state-societal divide, logrolling both state agencies and societal actors sharing common-interests and purpose (Solingen 2001). This process yields two ideal-typical coalitional forms—internationalizing and inward looking. These forms have different core constituencies, some favoring and others opposing Internationalization. Given their political makeup, internationalizing coalitions have greater incentives to create cooperative and secure regional orders than inward-looking ones. The two
types of coalitions develop different grand strategies toward the domestic, regional, and global political economy. These strategies have synergies across all three levels, reflected in the kinds of regional security arrangements that obtain. Strategies are more cooperative in internationalizing than in inward-looking regions (Solingen 1998). Once it prevails politically, the dominant coalition’s grand strategy becomes raison d’état.

The grand strategy of internationalizing coalitions emphasizes regional cooperation and stability, as well as the maintenance of secure access to global markets, capital, investments, and technology. Macroeconomic stability and international competitiveness are accorded primacy because both are expected to reduce uncertainty, encourage savings, and enhance the rate of investment. Regional cooperation and stability reduce the need for unproductive and inflation-inducing military investments and the need to protect state-owned enterprises under a mantle of national security. By contrast, the mobilization of resources for conflict can emasculate domestic macroeconomic objectives via expansive military budgets, government and payments deficits, rising costs of capital, inhibited savings and productive investment, depleted foreign-exchange coffers, overvalued exchange rates, currency instability and unpredictability, and thwarted foreign investment. The logic of internationalizing models, when these become dominant in a region, makes them collectively stable.

The grand strategy of inward-looking coalitions, in its purest form, hinges on the interests of protectionist sectors and of state industry and ancillary military-industrial complexes, as well as of ethnic, religious, and civic nationalist groups similarly threatened by internationalization. Whereas regional insecurity and competition nurture these coalitions, enhanced regional cooperation erodes their resources and mobilizing themes. Classically, these coalitions rely on populism and on active states controlling prices, increasing nominal wages, overvaluing the currency to raise wages and profits in nontraded goods sectors, and dispensing rents to private firms by discriminating against competing imports through tariffs, controls, and multiple exchange rates. These coalitions flout international and regional economic, political, and security regimes that are depicted as anathema to the economic, national, ethnic, or religious objectives they advance. The domestic logic of these models, when dominant in a given region, makes them collectively stable—feeding on each other’s existence and creating an environment that is resistant to internationalizing strategies.

These are two ideal-typical coalitional types against which real cases can be compared. Hybrid coalitions include elements from the other two in different degrees and combinations. In this framework, different regional coalitional clusters define the very boundaries of a region and its propensity for conflict and cooperation. The modal East Asian ruling coalition has been closer to the internationalizing end of the spectrum, whereas the modal Middle Eastern one has gravitated toward the inward-looking type (Solingen 1998, 2007). Military expenditures in East Asia have not been allowed to choke the domestic macroeconomic requirements of an internationalizing strategy. There have been neither arms races nor offensive build-ups that threatened neighboring countries in recent decades, although some consider China’s ongoing military modernization to have altered that trend (Hartfield & Job 2007). The expected synergies between domestic and regional stability so central to internationalizing coalitions are reflected in regional arrangements that reinforce the links between the economy and national security. Although created to deal with economic regionalism, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has addressed issues of collective security related to the Korean Peninsula, terrorism, and Sino-American relations, among others (Ravenhill 2001). ASEAN has also been geared to reinforce the links between economic and security regionalism, protecting exports, foreign
investment, and the domestic political viability (“resilience”) of internationalizing coalitions (Solingen 2005b, 2008). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) avoids divisive issues and seeks to enhance collective resilience through security dialogue. Its communiqués link the economic pillars of security regionalism to the peace and stability associated with globalization. The informal character of East Asian institutions allowed dominant domestic coalitions with comparable (but not identical) platforms of engagement with the global political economy to advance security regionalism as a vital component of internationalizing strategies, while protecting their domestic political survival and resources. Consensus rules and informality enabled these institutions to absorb newcomers as a means of weakening their competing inward-looking, autarkic, destabilizing agendas at home and throughout the region. A commitment to “open regionalism” was particularly well-suited for coalitions aiming at deepening their global ties while strengthening regional cooperation and stability. From that vantage point, intraregional and extra-regional bilateral, trilateral, and region-wide PTAs are compatible with internationalizing coalitions. Gruber (2000) interprets flexible intergovernmental arrangements in this region in similar terms. The political elites that initiated these arrangements, he argues, did not require the political protection provided by such regional institutions, because they enjoyed political stability at home and regional arrangements encountered little domestic opposition at the time of creation. However, even an informal ASEAN provided some protection against interference in domestic affairs while allowing ruling coalitions to resist domestic insurgency and separatism.

The dominant (internationalizing) coalitional backdrop in East Asia is not necessarily inimical to greater formalization and legalized verification and compliance mechanisms. Indeed, ASEAN states have ratified a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone that enables referrals to the International Court of Justice. Kahler (2000) suggests that coalitional types may explain varying positions vis-à-vis legalization, or the extent to which regional institutions display heightened obligation, greater precision in rules, and delegation of rule interpretation and enforcement to third parties. Thus, in contrast to inward-looking coalitions, internationalizing coalitions are expected to be more prone to use legalization when necessary for regional stability, and we should observe progressive legalization in tandem with maturing internationalizing regional clusters. Inward-looking coalitions may be more likely to resist legalization because of the high sovereignty costs and loss of autonomy that are so crucial to their domestic political survival.

The Arab League is an example of the latter case. Its members were ruled by domestic coalitions emphasizing import substitution, state and military entrepreneurship, nationalism, and populism, invariably leaning on the armed forces and authoritarianism. Massive nationalizations, particularly of oil resources but also of other industrial and physical capital, provided those coalitions with monopoly rents and sources of political support. The armed forces appropriated gargantuan proportions of that rent, transforming the Middle East into one of the most heavily militarized regions. The very logic of these domestic models—preference for state over private entrepreneurship, protectionism, nationalism, and military-industrial complexes—precluded effective regionalism in either economics or security and indeed led to sharp competitive outbidding among its members. The domestic political survival of these coalitions was a pivotal consideration in their design of the Arab League, trumping both collective security arrangements and effective intraregional conflict resolution (Aarts 1999, Barnett & Solingen 2007). The League abstained from intervening in most regional conflicts and succeeded in only 6 of the 77 inter-Arab conflicts it dealt with between 1945 and 1981 (Zacher 1979, Awad 1994).
subsequent record has not been much different (Harders & Legrenzi 2008; E. Solingen, unpublished manuscript). Further coalitional analysis must explore the extent to which alternative coalitions lead to unexpected kinds of security regionalism. For instance, dominant coalitions minimally engaged in the global political economy, representing protectionist sectors and expansive military-industrial complexes, which also arrive at effective regional security arrangements, would provide disconfirming evidence for the connection between internationalizing grand strategies and cooperative regionalism. The link between domestic political-economy coalitions and regionalism can also be influenced by the presence or absence of democratic institutions. However, some preliminary findings suggest a generally positive relationship between internationalizing coalitions and regional cooperation—particularly with similarly oriented neighbors—and a reverse relationship for inward-looking ones, democratic or not (Solingen 1998). Furthermore, both internationalizing and inward-looking coalitions can thrive in cartelized systems (Snyder 1991).

Democratic institutions in and of themselves are considered an important source of security regionalism. Conversely, membership in democratic clubs has been found to enhance the prospects of democratization in Latin America (Pevehouse 2005). Others have argued that “demobilizing social pacts” and the absence of democracy contribute to low levels of regional cooperation in the Middle East (Harders & Legrenzi 2008). However, that account cannot easily explain the difference between limited achievements by the region’s oldest institution (the Arab League) and a somewhat stronger record by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC, supported by dynamic business sectors, shares some traits with East Asia’s regionalism and has shunned highly ideological pan-Arab identity schemes (E. Solingen, unpublished manuscript).

The emergence and forms of security regionalism have also been studied from the vantage point of culture and identity (Abdelal 2002, Checkel 2005, Acharya & Johnston 2007). Such studies seek to deepen our understanding of discourses, communicative logics, patterns of persuasion, and the sociocultural background that informs specific efforts at regionalism, and the extent to which they impart transformative, self-perpetuating, and/or regenerative characteristics to the nature of regional relations. Johnston (2007) explains the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the result of multiple state interests creating enough uncertainty (particularly regarding China) to require some mechanism for increasing predictability in regional security. But beyond identifying a common interest in maintaining economic prosperity and avoiding costly arms races reminiscent of internationalizing clusters, Johnston probes in great detail the ARF’s socializing effects in China. Others invoke historical memory and identity as barriers to cooperation in the region. Katzenstein & Shiraishi (1997) highlight the role of domestic social and political norms favoring informal political and economic networks in accounting for the relative informality of Asian institutions. Kahler (2000) suggests that the diversity of legal systems across members precludes progress toward a more legalized regional framework.

Whether particular norms are common throughout a region, or whether regional institutions transform the identity of member states or would-be member states, is a frequent subject of contestation in this literature, even with respect to the European Union (EU) (Checkel 2007). While identifying shared norms among ASEAN states, Acharya (1999, p. 80) observes that culture may not necessarily explain those states’ reluctance to embrace transparency or confidence building as elements of a security regime. Moreover, national identity is sometimes contested or ambiguous (Abdelal 2002). Indeed, one might argue that it is a rare case when national identity is not contested. Virtually every Middle East state is an example; nationalism
for individual Arab states (wataniyah, or raison d’`etat) entailed vastly disputed goals and visions, varying across the narrow interests of ruling coalitions and of ethnic, sectarian, religious, family, or tribal groups (Sayigh 1991, Halliday 2005). For some, wataniyah represented a barrier to a higher form of Arab nationalism at the regional level (pan-Arab alqawmiyyat al-Arabiyya, or raison de la nation).

Barnett & Solingen (2007) highlight the apparent paradox of very limited achievements by the Arab League in organizing regional security, despite its members’ common language, identity, and culture—in addition to geographic proximity—all of which would have predicted stronger regionalism. Shared identity did not necessarily help Arab states overcome collective-action problems; it may even have exacerbated them. Arab leaders could neither live with pan-Arab nationalism nor live without it. On the one hand, the politics of pan-Arab nationalism and shared identity compelled them to embrace the rhetoric of Arab unity, an important source of domestic legitimacy. On the other hand, they feared Arab unity in practice because it would heighten their individual sovereignty costs. Consequently, the League’s design should not be seen as an unintended outcome but instead as the result of a clear preference for weak regional institutions that were, in essence, designed to fail. Even if it fell short in changing state preferences, the League had a measure of influence in socializing some Arab elites. It also had unintended effects. As long as aspirations for Arab unity lingered, leaders were subjected to pressures for fulfilling them even as they worked to frustrate them. The League’s low institutionalization was thus overdetermined by the dilemmas created by shared culture, efforts not to institutionalize shared norms, and by the domestic political-economy coalitions described above. Notwithstanding this weak regionalism, the Arab Middle East has shown growing regionalization of media, business and labor markets, and Islamist networks (Harders & Legrenzi 2008).

As this account suggests, the political-economy and ideational sources of regionalism may lead to the same outcome, but not always. Looking further at the interaction between these two different sets of variables might entail the study of episodes where the imputed cultural sources of security regionalism had the expected effect even in the absence of the appropriate underlying domestic coalitional foundation of member states. The case for shared norms would be stronger if they were shown to affect regionalism in spite of, rather than in consonance with, the nature of coalitional arrangements. Conversely, studies could examine cases that would appear to validate coalitional arguments on the one hand, but where shared-norms accounts would have not led to the observed outcome.

International Politics and Security Regionalism

An important point of departure in this vast literature is Haas’s concept of “spillover,” where cooperation in “low” (e.g., economic) politics gradually leads to political and security cooperation. Subsequent functionalist, neofunctionalist, and neoliberal institutionalist accounts differed in a number of ways but shared a general assumption that states advance their interests by creating regional institutions to manage growing interdependence and overcome collective-action problems. Institutions are expected to reduce uncertainty, enhance information about preferences and behavior, lower transaction costs responsible for market failure, monitor compliance, detect defections, increase opportunities for cooperation, reduce the costs of retaliation, facilitate issue linkages, and offer focal points or salient solutions (Keohane 1984).
Depending on the type of collective-action problem to be solved, institutions are assumed to take different forms (Koremenos et al. 2001).

Security regionalism ‘a la the EU has been an important empirical case for this brand of analysis. Yet the theory has proven less apt in explaining other instances of security regionalism (Acharya & Johnston 2007); elucidating why certain points become “focal” but not others (Johnston 2001); clarifying why some solutions along the Pareto frontier—that would leave everybody better off—are adopted over others (Krasner 1991); and specifying how to measure transaction-cost reduction a priori (or even a posteriori) as a motivation for creating security institutions, since such reductions must be compared to hypothetical environments without institutions (Kahler 1995). Furthermore, counter to common assumptions in neoliberal institutionalist analysis, investments are not always crucially about material resources, talk is not always cheap, and formalization can undermine cooperation (Lipson 1991). When transaction costs are a barrier to cooperation, shared social norms can—but do not always—lower that barrier, perhaps rendering formal institutions less necessary. Ample information and robust trust can similarly obviate institutions, but there is insufficient empirical analysis that gauges levels of trust and transparency. Such probes are difficult to design methodologically, though perhaps worth pursuing. Transparency is often found deficient in security matters and military expenditures in most regions beyond Europe, including East Asia.

In addition, counter to a crucial assumption of neoliberal institutionalism, the information-enhancing, problem-solving, hazard-mitigating, conflict-substituting, order-inducing, and cooperation-promoting qualities of institutions may not have Pareto-improving distributional effects at all.3 Both international (relative) power and domestic politics arguments often challenge the putatively ubiquitous public-good effects. Finally, one must know how state interests are constituted independently of (and prior to) states’ observed behavior toward regionalism. Neglecting the sources of utility functions hinders the ability to predict which form of regionalism might prevail among several efficient options, and hence, on whose behalf the benefits of functionalist efficiency will be skewed. This research agenda can be advanced by improving our understanding of micro-foundations linking domestic interests and beliefs, collective action, and regional outcomes (Tsebelis & Garrett 2001).

International power considerations have also been considered important sources of security regionalism. In particular, the decline of bipolarity and movement toward multipolarity enabled regional arrangements that could not have surfaced during the Cold War (Buzan & Weaver 2003, Lake & Morgan 1997). Such arrangements were also shaped by powerful regional states that accrued the benefits of creating them, but also arguably turned them into supple artifacts or pliable superstructures overlying the deeper foundations of power and subject to changes in those foundations. Other power-based arguments explain regional arrangements as the product of defensive regionalism, “binding,” or “bandwagon” institutionalism (Grieco 1997, Gruber 2000, Rosecrance 2001). Defensive regionalism stems from a perceived need to balance a hegemon or regional arrangements elsewhere. The “binding” hypothesis refers to weaker states binding themselves to international or regional arrangements to achieve greater power within them or to avoid being left behind. Weaker states bandwagon when they join institutions dominated by regional powers that offer them greater protection.

3For a more complete overview of the application of international relations literature to the study of regional institutions, see Solingen (2008).
AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Additional research is needed on the sources, forms, and consequences of regionalism. With respect to sources, the study of regionalism should aim at a more dynamic understanding of how global structures and processes are related to changes in the autonomy of regions. Does more globalization imply more or less regionalism? Does more regionalism beget more globalization? Does multipolarity induce more regionalism than hegemony? How central are U.S., Chinese, EU, Russian, Brazilian, Indian, and other local hegemonies to twenty-first-century regionalism? When are hegemonic powers catalysts of regionalism and when are they obstacles, and what regional forms obtain? And how does increasing security regionalism affect global power balances? Although the literature at the end of the Cold War foresaw enhanced autonomy of regional systems from the global system, it remains unclear whether regionalism has indeed evolved in that direction. Among other things, financial and economic crises have reflected less “decoupling” than predicted, as have security crises related to Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, and others. Understanding the effects of the global financial and economic crises on regionalism as a generic phenomenon, and on discrete regions in particular, seems of crucial relevance to next-generation research on regionalism. Will East Asian regionalism emerge even stronger from the current global crisis than it would have been absent the crisis? Will Europe and its peculiar form of regionalism emerge weaker?

Similar questions might be raised regarding the presumed links between hegemony or multipolarity, on the one hand, and the nature of regionalism as a phenomenon and the nature of specific regional forms, on the other. It does not seem to be the case, thus far, that regions have created security arrangements to counterbalance the United States. Rather, most regional powers continue to seek a U.S. presence, even where one might have suspected rising economic and military endowments to translate into enhanced regionalism and autonomy, as in East Asia. The fear (or at least suspicion) of regional hegemons may continue to provide a barrier to regionalism, from East Asia to the Middle East and South America. But whether or not the United States can be considered a promoter or inhibitor of regionalism remains an important question.

A better understanding of the sources of regionalism also entails an improved mapping of the role of state and nonstate actors (corporations, domestic networks, and transnational social movements) in shaping alternative forms of regionalism. Whether or not common terminology regarding regionalism and regionalization is ever adopted, the connections between bottom-up (societal) and top-down (inter-governmental) regionalism remain an important item on the research agenda. A focus on ruling coalitions as agents enables a productive inclusion of state and nonstate actors (coalitions are made of both), as well as a more organic view of the links connecting global, regional, and domestic goals. States, however, appear to remain key drivers of economic and security regionalism. Also vital in this area of inquiry is an improved understanding of the causal relationship between, and sequencing of, economic and security regionalism. Does economic regionalism drive or trail after security regionalism?

More generally, additional work on regionalism needs to focus on the political economy of national security. As we have pointed out, one very large body of research has been produced on the political economy of regionalism; a second large body of work has been generated on the security sources of regionalism. These topics are often treated as distinct, but much could be gained by combining insights from both.
Regarding the forms that regionalism can take, legalization has thus far been the anomaly, a signature feature of the EU. At issue is not whether regionalism has replaced other institutional alternatives, including states, global institutions, or nongovernment organizations. It has not. But there are key institutional differences among variants of regionalism, including PTAs. The EU provides only one model; East Asia is perhaps more representative of other regional practices. Duina (2006) argues that differences in PTAs’ legal forms stem from variations in the legal systems of member-states and the preferences of powerful actors in the groupings. Kahler (2000), by contrast, suggests that the choice for or against legalized regional forms is primarily instrumental and strategic. East Asian states, while resisting legalized regional frameworks, have nonetheless remained open to legalized multilateral forms that, among other things, constrain the United States, or to those—such as the International Court of Justice—that seem to provide more neutral settings than regional alternatives. This openness to various regional and multilateral options is not uniquely East Asian and indeed has fueled interest in the practice of “forum-shopping” (Busch 2007) among regional and international options. Evolving inter-regional economic and security arrangements are a related focus of interest in this area. An alphabet soup of cross-regional meetings has emerged in the last decade, linking East Asia and Europe (ASEM), South America and the Arab League, the Euro-Mediterranean region, Mercosur and the EU, and various others.

Some findings associate regionalism with improvements in economic exchange, human rights, accountability, democracy, transparency, and other norms. However, the jury is still out on whether regionalism’s effects have been as transformative as anticipated. Whereas some scholars suggest that regional institutions have indeed influenced state behavior, others caution that states that opt to join such institutions already abide by their rules, or only need to make marginal policy adjustments, prior to joining them (von Stein 2005).

The work reviewed here makes clear that epistemological and methodological diversity will continue to characterize the study of sources, forms, and consequences of regionalism. Principal-agent models, veto points, domino effects, demonstration effects, delegation, pooled sovereignty, path dependence, positive returns, norms diffusion, networks, and socialization all shed new light on the past and future of regionalism in international relations.

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