

Currently R&R at the *American Journal of Sociology*

The Structural Sources of Associational Life

Evan Schofer
Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota

Wesley Longhofer
Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota

October 2006

Word Count: 11,500

Direct correspondence to Evan Schofer (schofer@soc.umn.edu) or Wesley Longhofer (long0324@umn.edu), Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, 909 Social Sciences, 267 19th Ave South, Minneapolis, MN 55455. Work on this paper was supported by a Graduate Research Partnership Program grant from the University of Minnesota.

Abstract

We use cross-national data to examine the factors associated with expanded associational life. It is common to view associations as “bottom up” creations, formed by individuals with high levels of resources, skills, and pro-social values, or as the product of democratic institutions or values. We argue that the state and the world polity – which have grown tremendously in scope – are key sources of association in modern societies. Expanded state institutions provide legitimation and resources for association, and serve to constitute identities and purposes around which association occurs. Likewise, the world polity and global civil society are important sources of legitimated social problems, resources, and models for organizing. Arguments are tested with cross-national regression analyses in the contemporary period. Education proves to be an important predictor of associations, but national wealth and trust do not. A variety of structural and institutional factors, including democracy and state expansion generate expanded voluntary association. Nations that are more deeply embedded in the world polity have more associations. Moreover, the impact of these factors varies across *types of association*. Democracy particularly encourages political association, while international influences generate associations whose aims tend to mirror the agenda of the international community. Thus, national variation on these factors helps explain the distinctive configurations of civil society found in nations around the globe.

Introduction

The past decade has seen renewed interest in associations, in large part due to Putnam's emphasis on civic groups as a source of social capital, political participation, collective action, and effective democratic governance (Putnam 1993, 2000). We take up one of the fundamental questions in the literature: *What are the sources of association?*

One answer is that associations emerge "bottom-up" from society itself, a product of the capacities, skills, and values of the citizenry (Putnam 2000; Almond and Verba 1963). In contrast, a growing body of work attends to the broader structural and institutional factors that shape civic association: democratic institutions, state policy and law, institutionalized political culture, and so on (Paxton 2002; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Skocpol 2003; Schofer and Gourinchas 2001; Berman 1997; Reimann 2006). We develop and extend prior institutional studies by reflecting broadly on the role of the state (and the wider world polity) in encouraging and sustaining associational life, often in a "top-down" manner.

We argue that the modern state is in many ways the key to vibrant associational life. Not only is the state a locus of resources, opportunities, and constraints that influence voluntary organizing, it is a key source of the identities, purposes, and legitimations that underlie civic life more generally. Our argument represents a sharp contrast to American conservative/neo-liberal discourse, which characterizes the expansive modern state as a threat to private association.

Moreover, we argue that the world polity and global civil society play an important role in supporting and empowering domestic associational activity. The world polity is a source of collective purposes, cultural models, and resources that encourage

association (also see Reimann 2006). Moreover, the very idea of voluntary association has itself become quite fashionable within the international community. A panoply of international players – from the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) to the World Bank – now routinely devote resources and energies to the formation and “empowerment” of local association. Particularly in the developing world, the impetus to form associations may be substantially exogenous, rather than reflecting internal characteristics of societies.

Our study is distinctive from the literature in two ways: First, we examine country-level data on *associations*, rather than individual-level *membership* (which is often used to examine country-level arguments via multilevel analysis).¹ The emphasis on membership is partly the result of data availability, but it also reflects the orientation of many scholars of civic engagement (including Putnam himself), who hold up individual participation as an ideal. From that viewpoint, the rise of “checkbook” associations, professional lobbying organizations, and other non-participatory groups can be seen as a potential threat to social capital, civic life, and effective democracy. Yet, there is certainly reason to believe that associations are highly consequential for political life, irrespective of individual membership or social capital ties. Sampson et al. (2005), for example, show that neighborhood organizations powerfully influence protest and civic participation events, whereas individual reciprocity ties do not. We have no stake in normative debates regarding the relative importance of membership versus association.

¹ The aggregate prevalence of membership in societies does not correlate particularly highly with the number of associations. Corporatist societies, for example, tend to generate very high levels of membership concentrated in relatively few associations.

Both phenomena are worthy of study, and we expand the literature through our attention to the latter.

Second, our study is global in scope. Prior cross-national studies typically focus on industrialized democracies², exploring variation among societies where association is most common. Our world-wide sample involves a contrast between countries with *widely* varying levels of association (also see Paxton 2002; Salamon and Anheier 1998). We seek to understand the foundational predictors of association rather than variability at the high end.

Associations “From Society”

A dominant theme of the literature is that associations spring up from society itself – that is, from social interaction among individuals that possess appropriate attitudes, values, capacities, and resources (Putnam 1992, 2000; Almond and Verba 1963; See Orum 1989 for a review). Putnam (2000), for instance, places heavy emphasis on pro-social values and interaction. Trusting, altruistic individuals who engage in face-to-face interaction will create and join associations, implicitly to serve various functional needs or collective interests. Consequently, Putnam is concerned about television and the Internet, which atomize people and undermine face-to-face interaction in local communities.

The classic political participation literature likewise emphasizes the role of attitudes and values, as well as basic individual capacities and resources such as education, wealth, and leisure time (Almond and Verba 1963). Industrialization is

² Plus a smattering of non-Western countries covered in older versions of the World Values Survey.

thought to bring “modern” civic values, along with education and affluence which are necessary to support collective organizing. Education generates awareness of and concern for collective problems and the skills to organize effectively, while resources and leisure time enable and sustain associational efforts. These themes recur over the decades, for instance in Inglehart’s recent comparative work on “post-materialist” values (Inglehart 1997). Thus, one would expect that: *Societies with higher levels of pro-social values (e.g., trust), education, and wealth will exhibit higher levels of associational life.*

Institutions, the State, and Associational Life

A growing literature asserts the importance of political structures and institutions in shaping associational life (Paxton 2002; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Schofer and Gourinchas 2001; Clemens 1997). Historical institutionalist approaches stress the ways that political and legal institutions form the landscape of resources, opportunities, and constraints that motivate, limit, or channel associational forms and political participation. Skocpol has done foundational work in this area showing, for instance, that the state influenced the form of U.S. voluntary associations (Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000) and provided resources (e.g., Civil War pensions) that spurred civic life (Crowley and Skocpol 2001; also see Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Clemens 1997). More recent cultural and neo-institutional formulations have attended more directly to the institutionalized cultural scripts and schema which serve to constitute and legitimate collective actors, identities, and purposes (Schofer and Gourinchas 2001; Gourinchas and Schofer 2004). We focus on democracy and state expansion, and later

briefly touch on other dimensions of institutional variation (e.g., statism and corporateness).

Democracy. Tocqueville (2000[1835]), and many to follow, drew the link between the strong democratic institutions and traditions of the United States and its vibrant associational life (see Paxton 2002). Non-democratic societies routinely suppress or proscribe free association, while the inability of citizens to influence the regime substantially reduces incentives to form interest groups and many other types of association. Institutionalized political democracy, conversely, provides strong incentives to mobilize and influence state decisionmaking. Similar themes also appear in the social movements literature (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1997). Moreover, democratic political culture provides strong legitimation for individual participation in forms that include (but are not limited to) association. Indeed, these arguments are supported by prior cross-national research (Paxton 2002; but see Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Thus, we expect that *democratic societies will have more associations than non-democratic societies.*

Moreover, *democracy should have an especially large positive effect on associations devoted to social or political issues and reforms.* Non-democratic regimes place selective ecological pressures on associational populations because repression centers on those associations and movements that challenge the state or demand social reform, such as pro-democracy organizations or human rights groups. Associations that appear to be innocuous and/or apolitical (e.g., sports and recreational groups) are more likely to survive – and in some cases flourish – within non-democratic regimes.

Associational life in democratic societies will have a distinctive character, with more groups attending to social problems and political issues.

State Expansion. The expansion of the state provides *resources, legitimation, and identities* that encourage and sustain associational life in modern societies. This argument is contrary to the American conservative notion that the state crowds out association. We argue that the expansion of the state brings whole new domains into the public sphere, serving to establish and legitimate them as foci of citizen and interest group involvement. Moreover, the state generates new categories and constituencies that become the building blocks of association. Tarrow's (1998) work on social movements describes the latter:

State building not only made the national government a target for citizens' claims; it led to the broader cognitive and political framing of citizen actions. The standardization of taxation, of administrative regulations, and of census categories encouraged the formation of coalitions of groups that had previously been opposed or indifferent to one another. The classification of citizens into what started out as artificial groupings ... constructed new social identities or laid the bases for broader coalitions (Tarrow 1998:63).

The expansion of the state into new domains legitimates and provides incentives for greatly expanded association. For instance, U.S. governmental initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s to manage the natural environment (e.g., the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency and related legal frameworks) resulted in rapid proliferation of environmental interest groups. While some pro-environmental groups obviously preceded state involvement, the real explosion of environmental association occurred *after* the state moved into the domain (Hironaka 2000). Expanded laws, regulation, and state intervention put the issue squarely on the public agenda and

generated issues of contention for lobbyists, interest groups, and social movement organizations.

States also directly support and generate associations as they pursue various public agendas. A weak form can be seen in the non-profit laws in the United States, which provide favorable tax status and other incentives to encourage the formation of private associations. Direct government support for and collaboration with associations is more common in Europe and Asia. Scandinavian consociational democracy, for instance, involves large state subsidies for all sorts of associations. The expanding corporatist state in Sweden in the early part of the 20th Century established formal channels for interest groups to participate in the political system. Rothstein notes:

For example, the temperance movement was given the responsibility of handling the government's propaganda against widespread misuse of alcohol; the farmer's movement, the responsibility of handling subsidies to farming; small business organizations, the responsibility of implementing subsidies to support small business; and so on (Rothstein 2002: 214).

Collaboration between associations and the expanding state continued throughout the 1960s as the state promoted civic participation in areas like adult education, culture, and sports and recreation (Lundstrom and Wijkström 1997). Thus, we expect: *Societies with expanded states (in terms of size and scope) have greater associational activity than societies with smaller states.*

We expect state expansion to have a highly general positive effect on all types of association. The state touches nearly every part of the associational sphere, whether by providing licenses and monopolies to professional groups, serving as the target of social

movements and industry associations, and even by defining and constituting sub-national groups and identities around which many ethnic and community associations are formed.

Variation in state agendas, however, can have a profound impact on associational life. Newly-industrializing Asian societies provide a vivid example. The distinctive feature of East-Asian post-war states is an extreme focus on coordinated expansion of economic activity (Evans 1995). The result has been the proliferation of a variety of hybrid public/private or wholly private industry groups to coordinate economic activity and accelerate development (Evans 1995).

For instance, as Japan pursued its aggressive economic agenda in the past few decades, the state supported and relied heavily on coordination among industry groups as part of attempts to manage the economy and generate economic growth. Corporate-sponsored foundations, which the government perceived as essential to Japan's modernization process, were given special tax treatments in the 1960s to foster donations and activities (Amenomori 1997: 193). The result was a proliferation of industry and trade associations.³ In contrast, governments that were less mono-maniacally focused on economic growth, such as the welfare states of Western Europe, developed civil societies reflecting the broader agenda of the nation-state (e.g., around broader citizen participation). Thus, we expect: *States organized primarily around economic growth, as*

³ A broader expansion of civil society, however, did not occur until 1998, when the government moved to support private associations through the Law to Promote Specified Non-Profit Activities (the "NPO Law"). Within five years of the law's passage, the number of certified non-profit organizations – in areas ranging from education and human rights to culture and the environment – grew from nearly zero in 1998 to over 14,000 in 2003 (Hasegawa 2004: 242).

in the case of Newly-industrializing Asian countries, will have more trade and industry associations than other societies.

Globalization, the World Polity, and National Associational Life

Neo-institutional scholars highlight a key dimension of globalization: the growth of trans-national organizations and culture (a “world society” or “world polity”) in which nations are embedded. Institutions, culture, and discourses of the world polity have been observed to influence national policies and laws in areas such as education, women’s rights, the environment, human rights, and so on (Ramirez et al. 1997; Frank et al. 2000; see Meyer et al. 1997 for a review).

The world polity encourages domestic association in three interrelated ways: 1) *The globally legitimated issues and causes in world society provide cognitive frames and collective purposes that empower organizing at the domestic level.* Local associations often spring up around the issues raised at the global level on topics such as environmentalism, human rights, and gender equity. For instance, many domestic environmental NGOs are offshoots of the trans-national movement rather than indigenous responses to local environmental problems (Longhofer and Schofer 2006; Tsutsui, forthcoming). 2) The world polity’s “associational” character (Boli and Thomas 1999) penetrates down into nations – *via organizational structuration, resource flows, and cultural models.* Organizationally, the associational web of the world polity blurs into domestic association. The routine organizational activity of international associations (INGOs) often generates association at the domestic level. Also, the associational logic of the world polity provides models of organizing that have spread globally. 3) Finally,

the notion of “civil society”, itself, has become a dominant and highly legitimated discourse in world society. Cultural models and discourses stressing the importance of voluntary association and “civic engagement” have become very prominent in the last two decades. Key international actors and associations (e.g., aid donors) have seized upon voluntary association as a panacea to a variety of social problems, and channeled resources to that end.

The World Polity as a Source of Legitimated Social Problems, Resources, and Models

Legitimated global models and discourses of the world polity provide powerful cognitive frames for organizing and engaging in social movement activities (Benford and Snow 2000; Meyer al. 1997b; Tsutsui, forthcoming). International agreements and treaties define principles and legal standards, creating global expectations of nation-state behavior and citizen action. At the same time, the world polity provides potent authoritative discourses, often purveyed by professionals, experts, and scientists, that identify and help to socially construct various issues and social problems (Drori et al. 2003; Schofer 1999). In addition to defining social problems, international actors and social movements – such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International – generate innovative social movement frames that galvanize commitment and action. Entire packages of legitimated social problems, solutions, and social movement strategies get assembled in the world polity (often built upon movements that originally emerged in Europe or the US), and can suddenly wash ashore in nations around the world.

Once a social issue has been institutionalized at the global level, it becomes far easier for an individual anywhere in the world to take up the cause, organize, or protest.

This is particularly clear in the case of global environmentalism: international mobilization generated rapid changes in national environmental laws *and* sharp increases in domestic pro-environmental mobilization across the developing world (Longhofer and Schofer 2006).⁴

Moreover, international associations directly support national-level associational life. For instance, development and human rights organizations frequently provide funds for local “capacity building” – which often takes the form of developing local associational infrastructure. Major global environmental associations, such as Friends of the Earth International, routinely support the formation of chapters – or wholly independent domestic associations – around the world (Wapner 1996).

Intergovernmental organizations, including the UN and World Bank, also encourage domestic association by providing resources, conferences, and training to individuals in developing countries. As Reimann notes:

UN support of NGOs since the 1980s has grown exponentially and now includes not only funding for implementation of UN projects but funding for attendance to UN conferences, NGO training and “capacity building” programs, and support for NGO networking. By the late 1990s, UN agencies were providing more than \$2 billion a year on NGO programs (Reimann 2006: 49).

The resources that the world polity provides help sustain high levels of association in developing countries. A recent survey estimates that over 70% of the aggregate funding for the Ugandan NGO sector comes from international NGOs and donors, and a good portion of the remainder comes from the state (which itself receives

⁴ Indeed, one reason that the global movement was so successful in influencing national laws is that it simultaneously generated domestic pro-environmental constituencies – effectively “squeezing” the state from above and below at the same time (Schofer and Hironaka 2005).

substantial international aid) (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005). Similar patterns have been documented in Thailand, where a large portion of funding comes from UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF, UNESCO, World Health Organization), and in Ghana, where foreign aid supported the growth of non-profit organizations despite a military dictatorship in the 1980s (Pongsapich 1997; Uhlin 2002; Atingdui 1997).

The Growing Legitimacy of “Civil Society” in the World Polity

The very idea of *civil society*, itself, has become a dominant and highly legitimated discourse in the world polity. Ushered in by decades of Anglo-American dominance and the neo-liberal turn, civil society has become a potent ideology and a taken-for-granted goal of the UN, the World Bank, international donors, and an array of INGOs (Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, & Romani 2003; Nelson 1995; Reimann 2006). Civil society is now a celebrated cause and veritable panacea for nearly any social problem, ranging from ineffective democracy to environmental protection to underdevelopment. This represents a sharp departure from earlier views, particularly among the international development banks and donors, which saw the central state as the primary vehicle for solving social problems. Reimann has termed this phenomenon the “pro-NGO norm” that emerged in the international development field in the 1980s:

Based on liberal democratic and neoliberal economic principles, this new ideology supporting NGOs was one that included both service and advocacy NGOs and set up a new international standard for states. According to the new pro-NGO norm, in order to be a properly functioning free market and democratic nation in the 1990s and 2000s, it was now necessary to have a flourishing “civil society” sector that included NGOs and other citizen-organized groups (Reimann 2006: 59).

As this pro-civil society discourse has become increasingly hegemonic, organizations in the world polity devote resources to that end. For instance, the World Bank created a Civil Society Group in 1995, a collection of civil society “specialists” dispersed throughout the Washington departments and country offices that coordinate capacity-building initiatives for civil society organizations and facilitate collaboration with domestic associations in Bank projects.⁵ In the last 15 years, the Bank spent *sixty billion dollars* on civil society funding and sponsored 400 “learning programs” around the world focused on enhancing associational activity and citizen participation. Capacity-building initiatives by the Bank involve not only the disbursement of funds, but also training programs, external consultations, and technical assistance from Bank staff to civil society organizations and governments (Siri 2002; Reimann 2006). In short, the World Bank and many other international organizations have become engines of association.

The ascendance of civil society as an ideology has not only spurred governments, international development banks, and INGOs to sponsor associations, but it has also increased the legitimacy and standing of those associations in global affairs. Private associations are increasingly “brought to the table” and sometimes given consultative status within inter-governmental organizations. Likewise, major international conferences now provide space and voice for NGO representatives. There remains some doubt about their real efficacy, and some “NGO participation” is sometimes more

⁵ Such efforts have been often criticized on the grounds that World Bank supported NGOs may not result in true democratic representation of local groups. We certainly agree that World Bank sponsored groups are likely to have different aims and agendas than those emerging from local societies.

ceremonial than substantive. Nevertheless, this increasingly legitimate status of civic associations serves as a huge incentive for groups and interests to organize.

Consequences of World Polity Sponsorship of Domestic NGOs

We expect that *nations strongly influenced by the world polity (via resources, cultural ties, organizational ties, etc)* will have higher levels of associational activity. Conversely, societies that are less connected to the world polity – either because they are intentionally autarkic (e.g., North Korea) or merely peripheral in the world organizational/cultural system – will exhibit lower levels of association. We also presume that the historical expansion of the world polity and recent intensification of pro-civil society discourse greatly encourages the proliferation of domestic association around the world in recent decades. However, we lack the longitudinal data needed to explore the issue.

It is also worth noting that the world polity supports and transmits a distinctive Western organizational form. As Howell and Pearce note, associations sponsored by development agencies in sub-Saharan Africa comprise a particular “modern”/Western type of formal organization:

In supporting the creation and development of organizations such as women’s groups, credit associations, law societies, business associations, and local development NGOs, donors have defined civil society as an arena of formal and modern associations, distinct not only from a venal, inefficient state but also from an amorphous array of informal and primordial associations (Howell and Pearce 2001:185).

A similar pattern can be seen in the former USSR. As Russia underwent the transition from Soviet rule to democracy, international funding agencies, such as USAID and the MacArthur Foundation, funneled millions of dollars to Russian NGOs

“specifically targeted toward constructing civil society” (Henderson 2002: 141). Funded organizations have strongly reflected the discourse and interests of Western funding agencies, particularly in areas of democracy and social problem advocacy. As Henderson notes:

Funding from Western organizations has primarily gone to “Western-looking” Russian NGOs. A civic community does exist in Russia, but it is a civic community more comfortable at international conferences with fellow Western audiences than at home working among the local community (Henderson 2002: 161).

In addition, the world polity influences the *types* of domestic associations around the globe. World polity organizations and discourses overwhelmingly emphasize a particular set of globally legitimated issues: namely, those pertaining to human rights, equality (e.g., gender issues, racial discrimination, democratic participation), social progress (e.g., economic development, educational expansion), and environmentalism (Boli and Thomas 1999; Boli forthcoming; Chabbott 1999; Frank et al. 2000; Thomas et al. 1987). Indeed, resources from bilateral donor agencies, private foundations, and international organizations like the United Nations are most prevalent among “advocacy” NGOs involved in similar areas (Reimann 2006). Conversely, world polity associations and discourse less often address issues such as religion, labor unions, industry groups, and recreation (Boli and Thomas 1999).

The agenda of the world polity, we argue, shapes domestic association. A systematic survey of Ugandan NGOs, for instance, finds that association activities mirror global themes, with emphases on education, HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, development, environmental initiatives, and the like. Thus, the NGO “sector as a whole

acts as a relay for international governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the activities of Ugandan NGOs largely reflect the agenda and concerns of these international actors” (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005: 675).⁶ Thus, we expect: *Nations strongly influenced by the “world polity” will have higher levels of associations devoted to social issues such as human rights, development, gender equity, and the environment.*

The world polity is also an extraordinarily rationalized domain, home to associations and extensive networks of professionals, experts, and scientists (Drori et al. 2003; Gourinchas, forthcoming; Boli and Thomas 1999). Indeed, scientists and professionals were among the first to organize trans-nationally, as part of the progressive movement in the late 19th century (Schofer 1999). Studies have already shown that the world polity – which celebrates scientific rationality as a solution to many social problems – encourages the global proliferation of domestic scientific associations (Schofer 2003, 2004). We expect to observe a similar pattern for professional associations more broadly. *Nations more strongly influenced by the “world polity” will have higher levels of professional and scientific associations.*

Configurations

We identify several factors, above, that may account for the disproportional presence of particular types of associations in a given society. To the extent that their salience varies across national context, these factors may help us make sense of the

⁶ We do not mean to imply that these issues are not also pressing *local* needs. Rather, our point is that the organizational form, discourse, and agendas often have a lineage in global frames and discourses, rather than local or indigenous ones.

varying patterns of civil society observed around the world. For instance, developing countries lack many domestic factors that support associational life (compared to the industrialized West), yet may be powerfully influenced by the world polity. This may leave a distinct “stamp” on developing countries, in terms of the character of their associational sphere. We consider implications below.

Data

We drew upon a variety of sources to create a new cross-national dataset on the prevalence of associations in society. This approach complements prior studies of individual association membership data from the World Values Survey (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schofer and Gourinchas 2001) and larger-sample studies that use international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or their headquarters as a proxy for domestic associational life (Paxton 2002; Anheier et al. 2004; Kaldor et al. 2003). We employ a direct measure of association that is available for a large sample of countries.

Our primary variables are derived from the *Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations* (the “EA”) (Gale Research Group 2001). The EA provides contact information and descriptions for associations and organizations as collected by Gale researchers. The 2001 edition of the international EA directory contains contact information for more than 20,000 membership organizations in 206 countries. Examples include the German Mathematical Association, Family Planning Association of Kenya, and the Accordion Society of Australia. We coded each organization for country

location, general subject area, and, when available, membership level and founding date.⁷ Our main analyses contain information on voluntary associations for around 135 countries.

We also collected data from several other sources to corroborate our EA data and replicate our main findings. These include national scientific and learned societies (Opitz 2002), national environmental organizations (Tryzna and Davidson 2001), headquarters of international non-governmental organizations (Union of International Associations 2001), and non-profit organizations registered with Action Without Borders through their Idealist website (www.idealists.org accessed March 11, 2005). We constructed an index by adding the z-scores of the natural log of each variable. The natural log of each variable correlated at .72 or higher with all other variables, and the final measure correlated at over .9 with the EA measure. We principally focus on the EA data, because it is available for a larger sample of countries and because that source can be disaggregated by type of association. However, our key findings are replicated using both datasets (See Appendix C).

As noted above, these sources capture the existence of association, not the strength of individual membership or the overall extent of social capital in society. Nor do they include information on informal or clandestine associations such as loose kinship groups or terrorist networks. Moreover, the EA directory is not a complete census of all voluntary associations, but rather relies on questionnaires and regional Gale Group personnel to expand their database. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that our

⁷ The Gale Group addresses the US in a separate and much more comprehensive encyclopedia.

Consequently data for the US are not comparable and thus we do not include the US in our analyses, below.

sources do a good job of assessing the *relative* level of association across societies. To the extent that sources have idiosyncratic biases (e.g., sources published in Anglophone countries might overcount Anglophone associations), we might expect low correlation across sources. In fact, we observe very high correlations, even among sources published in different countries (with different national languages). It is also reassuring that the EA source paints a very similar picture to specialized sources, which tend to be more comprehensive. For instance, the EA count of environmental associations in 2000 correlates at .90 with national environmental organizations (Tryzna and Davidson 2001). Thus we are fairly confident that the EA directory does a good job of capturing relative differences in the level of association across societies. We nevertheless replicate our findings with other sources to ensure that results are not an artifact of biases inherent in the EA directory.

Dependent Variables

We constructed five dependent variables from the EA data. Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A.

Overall Association Level- Measured by taking the total number of associations listed in EA for each country. We took the natural log of this variable to reduce skewness. In addition to the overall association level, organizations were divided into four subcategories based on subject area.⁸ Again, the natural logarithm of each variable was used to correct for skew:

⁸ We exclude labor unions and religious groups from the analyses, as each is addressed in a different sociological literature. Analyses of each type are available from the authors upon request.

Economic, Trade, and Industry Associations- Associations include commercial organizations, trade groups, and agriculture and commodity exchanges. Examples include the Indonesian Nutmeg Exporters Association, Zimbabwe Butchers Association, and the Tokyo Trade and Industry Association.

Social/Political Issues Associations- These associations include development, community, welfare, public affairs, and environmental associations. Examples include the Environment and Development Association of Ghana, Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association, and the British Institute of Human Rights.

Professional, Educational, and Scientific Associations- Associations include natural and social science organizations, educational associations, and organizations by profession. Examples include the Israel Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Russian Society of Sociologists, and Argentine Association of Dermatology.

Recreational and Cultural Associations- Recreational and cultural associations comprise ethnic and national cultural groups, hobby associations, and athletic organizations. Examples include Bermuda Society of Arts, Elvis Presley Fan Club of Luxembourg, and the Women's Soccer Association of New Zealand.

Independent Variables

We examine a series of country-level factors that may explain variation in both the size and composition of associational life. Because some measures fluctuate rapidly from year to year, we employ multi-year averages when data availability permit it. See Appendix B for information on the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses.

Trust- We use the mean of individuals responses to a question from the 2002 World Values Survey as a proxy for the level of trust in a country. The question asks, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We took the average of this variable for national samples to create an overall societal measure of trust. Higher values indicate more trust.

Education- Education is measured in a conventional manner, as the gross enrollment ratio in educational institutions (World Bank 2001).⁹ We constructed an index using the z-scores of enrollment ratios in primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions.

Wealth- We measure national wealth by gross domestic product per capita (logged, World Bank 2001).

Democracy- Measured as a seven-point scale reflecting the level of civil liberties in a country (Freedom House 2003). Alternate analyses with an index of political freedoms yielded similar results.

State expansion- Drawing on Hironaka (2005), we use an index of five indicators of state expansion: government expenditures per capita, logged (World Bank 2001), government expenditures as percent of GDP, logged (World Bank 2001), state scope (Gurr 1989), overall legislative effectiveness (Jagers and Gurr 1996), and railroad mileage as measured per square mile, logged (Banks 2001). These measures capture elements of the overall size and capacity of the state, while Gurr’s “scope” measure reflects the extent of the state’s purview across many domains of society. An index was constructed by summing the z-score of each indicator.

⁹ Percent enrolled in tertiary educational institutions yielded similar results, although the sample size dropped due to missing data so we excluded the variable in analyses presented below.

Newly-Industrializing Asia- We also include a dummy variable representing Asian societies that have undergone intensive post-war state-led economic growth initiatives. These countries include Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

World Polity Influence/Linkage- We measure the influence of the world polity on nations by citizen ties to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Boli and Thomas 1999). This is the most common way to assess which nations are most affected by the world polity – but it is especially appropriate to examine impacts on associational life, given the arguments articulated above (see e.g., Schofer 2003; Frank et al. 2000). The variable reflects the number of individual INGO memberships held by citizens in a country, logged (UIA 2001).¹⁰

In addition to the independent variables described above, we also include the following control variables. To account for more associations among more populated areas, we control for total population (logged, World Bank 2001). Also, we control for civil wars since 1950 with a single dummy variable (Sarkees 2000). We include this variable to control for civil strife, which may weaken the capacity for a society to support an active associational life.

Methods

¹⁰ Analyses of the NGO index (but not the EA measure) require that we correct this measure for each case by subtracting the number of INGOs that are headquartered in each country. INGO headquarters is a component of our domestic association index, and could lead to tautological results if an uncorrected INGO measure were used.

We employ ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to test our hypotheses. Independent variables are computed as averages over the period 1970 to 2000. We do this for two reasons: First, several of our relevant independent variables fluctuate significantly or rapidly over time. For instance, the democracy values of Eastern European countries changes dramatically around 1990. We want our independent variables to capture the *typical historical level* of democracy, rather than the particular level in any given year. Second, this incorporates a historical lag into the analysis, while not wholly ignoring recent trends in independent variables that may affect associational life. We lack necessary data to include the lagged dependent variable in our models.¹¹ We seek to mitigate the possibility that reverse causality is affecting our results through the use of historically lagged independent variables. Fortunately, many of our independent variables are unlikely to be affected by reverse-causal processes. However, we discuss exceptions and pursue corollary analyses, including some longitudinal models, to address the issue (see below).

We conducted a range of analyses to assess the quality of our regression models and to determine robustness of our findings. Standard regression diagnostics to assess regression assumptions and to identify multicollinearity and potential influential cases were generally unremarkable. We also examined a variety of alternate model specifications, including variables such as: postmaterialist values, foreign investment, trade, foreign aid, statism, corporateness, internet hosts, televisions per capita, world-system position, regional dummies, dummy for the former USSR, urbanization, dummies

¹¹ Older volumes of the Encyclopedia of Associations are much less comprehensive, and thus not suitable for measuring our dependent variable earlier than 2000.

reflecting colonial history, and a Protestantism dummy. Our main findings were unaffected by these variations in model specification (unless sample size shrank dramatically due to missing data or several highly correlated variables were included at the same time). Several interesting corollary findings are shown in Appendix D.

Results

Levels of Association

Table 1 presents results of OLS regression models predicting the overall level of associations in a given country using our primary EA data source. Model 1 includes only the control variables and two domestic-societal variables: trust and education. The sample size is necessarily limited, as data on trust is only available for around 50 countries. Aggregate trust has a positive but non-significant effect on a society's level of associational activity. Although the effect is in the expected direction, we do not find definitive support for the argument that trust generates high levels of association.¹²

Model 2 examines the effects of the main societal and state-level variables. Education has a positive effect on the overall level of association, consistent with classical political sociology arguments. Economic wealth has a negative, non-significant coefficient in Model 2. Associations are more common in the developed world, but other independent variables (e.g., education) account for that variation better than GDP per capita. The negative effect of GDP may be due to multicollinearity or may reflect a substantive finding: Dill (2006) observes that NGOs are a route to resources and prestige

¹² Similarly, the national average of “post-materialist” values (Inglehart 1997) has a non-significant positive effect.

within deeply impoverished societies. Lacking private sector opportunities, skilled individuals create associations in large numbers to access grants and resources from international donors and/or the state.¹³ In any event, the effect is small and not robustly significant.

Democracy has a positive and significant effect on overall association. Countries with higher levels of democracy appear to have higher levels of voluntary associations. Given the limitations of our data, we cannot rule out the possibility that the result is affected by reverse causality. Indeed, a prior study has found exactly that: the relationship between democracy and voluntary associations is reciprocal (Paxton 2002). To further investigate this issue, we used information on the founding date of organizations in our sample to conduct longitudinal analyses (see below). Results are quite similar, with a strong positive and significant democracy effect.

The state expansion index also has a positive and significant effect. A single unit increase in the state expansion index yields a .13 increase in the log of total associations. This finding lends support to our argument that expanded states support higher levels of associational activity. As discussed above, this may reflect the legitimization of new issues in the public sphere and the state sponsorship of voluntary associations to pursue government agendas. Regardless of the mechanism, results sharply contradict the (American) conservative conventional wisdom that civil society flowers when the government remains limited.

Model 3 adds our international-level variable. The influence of the world polity, measured by national-level memberships in international non-governmental

¹³ We thank John Meyer for suggesting this interpretation.

organizations, has a positive and significant effect on the overall level of domestic association. This supports our claims that the world polity provides models and resources for organizing. Again, the possibility of reverse causality crops up, as domestic associations might serve as a springboard to international membership. The historical lag of our INGO measure, combined with strong anecdotal evidence that INGOs support domestic association (discussed above) lead us to believe that the effect is plausible. And, again we this finding is supported in longitudinal models involving a subset of our data (see below).

Our main findings are replicated in Appendix C, which employs an alternate measure of the level of associations in society based on an index of several other sources (see above). Results are very similar.

Types of Association

Table 2 turns to our analyses of different *types* of association. State expansion has a positive significant effect on all four types of associations. The state, which has its hand in nearly every form of public life (economy, the professions, social issues, etc.), and which tends to offer broad incentives (e.g., U.S. non-profit laws), becomes an omnibus source of support for association of all kinds.

Democracy, in contrast, has variable effects on different types of association. Democracy has the largest and most highly significant effect on social and political issue associations, as one would expect. Those are the sorts of associations that are most likely to be suppressed by non-democratic regimes. Democracy has a moderate and significant effect on trade/economic associations and professional associations. Finally, the effect

on recreational and cultural associations is smaller and not significant. In other words, autocratic regimes do not significantly dampen sports leagues, music groups, and the like. This supports our hypothesis that repressive states are most likely to suppress associations that challenge state authority, such as autonomous political groups, but may tolerate seemingly apolitical forms of association. Thus, democratic societies are distinguished most sharply by their very high levels of social/political associations.

We observe that newly-industrializing Asian countries have particularly high levels of economic, trade, and industry associations. We argue that this is due to the coordinated efforts by the state to engineer rapid economic growth in these countries – which yields a unique configuration of associational life. We also find a significant effect for professional associations, which is not surprising given the possible relationships between certain professional groups (e.g., engineers) and trade associations in such coordination efforts. The specialized agenda of these states appears to leave a distinct imprint on associational life.

Education has a positive effect on all forms of association, though the effect varies substantially in size and is insignificant in the case of social/political associations. In addition to trade/industry associations, education has a particularly large effect on professional and scientific associations. This makes a great deal of sense. Education is the basis for the professions and sciences in the modern world. We also find large, significant effects of education on recreational/cultural associations. To our surprise, we did not find a significant effect of education on social and political issue associations, although the sign is in the predicted direction. Perhaps mobilization around political

issues is shaped principally by the state itself (as well as the world polity; see below) and therefore is less directly dependent on levels of education in society.

The world polity, likewise, has varied effects across the four types of domestic association. World polity ties (INGO memberships) have a positive and significant effect on social/political issue associations, lending support to our hypothesis that the world polity disproportionately sponsors associations that address globally legitimated social issues, such as development and the environment. World polity ties also have a positive and significant effect on professional and scientific associations. We thus find support for our argument that the highly rationalized world polity encourages the diffusion of professional and scientific organizations (also see Schofer 2003). In short, these findings support our contention that the world polity encourages voluntary associations that mirror the organizations and agendas of the international sphere.

Corollary Analyses: Additional Arguments and Control Variables

We examined a large number of additional arguments and control variables (see Methods, Appendix B). We report several interesting findings in Appendix D.

*State Expansion * Democracy.* Expanded democratic states certainly encourage association, but large autocratic ones (e.g., the former Soviet Union) may not have a similar effect. In other words, the effect of an expansive state on associational life may be conditional on its level of democracy.¹⁴ Indeed, we find a positive and significant interaction between state expansion and democracy in Appendix D. The main effect of state expansion remains positive but shrinks substantially in size and falls shy of

¹⁴ We thank Doug McAdam for this suggestion.

statistical significance (though in some variants of our models a significant effect is still observed).

Statism. Schofer and Gourinchas (2001), drawing on Jepperson (1992, 2002), argue that statist polities dampen associational life. Statism refers to the institutionalization of political authority within an elite, bounded, and centralized state apparatus (a dimension that is quite orthogonal to the general issue of state expansion). Conversely, non-statist societies have open, decentralized states that draw legitimation not from a bounded civil service elite but from its role as representing wider society. Consistent with prior research, we find that among industrialized Western countries, statism has a negative and significant effect on associational life.¹⁵

Corporateness. Schofer and Gourinchas (2001) further argue that corporatist polities generate high levels of membership. Corporateness refers to the institutionalization of groups (e.g., unions, capital, etc) rather than individuals as the principle locus of political sovereignty and thus as the key players in the political system. However, membership is often passive and is generally channeled through a relatively small number of extremely large organizations, such as major unions, and that “new social movement” membership

¹⁵ Arguments regarding statism and corporateness were developed in the context of industrialized Western societies (as well as a few others such as Japan), and data only exists for those cases. We thus include statism and corporateness as an interaction with countries for which there is data and include a dummy variable reflecting cases with missing statist/corporatist data. Thus, the model contrasts variation on statism/corporateness among those countries for which data is available (namely, the industrialized West) rather than contrasting statist/corporatist societies to the entire rest of the world. Analyses looking exclusively at industrialized Western countries yield similar results, but many other variables in the model lose significance due to the extremely small N.

is dampened (Schofer and Gourinchas 2001). We find that within industrialized Western, corporatist polities have fewer associations overall, but the effect is not statistically significant.

British Colony. Lipset, Huntington, and others have suggested that the British empire put in place institutions and traditions conducive to the development of democracy (e.g., Lipset 1994). We indeed find in Appendix D that former British colonies have higher levels of association in our quantitative analyses.

Trade. We examined trade as well as other measures of economic activity and globalization (e.g., Foreign Direct Investment). Scholars have suggested that globalization and economic dependency can co-opt elites and make governments less responsive to citizens, perhaps undercutting democracy and local associational life. Conversely, optimists have suggested that global economic integration may prove stabilizing, and may in fact encourage the proliferation of democratic institutions. We find that trade (as measured by percent of GDP, World Bank 2001) has a positive effect on association, but the effect is always small and loses significance when additional variables are added to the model.

Corollary Analyses: Longitudinal Models

To address the limitations of our cross-sectional models, we made use of limited historical data to conduct exploratory longitudinal models. Specifically, the EA data source includes information on the founding dates for roughly 75% of associations in the directory. We used these dates to construct cross-national event history spell data on the founding of associations (as well as foundings-per-year data, which we analyzed with

negative binomial count models).¹⁶ Event history analyses and negative binomial models yielded similar results to those presented here (analyses available from authors upon request). Notable differences included a smaller education effect in the event history models, as well as an effect of INGO membership that was larger in analyses of the developing world (where we would expect the effect to be strongest) but smaller in the full sample and among industrialized countries only. However, the findings remained statistically significant. Most importantly, the democracy effect, which is most plausibly affected by reverse-causal processes, was positive and significant in the longitudinal models. In sum, exploratory longitudinal models corroborate our main findings.

Discussion

Levels of Association. Our study identifies the main factors associated with expanded associational life: education, democracy, state expansion, and the influence of the world polity via INGOs. We do not find firm evidence that aggregate trust encourages association, though the effect is in the hypothesized direction.

Much scholarship on civil society emphasizes individuals as the source of associational life. Our findings put a spotlight on broader structural factors deriving from the broader national and global polities. Taken as a whole, the state-level variables account for the lion's share of variation in civil society. Democratic and expanded states

¹⁶ This has two main weaknesses: 1) We do not have data on foundings of associations that failed prior to 2001, when our main data source was published. 2) Missing data on association founding dates may not be random. This creates potential biases of unknown magnitude. Lacking direct corroboration of the accuracy of our historical data (e.g., via systematic comparison with other high-quality historical data sources, which is a massive undertaking) we opted to present our cross-sectional findings only.

preside over the most vibrant civil societies in the world, while small autocratic regimes generate very little association. The world polity also serves as a major source of voluntary organizing, especially for developing countries, which typically lack a highly educated populous and an expanded state.¹⁷

Types of Association. As we predicted, democracy has a positive and significant effect on social/political issue associations. We observe smaller positive effects on trade/industry and professional associations, and no effect on recreational and cultural associations. Thus, democracy tilts the associational sphere of a society toward social/political issue associations and away from recreational/cultural associations (in a proportional sense). Conversely, education does not affect political and social issue organizations, but does positively affect the levels of trade/industry associations, recreational/cultural associations, and particularly the professions.¹⁸ The development-centric states of newly-industrializing Asia generate high levels of economic/industry associations and professional associations (the latter we did not expect), but have no impact on other types of association. Finally, we find that the world polity encourages social/political issue associations and professional organizations, but not other types of association. The very themes that are stressed in global discourse and association are recreated at the national level.

¹⁷ The effect of the world polity is not limited to the developing world. The interaction between world polity ties and less-developed country is not significant. Upon reflection, this makes a great deal of sense. INGOs are extremely active across Europe, Eastern Europe, and industrialized Asia. It is certainly the case that international environmental associations (e.g., Greenpeace) have a strong presence across the industrialized world and it is easy to see how their campaigns may spur local association.

¹⁸ Given the rooting of the modern professions in schooling, the later finding makes a great deal of sense.

Consequences: Configurations of Civil Society. We have identified factors that shape the level and type of association in society. But, what are the holistic consequences? What kind of civil societies are produced? We briefly describe several cases to exemplify common patterns and to provide a sense of the varied configurations that can emerge:¹⁹

1. “*Classic*” *civil society*. Sweden proves exemplary of the industrialized Western nations, which have extremely high levels of association and roughly equal representation across the four types in our study (trade/industry, professional, social/political, and cultural/recreational). The highly educated, democratic societies and expanded states found in the industrialized West are home to the largest – and most diverse – civil societies in the world. Associations of all types abound, addressing the many legitimate issues of the public sphere, and also emerging around the social, cultural, and recreational activities of citizens. In short, Sweden and many other countries of the industrialized West conform to the classic notion of civil society developed in the extant literature. There is, of course, variation within these cases. For instance, liberal/decentralized and corporatist polities are distinctive (Schofer and Gourinchas 2001), but in a global context they are quite similar.

¹⁹ We put forth these four categories as illustrations of the diversity of associational life, rather than as a formal typology. A rigorous and systematic treatment of civil society morphology warrants another paper. However, we should note that these four categories are crudely distinguishable via exploratory factor analysis. Specifically, we analyzed the proportion of a nation’s associations that fall in each of our four categories. Plots of national factor scores generate observable (but somewhat messy) clusters that broadly map onto the four categories discussed below. Analyses available from the authors upon request.

2. *State-led Development-Centric Civil Society.* Korea reflects a pattern common to many Asian nations: moderate-to-low levels of association overall, roughly half of which are trade and industry groups. Professional and scientific groups are also common (more than 20% of all associations in Korea) and other types are rare – especially recreational/cultural associations. The strong, development-centric states of industrializing Asian economies appear to have generated a unique variant of associational life. Indeed, one might wish to avoid using the term “civil society” when referring to Korea, as the associational pattern is quite unlike the classic civil societies of Europe and North America. Lacking a long history of democratic traditions or highly-expanded European-style welfare states, association expands around the main legitimate activity in the public sphere: economic development.

3. *Exogenous Development-Centric Civil Society.* In Tanzania, like many other developing nations, the associational sphere is dominated by social/political issue associations, which comprise roughly half of all associations. Many associations are devoted to development, specifically, or a host of related themes, including public health (esp. AIDS), women’s rights, environmental sustainability, and the like. In the absence of a highly educated population or expanded state, exogenous influences and resources become a major factor in encouraging and shaping associational life. Civil society is in large part derived from and dependent on the cultural models and resources of the world polity, which emphasize issues such as development, human rights, and the environment (also see Howell and Pearce 2001; Henderson 2002; Barr, Farchamps, and Owens 2005). As a consequence, the proportion of social and political issue associations in low income countries is far greater than in the diverse civil societies of the developed world. Other

forms – trade/industry associations, professional groups, and recreational/cultural associations are proportionally less common, especially the latter.

4. *Repressed Societies*. Countries such as Syria and North Korea have very few civic groups, even compared to impoverished Sub-Saharan countries. Societies with a long history of government restriction and repression tend to have very little associational activity across the board, and particularly in areas relating to governance and the public sphere. The former Soviet republics also serve as examples, although they have already changed significantly since 1991. In our dataset, highly democratic societies have on average 23 times the number of total associations than the most repressive in the world (e.g., Syria).

These variants of associational life provide an important perspective for both scholars and policymakers. It is often assumed that all voluntary associations are essentially the same around the world and will yield common benefits: increased social capital and greater provision of collective goods. The recent infatuation with civil society among scholars and policymakers hinges on the assumption that top-down engineered civil associations will generate those same benefits – that NGOs funded by World Bank “empowerment” grants, state-sponsored industry groups in Malaysia, or church groups sponsored under Bush’s “faith-based” initiatives will have the same impact as locally-emergent community groups. This seems unlikely. The associations of sub-Saharan Africa, born of exogenous models and resources, have different goals and consequences from the local community organizing generated by highly educated democratic citizens in the industrialized West (Dill 2006). Likewise, the associations generated by

development-centric states in Asia, or by “faith-based initiatives” in the U.S. differ greatly from those emerging with welfare-state expansion in Western Europe.

We do not mean to suggest that local, “bottom-up” voluntary associations represent the true ideal of civil society (as is common in public discourse), or that associations resulting from top-down structural resources are less desirable. Indeed, the varying consequences of each type have not been well-researched, and are much deserving of further study. Rather, the point is that *different social factors yield different kinds of associations* – and in the aggregate may yield quite different civil societies.

Conclusion

The literature on social capital has turned the spotlight on bottom-up organizing. Phrases such as “grassroots”, “local”, and “bottom-up” now carry great virtue, implying a highly authentic form of association that will pave the way to effective and vibrant democracy. This emphasis on bottom-up processes has come to dominate public discourse (and much scholarly discourse as well) regarding the nature of civic association. Bottom-up dynamics are important, but they are not the whole story. We offer a strong corrective that highlights the macro-structural sources of associational life. *The social structures of national and global polities provide scaffolding upon which association grows.* States and international organizations support collective identities and purposes, provide incentives to organize, and often sponsor associations directly in a top-down manner. Empirically, structural and institutional factors account for the great proportion of cross-national variation in associational life. The idea of “grassroots” organizing is normatively appealing, but it is insufficient to explain association in modern

societies. Attention to structural dynamics helps make sense of the widely varying levels of association and the starkly different configurations of associational life observed around the world.

References

- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Amenomori, Takayoshi. 1997. "Japan." Pp. 188-214 in *Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national analysis*, edited by L. M. Salamon and H. K. Anheier. Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press.
- Andersen, Robert, James Curtis, and Edward Grabb. 2006. "Trends in Civic Association Activity in Four Democracies: The Special Case of Women in the United States." *American Sociological Review*, 71(3): 376-400.
- Anheier, Helmut K., Mary H. Kaldor, and Marlies Glasius. 2004. *Global Civil Society 2004/5*. Sage.
- Anheier, Helmut K. and Lester M. Salamon. 1998. *The nonprofit sector in the developing world: a comparative analysis*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Atingdui, Lawrence. 1997. "Ghana." Pp. 369-400 in *Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national analysis*, edited by L. M. Salamon and H. K. Anheier. Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press.
- Banks, A. S. 2001. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (dataset). Binghamton: Computer Systems Unlimited.
- Barr, Abigail, Marcel Fafchamps, and Trudy Owens. 2005. "The Governance of Non-Governmental Organizations in Uganda." *World Development* 33(4): 657-679.
- Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26:611-639.
- Berman, Sheri. 1997. "Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49(3):401-429.
- Boli, John and George Thomas, eds. 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Boli, John. Forthcoming. "Trends in World Culture." Prepared for the symposium, "The Future of World Society," June 23-24, 2004, Zurich. To be published in a volume of conference papers.
- Chabbott, Colette. 1999. "Development INGOs." Pp. 222—248 in *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*, edited by J. Boli and G. Thomas. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Clemens, Elisabeth. 1997. *The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crowley, Jocelyn Elise and Theda Skocpol. 2001. "The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 813-829.

Curtis, James E, Douglas E. Baer, and Edward G. Grabb. 2001. "Nations of Joiners: Explaining Voluntary Association Membership in Democratic Societies." *American Sociological Review*, 66:783-805.

Das Gupta, Monica, Helene Grandvoinnet, and Mattia Romani. 2003. "Fostering Community-Driven Development: What Role for the State?" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2969. World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, D. C.

Dill, Brian. 2006. "(Under)Developing Democracy: Mechanisms of Community-Based Service Provision in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania." Unpublished manuscript. Department of Sociology. University of Minnesota.

Driori, Gili, John W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, and Evan Schofer. 2003. *Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer. 2000a. "The Nation-State and the Natural Environment Over the Twentieth Century." *American Sociological Review* 65: 96-116.

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer. 2000b. "Environmental Protection as a Global Institution." *American Sociological Review* 65: 122-127.

Gale Research Group. 2001. *Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations*, 37th ed. Detroit, MI: Thomson Gale.

Gourinchas, Marion F. Forthcoming. "The Construction of a Global Profession: The Transnationalization of Economics." *American Journal of Sociology*.

Gourinchas, Marion F. and Evan Schofer. 2004. "The Multifaceted Nature of Civic Engagement: Forms of Political Activity in Comparative Perspective." Presented at the annual conference of the Social Science and History Association, Chicago, November 18, 2004.

Gurr, Ted R. 1989. POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REGIME CHANGE, 1800-1986 [Computer file]. Boulder, CO: Center for Comparative Politics.

Hasegawa, Koichi. 2004. *Constructing Civil Society in Japan: Voices of Environmental Movements*. Melbourne [Australia]: Trans Pacific Press.

Henderson, Sarah L. "Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Sector in Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(2): 139-167.

Henige, David P. 1970. *Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hironaka, Ann. 2000. "The Globalization of Environmental Protection: The Case of Environmental Impact Assessment." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, March 2002.

Hironaka, Ann. 2005. *Neverending Wars: Weak States, the International Community, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Howell, Jude and Jenny Pearce. 2001. *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inkeles, Alex D. and David H. Smith. 1976. *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jagers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. *Polity III: Regime Change and Political Authority, 1800-1994*. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR.

Jepperson, Ronald. 1992. "National Scripts: The Varying Construction of Individualism and Opinion across the Modern Nation-States." Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale University.

Jepperson, Ronald. 2002. "Political Modernities: Disentangling Two Underlying Dimensions of Institutional Differentiation." *Sociological Theory*. 20(1):61-85.

Kaldor, Mary H., Helmut K. Anheier, and Marlies Glasius. 2003. *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review*. 59:1-22.

- Longhofer, Wesley and Evan Schofer. 2006. "The Global and Domestic Origins of Environmental Association." Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada.
- Lundström, Tommy and Filip Wijkström. 1997. "Sweden." Pp. 215-248 in *Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national analysis*, edited by L. M. Salamon and H. K. Anheier. Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press.
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jagers. 2000. *Polity IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-1999*[dataset]. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
- McAdam, Douglas, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (eds.) 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, and Georges Thomas. 1987. "Ontology and Rationalization in Western Cultural Account." Pp12-37 in G.M. Thomas et al. (eds.) *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and Individual*, Sage.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology*. 103:144-181.
- Meyer, John W., David John Frank, Ann Hironaka, Evan Schofer, and Nancy Brandon Tuma. 1997. "The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870-1990." *International Organization* 51(4):623-651.
- Nelson, Paul J. 1995. *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Apolitical Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Orum, Anthony M. 1989. *Introduction to Political Sociology*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Opitz, Helmut (ed.). 2002. *World Guide to Scientific Associations and Learned Societies*, 8th ed. München [Germany]: K.G. Saur.
- Paxton, Pamela. 2002. "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." *American Sociological Review*, 67: 254-277.
- Pongsapich, Amara. 1997. "Thailand." Pp. 446-468 in *Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national analysis*, edited by L. M. Salamon and H. K. Anheier. Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Putnam, Robert, et al. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert (ed.) 2002. *Democracies in Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford University Press.
- Ramirez, Francisco, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan. 1997. "The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890-1990." *American Sociological Review* 62: 735-745.
- Reimann, Kim D. 2006. "A View From the Top: International Politics, Norms, and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs." *International Studies Quarterly*, 50:45-67.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2002. "Social Capital in the Social Democratic Welfare State." *Politics & Society* 29(2): 207-241.
- Ruiter, Stijn and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2006. "National Context, Religiosity, and Volunteering: Results from 53 Countries." *American Sociological Review* 71(2): 191-210.
- Salamon, Lester and Helmut Anheier. 1998. "Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Non-Profit Sector Cross-Nationally." *Voluntas* 9(3): 213-248.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid. 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18(1): 123-144.
- Schofer, Evan. 1999. "Science Associations in the International Sphere, 1875-1990: The Rationalization of Science and the Scientization of Society." Pp. 249-266 in *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*, edited by J. Boli and G. Thomas. Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Schofer, Evan. 2003. "The Global Institutionalization of Geological Science, 1800-1990." *American Sociological Review* 68 (Dec): 730-759.
- Schofer, Evan. 2004. "Cross-national Variation in the Expansion of Western Science." *Social Forces* 83, 1:215-247.
- Schofer, Evan and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas. 2001. "The Structural Contexts of Civic Engagement. Voluntary Associations Membership in Comparative Perspective." *American Sociological Review* 66(6): 806-828.
- Schofer, Evan and Ann Hironaka. 2005. "World Society and Environmental Protection Outcomes." *Social Forces* 84(1).

Siri, Gabriel. 2002. "The World Bank and Civil Society Development: Exploring Two Courses of Action for Capacity Building." Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute Working Papers.

Skocpol, Theda and Morris P. Fiorina (eds.). 1999. *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press.

Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. "A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States." *American Political Science Review*, 94(3): 527-546.

Skocpol, Theda. 2003. *Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life*. University of Oklahoma Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000 (1835 and 1840). *Democracy in America*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Tryzna, Ted and Elizabeth Davidson. 2001. *World Directory of Environmental Organizations*, 6th ed. Claremont, CA: California Institute of Public Affairs.

Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. Forthcoming. "'Redressing Past Human Rights Violations: Global Dimensions of Contemporary Social Movements.'" *Social Forces*.

Uhlen, Anders. 2002. "Globalization, democratization and civil society in Southeast Asia: observations from Malaysia and Thailand." Pp. 149-166 in *Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The construction of identity*, edited by C. Kinnvall and Kristina Jönsson. New York: Routledge.

Union of International Associations. 2001. *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Brussels [Belgium]: Union of International Associations.

Wapner, Paul. 1996. *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,

World Bank. 2001. *World Development Indicators 2001*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank. 2003. *World Development Indicators 2003*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Table 1. OLS Regression Models Predicting Overall Association Levels, 2000

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Control			
National wealth	0.23 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.20* (0.08)
Population	0.41*** (0.09)	0.52*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.08)
Civil war	-0.62 ⁺ (0.36)	-0.50** (0.18)	-0.47** (0.17)
Domestic-Societal			
Education	0.18 (0.11)	0.13** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)
Trust	0.48 (0.91)		
Domestic-State			
Democracy		0.34*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)
State expansion		0.13** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
International			
World polity ties (INGO memberships)			0.53** (0.17)
Constant	-5.07 ⁺ (2.53)	-5.42*** (0.74)	-4.15*** (0.82)
N	54	140	138
Adjusted R-squared	0.45	0.76	0.78

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed test

⁺ p<.10, two-tailed test

Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 2. OLS Regression Models Predicting Types of Associations, 2000

Variables	Model 4 <i>Trade/Industry</i>	Model 5 <i>Social/Political</i>	Model 6 <i>Professional</i>	Model 7 <i>Recreational/Cultural</i>
Control				
National wealth	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.45*** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)
Population	0.36*** (0.09)	0.22* (0.10)	0.30** (0.09)	0.27* (0.10)
Civil war	-0.29 ⁺ (0.16)	-0.52** (0.18)	-0.42* (0.17)	-0.35* (0.16)
Domestic-Societal				
Education	0.12** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11** (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)
Domestic-State				
Democracy	0.21** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.14 ⁺ (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)
State expansion	0.12* (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15** (0.04)
Newly-industrializing Asia	0.79*** (0.21)	0.30 (0.21)	0.59* (0.25)	0.06 (0.31)
International				
World polity ties (INGO memberships)	0.19 (0.19)	0.58** (0.21)	0.57** (0.21)	0.30 (0.20)
Constant	-4.69*** (0.97)	-2.32* (1.02)	-5.99*** (1.07)	-5.65*** (1.09)
Observations	138	138	138	138
Adjusted R-squared	0.73	0.68	0.78	0.71

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed test

⁺ p<.10, two-tailed test

Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analyses.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Total EA Associations, logged	140	.69	8.44	3.39	1.47
NGO Index	139	-6.67	14.64	1.30	4.32
Trade/Industry Associations, logged	140	0	7.45	2.24	1.35
Social/Political Associations, logged	140	0	6.56	2.37	1.32
Professional Associations, logged	140	0	7.08	1.87	1.57
Cultural/Recreational Associations, logged	140	0	6.75	1.40	1.27
GDP per capita, logged	140	4.68	10.64	7.48	1.57
Population, logged	140	11.45	20.77	15.65	1.79
Civil war (war=1)	140	0	1	.28	.45
Trust	53	1.08	1.67	1.29	.16
Education index	140	-5.76	5.34	-0.31	2.53
Democracy	140	1	7	4.09	1.67
State expansion index	140	-5.85	5.93	2.25	-0.14
INGO memberships, logged	138	3.74	8.15	5.95	0.98
INGO memberships (1999 only), logged	140	4.49	7.93	6.34	0.85
State expansion*democracy	140	-1.34	5.93	0.58	1.50
Statist polity	140	0	1	0.14	0.34
Corporatist polity	140	0	1	0.12	0.33
Missing statist/corporatist	140	0	1	0.74	0.44
Trade (% GDP), logged	137	2.74	5.88	4.15	0.53
Newly industrializing Asia (NIA=1)	140	0	1	0.05	0.22

Appendix B. Variables Used in the Analyses

Variable	Description	Transformation	Years	Source
Dependent				
EA Associations		Logged	2000	Gale Research Group 2001
NGO Index	Index of five association directories	Sum of z-scores of natural log for each source	2000 (approx.)	Gale 2001; Opitz 2002; Tryzna and Davidson 2001; UIA 2001; Action Without Borders 2005
Independent				
National wealth	GDP per capita, constant US\$	Historical mean, logged	1970-1999	World Bank 2001
Population		Historical mean, logged	1970-1999	World Bank 2001
Civil war	Dummy, 1=civil war		1950-2000	Sarkees 2000
Trust	1=low, 2=high	Mean	2002	World Values Survey 2004
Education	Primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment ratios (percent gross)	Sum of z-scores for historical mean of each education ratio	1970-1995	World Bank 2001
Democracy	Index of civil liberties 1=low, 7=high		1972-2000	Freedom House 2004
State expansion index	Index of government expenditures as percent of GDP and per capita; legislative effectiveness; state scope; railroad mileage per square mile	Sum of z-scores of historical means; Government expenditures and railroad mileage logged	Various years, 1970-2000	World Bank 2001; Jaggars and Gurr 1995; Gurr 1989; Banks 2001
Newly Industrializing Asia	Dummy, 1= Newly industrializing Asian country			
World polity ties	International non-governmental organization memberships	Historical mean, logged	1970-1999	UIA 2001
State expansion * democracy	Interaction term of state expansion and high democracy dummy variable (high democracy=6 or higher)			
Statist polity	Dummy, 1=Statist			Jepperson 1992; Jepperson 2002
Corporatist polity	Dummy, 1=Corporatist			Jepperson 1992;

Missing statist/corporatist	Dummy, 1=Missing statist/corporatist data			Jepperson 2002
British colony	Dummy, 1=Former colony			Henige 1970
Trade	Percent of GDP	Historical mean, logged	1970-1999	World Bank 2001

Appendix C. OLS Regression Models Predicting Overall Association Levels, 2000¹

Variables	Model 1A	Model 2A	Model 3A
Control			
National wealth	1.28** (0.38)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.17)
Population	1.54*** (0.22)	1.74*** (0.08)	1.25*** (0.22)
Civil war	-0.86 (0.81)	-0.93* (0.41)	-0.75* (0.37)
Domestic-Societal			
Education	0.22 (0.27)	0.29** (0.08)	0.23** (0.08)
Trust	-1.69 (2.27)		
Domestic-State			
Democracy		1.05*** (0.11)	0.84*** (0.13)
State expansion		0.25* (0.10)	0.26** (0.09)
International			
World polity ties (INGO memberships) ²			1.51** (0.55)
Constant	-29.58*** (6.46)	-30.73*** (1.79)	-29.28*** (1.64)
<hr/>			
N	54	139	137
Adjusted R-squared	0.58	0.86	0.87

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed test

Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses

¹ We replicate our results from Table 1 using an index of five different association directories.

² Measured in 1999 only. We subtract INGO headquarters from our independent variable and include them in the dependent variable. However, we do not have historical data for INGO headquarters.

Appendix D. OLS Regression Models Predicting Overall Association Levels, 2000

Variables	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Control						
National wealth	-0.19* (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.20* (0.08)	-0.19** (0.07)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.20* (0.07)
Population	0.32*** (0.07)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.41*** (0.08)
Civil war	-0.44** (0.16)	-0.52** (0.17)	-0.46** (0.17)	-0.47** (0.15)	-0.49** (0.17)	-0.49** (0.15)
Domestic-Societal						
Education	0.13*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Domestic-State						
Democracy	0.22*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)
State expansion	0.04 (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
State expansion * democracy	0.17* (0.07)					0.17** (0.06)
Statist polity		-0.82** (0.23)				-0.52* (0.22)
Corporatist polity			-0.26 (0.24)			-0.02 (0.22)
(Missing statist / corporatist data)		-0.57** (0.21)	-0.24 (0.23)			-0.44 (0.23)
International						
World polity ties	0.45** (0.17)	0.52** (0.17)	0.55** (0.17)	0.50** (0.16)	0.49** (0.18)	0.40* (0.16)
British colony				0.56*** (0.12)		0.49*** (0.14)
Trade					0.33* (0.14)	0.25 (0.14)
Constant	-3.73*** (0.80)	-3.53*** (0.96)	-3.60*** (0.99)	-4.56*** (0.78)	-6.55*** (1.35)	-5.32*** (1.37)
N	138	138	138	138	135	135
Adjusted R-squared	0.78	0.79	0.77	0.80	0.78	0.82

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed test

Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses

