THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT AND THE MODES OF POLITICAL ACTION

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There have been widely differing claims about how environmental groups attempt to reform environmental policy—from those who see the movement as challenging the prevailing social paradigm through confrontation and violence, to those who lament the movement’s reliance on conventional styles of political persuasion. This article uses data from the 1998 Global Environmental Organizations Survey (GEOS) to map the political activities used by environmental groups across the globe and to determine what best accounts for these patterns of action. The authors examine the responses of 248 environmental groups in the GEOS; these data allow the authors to compare environmental group behaviors across 59 nations and 5 continents. They find that most environmental groups engage in a mixture of political methods and activities. Although there is little evidence that institutional structures influence participation, the mix of organizational resources and ideology are potent influences on participation patterns. The results help to explain the role that environmental groups play in contemporary politics and the factors that affect this role.

Keywords: environmental movement; green politics; social movement; interest groups; political activity; protest

Environmental groups are contentious and visible actors on the contemporary political stage. But as representatives of new issue demands and political values that frequently conflict with the dominant paradigm of...
industrial societies, environmental groups find themselves often challenging entrenched social interests and governments that oppose their goals. The desire for influence places environmental groups in the dilemma of other challenging movements: to protest the political status quo or to work within conventional channels to implement new policies.

The tactics that environmental groups use, and normatively should use, are an unresolved theoretical issue among social movement researchers. Some scholars argue that the distinct political interests of challenging political movements require that they confront the political establishment with unconventional and direct forms of political action, such as protests and spectacular events (Lipsky, 1968; McAdam, 1997; Piven & Cloward, 1977). Unconventional action draws public attention to environmental causes that would not occur through normal political processes. Moreover, the antiestablishment values of these groups supposedly discourage collaboration with bureaucracies and government officials—green groups are the vanguard of a new movement espousing participatory democracy (Milbrath, 1984). Thus the direct-action campaigns of Greenpeace and other green groups are seen as epitomizing the core values and political style of the environmental movement.

Another part of the literature maintains that most successful social movement organizations (SMOs) adopt activities that promote their cause—whether this is through protest or through conventional lobbying activities (Jenkins, 1983; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Because governments enact and administer policy, it is necessary to engage in conventional lobbying activities that lead to legislation. Research on the environmental movement in Europe and the United States is thus replete with examples of these groups working with members of parliament, testifying before government commissions, and engaging in other lobbying activities (Dalton, 1994; Rootes, 1999; Shaiko, 1999). Thus the environmental movement uses a variety of conventional and unconventional methods to acquire resources, allies, and influence in the political process.

The choice between fundamentalism and pragmatism is a common dichotomy that faces social movements in advanced industrial societies, where both options are accepted within the boundaries of democratic politics (e.g., Rochon, 1988; Tarrow, 1994). But these choices may be more problematic in transitional and consolidating democracies. Tolerance of political dis-
sent is often more limited in the developing democracies; at the same time, the threats to the environment often include more direct and severe threats to the public. As relatively recent incidents in Brazil, Nigeria, and other developing nations illustrate, a strategy of government opposition may bring repression and even physical attacks on movement activists. The choice between antisystem opposition and a more accommodationist strategy of conventional participation thus poses an even stronger dilemma in these nations.

This article addresses these questions about the action repertoires of social movements by examining the methods that environmental groups actually use across the globe. The analyses are based on a survey of 248 environmental groups included in the Global Environmental Organizations Survey (GEOS). Case studies are a central research method on social movements, but specific cases provide a limited basis for generalization to overall strategies of action for a social movement. This empirical survey of the environmental movement across the globe thus compliments the case study evidence with systematic data on the general repertoire of action adopted by environmental groups.

Beyond describing the patterns of action, our unique data source enables us to explore two other important research questions. First, most empirical research on environmental groups has focused on the advanced industrial democracies (e.g., Dalton, 1994; Lowe & Goyder, 1983; Pierce, Steger, Steel, & Lovrich, 1992; Shaiko, 1999). The GEOS project is the first to include a large number of environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) outside the advanced industrial democracies. This study includes a large sample from Latin America as well as new groups from the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. These data enable us both to replicate earlier research on the advanced industrial democracies and to see if groups in developing democracies follow these same patterns.

Second, the breadth of our data collection provides a valuable analytic tool to test existing theories about the factors affecting the political activities of a challenging movement, such as environmental groups. For instance, the social movement literature stresses the importance of political institutions—political opportunity structures (POS)—in predicting movement action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1994). With groups from more than 50 nations spanning a wide range of institutional conditions, we can analyze the impact of opportunity structures in an unprecedented way. Similarly, the variation in issue concerns and political orientations across the groups

1. For instance, when Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa challenged his government over environmental policies in 1995, he and several supporters were publicly executed. When Chico Mendes led an effort to unionize Brazilian rubber tappers and limit the destruction of the rainforest, he was assassinated in the late 1980s.
and nations in our study provides an unrivaled empirical resource to examine the factors that systematically influence the general patterns of action by environmental groups (Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002).

**THE REPERTOIRES OF ACTION**

Just like any other organization, ENGOs must develop and implement strategies to achieve their objectives. Green groups deliberate over the strategies that should promote their organizational and political imperatives. Social movement scholars no longer perceive social movements as irrational and spontaneous actors; they assume that ENGOs are making rational tactical choices. The question concerns what choices they actually do make.

Environmental groups are often seen as facing a dichotomous choice between fundamentalist, expressive activities and pragmatic, instrumental activities. From the first perspective, environmental movements are seen as advocates of a broad-scale critique of the political and social system (Milbrath, 1984). The core ideological beliefs of the environmental movement challenge the dominant norms and practices of capitalist (and state-owned) economies and the presumption that economic growth underlies these societies. New social movements champion alternative values and politicize areas of life previously considered within the private realm, such as environmental protection and gender equality. As a challenging political movement aligned against major social forces such as business interests (and often labor unions), ENGOs have less potential to achieve policy change through conventional political channels, such as lobbying or voting. In fact, a major resource of the environmental movement is to present a sharp challenge to the political establishment and thereby mobilize public support for their cause, much as social movement scholars have argued for other challenging groups (Lipsky, 1968; McAdam, 1997). Thus it appears natural for Greenpeace to engage in conflict with the establishment and, more generally, for ENGOs to protest the actions of the dominant social and economic actors.

The values of ENGOs also should distance them from participation in more conventional forms of political influence. The participatory style of new social movements leans toward decentralized, nonhierarchical, and expressive forms of behavior. Therefore, the smoke-filled rooms and back-hall lobbying of most political systems conflicts with the participatory values of most ENGOs. As green groups establish their identity as challengers to the political establishment, this also limits their potential to simultaneously be seen as relying on conventional channels of influence. Greenpeace activists would have difficulty pursuing a strategy of donning fatigues to sabotage an
industrial facility by night and then dressing up in suits and ties to meet with government civil servants the next day. The mass membership attracted by the evening activities might be repelled by the seeming collaboration with government in the daylight, and the government may find it difficult to work with a group that consciously violates the law. In other words, the choice of protest and confrontation as a tactic can strengthen the anti-institutional identity of a movement and thereby limit its repertoire of possible activities.

In contrast to this ideological-structured framework of action, other social movement scholars argue that the pragmatic aspects of politics take precedence over ideological considerations (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1994). With organizational imperatives at the center of social movement behavior, groups must provide continuity for the organization through efforts to recruit new members and to demonstrate their ability to produce results. Such goals often mean working within the established political system. For example, ENGOs in Western Europe were inevitably drawn to cooperate at least partially with the political establishment—despite their fundamental critique of government policy (Dalton, 1994; Diani, 1995). Furthermore, this perspective expects SMOs to use conventional methods to acquire resources, allies, and influence from the available opportunity structure. The pragmatic resource needs of a NGO thus may outweigh even an ideology of antiestablishment challenge.

The dichotomy between fundamental opposition and protest, on one hand, and pragmatic attempts at reform within the political system, on the other, is a central theme in social movement research. It is clearly a tension felt by social movement activists as they try to establish the identity of the group and to translate this identity into patterns of action. Research on peace movements, women’s groups, and other challenging groups often echoes this theme (e.g., Gelb, 1989; Rochon, 1988). Thus we examine the extent to which environmental groups across the globe follow a dichotomy between protest and conventional forms of action, and how they distribute themselves between these two forms of action.

Although the dichotomy between unconventional and conventional action is real, we believe it is overstated. Environmental groups, and other social movements, have multiple goals they should and must pursue (Rucht, 1990). ENGOs must maintain and even enlarge the organization and its resources; they must communicate, inform, and mobilize their members; they want to shape political discourse; and they want to influence public policy. These different goals inevitably require a mix of political tactics.

Consequently, the political reality is that most social movements pursue multiple goals, which lead to a need to use multiple forms of action. Aside from “purist” organizations that exclusively perform one form of activity,
most studies of the environmental movement show that a broad repertoire of tactics and strategies is employed. Dalton (1994), for instance, states, “What may be distinctive about environmental interest groups as a whole is the mix of methods they use in the name of environmental reform” (p. 185). A typical environmental organization normally performs multiple forms of actions, such as pressuring policy makers, informing the public, and attempting to acquire resources and monies from the public. Some activities may be more visible in the media and to the public-at-large, but most groups tend to pursue different tactics at different times. For instance, even challenging groups such as Greenpeace recognize the need to participate in conventional lobbying activities to influence policy; they just pursue such activities quietly while publicly trumpeting their confrontational tactics.

Our initial empirical goal, therefore, is to determine if ENGOs pursue separate modes of political action and to assess the interrelationship between different modes of action. Then, we examine the factors that influence the choice of activity patterns. The results hold implications for determining both the true identity of the environmental movement and its role within contemporary political systems.

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SURVEY

There have been several empirical studies of environmental groups, but nearly all of these studies focused on advanced industrial democracies (e.g., Dalton, 1994; Diani, 1995; Lowe & Goyder, 1983; Pierce et al., 1992; Rootes, 1999). We have extensive information on the important national environmental groups for the OECD nations: their membership, issue interests, staffing and budgetary resources, and policy activities. When one goes beyond these nations, however, the information on ENGOs is much less extensive. Some studies document the movement in a single nation, but more often the literature reports on only a specific campaign or the experience of a single ENGO.

Our goal is to provide the first systematic assessment of the activities of environmental organizations that reaches beyond the OECD nations. We compiled a list of the major ENGOs in the OECD nations based on prior research and an extensive series of published environmental directories.² Our

² We relied on a variety of handbooks to identity potential groups: Brackley (1990); Deziran and Bailey (1993); Katz, Orrick, and Honing (1993); Ruffin, McCarter, and Upjohn (1996); Trzyna, Margold, and Osborn (1996); and the membership lists of the European Environmental Bureau, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the international
criteria for inclusion was that a group be an established environmental group, with broad political interests, and an active participant in national politics. We attempted to exclude groups with purely local or regional interests as well as groups with single interests, such as antinuclear groups. Because discussions of global environmentalism often focus on North/South issues that involve Latin America, and because the democratic rights necessary to develop ENGOs exist in this region, we included Latin American groups within our project. We also included ENGOs from the former communist nations of Eastern Europe and the CIS to describe these new groups and determine how they compare with the global environmental community. In addition, we purposively selected other nations in East Asia that might have significant environmental movements and consciously decided not to include most African or Middle Eastern nations in our survey.

A four-page mail questionnaire covered several topics: the policy interests of the group, their evaluation of various national political institutions on green issues, their use of various types of political activity, and the organizational characteristics of the group. We posted the questionnaire—in either English or Spanish—in two mailings during 1998. The database began with 698 groups; 51 questionnaires were returned by the post office as undeliverable. We received a completed questionnaire from 248 environmental groups representing 56 nations. This yields a response rate of 38%, which we believe is an underestimate of the actual response rate. Furthermore, there is affiliates of WWF, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth. For additional information on the nations and groups included in the survey, see Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002). An electronic listing of the groups in our initial mailings is available from the authors on request.

3. In large part, this was because the lack of effective democracies in most of these nations limited the development of autonomous environmental groups. For example, the Freedom House listed only one sub-Saharan nation as “fully free” from 1990 to 1998, and a handful more were consistently “partly free” during this period. In addition, the prior research needed to identify the major environmental groups, if they existed, is substantially less developed for these regions.

4. One of the complications of an international mail survey is the uncertain reliability of the postal system in some nations. For instance, approximately half of these returns came after the second mailing, suggesting that many undelivered questionnaires in the first mailing were not returned because presumably these groups also did not exist a few months earlier during the first mailing.

5. We say this because the information on environmental groups in developing nations is less reliable, and the environmental movement is more highly fragmented into small and fluid groups. For instance, our database identifies 40 prospective environmental groups from Brazil but only 11 for Germany. We received responses from six of the German environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) (54%) but from only seven of the Brazilian groups (18%); the smallest of the German mass-membership groups we surveyed has 110,000 members and the largest of the Brazil membership groups has only 20,000 members. We suspect many small groups listed in databases for the developing world no longer exist. If the relevant factors
a diversity of nations represented in the survey and a diversity of groups within those nations (see Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002). For instance, our sample includes Greenpeace affiliates from the United States, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Russia, Australia, and New Zealand. We also received replies from WWF affiliates in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Australia, Britain, India, and Japan. A diverse set of national groups is also included in our survey. The combined membership of our groups exceeds 20 million environmentalists, spread around the globe. Thus we feel that the 1998 GEOS provides a reasonable basis for making initial estimates about the behaviors and orientations of environmental groups in broad international terms.

THE PATTERNS OF ACTION

The green movement seeks to influence government policy on environmental issues, and this necessitates direct or indirect involvement in the policy process. The nature of this involvement might vary depending on the type of issue being addressed or the immediate objective of the group. But in general terms, ENGOs choose from a standard repertoire of action for most campaigns, and we are interested in this repertoire of choice.

To ascertain the general action patterns of environmental groups, we asked how frequently the group engaged in various types of political activities: “This list includes various means that different groups might use to influence policy on environmental and conservation issues. For each one, would you indicate how frequently your organization uses each method: often, sometimes, rarely, or never?”

Group representatives then responded to a list of 13 types of activities.

Table 1 displays the frequency of various activities. One of the most striking features is the pronounced usage of expressive, public-oriented mobilizing activities. The most frequent form of behavior is contacts with the media: 67% of groups say they do this “very often.” Efforts to mobilize public opinion is a close second with 64% of groups stating that they do this very often. As many social movement scholars have observed, such public events are virtually the lifeblood of public interest groups. These activities provide a way to sensitize the public to the groups’ issue concerns, mobilize support for specific campaigns and membership in the groups, and put political figures on
notice. Thus it is not surprising that this is a basic part of the political repertoire of environmental groups around the globe.

As we noted previously, some theorists stress that what makes the environmental movement “new” is its reliance on unconventional forms of action. Despite this image, most groups employ a fairly broad set of conventional political behaviors. A majority of groups, 51%, have informal meetings with civil servants or government ministers. Almost half of the sampled environmental groups contact local government authorities (45%) or work with governmental commissions (44%). Along the same lines, formal meetings with government officials and interactions with members of parliament are also frequent activities.

Challenging or unconventional forms of action did not register frequently in comparison with conventional activities. Only 19% of environmental groups very often engage in demonstrations, protests, or direct action. Even lower, in fact the least popular method, is seeking legal recourse to the courts or other judicial bodies (15%). Despite the rhetoric of protest linked to the environmental movement, previous research has shown that protest is a relatively limited part of the action repertoire of ENGOs even in established democracies. The “high risk” and “high energy” nature of these activities necessitate their infrequent use—part of the impact of protest arises if it is an unusual event. Routine protest would, by definition, lose some of its impact.

Another frequent activity is alliance formation with other groups. As Charles Tilly (1978) and Mario Diani (1995) have previously suggested,

### Table 1
**Political Activity of Environmental Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with people in the media</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to mobilize public opinion</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with other environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal meetings with civil servants or ministers</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with local government authorities</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with international ENGOs</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in commissions and government advisory committees</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal meetings with civil servants or ministers</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with MPs or parliamentary committees</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations, protests, direct actions</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse through the courts or other judicial bodies</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with social groups, such as unions or business groups</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with officials of political parties</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table entries are the percentage of groups that performed each activity “very often”; missing data are excluded from the calculation of percentages.*
some of the best allies for a challenging group are other challenging groups. Some of the most cited forms of political action are working with other domestic ENGOs (48%) and contacting international ENGOs (45%). Despite the potential competition between green groups in acquiring and retaining members and in promoting their own agendas, environmental organizations are eager to engage in contacts and relationships with other like-minded organizations.

To develop broad measures of separate modes of action, we factor analyzed these items. Factor analyses identified three dimensions of action, and through further analyses we expanded this to four dimensions: conventional, networking, mobilizing, and protest. Conventional activities aim at influencing the legislative and policy-making process, such as meeting with government officials and lobbying. Networking behaviors are personal ties, linkages and partnerships, either supporting or opposing, among social sectors and groups. Mobilizing activities are those instrumental forms of action that involve the recruitment of members, the mobilization of public support for the movement, and the advertising of the movement’s causes. Unconventional activities are confrontational practices, such as protests and demonstrations, that attempt to disrupt the political balance and generate attention. As the theoretical literature on social movements suggests, each of these

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
\text{Variable} & \text{Challenging} & \text{Conventional} & \text{Networking} \\
\text{Protest} & .77 & -.14 & .18 \\
\text{Mobilize} & .70 & .14 & .25 \\
\text{Courts} & .68 & .24 & -.02 \\
\text{Media} & .62 & .20 & .27 \\
\text{Parties} & .62 & .43 & -.07 \\
\text{Parliament} & .55 & .50 & .08 \\
\text{Formal meetings} & .22 & .81 & .08 \\
\text{Informal meetings} & .11 & .77 & .21 \\
\text{Commissions} & .02 & .77 & .13 \\
\text{Local government} & .26 & .50 & .08 \\
\text{International ENGOs} & .06 & -.01 & .84 \\
\text{Domestic ENGOs} & .15 & .31 & .60 \\
\text{Social groups} & .36 & .25 & .45 \\
\% variance & 22.3 & 21.7 & 11.7 \\
\end{array}
\]

6. We factor analyzed the 13 items, and this yields three dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The varimax-rotated solution is shown below. In this solution, both mobilizing and unconventional activities load on a single factor. However, based on theoretical grounds, the distinct marginal distribution of both sets of variables, and their correlates with other items in the survey, we decided to separate mobilizing and unconventional activities into separate indices.
dimensions can serve different functions within the political process and requires different political credentials for a group.

The patterns of action across six geographic regions provide an overview of participation in each mode. North America consists of groups from the United States (mostly) and Canada. Similarly, Western Europe and the Pacific Rim region (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) are advanced industrial nations with different cultural histories and geopolitical conditions. Latin America is a third region. Eastern Europe includes the formerly communist nations of Eastern Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union. The Asian region in our survey includes environmental SMOs from China, India, Korea, and Turkey.

The first set of bars in Figure 1 displays the percentage of groups in each region that frequently engage in mobilizing activities. Mobilizing public opinion and contacts with the media are essential to public interest groups, even in nations where the democratic process is not so extensively developed.

Environmental groups also commonly engage in networking activities—the second set of bars in Figure 1. Working with national and international environmental groups as well as other domestic interest groups is a frequent activity among ENGOs in the advanced industrial democracies and is only slightly less common in the developing world. By their very nature as challenging groups, public interest groups must seek out allies in pursuit of policy influence.

The third set of bars presents participation in conventional political activities. In this instance, two regions stand out from the cross-national average. Green groups in Eastern Europe have still not established close political ties with government agencies. Despite the greater government attention to environmental matters as a result of democratization, tensions between the movement and the government apparently still remain (e.g., DeBardeleben & Hannigan, 1995). Ironically, the links between environmental groups and government are most frequent in Asia. We attribute this to state domination of society in the nations comprising our otherwise heterogeneous Asia sample (China, India, Korea, and Turkey). In China, for example, groups exist only if they are accepted by the communist regime, and a similar pattern occurs in the other nations albeit for different reasons—a pattern that also emerges in other Asian nations, such as Taiwan (Lee & So, 1999).

7. We constructed additive indices of each measure: mobilizing = mobilize + media; networking = INGO + NGO + social groups; conventional = commissions + formal meetings + informal meetings; protest = protest + courts. The summated scores were divided by the number of items, so the resulting variables are coded from 1 (often) to 4 (never). Missing data on one item resulted in missing data being assigned on an index.
The greatest regional variation occurs for unconventional activities: protest and the courts. There are good reasons to hypothesize that unconventional actions are most likely to occur in the developing world. We would argue that the greatest environmental challenges exist in the developing world and that governments are often least responsive to environmental claims in these regions (Gardner, 1995; Livenash, 1992). These factors might force environmental groups with limited political resources to resort to protest as a challenging group. At the same time, green groups often operate in a political context where civil liberties are not secure. Indeed, we find that groups in the developing world are less likely than European or North American groups to engage in challenging actions. For instance, 22% of West European groups score high on the challenging index, compared with only 11% in Latin America.

Figure 1. Regional Patterns of political action.
Note: Figure entries are the percentage scoring high on each index.

**FIGURE IS MISSING TEXT?**
In summary, in contrast to their popular image as challenging groups that function outside the political process, ENGOs use a variety of tactics in pursuit of their political goals. As citizen groups, these groups devote a large part of their efforts to activities that might generate public attention and support for their cause. In addition, environmental groups commit considerable effort to conventional political methods: meetings with government officials, participation in government commissions, and contact with parliament. The unconventional activities that often define public images of the movement are actually a small part of their political efforts. Thus in pursuit of their goals, the movement relies on a set of methods that span the entire repertoire of available activities.

PREDICTING POLITICAL ACTION

The dividing line that once may have pressed SMOs to rely on unconventional actions is no longer so clearly apparent, and ENGOs use a mix of methods in pursuing their goals. Having a diversity of tactical choices does not mean that a group uses each method available to it or uses the methods with equal regularity. A green group can develop its own political style, choosing a pattern of action consistent with its goals, resources, and political identity. Much as occurs for studies of individual political participation, ENGOs may specialize in certain modes of action, and a set of factors may condition these choices.

This section examines the factors that determine the modes of action regularly used by ENGOs. We are not interested in the choices of tactics on a specific issue or political campaign but in the broad strategies of action that guide the general behavior of groups. In other words, are certain groups disposed to specific modes of action and hesitant to engage in other forms—and what conditions these tendencies?

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

The basic resource mobilization theory of social movements argues that group behaviors are strongly dependent on organizational resources (Gamson, 1975; McCarthy & Zald 1977). For example, Zald and McCarthy (1987) claim that “the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization” (p. 87). This section examines whether the sheer quantity and type of resources of an ENGO affect its patterns of action.
The core hypothesis maintains that the more resources an organization acquires, the more active it will be, regardless of the participation mode. This hypothesis presumes that contemporary political action of both conventional and unconventional forms is often based on planned efforts, coordinated and funded by the group. Resources are needed to provide research and analyses when a group testifies before a government commission; the same resources can pay for the infrastructure of a mass meeting or protest. For example, Shaiko (1999) found that American environmental groups with greater resources were more active in lobbying and mobilization activities; Dalton (1994, chap. 8) documented a similar relationship for European ENGOs. Surveys of public interest groups in America similarly find that the amount of a group’s organizational resources is related to the overall level of political activity by the group (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986; Walker, 1991, chap. 6). Thus groups with more resources can exert more effort for all types of political action.

A counterhypothesis suggests that resource levels differentially affect the choice of activity patterns. A large paid staff might lead to strategies that prioritize organizational maintenance over highly demanding and confrontational strategies. Full-time employees also provide green ENGOs stability and permanence that can lead to sustained connections with like-minded groups and established political and social actors. Thus resource-rich and professional organizations tend to perform routine “low risk” activities, such as conventional and mobilizing strategies (Milofsky, 1988; Oberschall, 1993). Conversely, Piven and Cloward (1977) claimed that poorly funded movements often rely on the time and energy of volunteer activists, thereby leading to spontaneous, protest-based tactics. Thus ENGOs with small budgets and staffs may be more likely to perform more confrontational activities, as they need to get noticed and cannot appeal to a broad-based membership.

In addition, the age of the organization may reflect the resource base and political orientation of a group. The logic of institutional development implies that over time, a public interest group develops more legitimacy and connections with major social and political institutions. Much of its public appeal may be related to this institutional access and influence. In contrast, younger organizations may not have the necessary experience and contacts for conventional political influence and therefore are more likely to challenge the prevailing social paradigm. Thus Dalton (1994, p. 204) showed that older organizations rely more on conventional forms of behavior, and newer organizations are more likely to perform protest activities.

Table 2 evaluates the resource mobilization hypotheses. Resources facilitate political activity of all types—there are statistically significant corre-
tions between the number of full-time employees and all four modes of participation. Expressing one relationship in percentage terms for reference, 73% of the groups with the smallest staffs (lowest quartile) score high on the conventional participation scale, compared with 94% among groups with the largest staff support. Contrary to the frequent claims that protest is the resource of those without resources, protest is more common among groups with larger staffs \( (r = .15) \) and larger budgets \( (r = .06) \), who also engage in other forms of political action. Only 29% of the groups with the smallest staffs score high on the protest scale, versus 37% among the best-staffed groups. The other measures of organizational resources generally follow the same pattern, albeit with weaker effects. It is not merely money that is important to mounting action; expertise and professional staff also facilitate political action.

In addition, the age of the organization is strongly connected with conventional activities. In part, this may be because time enables a group to develop contacts and gain official standing within conventional political channels. To the extent that governments seek out the involvement of the environmental movement, groups that have a longer history are more likely to have become part of this process. In addition, older ENGOs are less likely to be ideological and confrontational. When both factors are combined, the age of the organization has a positive impact on conventional action, while slightly decreasing the likelihood of unconventional action.

In summary, group resources are a significant influence on the levels of political involvement displayed by environmental groups. Groups with large staffs are better able to lobby decision makers, organize a protest, or mobilize their supporters in a public demonstration—action requires resources.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Mobilizing</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of full-time employees</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of part-time employees</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget increasing</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>–.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership size</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of group</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>–.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table entries are Pearson correlations \( (r) \). *(p < .05)*
IDEOLOGY

The previous approaches explain group activity without any mention of the values and goals of an environmental group. A framework of ideologically structured action suggests that the distinct political values of an SMO influences organizational behavior (Zald, 2000). Ideology is a critical element that shapes organizations’ perceptions of environmental problems and the subsequent forms of strategies and tactics. Ideology predisposes organizations to select certain political actions that are considered to be “suitable,” independent of which method is most likely to achieve the desired result. Russell Dalton (1994), for example, showed that the activity patterns of European ENGOs are closely related to their environmental ideology. Robert Brulle (1996) demonstrated that the ideological orientation of U.S. environmental groups shapes their patterns of alliances and resource mobilization. Political strategies are thus inextricably linked with the norms and ideology of the organization.

In addition, new social movements, such as green groups, emphasize their distinct ideological position and independence from larger social and political networks. Thus the deep-seated ideological convictions of some environmental organizations may isolate them from established political interest groups and institutions. Because environmental organizations express demands that challenge dominant social and economic norms, they also have less confidence in achieving political change through conventional political channels, such as lobbying or voting. Environmental organizations are thus expected to engage in “expressive” and dramatic displays to make their demands known, such as civil disobedience, demonstrations, and sit-ins.

Table 3 examines the relationship between ideological orientations and patterns of action. To tap environmental ideologies, we distinguish between ecologist groups and conservation groups (Dalton, 1994; Lowe & Goyder, 1983). Ecologist groups are more likely to focus on the environmental issues of advanced industrial societies that may call for basic changes in societal and political relations to address these problems (such as rejection of nuclear power or adopting sustainable environmental standards). Conservation groups are concerned with wildlife and other preservation issues and often emphasize these goals without challenging the dominant social paradigm. The goals are reflected in the preferred modes of action. Ecologist groups—advocates of an alternative paradigm and challenging identity—are significantly more likely to pursue protest activities ($r = .41$) and mobilizing activities ($r = .24$). Although not statistically significant, ecologist groups tend to

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8. The classification of groups as ecologist, mixed, or conservationist follows the guidelines described in Dalton (1994). The research team coded most of the ENGOs in the survey in terms
avoid conventional participation channels ($r = -.07$), keeping with their antisystem identity. Indeed, it is not surprising that challenging groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and their associates are more likely to use protest and citizen mobilization in behalf of the environment; this is the raison d’etre of these groups. Conversely, conservation groups limit their tactics to conventional activities, such as meetings with government officials and participating on government-sponsored commissions. What is surprising in light of the simplistic portrayals of group actions often found in the literature is the use of conventional tactics by both types of groups; the main difference across the ideological group spectrum is the extent to which groups use unconventional activities.

Another indicator of ideological orientation asked group representatives to position their organization along a 10-point scale that measured the extent to which environmental reforms could be implemented without fundamental changes in the economic system. Criticism of the economic system leads to mobilizing behaviors ($r = .13$), networking ($r = .19$), and protest ($r = .21$), with a slight negative correlation with conventional action ($r = -.03$). Criticism of the dominant economic paradigm leads ENGOs to seek work through civil society and public action as well as through conventional political channels. The ideological orientation of an ENGO thus strongly influences the mix of activities it employs.

of this orientation, based on the information we collected on the groups and in several instances after consultation with national experts.

9. The question wording was as follows: “We would like to ask a few questions about the political orientation of your group. Some groups believe that the environment can be protected effectively only if societies fundamentally change the way their economies work. Other groups believe that it is possible to protect the environment without fundamentally altering the economic system. Where would you place the philosophy of your group in this debate? 1) Can protect the environment only if the economic system is fundamentally changed, to 10) Can protect the environment without changing the economic system. (Mark the box closest to your position).”

### Table 3

**Ideology and Patterns of Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Mobilizing</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecologist orientation</td>
<td>–.07</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment vs. economy</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.21*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table entries are Pearson correlations ($r$).*

*p < .05.*
Another central theory of social movement research argues that the institutional context of action influences the actual behavior of movement organizations. These scholars view SMOs as rational actors responding to opportunities as they arise, and thus the structure of those opportunities arguably influences group strategies (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; McAdam et al., 1996; Rucht, 1996; van der Heijden, 1997). For instance, if conventional lobbying represents a real opportunity for influence, the sensible organization will use this method; if protest appears to be more effective, this mode will be preferred. In short, the POS presumably can encourage or discourage certain activities depending on how political processes function and what access points (and likely influence) are available for specific political activities.

Three aspects of the political context might be relevant in explaining the general action patterns of green groups. First, POS theory maintains that “open” political systems encourage social movements to work within established conventional political channels, whereas “closed” systems prompt challenging movements to use protests and external forms of political influence. For example, Herbert Kitschelt (1986) suggested that when antinuclear power movements faced an open political system, they used conventional tactics, such as lobbying, petitioning, electoral campaigning; but in closed systems, with fewer opportunities for conventional political influence, the antinuclear movement used civil disobedience, demonstrations, and even violence. Sidney Tarrow (1994) also highlighted the importance of system openness. Although this version of POS theory is debated in the literature, it is clearly one of the primary theories of social movement action.10

The practical question is how to judge the openness of a political system. Our study examines ENGOs across a wide range of political systems. Rather than small differences in the openness of the political system across European democracies, the nations in our study vary considerably in their basic level of democratic development, civil liberties, and openness to political challengers.

The greater variation in political structures across these nations should provide an even more robust test of this theory, although some social movement scholars have questioned whether political structures play the same role in less democratic or transitional democracies (e.g., Bourdreau, 1996; Meyer, 2002). At one level, this is an empirical question. But several studies suggest

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10. Some research notes that the differences in system openness are not extreme across Western democracies and may even be highly variable over time (Rucht, 1990). It is difficult to make a general assessment that the German system, for example, is more or less open to environmental interests than the Swedish system.
that the institutional context of action does shape social movement behavior in the developing world. Brockett (1991) emphasized the importance of meaningful access points as encouraging conventional action and discouraging protest among citizen groups in Latin America. Similarly, after discussing this theoretical question, Bourdreau (1998) argues that the action repertoires of groups in the developing nations will be shaped by the existence of democratic rights and the tolerance of the system toward political dissension (see also Almeida & Stearns, 1998).

Therefore, in comparing the role of opportunity structures across our range of nations, we focus on the extent of democratic development within the nation. Democratic societies are more likely to afford people with the opportunities to express new political interests, mobilize support, and work through conventional political channels. Democratic rules facilitate the free exchange of ideas, the ability to form groups, and the potential to oppose a government—even if environmentalism represents a challenge to the dominant economic paradigm. In contrast, authoritarian systems frequently suppress even conventional environmental action. Thus our data provide an exceptionally rich test of whether institutional context (comparing open democracies and less-open systems) affects the use of conventional political participation.

Scholarship is divided on how democratic development might affect the use of protest (Boudreau, 1996). On one hand, one might expect that democratic nations are more tolerant of unconventional political actions, whereas such activities might be repressed by less democratic regimes. On the other hand, because of the lack of other options, challenging groups in less democratic nations may feel it is necessary to resort to protest as their only means of influence. Both hypotheses are plausible, and one can cite abundant anecdotal evidence to substantiate each. Our analyses will enable us to systematically test these rival hypotheses.

A second aspect of POS involves the presence of allies within the political process (Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978). The logic holds that when challenging groups can find allies within the governing process, they are more likely to engage in conventional political activities; but when these groups do not have connections to government, they are more likely to fight their battles in the streets and through mobilizing activities. For instance, most scholars suggest that Leftist governments are more responsive to the environmental movement, which should lead ENGOs to the use of conventional activities when the Left is in power and unconventional actions when the Right controls the government (della Porta & Rucht, 1995; Kriesi, 1995; cf. Dalton 1994, chap. 8). Moreover, the strength of the Green Party in a nation may be an even clearer measure of the presence of allies within the political system. Once a
Green Party becomes part of parliament, the environmental movement presumably has access to sympathetic voices within the political process and can use the powers of the legislative process to address their interests. Without such representation, environmental groups may feel a stronger need to resort to unconventional forms of action. Extending this logic even further, Arend Lijphart (1999) maintains that multiparty systems provide the opportunity to represent a broader diversity of political viewpoints—and thus environmental groups (and other social movements) might be more likely to find political allies in such a system. 11

A third aspect of POS theory suggests that the social and economic endowments of a society may influence political action. Advanced industrial nations grant citizens the economic security to forsake a portion of their income for environmental protection and furthermore allow people the opportunity to make a living pursuing social change. Economically developed countries produce higher incomes and should provide more possibilities for ENGOs to acquire resources and work with established interests. In contrast, the social and political elite of developing nations may be less accommodating to environmental interests, which would pressure green groups to seek influence through unconventional methods.

Case studies of social movement campaigns frequently refer to POSs in explaining the activities of a SMO. Indeed, it seems plausible to expect that institutional constraints and resources should affect the behavior of SMOs. However, such patterns are difficult to demonstrate in single case studies because many causal factors are at work and the strategic choices of any specific green campaign may be unique; we need to look beyond single campaigns for a general pattern of action that is consistent with the opportunity structures. Our data are well suited to test the POS approach. We do not focus on a specific campaign, but ask environmental groups about their general patterns of action. In addition, because of the cross-national breadth of our study, we have a much wider range of structures to compare than is normally available to social movement scholars.

Table 4 assembles the evidence to test these expectations. For each nation, we coded various characteristics of the political institutions and the political process, and then we correlated these variables with our four participation modes. The first panel of the table examines whether the political rights and

11. More generally, Lijphart (1999) discusses this as part of a pattern of consociational democracy in which political interests are more readily accepted and represented within the political system. Lijphart’s measures of consociationalism are not available for all the nations in our study, but the number of parties is a strong surrogate for this general concept.
the openness of democratic structures affect participation patterns. Using the measures of political and civil rights devised by the Freedom House, or institutional-based measures of democracy by Jaggers and Gurr (1995), the extent of democracy does not have a significant influence on the likelihood of conventional political action. In fact, contact with government agencies is slightly lower in the more democratic nations. The lack of relationships is even more striking because we are comparing nations with fundamental differences in their political structures—variation between democratic and nondemocratic nations—and not just minor differences among European democracies.

At the same time, the clearest evidence of the impact of opportunity structures actually works counter to the theory. ENGOs are more likely to use the protest mode in nations that are more democratic and have greater civil and political liberties. For example, among the nations scoring highest on the Freedom House scale, 32% score highly on the protest measure; this declines monotonically to the lowest ranked nation (People’s Republic of China), in which neither of the two groups reports using protest. These relationships indicate that even though the environmental grievances may be objectively greater in the developing world, green groups in advanced industrial democracies are more likely to use protest as a tool. We suspect that this is because a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Mobilizing</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House: political rights</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House: civil rights</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House: press freedom</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House summary</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Democracy Index</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness of participation</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential allies</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-leaning government</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Green Party in parliament</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.28*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties (ln)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.22*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP/capita</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average education level</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Televisions/capita</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are Pearson correlations (r).
*p < .05.
The democratic system is more likely to tolerate protest as political expression. Confrontation with government may get Greenpeace favorable press coverage in Europe, but such actions might be repressed in a developing democracy.

The second panel in the table considers whether the presence of potential allies within the political process affects the action repertoire of ENGOs. A Leftist government, for instance, is not systematically related to any participation mode. Indeed, in retrospect one might ask whether the activity patterns of ENGOs should be dependent on who runs the government. Most green ENGOs will continue their past patterns of protest or consulting with friends in parliament regardless of who forms the government. Their policy success may vary with the composition of government but not their policy effort. There is some evidence in support of the allies hypothesis, however. The strength of green parties is significantly related to both conventional and unconventional activity. In addition, there is a tendency for protest to be more common in systems with a large number of political parties—again suggesting that increasing democratic access stimulates protest activities.

The variables in the lower panel in the table examine whether a nation’s resource environment generally affects the activity patterns of ENGOs. Because our nations vary greatly in their social conditions, this should provide a powerful test of whether the resource context influences activity levels. These macro-resource factors have little influence on any type of group action. For instance, national affluence (purchasing power parity (PPP)/capita) is virtually unrelated to each of the four activity dimensions. Even though none of the structural factors displays significance, there is a slight propensity for mobilizing and protest strategies to occur in advanced industrial societies ($r = .09$ and $r = .05$). At the systemic level, protest is not found in poor nations but in rich political contexts. Still, despite the huge variations in economic and social development in the sampled countries, structural economic and social conditions do not appear to have a substantive influence on green ENGO action repertoires.

The range of political institutions, and thus the opportunities for political action, varies considerably across the nations in our study—from the open,

12. In other research (Dalton & Rohrschneider 2002), we demonstrated that membership in challenging social movements, such as the environmental movement and women’s groups, also tends to be more common in the advanced industrial democracies. These societies provide both the resources and the political climate where these new social movements are likely to develop and where their challenges to the political authorities will be tolerated.

13. PPP/capita is based on 1997, average education levels are the average years of formal schooling, and televisions/per capita is the number of televisions per 1000 residents. These data are from the World Bank, World Development Report, 1998.
pluralist democracies of the West to the emerging democracies in East Europe and Latin America. Thus it is striking to find minimal effects for political structures. Few of the correlations in Table 4 reach the level of statistical significance, and the strongest relationships tend to run counter to what theory would suggest. It appears that the general predictive power of the POS is limited. We believe this is because the characteristics of individual ENGOs, such as their resource base and ideology, are more direct influences on behavior than broad social and political context (as shown in Tables 2 and 3). Greenpeace affiliates follow a pattern of action that is probably more similar across nations than to the activities of the national bird society in the same nation. Thus fixed national characteristics, such as system openness or level of affluence, have limited potential to explain the behavior of specific ENGOs.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Each theory of political action has some support in the previous analyses. To provide a more definitive assessment and to separate the independent effects of each theoretical explanation, we assembled a set of measures into multivariate ordinary least squares regression models. One initial concern was the potential multicollinearity problems. For example, the Freedom House measure of democracy is strongly correlated with the PPP/capita measure ($r = .67$). Because we felt that the level of democracy is the theoretically more important variable, we chose to include it in the model. Similarly, the number of full-time employees was strongly correlated with the group’s annual budget ($r = .71$); therefore, we included only the employee measure because it produces the strongest bivariate relationships (Table 2).

Table 5 presents the results from our four regression analyses. The overall patterns of the bivariate analyses generally carry over to the multivariate models. The most consistent predictor is the number of full-time employees of the group; well-staffed groups have the ability to be more politically active, regardless of the mode of activity. Staff members can arrange meetings with parliamentarians, as well as arrange for a mass demonstration or a media campaign. In contrast, an understaffed ENGO—a common pattern within the environmental movement—may struggle to be active in any domain. All of the coefficients for employees are strongly positive and significant.

The other significant predictor is ecologist orientation. As we have previously shown, ecologist groups are more likely to engage in protest actions ($\beta = .37$), even controlling for the other predictors in the model. Ecologists more often use mobilizing activities ($\beta = .24$), and there is a weaker tendency for ecologists to network with other ENGOs and social groups ($\beta = .17$). Con-
versely, there is a weak, albeit not statistically significant, tendency for ecologist groups not to participate in conventional activities ($\beta = -0.04$).

The other effects in the model are often linked to a specific participation mode. For instance, the age of a green ENGO is positively linked to participation in conventional activities. We attribute this both to the less controversial policies that older groups often advocate, such as animal protection or cultural preservation, and to their involvement in conventional politics over their longer history. In general, POSs continue to display only weak effects.\(^{14}\) The percentage of green parties is a statistically significant predictor only of protest activity, but the presence of allies actually encourages protest (and to a lesser extent, conventional action).

### The Implications of Green Modes of Action

To some, the environmental movement represents a deep and fundamental challenge to the dominant paradigm of the current economic order—a challenge to the paradigm that the economy should be organized around the maximization of profit at the expense of the environment.\(^{14}\) We also estimated several other models to test the effect of political opportunity structure (POS) on activities. For example, if the POS argument primarily holds in the context of democracies, we would expect that federal systems encourage conventional activities, whereas centralized systems lead to more protest activities. To test this expectation, we divided the entire sample at the mean value of the Freedom House score, roughly classifying the sample into free and unfree countries. We then replaced the Freedom House variable in Table 5 with a country’s federalism-centralism score (Polity III data) and estimated the model for the four activities within each of the two groups. None of the eight federalism scores is statistically significant, which means that more refined POS arguments limited to democracies also do not explain group activities.

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Table 5

**Multivariate Analysis of Patterns of Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Mobilizing</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of full-time employees</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of group</td>
<td>0.26*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologist orientation</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House summary</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party % in parliament</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Table entries are Pearson correlations ($r$).

* $p < .05.$
lenge that supposedly leads to programs of direct action and antisystem pro-
test. To others, the environmental movement has become almost just another
interest group, lobbying in parliamentary hallways and participating in
administrative hearings to pass reform legislation, much as other any other
group. Our goal was to determine the accuracy of these contrasting patterns
by systematically studying the activities of environmental groups. In addi-
tion, we wanted to extend past research on movement action in Western
democracies to a broader international comparison of environmental groups
in the First, Second, and Third World. Our analyses were based on the first
broad international survey of environmental groups in 56 nations.

The environmental movement in both the developed and the developing
world pursues a mixed strategy of political action. The most common activi-
ties aim at mobilizing public opinion or bringing media attention to the move-
ment and its causes. Networking with other environmental groups, social
movements, and interest groups is a common aspect of environmental action.
In general terms, such mobilizing and network activities appear to be an inev-
itatable element of citizen-based movements.

More interesting are the relative patterns of conventional and unconven-
tional action. Participation in government committees and meeting with gov-
ernment officials are common modes of action for ENGOs. At the same time,
protest and direct action are infrequently used parts of the political repertoire
of the movement. In short, there remains an element of protest within the
movement, but this is overshadowed by markedly higher levels of conven-
tional political action. Much as others have found for European groups, par-
ticipation patterns are best described by a diverse mix of activities within the
movement.

The findings for protest activity deserve special mention. We suspect that
images of environmentalists as antisystem radicals were always overdrawn,
but the empirical evidence demonstrates that this image does not apply today.
Furthermore, protest is not the tool of the politically marginal groups. Protest
is more common among large, better staffed groups. Protest is also more
common in the advanced industrial democracies, not in the developing world
where political access and democratic voice are more limited. These patterns
suggest that protest by environmental groups represents the continuation of
conventional politics by other means rather than an antisystem pattern of
action.

When we probe below the overall patterns of action, we also find that dif-
ferent groups gravitate toward distinct modes of activity. A group’s environ-
mental identity has a strong influence on its choice of political tactics. Groups
that hold a challenging ideology or that have created an identity as a challeng-
ing group, such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, are more likely to
resort to protest. In contrast, groups with a more traditional conservationist orientation or with values that do not challenge the dominant economic paradigm are more likely to find themselves working within conventional political channels. In other words, the total mix of activities comes from different groups emphasizing different modes of activity that are compatible with their environmental identity.

In addition, group resources are an important stimulus to action. Virtually regardless of the mode of action, groups with larger staffs, larger budgets, and larger memberships are more likely to be active. This underscores the importance of resource-mobilization-based theories of social movement behavior (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). At the same time, it suggests that even protest activities have evolved into planned, orchestrated events that require a staff and organizational expertise to execute successfully.

The nonfindings are equally significant. Many social movement theorists studying Western democracies argue that institutional contexts define a POS that influences the tactics chosen by SMOs (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). One of the unique aspects of the GEOS is the ability to compare the activity of green ENGOs across a wide range of political and social contexts; the nations in our study range from the most affluent, advanced industrial democracies to nations ranking far lower on both political and social development. With such a wider range of contexts, the impact of POSs should be even more important. In actuality, we found only weak evidence that national political contexts shape movement strategies. Within each nation, the environmental movement is so diverse that national-level opportunity structures have little influence on the participation patterns of environmental groups. Some groups in most nations pursue conventional methods, whereas others focus on mobilizing and protest activities—and both strategies are possible in most political settings regardless of the political structures of the nation.

In summary, our findings counter the frequent assumption that social movements are an exception to the normal patterns of interest group politics in a democratic polity. Environmental groups, women’s groups, and the peace movement are seen as challengers to the political order, advocating different values and a different style of action. Such tendencies do exist within these movements. But taken together, our findings provide further evidence that the environmental movement as a whole is losing its antisystem orientation. Our findings support the contention that environmental politics is largely becoming the extension of conventional politics to a new policy domain, as evidenced in both the mixed repertoire of action of ENGOs and the factors that condition these actions. And it is even more striking that these patterns apply to the developing world as well as the advanced industrial
democracies. Perhaps this is partial evidence of the now global nature of the environmental movement.

REFERENCES


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