The Social Transformation of Trust in Government
Russell J. Dalton

The phenomenon of declining political trust among the American public has been widely discussed, with the explanations often focusing on specific historical events or the unique problems of American political institutions. We first demonstrate that public doubts about politicians and government are spreading across almost all advanced industrial democracies. The pervasiveness of this trend suggests that common social forces are affecting these nations, and we examine the social correlates of the decrease in trust. We find the greatest declines are among the better-educated and upper social status. These results suggest that changing citizen expectations, rather than the failure of governments, are prompting the erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies.

Introduction

During the last third of the twentieth century, public trust in government and political institutions eroded in almost all advanced industrial democracies. The malaise is perhaps most visible in the United States. Beginning with the crises and political scandals of the 1960s and 1970s – Vietnam, urban unrest, and Watergate – Americans’ trust in their politicians sank steadily lower. Trust in government partially rebounded during the first Reagan administration; by the end of the Reagan/Bush administrations, however, public skepticism had returned. Even the end of the Cold war and the dramatic economic gains of the late 1990s saw only marginal increases in public evaluations of government.

Declining trust in government has also spread across almost all advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, 2004). For instance, Sweden created a model of social democracy that many other European states sought to emulate, but even the Swedes have become progressively more skeptical about their democratic process (Holmberg, 1999). As scandals strained British faith in their political institutions in the mid-1990s, a parliamentary committee was formed on ‘Standards in Public Life’...
In testifying during the committee’s initial study of ethics in government, Ivor Crewe stated: ‘there is no doubt that distrust and alienation has risen to a higher level than ever before. It was always fairly prevalent; it is now in many regards almost universal’ (Crewe, 1995). Even at the other end of the world, New Zealanders have become less trustful of their government, which led to a fundamental change in the electoral system in the early 1990s (Vowles et al., 1995). During the 1990s Germany achieved a major historic goal: to unify Germany as a free and democratic nation – but support for the political process subsequently sank among the West German public (Kepplinger, 1996, 1998). A similar pattern is evident in most other advanced industrial democracies.

This research has two goals. We first summarize the empirical evidence that trust in government is decreasing in most advanced industrial democracies. The breadth of these political trends leads us to search for equally broad social forces that are affecting these nations, and that might erode the public’s trust. Previous research offers contrasting theories of the social base of decreasing trust that we test here. Much of our analyses focus on the United States, and where possible we extend these analyses to other contemporary democracies. We examine the social status and generational patterns of political support. The results suggest that changing citizen values and political expectations have created a new political Zeitgeist, which stimulates greater skepticism of government. This ‘creedal passion,’ in turn, is generating new pressures for institutional change that may transform contemporary democratic processes.

The Cross-National Trends

The first step in our research is to describe the trends in trust in government over time. We recognize that political support exists on multiple levels, and that the time trends differ across these levels. We focus on trust in politicians and government for several reasons. Since the political trust measures were formulated in the early American National Election Studies, they have been widely replicated in other national opinion series. Furthermore, for the United States at least, there is clear evidence that these attitudes have trended downward over the later half of the twentieth century. Thus, trust in government measures have been at the center of research on political support.

As we just noted, the most extensive evidence on public trust in government comes from the United States with its long series from the American National Election Studies (Figure 1). The early readings revealed a largely supportive public. Most Americans believed that one could trust the government to do what was right, that there were few dishonest people in government, that most officials knew what they are doing, and that government was run for the benefit of all. These positive feelings remained relatively unchanged until the mid-1960s and then declined precipitously.

Trust of government officials reached a low point in 1980, then these trends partially reversed during the initial years of the Reagan administration. Reagan
stressed the positive aspects of American society and politics — and opinions rebounded in 1984. However, the decline continued in later elections. By the end of the first Bush administration these indicators were near their historic lows. Opinions trended further downward early in the Clinton administration. By 1996 only 33 percent of the American public felt one could trust the government to do the right thing most of the time, only 28 percent believed the politicians care what people think, and only 47 percent thought most government officials were honest. There was some rebound by the 2000 election, but levels of support remain far below their levels of the 1950–1960s. Virtually all other long-term US public opinion series confirm these downward trends (Lipset & Schneider 1983, 1987; Miller & Borelli, 1990; Nye et al., 1997; Pew Center for Media and the Press, 1998).

American politics scholars see these opinion trends, and explain them in terms of the specific and unique events of American history over this period. But recent research demonstrates the breadth of these patterns across nearly all advanced industrial democracies. Edited volumes by Norris (1999) and Pharr and Putnam (2000) assembled evidence that trust in government and the institutions of representative government is generally eroding in most Western democracies. Drawing upon these analyses, we collected even more extensive data for all the advanced industrial democracies that have long term series of trust questions that date back to the 1960s or the 1970s when this changing Zeitgeist first became apparent. Is there a general pattern that extends beyond the unique political history of each nation?

Table 1 presents several different measures of trust in politicians and government available from surveys in 16 nations — essentially all the advanced industrial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>(St. error)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>(N of timepoints)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Trust government</td>
<td>−.247 (.333)</td>
<td>1969–98</td>
<td>7 AES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal MPs honest</td>
<td>−.491 (.073)</td>
<td>1976–98</td>
<td>19 Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>−.385 (.228)</td>
<td>1974–96</td>
<td>4 AES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−.577 (.101)</td>
<td>1974–96</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians don’t care</td>
<td>−.297 (.114)</td>
<td>1974–96</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>−.331 (.185)</td>
<td>1974–00</td>
<td>8 BSA, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−.259 (.176)</td>
<td>1974–00</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party over nation</td>
<td>−.796 (.231)</td>
<td>1974–00</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve government</td>
<td>−.636 (.284)</td>
<td>1973–96</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Govt. doesn’t care</td>
<td>−.611 (.157)</td>
<td>1965–97</td>
<td>8 CES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−.599 (.149)</td>
<td>1965–97</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Politicians don’t care</td>
<td>−.185 (.194)</td>
<td>1971–94</td>
<td>9 DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make right decisions</td>
<td>−.169 (.281)</td>
<td>1971–94</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>−.389 (.261)</td>
<td>1978–91</td>
<td>11 Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−.495 (.158)</td>
<td>1974–94</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A party furthers interests</td>
<td>−.891 (.421)</td>
<td>1974–91</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Govt. doesn’t care</td>
<td>−1.685 (.280)</td>
<td>1977–97</td>
<td>8 FES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officials honest</td>
<td>−1.183 (.227)</td>
<td>1977–00</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Officials don’t care (2)</td>
<td>−1.270 (.249)</td>
<td>1969–94</td>
<td>5 GES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officials don’t care (4)</td>
<td>−.524 (.352)</td>
<td>1974–98</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−.525 (.318)</td>
<td>1974–91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Politicians trustworthy</td>
<td>−.850 (.613)</td>
<td>1983–95</td>
<td>4 IES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Officials don’t care</td>
<td>−.451 (.176)</td>
<td>1968–97</td>
<td>5 Misc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs lose touch</td>
<td>−1.353 (.1134)</td>
<td>1968–91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust government</td>
<td>−1.165 (.615)</td>
<td>1968–91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Trust national politicians</td>
<td>−.572 (.158)</td>
<td>1976–96</td>
<td>5 JES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many dishonest politicians</td>
<td>−1.943 (.942)</td>
<td>1976–92</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>.785 (.200)</td>
<td>1971–94</td>
<td>8 DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs don’t care</td>
<td>.903 (.189)</td>
<td>1971–94</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promise too much</td>
<td>−.653 (.102)</td>
<td>1977–94</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP friends</td>
<td>−.325 (.151)</td>
<td>1977–94</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal interest</td>
<td>.150 (.188)</td>
<td>1977–94</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>MP out of touch</td>
<td>−4.500 (2.835)</td>
<td>1993–99</td>
<td>4 NZES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
democracies that have carried out long-term election study series. Many of these items use similar wording because they were influenced by the University of Michigan’s pioneering studies in electoral research. The table presents the per annum change coefficient (regression coefficient), even though we do not presume that all trends are exactly linear.4

By expanding the cross-national and cross-temporal breadth of the empirical data, there is now clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians and government in most advanced industrial democracies. Americans’ decreasing trust in government in Figure 1 produces the significant negative change coefficients apparent in the table. This downward trend is replicated in almost every other case—the major variation being in the timing and pace of decline, rather than the direction of the change.5

Especially striking are the specific patterns in West Germany, Italy and Japan. Political support grew during the postwar decades in these nations, as part of their successful democratic development. But then something caused these trends to reverse and trust eroded from its 1970s highpoint. In West Germany, for instance, the public became more supportive of political elites, more allegiant to political parties, and more supportive of the democratic process from the 1950s until the 1970s (Baker et al., 1981). Then, trust in politicians decreased in the 1980s and even more in the 1990s (Kepplinger, 1996, 1998). Political support also grew in the postwar decades in Italy and Japan as democracy took root, then the trend shifted and these citizens became more cynical of government (see, e.g., Pharr, 2000; Tanaka, 2001). The fact that support trends reversed in these three nations suggests that some new force entered into the public’s political calculus to erode political support.

The sharpest deviation from the pattern of declining trust is The Netherlands. The two longest Dutch opinion series, ‘MPs don’t care’ and ‘political parties are only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Trend (St. error)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>(N of timepoints)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>−.029 (.298)</td>
<td>1969–93</td>
<td>(4) NES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs don't care</td>
<td>−.240 (.402)</td>
<td>1969–93</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust politicians</td>
<td>.062 (.166)</td>
<td>1973–97</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians knowledgeable</td>
<td>−.348 (.267)</td>
<td>1973–97</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only interested in votes</td>
<td>−1.215 (.141)</td>
<td>1968–98</td>
<td>(10) SES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs don't care</td>
<td>−.625 (.132)</td>
<td>1968–98</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust index</td>
<td>−1.370 (.099)</td>
<td>1968–98</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust government</td>
<td>−.957 (.282)</td>
<td>1958–00</td>
<td>(11) ANES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians don't care</td>
<td>−.787 (.122)</td>
<td>1952–00</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders crooked</td>
<td>−.277 (.153)</td>
<td>1958–00</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Most series are based on the respective national election study series in each nation. Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients of time on each variable; the associated standard errors are in parentheses. The original variables are coded so that negative regression coefficients indicate a decrease in trust over time.
interested in votes’, show statistically significant improvements between 1971 and 1994. These are the only two statistically significant positive coefficients in the table. However, two of the three additional measures that are available for the 1977–94 period display a decline. We can speculate on why The Netherlands differs from other nations, but without further empirical evidence this will remain mere speculation.\textsuperscript{6} Norway and Denmark also display a mixed pattern, which justified Listhaug’s (1995) early caution. However, when we examine support measures across this larger set of nations, there is an obvious pattern of spreading public negativity toward politicians and the government.

Trust in politicians and government is only one facet of political support, but the patterns described here also appear for other aspects of support. For instance, confidence in political institutions has eroded over this period, especially for the key institutions of representative democracy. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) documented a broad erosion in party attachments and support for political parties in advanced industrial democracies. Public confidence in parliament and political institutions has similarly eroded (Dalton, 2004, chapter 2). Thus, the first striking empirical finding is the wide scale erosion of trust in government across the advanced industrial democracies during the later third of the twentieth century. Even though national experts vary in the factors they cite as potential causes of the decline, the pattern is generally apparent across nations – which tends to discount ‘proper name’ explanations that are linked to the unique history, or policy performance of the nation. For instance, Austrians point to the collapse of the collectivist consensus, Canadians discuss the tensions over nationality and Quebec, Germans point to the strains of unification, and the Japanese explain these trends in terms of the prominent scandals and the economic recession of the 1990s. In every case there are national explanations for the drop in trust in government. But, to assume that a simultaneous decline of trust throughout advanced industrial democracies during the late twentieth century was purely coincidental, seems unlikely. The breadth of these changes encourages us to look beyond specific national conditions to forces generally affecting advanced industrial democracies.

**Socioeconomic Change and Political Support**

To understand the significance of decreasing political trust, we need to understand the cause. The general nature of these trends should lead us away from explanations based on proper nouns – Vietnam, Watergate, the Lockheed Scandal, the Chirac Scandal, Bill and Monica – since the erosion of political support happens in nations with very different political histories. In addition, there are strong logical reasons to discount the institutionally based explanations of decreasing trust – divided government, campaign finance, or the structure of party competition – since the same trend occurs in nations with very different institutional structures and electoral systems. It is more likely that decreasing trust reflects factors that are broadly affecting advanced industrial democracies as a group.
Social Status and Trust

The most extensive discussion, and the richest theoretical debate, has focused on the potential impact of economic change and social modernization on decreasing trust in government. As a starting point, the conventional view of political support held that the better educated and upper social status individuals were more supportive of the political process, and this was presented as a virtual prerequisite for an effective democratic system (Almond & Verba, 1963; Stokes, 1962). These upper status groups disproportionately benefited from the existing social and political systems, and presumably understood and appreciated the complexities of the democratic process. From this starting point, scholars have debated how social change over the last third of the twentieth century may have affected these patterns.

One body of literature argues that advanced industrial societies have created new social and economic problems that erode the political support of the citizenry. Numerous commentators claim that social groups on the periphery of the economy—such as the unskilled, the unemployed, and the unemployable—are becoming marginalized by the labor structure of advanced industrial societies (e.g., Offe, 1984; Bobbio, 1987). These marginalized or ‘commodified’ citizens are seen as a potential source of political dissatisfaction. More recently, other researchers have suggested that the competitive pressures and economic dislocations of globalization are also fueling the loss in political confidence (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000). Lower status individuals presumably bear the greater costs of economic competition, and share in a smaller proportion of the benefits. Indeed, contemporary political leaders (on both the Left and Right) frequently claim that globalization threatens the social benefits and wage levels of the industrial working class. Lawrence (1997), for example, provides a strong rationale for this position, but then fails to find empirical support for these claims (also see Uslaner 1999). In other words, these authors claim that increasing inequality in economic conditions may lead to growing cynicism among those at the lower end of the social status ladder.

Another approach offers a very different accounting of advanced industrial societies over this same period. The second half of the twentieth century was a time of rising affluence, expanding education, and improving social opportunities for most citizens. Even the ‘economic downturn’ of the post-1974 period was actually characterized by continued growth albeit at lower rates of improvement. By the end of the century, most citizens in these nations enjoyed a living standard that was unimaginable at the beginning of the century and unmatched in human history.

Several scholars thus claim that social modernization is transforming the relationship between citizens and the state. Greater political skills and resources—that is, higher levels of cognitive mobilization—lead contemporary electorates to toward elite challenging forms of political action, which often places them in conflict with politicians and government officials (Inglehart, 1990, chapters 10–11). In addition, these same individuals tend to be less deferential toward social and political authorities (Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, 1999). New social movements, such as
environmentalism and the women’s movement, have changed the discourse of politics and challenge both the values and the political style of contemporary democratic politics. The changing value orientations of contemporary politics is another factor potentially contributing to changing public images of government (Inglehart, 1990). The better-educated and the young have been at the vanguard of these trends.

In short, this perspective maintains that the development of advanced industrial societies is leading the better educated and the higher social strata to question political elites and the traditional processes of representative democracy, and thus the locus of change is centered among these groups. In other words, the greatest loss in support should be located among those who are at the upper end the economic order: the better educated, the more skilled and those with higher incomes.

While both hypotheses are plausible, we should also note that previous analyses of the American opinion trends often conclude that there is little systematic evidence in support of either hypothesis (Craig, 1996, pp. 51–54; Orren, 1997, p. 84; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). This article will analyze a broader data base than has previously been available, in an effort to find a more conclusive explanation. One problem is that the changes that occur from one year to the next, tend to be small. To analyze such effects, one needs to precisely identify what should be changing, and test for change with a statistically powerful method.

Testing for Change

Our theoretical interests require that we track changes in political trust across as long a time span as possible in order to identify the long-term sources of change against a background of short-term election effects in images of government. We start with a detailed analysis of the trends for American education groups. Figure 2 illustrates the trust in government of three education groups from 1958 to 2000: less than high school, high school degree, some college or more.7 We use education to measure social status because when we turn to the cross-national analyses, education is a consistent social status variable asked across time and nations. It is more problematic to ensure comparability with other social status questions, such as employment or income that have different measurement across surveys. To detrend the series and focus on the relative differences across educational groups, group values in the figure are expressed as deviations from the overall sample mean for each time point. The lines in the figure represent the trend for each educational group.

In the halcyon days of the late 1950s and early 1960s, better-educated Americans were more trustful of government. Over time the trust levels of the better-educated decrease at a steeper rate, and in relative terms trust levels increase among the lesser-educated. Thus, by the end of the time span the better educated have become less trustful than those with lower levels of education.

These results were further validated by examining the impact of other social status measures on political trust. Family income ranked by percentile is positively related
to political trust in 1958 ($r = 0.10$), and negatively related in 1996–2000 ($r = -0.03$). Various measures of occupational status display the same reversal of correlation between these two periods. In summary, the erosion in political support has been greater among the better-off in American society when judged against the baseline pattern in 1958.

The social change hypothesis implies that these causal forces should be apparent in the changing influence of social status across other advanced industrial democracies, and not just Americans. While visual inspection of a chart can suggest a general pattern, a statistically test would provide stronger evidence that real change is occurring and provide a basis for cross-national comparison.

We therefore combined a survey from the beginning and end of each time series that was available from Table 1. For each nation, we modeled trust in government as a combination of three factors: the year of the survey, educational level, and an interaction term combining education and the year of the survey. The overall drop in

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*Figure 2* Changing Relationship between Education and Trust in the United States.

*Note:* The lines in the figure represent the regression lines for the relationship between the three educational groups and trust in government question over time.

political trust should produce a negative coefficient for the time variable. We expect a positive initial relationship between education and political support. If the decrease in trust is concentrated among the better educated, the education*time interaction coefficient should be negative, indicating that the better educated have become relatively more critical by the second time point.

Table 2 presents the results of these regression analyses for the ten nations were we have access to raw survey data. As expected, in most nations the better educated are initially more supportive of the political system. In the United States, for instance, the reversal of the educational relationship can be seen in the two regression slopes derived from the pooled model.9

\[
\begin{align*}
1958\quad \text{Trust} &= 2.822 + 0.035 \times \text{Education} \\
1996 - 2000\quad \text{Trust} &= (2.822 - 0.406) + (0.035 - 0.037) \times \text{Education} \\
\text{Trust} &= 2.416 - 0.002 \times \text{Education}
\end{align*}
\]

The pooled model shows that the drop in trust over time (−0.406) and the shift in the education relationship (−0.037) are statistically significant effects. Similarly, the impact of education weakens over time in all by one nation, as seen in the negative interaction effects in the table. Only in Norway does the correlation between trust and education increase over time; this is surprising since the shift from a conservative government in 1969 to a Labour government in 1993 would be expected to have pushed social status groups in the opposite direction. In the United States, Germany, Japan and Switzerland, the shift is large enough to actually reverse the correlation between education and political support between time periods.

Table 2 The Effect of Education on Trust in Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.822*</td>
<td>−0.406*</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
<td>−0.038*</td>
<td>1958−96/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2.341*</td>
<td>−0.642*</td>
<td>0.182*</td>
<td>−0.082</td>
<td>1969−98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.789*</td>
<td>−0.157</td>
<td>0.292*</td>
<td>−0.122*</td>
<td>1974-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.346*</td>
<td>−0.281*</td>
<td>0.139*</td>
<td>−0.066*</td>
<td>1965−97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.294*</td>
<td>−0.029</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
<td>−0.054</td>
<td>1975−95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.668*</td>
<td>−0.220*</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>−0.038*</td>
<td>1974−96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.331*</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>−0.066</td>
<td>1976−96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.359*</td>
<td>−1.191*</td>
<td>0.347*</td>
<td>0.210*</td>
<td>1969−93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.406*</td>
<td>−1.330*</td>
<td>0.224*</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td>1968−94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.673*</td>
<td>−0.210*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>−0.018</td>
<td>1974−96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The British and Canadian results are based on an index of the ‘don’t care’ and ‘lose touch’ questions; Sweden and Norway combined ‘MPs don’t care’ and ‘parties are only interested in votes’; the United States and Australia use the trust in government question; Germany, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland use the ‘big interests’ question. The table presents the unstandardized regression coefficients; coefficients significant at the 0.05 level are denoted by an asterisk.

Sources: National election studies in the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Sweden; Political Action study and 1995–8 World Values Survey for Finland, Germany, and Switzerland; Political Action and the 2001 British Election Study for Britain.
Are these significant differences? In numeric terms the changes look quite small, and the relationship between education and political trust is modest at best. If one simply looked at the 1958 and 1996–2000 relationships in the United States in theoretical isolation, one might conclude that social status differences are not important in either period. Furthermore, the small changes in relative opinions across educational groups are not large enough to have produced the initial large drop in nations such as the United States, Britain and Sweden during the 1970s – specific events or other stimuli lowered trust during this period. But the slow reversal of social status differences presses trust downward. The eventual reversed relationship may explain why trust did not improve when the specific negative events of these decades ended, because the political system had lost the confidence of its upper status citizens.

In addition to the reversal of these relationships, educational levels have risen considerably over time. In 1958 only 20 percent of the US sample had at least some college education, by 1996–2000 this increased to 49 percent of the sample. If the initial relationship between education and political support had remained constant, this would have stimulated a further increase in trust as the percent of better educated citizens increased. However, the reversal of this relationship magnifies the impact of education.

The United States data can be used to illustrate these effects, since the American data series is the longest and the interaction effect falls in the middle of the range in Table 2. When these two factors are combined – a changing relationship and rising educational levels – the total shift in political trust due to these effects equals approximately a fifth of the overall drop between these two periods.10

The robustness of the cross-national findings is also an impressive testament that systematic changes are occurring, because many of these time comparisons are relatively short and the confounding effect of other factors could affect these small social status effects. For instance, changes in the partisan composition of governments could affect the relationship between education and political trust (a hypothesis we test below). Still, the general pattern of our results strongly indicates that higher status groups have experienced a greater loss of support over time.11

**Generational Change**

Generational change is a related concept in discussions about the changing political orientations of Americans. In the quieter, more halcyon days of the early 1960s, researchers maintained that the young began their political experiences with a positive orientation toward government that gradually faded with time (and presumably with the accumulation of less than idealistic political experiences. (Easton & Dennis, 1965; Hess & Torney, 1967). My how things have changed!

College-educated youth often generated the first major public demonstrations against the working of the democratic process in the 1960s and 1970s. In the United States, the Free Speech Movement and student participation in the civil rights
movement and anti-Vietnam demonstrations presented some of the first radical critiques of democracy (by children raised under and benefitting from this same system, often those from the same supportive young generation that Easton and Dennis (1965) studied). The faces of young college students were also prominent in the spread of the student movement, the environmental movement and the formation of new Green parties in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, and the growth of the women’s movement over this same time span.

Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart, 1990; Abramson & Inglehart, 1995) has persuasively argued that the process of generational change has played a central role in transforming the politics of advanced industrial democracies. First, better-educated youth exhibit a greater concern for new quality of life issues that often put them in conflict with the dominant political parties and existing government priorities. Second, this group more often favors more involvement in the decisions affecting their lives, which leads to greater support for participatory politics and corresponding criticism of the institutionalized structure of representative democracy (also see Dalton, 2004, chapter 5). Therefore, this is the group that is more likely to protest, join citizen groups and new social movements, criticize political parties, and generally challenge the established political order.

This logic leads to the expectation that there is a distinct generational component in the decline of political support: the greatest loss in support should be located among younger generations. Again, this implies that the political and social development of advanced industrial democracies is producing citizens who are more critical of these political systems.

**Testing for Change**

To test the generational hypothesis, we again begin with the extensive data series available from the American National Election Study. Figure 3 plots the trust levels of four generations over the time span of the ANES. To focus on the relative pattern across generations, we again present these data as deviations from the average for each time point. In 1958 there are modest generational differences, with the oldest cohort (born before 1910) expressing more distrust of government than subsequent cohorts; that is, there is a negative relationship \( r = -0.07 \) between trust and age. Over time, trust decreases among all generations. But if one looks closely at the haystack of lines and time points, we can see an additional pattern. Gradually the generational relationship reverses. The pre-1910 generation gradually becomes relatively less cynical of government; by the time that it leaves the electorate in the late 1980s, this generation is the most trustful. Conversely, the figure indicates that the youngest generation becomes relatively more distrustful over time. Thus, by the end of the series the age relationship is reversed: trust of government is greater among older Americans \( r = 0.05 \). These differences are admittedly modest, but the incremental effects of generational change can have large cumulative effects, because
over time older and more trustful citizens are gradually replaced by younger and more cynical individuals.

We can also summarize these generational patterns with cross-national analyses of the age relationship across time (similar to the educational analyses above). The results regression results in Table 3 generally confirm the theoretical expectations. As shown in Figure 3, the age relationship is negative among Americans in 1958 ($b = -0.0036$). The positive coefficient for the interaction term ($b = 0.0051$) means that by 1996–2000 older Americans are more trustful than the young. These results also show that the small patterns displayed in Figure 3 are statistically significant when their cumulative effects are calculated through longitudinal analyses.

Furthermore, this same pattern of generational change occurs in most of the other nations for which we have data. The age relationship is initially negative in Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the United States; and the interaction term is positive in these same nations. The exceptions are Japan and Switzerland, where the young were already more critical at the first time-point and there is not a significant
change in this relationship over time. And in Norway, there is no age gap at the first time point, but the older Norwegians are significantly less trustful at the later time point.

All told, the long-term decrease of political support has been disproportionately greater among the young. One should note that in instances such as the United States, the initial abrupt decline in political trust between the mid-1960s and late 1970s cannot be explained by generational turnover; the shift was greater than could be explained by generational differences, and generational patterns gradually evolved over a longer time span. But the cumulative forces of change over this period had their strongest effect on the younger generations. Consequently, the young are now more likely to display lower levels of political trust and greater cynicism towards politicians and political institutions. Members of ‘generation X’—for example, begin their political experience as cynics—and these sentiments might only deepen with continued experience with everyday politics. The normal process of demographic turnover may therefore produce continued downward pressure on political support in the years ahead.

A Multivariate Model

The above analyses summarize longitudinal patterns, but they are essentially univariate analyses of each predictor, and without considering the overlap between these two predictors and possible controls.

We will not attempt to build a final statistical model of political trust, but we want to move in this direction by expanding our analyses to a multivariate model that
includes both of our predictors and some initial controls variables. We utilize the cumulative file from the American National Election Study because of its richness in including a very long comparable series (1958–2000) for our independent and dependent variables, along with measures of partisanship as a potential control variable. We initially modeled trust in government as a combination of five factors: the year of the survey, educational level, the respondent’s age, an interaction term combining education and the year of the survey, and an interaction term combining age and the year of the survey. 13

Table 4 presents the results of these regression analyses for the cumulative American National Election Study surveys (Model I in the table). As expected, the time coefficient is negative and very strong ($\beta = -0.439$) since trust has trended downward over these five decades. The positive education coefficient ($\beta = 0.040$) indicates that better educated Americans were initially more supportive of government. However, the reversal of this educational relationship is documented by the negative and stronger effects of the education interaction term ($\beta = -0.107$).

The age coefficients also follows what we previously observed. The initial relationship between age and trust in negative ($\beta = -0.128$) as older Americans tended to be more distrustful of government. The age $\times$ interaction term outweighs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstand.</td>
<td>Standardized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>-.439</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>E*Interaction</td>
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<td>-.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age*Interaction</td>
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<td>.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent PID</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep/Dem Admin.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>49.706</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.458)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is the trust in government question, and the standard errors are presented in parentheses below each coefficient; all the coefficients in the table are significant at the .01 level or better.

Source: American National Election Survey, 1958-2000 cumulative file (approximate N is over 30,000 cases, pairwise deletion of missing data was used).
this initial relationship ($\beta = 0.195$), however, indicating that this relationship is changing significantly over time so that by the end of the series, the young are now less trustful of government. Whether interpreted as age or generational effects, the relationship has changed over these decades.

Pooling these data enables us to consider one of the major rival hypotheses to explain these patterns in American public opinion. Previous research has demonstrated a strong relationship between partisanship and evaluations of the government (e.g., Anderson & Guillery 1997; King 1997). Indeed, the earliest time point came during the Eisenhower administration, when the better educated Republicans may have been more positive toward the government. The latter time points came during the Democratic Clinton administration, when the better educated may have been more skeptical of the policies emanating from a Democratic White House. In addition, partisanship is a potent influence on other attitudes and issue opinions that might shape evaluations of government. For instance, perceptions of the economic performance of government are heavily dependent on partisanship, as are other performance evaluations. Therefore, to ensure that the patterns described above are not a spurious consequence of the mix of partisan administrations, we estimated a second model. This model includes two control variables: the partisan attachment of the respondent recoded so that high values reflect attachment to the incumbent party, and the party composition of the government.\textsuperscript{14}

Model II in Table 2 presents our multivariate model with these two additional control variables. The respondent’s identification with the party of the incumbent president has a significant impact on trust in government ($\beta = 0.094$) and there is a weak effect for trust to be slightly higher during Republican administrations ($\beta = 0.025$). The key point for our discussion is the stability of education and age effects across models. Whether we rely on the unstandardized or standardized parameters, the impact of education and age are essentially unaffected by the inclusion of the party controls.

The small changes in relative opinions across educational and age groups are not large enough to have produced the initial sharp drop in Americans’ trust in government in the late 1960s and early 1970s – specific events or other stimuli lowered trust during this period. But the slow reversal of social status effects presses trust downward and may explain why trust did not improve when the specific negative events of this period ended, because the political system had lost the confidence of its young, better-educated citizens.

**Social Change and Political Support**

These findings challenge prevailing images of trust in government in two major ways. First, the literature has often focused on the decline in political support among the American public, and attributed this trend to the unique political history of the United States – ranging from the negative impact of the Vietnam War and Watergate to the Bill and Monica affair. Our findings first demonstrate that cynicism is
spreading to nearly all advanced industrial democracies. In each of these nations as well, the national literature links these trends to the unique events of the nation’s history. But rather than coincidental events occurring simultaneously in nearly a dozen and a half nations, we have suggested that general forces of social change are affecting public images of government.

Second, we have linked these trends of decreasing trust to a process of social modernization in advance industrial democracies. Ironically, trust in government is decreasing most among groups that have benefited most from the progress of democratic governments during the late twentieth century. The better educated, for example, presumably have better paid careers and better life chances. And younger generations benefit from a society with higher living standards, and more freedoms, than their parents enjoyed. This is why it once was common for these groups to be more supportive of the existing political order (Almond & Verba, 1963; Stokes, 1962). Nevertheless, skepticism of the political process has grown more rapidly among the young and better-educated. In several nations this shift has been so large that generation and education are now negatively related to trust in government. Thus when two factors are combined – the change in this relationship and demographic change in education and generational groups – they make a significant contribution to the decline in political support.

Moreover, the impact of these shifts is magnified because better educated youth represent the pool of future social elites, serve as opinion leaders on politics, and are more likely to be politically active. If political systems normally expect greater allegiance from the upper status groups – who diffuse these norms through their role as opinion leaders – then the reversal of this relationship could have equal effects in the opposite direction. The increasing cynicism of upper status groups may contribute to a changing *zeitgeist* about politics, with the cultural norms shifting from allegiance to criticism. Such cynicism may also generate a dynamic where additional scandals or negative news about government reinforces these impressions, while positive news about government is discounted. In the end, this process could produce the enduring negativism about government that we have observed, even when economic and political conditions are positive.

We have attributed these socio-demographic patterns in decreasing trust to changing expectations of government. These groups are the forefront of the new style of politics in advanced industrial democracies, represented by less deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the democratic process (Inglehart, 1990; Dalton, 2004, chapter 3). As Klingemann (1999, pp. 42–46) and others have suggested, we appear to be witnessing a new pattern of ‘dissatisfied democrats’ or ‘critical citizens’ who are committed to democratic ideals, but critical of how contemporary democracies fulfill their own ideals. And since this pattern has spread across the advanced industrial democracies, it appears to be a new feature of contemporary politics, rather than a short-term reaction to problems of governance.

These criticisms of government have led to popular and elite calls to reform the institutions of democratic governance, and thereby renew trust in government. For
instance, it is claimed that the US presidency suffers from the accumulated negative images that range from Watergate to Bill and Monica; thus restoring the dignity of the office will restore public trust. The US Congress supposedly suffers from its own set of scandals and various problems of the legislative process; reform Congress and trust will improve. Other analysts argue that politicians are now more concerned about pleasing special interests; thus change the structure of campaigns and enact finance reform and political support will rebound. Or the growth of investigative and attack journalism have demoralized the American public; thus media reform is the solution. The same scenario could be played out for most other advanced industrial democracies. Rising dissatisfaction in Britain, for instance, has led to a fundamental set of structural reforms by the Blair government, and dissatisfaction with parties has stimulated recent electoral reforms in Japan, New Zealand and Italy.

Our findings, however, suggest that such institutional reforms will not restore trust in government, if declining trust in government reflects changing expectations of government among the public. And indeed, the initial evidence suggests that recent institutional change in several nations has not ‘fixed’ the decline in political support. In New Zealand there was a temporary bounce in political support after the electoral system was reformed, but within 18 months trust was again trending downward (Karp & Bowler, 2000). Similarly, trust in parliament decreased in Japan after the restructuring of the electoral system (Tanaka, 2001). The bounce in political trust that greeted Tony Blair and New Labour’s initial entrance into government had also receded by the end of his first term (Bromley et al., 2002).

Certainly democratic institutions should adapt and explore alternative forms. Partially prompted by popular dissatisfaction with the governing process, contemporary democracies have implemented reforms to expand access, increase transparency, and improve the accountability of government (Cain et al., 2003). These reforms are expanding citizen access in significant ways and transforming the democratic process. Yet, such reforms should be judged by their ability to improve the democratic process, not to change citizens’ negative images of government. We have entered a new period when governments must confront a public skeptical of their motivations, doubtful about the institutions of representative democracy, and willing to challenge political elites. The ‘new civic culture’ of advanced industrial democracies is thus fundamentally different from the cultural model of the past.

Notes

[1] The data analyzed in this article were provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Social and Political Research, the Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung, the ESRC Archive at Essex University, the Norwegian Data Services, the Steinmetz Archive, and the Swedish Data Archive. I am indebted to the national election study teams for collecting these data and making it available for secondary analysis. I would also like to thank Martin Wattenber and Ian McAllister for their comments on these analyses, and the anonymous reviewers of a prior version of this paper for their comments.

For a discussion of the different dimensions of political support see Easton (1965, 1975)
Norris (1999), and Klingemann (1999). Dalton (2004) demonstrates that democratic norms and support for democracy as a regime form have apparently increased over this same time period, as has national pride as a measure of support for the political community. In contrast, trust in politicians, political parties and political institutions has generally eroded over this same period in most advanced industrial democracies.

[2] There is a rich ongoing debate on the theoretical and empirical meaning of political trust, and the relationship of these items to other dimensions of political support (Hardin, 2002; Braitwaite & Levi, 1998). While acknowledging these questions, we believe that trust in government is a meaningful theoretical and empirical concept as measured by the Michigan battery. Although one may developed improved or alternative measures of trust or political support, the tracking of these existing indicators over time provides a valuable empirical base for research on political support.

[3] We end our analyses in most nations with data up until 2000. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, several polls found a sharp increase in Americans’ trust in government. By 2002, however, trust levels were clearly regressing to their prior levels (Dalton, 2004, chapter 2). Thus, for the sake of cross-national consistency we end our US analyses with data from the 2000 American National Election Study.

[4] The specific question wordings and data sources are available from the author. We measured the statistical significance of trends based only on the number of aggregate survey time points in each nation. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000, pp. 62–63), however, present a more extensive discussion of the alternative ways to measure statistical significance in public opinion survey series.

Although we describe trends in linear terms, we know that not all trends have followed a straight line descent. In the United States, for example, early declines lowered trust in politicians to a plateau and opinion trends have fluctuated around this new baseline for the last two decades. In some nations support there are obvious positive and negative deviations in the long-term trend for specific elections. Our general expectation is that over the last third of the twentieth century the general trend is downward, although there are variations in the patterns of decline. Thus, we use linear trends to measure whether the general pattern is one of decreasing trust (albeit not necessarily linear).

[5] One common limitation of these surveys is their short length for many nations. If the American series had only started in 1976, for example, the marked drop in political trust would be less evident (or even invisible). The respective 1976–96 coefficients would be: trust (0.057), crooked (0.114), and don’t care (−0.714).

[6] I suspect that the Dutch time series begins too late to capture the stable period of Dutch politics before the end of pillarization and the realignment of the party system in the late 1960s (what would be equivalent to US opinion levels post-1974 as described in the preceding footnote). Rudy Andeweg (1992, p. 183), for instance, maintains that the Provo violence of 1965–66 damaged the legitimacy of government and authority more generally, and that these changes of public orientations occurred before the first Dutch election studies in the 1970s.

[7] For the United States we use the ‘trust the government to do right’ question because it is available for the longest time span. The ‘few big interests’ series only begins in 1964 and the ‘don’t care’ item used in other nations changes wording in the United States.

Because we are looking for small effects, we have tried to maximize our N by coding only three educational groupings: (1) less than high school degree, (2) high school degree, (3) some college or more education. The results from pairs of adjacent election studies were combined to further increase the group Ns for the figure.

[8] There is not a single common question that has been asked over time in all nations, so the analyses use a few different items. We began with the ‘don’t care’ question, including another indicator when multiple measures were available. In a few cases the ‘don’t care’ question was
not asked, so we used another trust item from Table 1. Not all the aggregate trends in Table 1 are publicly available in raw data form for analysis; we have been able to acquire the survey data for only about half the nations from the table.

To maximize the number of nations for analysis, we utilized additional data sets when the national election surveys were not available. The pairing of the 1974–75 Political Action data with the 1995–98 World Values Survey provides data for Germany, Finland and Switzerland and one timepoint for the British comparisons. These two surveys included the ‘few big interests’ question, which tracks the same patterns as displayed in Table 1.

[9] In more precise terms, the year of the survey is coded 0 for the first timepoint and 1 for the second timepoint. I then created an interaction term that multiplies education by this dummy variable. Thus the equation can be interpreted as two separate models. First survey: \( a + b_1 \) (educ); the other variables have a value of 0 in this year. Second survey: \( (a + b_3) + (b_1 + b_2) \) (educ); \( b_3 \) is from the interaction term is the decrease in the intercept between timepoints, and \( b_2 \) is the adjustment of the education slope for the second timepoint.

[10] We consider the US a conservative estimate of educational effects. First, the interaction coefficient is higher in most other nations in Table 2. In addition, the rise in educational levels has been greater for most other nations over a comparable time period.

Measuring effects is not straightforward because multiple factors are involved. We developed the following estimates based on what we felt were reasonable assumptions. The mean levels of trust dropped from 2.92 in 1958 to 2.41 in 1996–2000, for a change of 0.51. At the same time, the mean educational level increased from 2.81 to 4.11, for a change of 1.30. We used the results of Table 2 to estimate the impact of the changing relationship between education and political trust. If the educational relationship had remained as in 1958, then rising educational levels would have increased political trust by 0.045 \((0.035 \times 1.30)\). Instead, the negative relationship in 1996–2000 and the change in mean education lowered trust by \(-0.048\) \((-0.037 \times 1.30)\). When both effects are combined, this produces a \(-0.093\) shift in political trust, which is approximately a fifth of the total decline over time \((-0.51)\).

[11] The ideal analyses would replicate the detail of our US analyses across all the available time points in each nation. This should be an agenda for future research, to assemble the national data series to replicate the analyses now possible with the ANES. Still, the consistency of the results in Table 2 suggests the accuracy of the general pattern as a baseline for further detailed national analyses.

[12] Because we are looking for small effects, we have tried to maximize our N for each generation by coding for broad grouping: (1) born in 1909 or before, (2) born 1910–29, (3) born 1930–49, and (4) born 1950 and later. The results from two adjacent election studies were combined to further increase the group N for Figure 3.

[13] For the analyses in Table 2 we recoded the year of the survey as count of biennial elections with 1958 = 1 and the 2000 survey = 22. This avoided the perfect correction between variables and interaction terms that would occur if the simple year of study were used.

[14] We first recoded the seven point party identification question so that 1 = strong identification with the opposition party and 7 = strong identification of the incumbent president’s party. The second variable was a dichotomous coding with 0 = Democratic presidential administration and 1 = Republican administration.

References

