Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Incremental Change in Security Institutions

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Abstract and Keywords

Historical institutionalism as an explicit tradition has largely remained on the sidelines in international security scholarship, with some exceptions. The chapter begins by reviewing the sources of resistance to the tradition in security studies. We then apply its analytical toolbox to two empirical realms at different levels of analysis: divergent regional security paths in East Asia and the Middle East; and the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These cases show the utility of historical institutionalism in spanning sub-national, regional and international levels of analysis; its value for examining the role of critical junctures for evolving security arrangements; and its timely applicability beyond topical, geographical, and ontological foci that have been standard fare in security studies.

Keywords: international security, developmental pathways, non-proliferation, critical junctures, incrementalism

IT would be an exaggeration to say that historical institutionalism (HI) pervades the study of international relations (IR), let alone international security (IS). Prima facie historical institutionalism appears to have less distinct or explicit a place in the international security area than in other subfields of Political Science, the “institutional turn” in IR notwithstanding (Fioretos 2011). And yet concepts central to HI have nonetheless permeated studies in IS. Its core themes emerge in studies of sovereignty (Krasner 1991, 2001); of 1989 as a critical (world historical) juncture that brought unipolarity and a big discontinuity in the international system (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999); 9/11 as an-other critical juncture resulting in the overhaul of global security practices (Hurd 2002); and path dependence in United Nations Security Council composition, among others (Argomaniz 2009).

Inattention to security institutions in IR may have stemmed from long-standing assumptions that security issues present the most fundamental challenge to international cooperation generally, and to institutions as handmaidens of cooperation in particular (Keohane 1993; Lake 2001). Accordingly, states create institutions as little more than vessels upon which states imprint their pre-constituted interests. This instrumental view of institutions
is especially strong in neorealist narratives connecting the absence of a central authority above sovereign states to the uncertainty and fear that characterize international politics. Security cooperation here takes the shape of voluntary, ad hoc agreements between sovereign states relying on institutions to bargain on behalf of their self-interest (Jervis 1999; Mearsheimer 2001). Security institutions are thus little more than marriages of convenience, lacking the potential for longevity and autonomy, marked by fluidity and transience, and summarily discarded when national considerations require it. Path dependence is hardly a factor; great powers can overcome the obstacles to reversal, altering pathways as they see fit, sometimes turning security institutions into the “velvet glove” of hegemonic iron fists (Ruggie 1994). The centrality of states as units of analysis defies policy inertia. States do not delegate to institutions; they regulate them. Security institutions enhance information and transparency much less than their economic counterparts and lack the latter’s strength, complexity, or depth (Jervis 1982; Lipson 1984).

Neoliberal institutionalism questioned neorealism’s rigid view of institutions, suggesting that failure to employ institutions as mechanisms to move states toward the Pareto frontier overlooks meaningful cooperation (Krasner 1991; Jervis 1999). This functionalist turn accommodates security institutions with explicit rules, consistency in expectations, and monitoring and enforcement powers that can transcend anarchy (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). It is also more sensitive to temporality insofar as shared expectations alter states’ cost-benefit calculations in the long run. Iterated interactions can change incentive structures, rendering defection less feasible or likely. This notion of the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985) contains surface similarities with the HI concept of “increasing returns,” which describes the enhanced benefits stemming from familiarity gained with established arrangements (Thelen 1999). However, the neoliberal institutionalist approach ultimately pales in comparison to historical institutionalism’s commitment to temporality. States still act ultimately at the behest of their expected utility calculations, sideling the broader impact of institutions (Fioretos 2011). Intrinsic institutional change— independent from state fiat— does not effectively enter the calculus. The stasis ontology and instrumentality of neorealism thus remains.

Sociological perspectives focused attention on the power of institutions to form identities, shape interests, and constitute agents (Wendt 1992; Ruggie 1998). Constructivists challenged the dominant neorealist and neoliberal paradigms that viewed institutions as passive, efficient solutions to market imperfections (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). They focused, instead, on how institutions and norms reflect and imprint the collective identities of member states, changing beliefs and identities and altering the very definition of interests (March and Olsen 1998; Johnston 2001). Security institutions are no exception, highlighting and perpetuating similarities among participants, at times overriding material conditions. The more complex interplay between structure and agency here echoes themes in historical institutionalism but the overlap is hardly perfect. Furthermore, various constructivist strands do not constitute a coherent IR theory but rather a method and epistemology (Klotz and Lynch 2007).
These different approaches employ various definitions of security institutions. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism largely focused on formal institutions (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, World Trade Organization, alliances) whereas constructivist work addressed a wider spectrum often found in historical institutionalism including patterned interactions, embedded or informal procedures, conventions, and codes of conduct (cf. Hall and Taylor 1996). The more inclusive definition is well suited for the study of international security, which features few centralized, formal mechanisms but rather various regularized behavioral patterns and shared expectations (Keohane 1989; Wallander and Keohane 1999). Furthermore, it is particularly suitable for avoiding the pitfalls of case selection in studying only formal institutions (Lake 2001).

Our chapter proceeds by applying concepts in historical institutionalism to two empirical realms in an effort to illustrate their utility beyond existing topical, geographical, and ontological foci in security studies. The primacy accorded to “temporality” is the distinguishing hallmark of historical institutionalism, a commitment to thorough examination of the timing, sequence, and context within which institutions emerge and develop (Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate, Chapter 1, this volume). The first application explains variation in regional orders along the conflictive/cooperative spectrum. The second explains continuity and change in arguably the most crucial global security institution, the non-proliferation regime. They both address big questions spanning the subnational, regional and global levels of analysis. Whereas a strong state-centric focus has naturally been most entrenched in the study of security, our cases broaden the scope of existing work to a wider range of domestic and international institutions that include, but also transcend, states.

**Domestic Coalitions, Institutions, and Regional Orders**

A promising conceptual tool for the study of security comes via a tradition with roots in Polanyi (2005 [1944]), Gerschenkron (1992), Moore (1966), and Skocpol (1979), among others, that explores the impact of class, sectoral or other coalitional dynamics on long-term institutional outcomes. This tradition has been alive and well in international and comparative political economy (e.g., Katzenstein 1978; Gourevitch 1986; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) but entered IS much later, with pioneering work by Snyder (1991) among others, largely devoted to understanding imperial overexpansion by great powers. Using the distributional consequences of the second major wave of globalization as a point of departure, Solingen (1998) identified two competing models of domestic political survival. Advanced by rival coalitions of both state and private actors, these ideal-typical models promote political-economy strategies with important implications for security outcomes. Inward-looking coalitions logroll statist and protectionist forces, including expansive military-industrial complexes that displace private sector activities. Internationalizing coalitions privilege economic growth driven by competitive export-oriented sectors and firms. A strategy hinging on integration in the global political economy makes these coalitions
averse to regional conflict that might disrupt its objectives, including macroeconomic and regional stability.

Diverging trajectories in East Asia and the Middle East provide a useful window into the crucial consequences of timing, sequence, and coalitions’ institutional choices for regional orders. Whereas East Asia has become the engine of the twenty-first global economy, avoiding wars for several decades now, the Middle East exhibits failed states, civil wars that spill over across borders, and stunted development. Between 1973 and 1994 ballistic missiles were used in battle ten times, with Middle East states accounting for eight instances; East Asia for none (Karp 1995). Since the 1960s Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Libya have used chemical weapons; no states have done so in East Asia. This contrast is puzzling because both regions shared common initial conditions in the mid-twentieth century: colonialism as formative experiences, comparable state-building challenges, economic crises, low per-capita gross national product (GNP)s, heavy-handed authoritarianism, low intra and extra-regional economic interdependence, and weak or non-existing regional institutions.

The underlying sources for diverging state trajectories are in critical junctures that led to the embrace of different models of political survival by ruling coalitions in each case. The typical model in East Asia hinged on economic performance and growth, which entailed an emphasis on competitive export-led manufacturing and promotion of private entrepreneurship. By contrast, the reigning model in the Middle East hinged on inward-looking self-sufficiency, nationalism, and state and military entrepreneurship, buttressed by oil rents where available. Once adopted, both models became self-reinforcing, perpetuated by embedded and complementary institutions emanating from initial choices. The critical junctures, often triggered by wars or political-economy crises, began in East Asia with the inception of postwar Japan’s economic miracle, followed by crucial shifts in Taiwan and South Korea, and progressively others. The critical junctures in the Middle East were Egypt’s Free Officers 1952 revolution and analogous shifts throughout that region. Choices made during those defining years were embedded in the respective permissive and catalytic conditions that drove the regions in different directions. In brief, early and effective land reform, a relatively brief period of import-substitution, and natural resource scarcity weakened domestic political opposition to export-led growth in East Asia. By contrast, late, inefficient or nonexistent land reform; longer exposure to import-substitution through extensive state and military entrepreneurship; and abundant oil resources or second-order rentierism (among neighboring non-oil economies) empowered opponents of export-led growth throughout much of the Middle East.

Put differently, politically stronger beneficiaries of relative closure, import-substitution, state entrepreneurship, and natural resource monopolies—mostly within the state itself—constituted powerful veto points against alternative models in the Middle East for decades. Alternative models would have entailed appealing to different sources of legitimacy—based on new relations with international markets and institutions—than those typical of 1950s–1960s-style pan-Arab politics. Some trace this profound suspicion of external influences to colonial domination and exploitation. Yet the latter was very much
present in East Asia, and did not preclude that region’s profound transformation. China’s yoke under colonial arrangements, Japan’s imperial colonial violence and subsequent occupation by the US, and Vietnam’s victimization by various external powers, among others, warn against excessive concentration on colonialism as the main barrier to change. The exhaustion of import-substitution in industrializing states created a critical juncture, a crisis that restricted choices going forward (Hirschman 1968). Differences in oil resources and land reform led to distinctive options, each relying on different coalitions of state and private interests. Abundant natural resources hindered the prospects for competitive manufacturing; enhanced patronage funds for beneficiaries of import-substitution; and eroded private sector wherewithal in the Middle East. Natural resource scarcity and effective land reform favored proponents (and weakened opponents) of labor-intensive manufacturing and private entrepreneurship in East Asia. Once in place, each model reinforced the coalitional networks between state and private actors that benefited from each path.

Political forces unleashed by Nasserism, Ba’athism, and rentier economies constituted formidable barriers to change due to overwhelming incentives to retain rents and disincentives to alter dominant models. Logics of path dependence, including reproduction of political forces invested in extant institutional arrangements and self-perpetuating mechanisms of exclusion, go far in explaining the durability of regimes. Middle Eastern leaders’ rejection of export-led growth in the 1960s may not have been unusual for that “world-time.” Yet subsequent opportunities introduced by the 1970s oil windfalls, the 1980s crises, the widespread global economic transformations of the 1990s, and the ensuing dramatic expansion of capital flows were also willfully missed (Henry and Springborg 2001). Potential critical junctures pregnant with possibilities for change were deflected. Declining oil windfalls in the 1980s denied Middle East leaders resources erstwhile available to avoid adjustment, yet path-dependent legacies continued to burden change. Even more recent efforts to liberalize trade and investment encountered fierce opposition to reversing deep-seated biases.

Despite broad divergence, competing models in East Asia and the Middle East shared three important features regarding state, military, and autocratic institutions. First, both relied on states, yet differences in the character of that reliance would have differing effects on the respective evolution of states over time. The two models differed in the extent to which states replaced or enhanced private capital. East Asian states were active lenders and regulators but significantly less active entrepreneurs than Middle East states. East Asian leaders watchfully steered states to macroeconomic stability and proper conditions for sustained export-led growth. States thus evolved into relatively adaptable institutions linking across the domestic, regional, and global economies. Buffeted by a very severe crisis in 1997–98, East Asian states rebounded. By contrast, rigid, exhausted, and depleted Middle East states presided over current account and budget deficits; high inflation and unemployment; and scarce foreign exchange. They became too weak to exert control over society except through force, as remains the case today.
Notwithstanding significant differences among them (and outliers like North Korea), East Asian states approximated ideal-typical developmental states ushering in industrial transformation through Weberian-style meritocratic bureaucracies able to extract resources from society and convert them into public goods (Evans 1995). Despite wide variation across the Middle East, predatory states undercutting development even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation remained largely dominant, relying on patronage-based bureaucracies primarily supplying private goods to rapacious ruling coalitions (United Nations Development Program 2009). Rents, cronyism, and corruption afflicted both types of states to different degrees. Both types were vulnerable, albeit to different challenges. East Asian states became more susceptible to global economic trends (e.g., declines in global demand) and evolving risks of capital liberalization. Middle East states, though not completely immune to the same vulnerabilities (including lower demand for oil), were also buffeted by the exhaustion of import-substitution and subsequent balance of payments, high inflation, unemployment, inefficient industries, and weak private enterprise.

Second, military institutions played important roles initially in both models, particularly as repressive mechanisms of political control. Yet the military itself evolved along different lines in tandem with prevailing political-economy models. The requirements of each model imposed different constraints on: (1) the relative size and missions of military-industrial complexes; and (2) the extent to which these complexes replaced private enterprise beyond arms production. In the Middle East, dismal economies notwithstanding, arms races typical of inward-looking models consistently attracted the highest levels of military expenditures relative to GNP worldwide. Though the average for the two regions was not dramatically different in the 1960s, with the onset of internationalization East Asian averages declined to nearly half those of the Middle East by the 1970s and 1980s. Military expenditures as a percentage of central government expenditures were historically high in both regions, arenas of Cold War sensitivity. Yet they remained 20 percent on average for Middle East states by the 1990s, nearly double the developing world average, and about 50 percent higher than East Asia’s by the 2000s.

The typical Middle East state had militarized economies of the kind that were not permissible with the onset of internationalization in most East Asian cases. The former entailed gargantuan military-industrial complexes producing items either remotely or wholly unrelated to military demand; owned vast portions of land, natural resources, and sprawling networks of state enterprises; and employed the largest proportions of population relative to other regions, a pattern that lingers today from Egypt to Syria. Most importantly, this model replaced and often decimated the private sector. Unsurprisingly, military elites appropriating such rents were major opponents of privatization and key veto points blocking broader economic transformation (Halliday 2005). These were veritable instances of a Wehrwirtschaft (war economy) even after internal repression—mukhabarat regimes—had largely replaced external wars as their core “mission.” By contrast, East Asian growth models sought to develop private sectors; required stable macroeconomic policies and predictable environments; and minimized the potential for inflationary military alloca-
tions that might endanger those core objectives (Chan 1992). The result was increasingly more professional militaries with declining political control over the economy and polity.

Third, both models relied on authoritarian institutions. Yet each would foreshadow differential paths regarding democratization, stemming from variations in the nature and role of military institutions and private entrepreneurship described earlier. Export-led models introduced by authoritarian leaders and ruling coalitions in East Asia were not precisely designed to advance democracy but to curb it. Yet they unintentionally encouraged democratic institutions via several causal mechanisms: fostering economic growth, stronger private sectors and civil societies, and more professionalized militaries attuned to outward-oriented growth. By contrast, the nature of Middle East models engendered higher barriers to the development of democratic institutions. Weaker private sectors and weakened civil societies were less able to demand political reform. Furthermore, more entrenched military industrial complexes spread throughout vast segments of the economy were better able to resist those demands for political reform. Over time, the initial common dominance of authoritarian institutions in both regions gave way to increased differentiation. Various authoritarian regimes in East Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines, evolved into full-fledged democracies.

Those three institutional features of domestic models had implications for the nature of relations within regions. The inability to deliver resources and services to constituencies previously mobilized through revolutionary or nationalist fervor; and efforts to divert attention from failed, economically depleted, entropic, crisis-prone, militarized and de-legitimized models led Middle East regimes to: (a) Emphasize nationalism and military prowess; (b) Externalize conflict; (c) Exacerbate arms races; and (d) Engage in competitive outbidding at the regional level. Each of these vectors individually enhanced the prospects for intended or unintended war and militarized intrusions in the domestic affairs of neighboring states. Collectively they made those even more likely, creating a structural tendency toward militarized conflict even where it may not have been the most favored preference. Mobilizations, overt subversions, and cross-border invasions were certainly intended, but not always controllable. Lacking institutional power and legitimacy domestically and regionally, Middle East leaders deployed violence at home and abroad, evoking Tilly’s arguments on the use of force (Dodge 2002). Domestic fragility hidden behind pan-Arab or pan Islamic rhetoric fueled mutual assaults on sovereignty among Arab states (Halliday 2005). By contrast, East Asia’s developmental states model required: (a) Contained military-industrial complexes and limited military competition; (b) Regional stability; (c) Domestic stability, predictability, and attractiveness to foreign investors; and (d) Taming arms races that might affect (a) through (c). Each of these requirements individually dampened the prospects for war and militarized conflict. Collectively they made them even less likely despite lingering hostility and nationalist resentment.
The regional context reinforced each region’s respective models via different structural mechanisms: (1) Hegemonic coercion (Nasserism, Ba’athism, and equivalents in the Middle East; coups and external interventions in East Asia); (2) Diffusion (second-order “Dutch disease” effects in the Middle East flowing from oil producers to regional clients; “flying geese” and bandwagon effects in East Asia); and (3) Emulation (Japan in East Asia; competitive outbidding among pan-Arab and pan-Islamic visions in the Middle East). In time, regional agglomeration of specific models imposed neighborhood effects or network externalities that reinforced prevailing models. Regional institutions in each case could not but reflect those background conditions: East Asian institutions conformed to cooperative “open regionalism” (i.e., openness to the global economy) unlike their Middle East counterparts.

Finally, the models also explain contrasting nuclear trajectories in both regions since the inception of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Middle East models entailed stronger incentives to pursue nuclear weapons than East Asian ones, for which nuclearization has been much less attractive (except for North Korea, the autarky-seeking regional anomaly). Heavy regional concentration of internationalizing models in East Asia reinforced each state’s incentives to avoid nuclearization. Conversely, heavy regional concentration of inward-looking models throughout the Middle East exacerbated mutual incentives to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria violated their NPT commitments to advance their nuclear weapons capabilities. Here as well, propositions linking models to nuclear decisions are bound by historical timing and temporal sequences in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Disincentives stemming from an internationalizing model may be stronger at deliberative or incipient stages of nuclear weapons consideration, as was the case historically in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Once nuclear thresholds have been crossed (often in the form of nuclear tests), as under inward-looking Maoist China in 1964, path dependence and “endowment effects” trump other incentives. As expected from prospect theory, it is far more costly politically to eliminate existing nuclear weapons entirely than to reverse steps prior to their acquisition (Jervis 1994; McDermott 1998). Put differently, when nuclearization precedes the inception of internationalizing models, subsequent denuclearization may be much harder. Temporal sequences and context matter, which points to useful exchanges between prospect theoretic and historical institutionalist perspectives.

Our account thus far illuminates the importance of temporality and downstream effects of early choices. However, new critical junctures and learning can provide mechanisms for change even in processes heavily burdened with path dependency. Sadat used crisis to introduce infitah (economic reform) facing incalculable political risks, struggling to reverse Nasserism and stressing growth, foreign investment, exports, military conversion, and new relations with international markets and institutions. The political landscape Sadat inherited and his own eventual assassination continued to trump Egypt’s transition, as have recent developments since the Arab uprisings that also unleashed new socio-political configurations. Non-oil producers (Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey) began promoting private sectors in the 1980s and signing trade and investment agreements to promote and protect foreign investments. Praetorian states such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which had
mobilized revolutionary nationalist-populist zeal, swept competitive private capital more forcefully than monarchies, creating higher barriers to reform in the former, beyond those imposed by rentierism (Henry and Springborg 2001). Gulf sheikhdoms incepted new models on the foundations of old colonial and semi-feudal states, particularly in the last decade. Dubai pioneered early diversification away from oil as far back as the 1970s, promoting outward-oriented free-trade zones, tourism, financial, shipping, stock exchanges and greater appeal to foreign companies. Other emirates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait embraced their own variants designed to diversify, privatize, and relax foreign ownership rules. After decades of public sector expansion, import-substitution, high inflation, mounting external debt, and political violence in the 1970s, Turkey’s military brutally altered the relative strength of political forces in the early 1980s, enabling Premier Turgut Özal to consolidate support for a new model based on competitive export-led growth (Waterbury 1983). The European market was a prime incentive (as was the absence of oil). Turkey could also count on a more robust and institutionalized business class fostered under Kemal Atatürk.

These and other experiences weaken deterministic views that path dependence poses insuperable barriers to alternative models. Differences in oil endowments, institutions, and private-firm incentives toward openness shape different contexts and opportunities. But Sadat forged new opportunities and advanced them in a fairly constraining context that outlived him. Özal leaned on allies in key state agencies, Korean-style private conglomerates, and popular wariness of violence and economic disarray to launch a new model. Sheikh al-Maktoum used oil endowments to replicate Singapore in Dubai. And yet the continued relevance of timing and historical context is brought to relief by the fact that East Asia’s competitiveness stemming from earlier decisions compounds the difficulties that Middle East leaders confront today (Noland and Pack 2005). The favorable global and regional, political and economic circumstances that lubricated the inception of East Asia’s model cannot be taken for granted. Amsden’s (2001, 286) reformulation of Gerschenkron’s theory has potentially ominous implications for nationalist models: “the later a country industrializes in chronological history, the greater the probability that its major manufacturing firms will be foreign-owned.” Though such prospects have not deterred Eastern European states or East Asia’s newcomers as Vietnam, they are far more politically menacing for Middle East leaders struggling to transcend inward-looking models. As Binder (1988, 83) notes regarding the Middle East, “no other cultural region is so deeply anxious about the threat of cultural penetration and westernization.” Difficulties may not be insurmountable, however. Assessing the transformation of state power in Egypt and Turkey, Waterbury (1983, 261) suggested that “economic and class structures ... acted as retardants to processes of change but did not determine or cause them ... Rather, narrowly based political leadership, assisted by insulated change teams, drove forward both [our emphasis] the import-substitution strategy and the subsequent introduction of market-conforming policies.”

The presence of within-region variation, outliers and anomalies has important substantive and methodological implications for the analysis of coalitions, institutions and regional orders. First, it provides further support for the relationship between models of political
survival and external conflict. Outliers strove to adopt alternatives to regional models and exhibited dissimilar conflict behavior. Second, it questions micro-phenomenological theories emphasizing local cultural origins and regional uniqueness, and counters deterministic views about inevitable outcomes in any region, drawing attention to contingency. Third, anomalies place limits on “universalizing comparisons” assuming that the same internal causal sequence recurs in all regions. History and path dependency supply enough warnings against temptations to overemphasize invariant common properties across all regions. Fourth, contrasts between Southeast Asian and Middle East states also highlight wide variation among Muslim countries and the centrality of context and sequence. The former, once labeled the “Balkans of the East” (under Sukarno’s inward-looking model), were subsequently able to transform rentier political economies, follow a more flexible and “modern” Islam, and spearhead cooperative regional institutions. A key quandary in East Asia is whether the archetypical model is robust enough—particularly in China—to reproduce the low levels of militarized conflict observed in recent decades. Some paths are more dependent than others. Finally, the models described in this section provide more complete accounts than any of the approaches to security institutions reviewed in our introductory section for why different regional institutions emerged, in whose interest they operated, when they were allowed to play a significant role, and why they may not have been vital to regional cooperation.

Institutional Change in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Our second empirical case enables us to address more pointedly the concern with institutional order and change in historical institutionalism through a focus on a nearly universal international institution, the nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPR). The NPR offers ideal grounds for understanding durability and change in highly subscribed security institutions. The regime’s current makeup reflects a long-term layering process that saw the introduction of new rules atop existing ones since the Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signatures in 1968 (see Wan 2014). This includes additions to the official treaty review process with the extension of preparatory committees and the creation of a third main committee and subsidiary bodies. Such changes have allowed for a more prescriptive regime; action plans developed at recent review conferences have served as barometers for non-proliferation activity among parties. Another example of layering are updated guidelines from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee that flesh out the safeguards agreements undergirding the NPT, specifying the items that require International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attention prior to interstate transfer. These independent structures thus both implement and extend treaty principles. Further, the lone alteration to the NPR’s legal framework—the 1997 Additional Protocol—provided the IAEA with “complementary access” to inspections, beyond its long-standing comprehensive safeguards agreements. These are but a few of the ways in which procedures, rules, and organizations have been built atop the regime’s backbone treaty (Dunn 2007).
Historical institutionalism’s analytical toolbox can also improve our understanding of the particular timing and character of change in the NPR. In their exploration of critical junctures, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 355) underline the impact of short-term causes of change; junctures can serve to relax the “‘normal’ structural and institutional constraints on action.” The evolution of the NPR indeed reveals the presence of such trigger events. These include a number of nuclear tests and findings regarding non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. Yet these events by themselves are insufficient for understanding why incremental change versus transformative change emerged in their aftermath, or why the NPR was reinforced rather than completely overhauled during these periods of heightened political contestation.

An early critical juncture for the NPR emerged shortly after the 1970 entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even as a negotiating committee drafted the full-scope and comprehensive safeguards agreement (concluded in 1972), a select group of states sought to supplement the treaty by other means. Nuclear weapon states had long called for a strong IAEA-centered system with enforcement capabilities, but the need to secure the support of the non-nuclear weapon states had prevented tighter obligations within the NPT itself. Beginning in 1971, a group of 15 nuclear exporting states met informally—as the Zangger Committee—to find common ground on the technical components that would fall under the umbrella of safeguards agreements. Such a move would effectively govern state-to-state transfers of nuclear materials at the pass. These concerns were inextricably linked to the expansion of nuclear trade in that particular “world-time.” The South American market was about to open via a 1975 West Germany–Brazil cooperation agreement, while a series of impending transfers involved sensitive cases including Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

If the emergence of the Zangger Committee in 1971 marked the beginning of this critical juncture, then India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion in May 1974 provided the tipping point. While a non-party to the NPT, India had long expressed interest in a weapons program. It was part of the very group of advanced industrial and industrializing states with research and production capabilities that the NPT was designed to target. Thus, membership or not, India’s surprising progress in its nuclear development signified a major failure on the part of the regime. The confluence of external circumstances further explains the significance of its test. In the midst of nuclear trade expansion, with regional instability surrounding the would-be recipients, the appearance of a worst-case scenario confirmed obvious concerns on the part of supplier states. After all, the Indian device used plutonium produced with the help of peaceful materials from Canada and the US, in the form of a research reactor and a heavy water moderator (Fuhrmann 2012).

In the aftermath of India’s test, states acted decisively. The Zangger Committee concluded and released its trigger list, thus adopting self-imposed export restrictions on nuclear-specific exports. Within the IAEA, the Director-General pushed for stronger institutionalization of the safeguards agreements. This included the establishment of a committee that would interpret technical terms and impose timelines and efficiency goals, as well as the release of annual implementation reports. This incremental change to the NPR struc-
ture was supplemented by more fundamental overhauls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group emerged in 1975, reaching agreement on even more stringent controls, with safeguards encompassing not just materials but facilities. President Jimmy Carter led a global initiative in 1977 to evaluate proliferation risks across the entire fuel cycle. It was a system-level response that far outstripped those to subsequent rogue nuclear tests—including India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea’s transgressions in the 2000s. But as demonstrated, India’s 1974 test did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it marked the culmination of a critical juncture that effectively began in 1971 with the Zangger Committee, and reflected long-term processes and developments in global nuclear trade that haven’t been replicated since. These are the types of phenomena often highlighted by historical institutionalism.

Long-term institutional developments were similarly linked to a second critical juncture in the life of the NPR. The IAEA experienced a period of sustained success in the 1980s. Safeguards agreements grew to encompass an overwhelming majority of nuclear facilities within non-nuclear weapon states. The Agency flourished under the direction of Hans Blix, with the Reagan presidency calling for its further strengthening and China showing support via membership and submission to a voluntary safeguards agreement, before acceding to the NPT in 1992 (Negm 2009). The high standing of the IAEA was evident at the 1990 NPT Review Conference, with states encouraging the Agency to utilize its special inspections power under the NPT and develop new safeguards approaches (Sloss 1995). This unprecedented activism thus marked the beginning of another critical juncture—with events in 1990 and 1991 providing the roots for jurisdictional expansion. In 1991, the UN Security Council tasked the IAEA with special missions in Iraq and South Africa, assigning safeguards-related activities that nonetheless far exceeded the scope of existing agreements. This included drawing up action plans for future monitoring, imposing short-notice inspections, and using qualitative analysis to ensure the “completeness” of information provided.

The tipping point in this critical juncture was similarly apparent. In the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War, the IAEA-UN Special Commission joint mission in Iraq discovered numerous violations: with discrepancies in declared activities, previously undeclared nuclear material, and unknown hidden enrichment facilities. The non-compliance case in 1991 marked a first for the NPR. The IAEA Board of Governors immediately elaborated procedural remedies that would tighten the reporting requirements of states, while parties reaffirmed the Agency’s special inspections power. Then, an intensive formal review by the IAEA yielded Programme 93+2, which would endow the Agency with much more authoritative powers vis-à-vis NPT parties. Under the terms of the voluntary Additional Protocol, states would provide broad-based information regarding their nuclear programs, well beyond the existing scope of inspections. Combined with the complementary access discussed, and building upon the newly established Information Review Committee, NPT parties delegated a greater analytical role to the IAEA within the NPR. The expanded focus on nuclear programs was underscored with the new dual-use trigger lists offered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.
That Iraq’s violations sparked the reevaluation of the NPR in the mid-1990s is undeniable. Yet this short-term trigger explains only the timing of change, not its character. The hallmarks of Programme 93+2 and the Additional Protocol were already delegated to the IAEA in 1991 for its special missions. The trajectory of enhanced influence was thus underway prior to the discoveries of Iraqi violations, a product of the Agency’s success within the NPR in the late 1980s. As with India’s test, Iraq’s non-compliance exposed the already-loosened constraints for institutional change. Members then decided that the IAEA’s expanded powers would no longer be limited to special circumstance, and altered the legal framework of the NPT accordingly. It is notable that a series of non-compliance cases in the 2000s—Iran and Libya in 2003, Egypt and South Korea in 2004—did not elicit more than operational tweaks within the IAEA. Again, only by considering long-term developments can we explain why the same trigger (non-compliance) in separate critical junctures (post-1991, post-2001) resulted in different outcomes, and just the one instance of widespread change.

Most empirical studies on gradual institutional change in international relations are in the field of international political economy. Yet this brief overview demonstrates that historical institutionalism has much to contribute to our understanding of the evolutionary pathway of the NPR. Grasping the dynamics between short-term trigger events within critical junctures and longer-term institutional developments helps explain variance in outcomes related to institutional change in security regimes. Other examples from the NPR case underscore that historical institutionalism can illuminate important phenomena related to institutional durability and change in international security. The notion of lock-in effects as a primary mechanism of path dependence is especially pertinent in a treaty that designates two classes of states, separating the nuclear-haves from the have-nots. Given the perfect overlap between the nuclear weapon states and the permanent members of the UN Security Council, there certainly exists the perception that the group of five continue to set forth rules that protect extant policies, turning them into veto players against change—especially on the issue of disarmament. The possibility of expanding the permanent membership of the UN Security Council could thus have reverberations within the NPR. Ultimately, the jury is still out on whether layering will remain the modal pattern of change in the NPR or, alternatively, “drifting” and “exhaustion” will overwhelm this core security institution (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

Conclusions

Empirical incursions into divergent regional paths in East Asia and the Middle East and incremental transformations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime illustrate the value of historical institutionalism for the study of security in a number of ways. First, these cases draw attention to big questions with an explicit temporal scope that relates to the creation, reproduction, development, and makeup of evolving domestic and international institutions relevant to security outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Fioretos 2011). Second, they affirm historical institutionalism’s relative epistemological neutrality or eclecticism, enabling an emphasis on agents and material conditions as well as onlock-in effects as a primary mechanism of path dependence is especially pertinent in a treaty that designates two classes of states, separating the nuclear-haves from the have-nots. Given the perfect overlap between the nuclear weapon states and the permanent members of the UN Security Council, there certainly exists the perception that the group of five continue to set forth rules that protect extant policies, turning them into veto players against change—especially on the issue of disarmament. The possibility of expanding the permanent membership of the UN Security Council could thus have reverberations within the NPR. Ultimately, the jury is still out on whether layering will remain the modal pattern of change in the NPR or, alternatively, “drifting” and “exhaustion” will overwhelm this core security institution (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

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ideas and other mechanisms of institutional change (Hall 2010; Sil and Katzenstein 2010). The cases thus open a window onto second-order questions such as the relationship between interests and institutions at the subnational, state, and international levels. They address individual preferences not as constants or given but endogenous to earlier historical processes and institutional arrangements that endowed some groups with power and resources in one spatial or temporal context but not another (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate, Chapter 1, this volume). Third, they defy hyper-structural accounts that remove much of the agency from individual actors. Instead, they offer more nuanced portrayals of the relationship between institutions and individuals, a hallmark of historical institutionalism. Further, they control for world-systemic effects—those enabling conditions residing in global historical circumstances or “world-time”—that affect domestic coalitions, regional trajectories, and international institutions. These macro-level causal mechanisms help explain why and how timing and sequence contribute to wide variation in regional outcomes; why reversals become more difficult; why, when, and how wars, economic crises, revolutions, waves of nuclear market expansion, and nuclear tests have lasting effects; why alternatives forgone may have been more efficient; and why some paths are more dependent than others.

Three additional points stand out that may help advance further applications of historical institutionalism to the understanding of international security. First, our focus spanning sub-national, regional, and international levels emphasizes the utility of the tradition’s insights beyond the standard, sometimes single-minded focus on state-centric approaches to international security. The preferences of ruling coalitions within a single state can vary over time. Hence they can shape a wide range of policies irreducible to abstract and putatively invariant notions of maximization of state power and “national security.” Systemic shocks can lead a wide range of agents—including states but also IAEA Director Generals and extra-institutional actors—to advance institutional change in major security institutions. Second, while reviewing the centrality of critical junctures to evolving security arrangements, our cases illustrate how historical institutionalism enables us to both recognize what counts as a critical juncture as well as explore those junctures’ varying effects. Some junctures lead to significant changes in models of regime survival, security-related outcomes, and NPR mandates while others enable no more than operational tweaks within existing models and procedures. This point suggests a promising research path for deepening our understanding of those critical junctures that matter for security trajectories. Responses to crises (nuclear tests, exhaustion of import-substitution) are embedded in longer-term permissive conditions born earlier within the critical juncture or even at previous critical junctures. Third, the cases also point to the utility of historical institutionalism for understanding regions beyond Europe and North America—more frequent loci of empirical work in this tradition. For instance, regional institutions constitute a significant thematic component of historical institutionalist studies in international security. Yet most of these studies, as well as those of international institutions more broadly, retain an emphasis on a European anomaly that obscures proper understanding of institutions elsewhere in the world (Solingen 2014). As our cases suggest, historical institutionalism can inform more relevant comparisons of emerging states with each oth-
er. This is an especially fertile research horizon as international security arguably moves unto new spatial and temporal terrains with the diffusion of power from West to East and North to South.

The analytical toolbox and empirical focus of historical institutionalism can thus help move the study of international security beyond standard work on state-based security and “great powers.” In so doing, the tradition sheds light on novel causal mechanisms, allowing scholars to revisit conventional wisdoms, and clarify new or intractable puzzles. For instance, the extensive literature on the sources of World War I is steeped in references to the role of timing, sequence, critical junctures, and path dependence as underlying the outbreak of the Great War. The explicit integration of historical institutionalism categories can improve our understanding of that particular critical juncture in 1914, pregnant with implications for 2014 and beyond (see Lebow 2014). The enduring legacy and institutionalization of Germany’s “iron and rye” coalition backed by its military-industrial complex precluded its replacement by a different political-economy model with different security corollaries, a model that became feasible only in the aftermath of two cataclysmic wars (Solingen 2014). From this standpoint, temporality and sequences explain much of the history of war and peace in the twentieth century. Whether or not China will follow comparable sequences in the twenty-first century is a subject of high contemporary concern in the study and praxis of international security (Tang 2014).

Historical institutionalism can also open up new research frontiers of relevance to twenty-first-century international security. Our analysis of diverging regional trajectories highlights the deep connections and synergies that accrue to applications of historical institutionalism resting at the intersection of comparative politics, comparative political economy and international security. As agents straddling all three domains, domestic political coalitions acquire particular relevance for explaining security outcomes. For instance, the possibility that path-dependent legacies from the Great Recession might alter the nature of ruling coalitions—possibly in an inward-looking direction—with corresponding security externalities, provides another important research frontier for understanding first- and second-order effects of critical junctures. Finally, as the cluster of institutions regulating ownership of nuclear weapons—the imputed inner sanctum of national security—one can hardly think of a least-likely case for institutional change than the NPR. Yet new sources of potential transformation pushing toward reductions in existing nuclear arsenals and visions of a nuclear-free world suggest that the non-proliferation regime could have a Sinatra effect [“if I can make it there, I can make it anywhere”] on the study of historical institutionalism in international security: if revolutionary institutional change were to happen there (the non-proliferation regime), change could arguably happen anywhere.

References


**Notes:**

(1.) Leeds and Mattes (2010) define alliances as formal agreements among independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict.

(2.) For the full argument, empirical evidence and references, see Solingen (1998, 2001, 2007a, 2007b, 2008), on which this section builds.

(3.) This stylized account depicts Weberian ideal-types; neither model characterizes the universe of cases in its region nor fits any particular case wholesale but some approximate ideal-types better than others. Significant differences within each region introduce useful methodological advantages explored elsewhere (Solingen 2007a, 2007b).

(4.) “Path dependence” operates through causal mechanisms that explain why and how hypothesized causes yield particular outcomes (Falleti and Lynch 2009). Those mecha-
nisms include positive feedbacks, increasing returns, self-reinforcement, lock-in effects, learning, reactive effects and competition (Pierson 2000, 2004; Mahoney 2000).

(5.) For more on the concept of “world-time,” see Skocpol (1979).

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