CHAPTER

CITIZENSHIP AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY

Every age since the ancient Greeks fashioned an image of being political based upon citizenship.

Engin Isin, Being Political

What does it mean to be a “good citizen” in today’s society?

An article on the annual UCLA survey of college freshmen presented an interview with a California university student who had spent his semester break as a volunteer helping to salvage homes flooded by Hurricane Katrina. The young man had organized a group of student volunteers, who then gave up their break to do hard labor in the devastated region far from their campus. He said finding volunteers willing to work “was easier than I expected.” Indeed, the gist of the article was that volunteering in 2005 was at its highest percentage in the twenty-five years of the college survey. This experience was repeated as young people came to help with the destruction of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and the UCLA survey found that volunteering had risen further in the fall 2013 freshman class.

Later I also spoke with another student who had traveled to help with hurricane cleanup. Beyond this experience, he was active on a variety of social and political causes, from problems of development in Africa, to campus politics, to conflict in the Middle East. When I asked about his
interest in political parties and elections, however, there was stark lack of interest. Like many of his fellow students, he had not voted in the last election. He had not participated in the presidential campaign, which was his first opportunity to vote. This behavior seems paradoxical considering the effort involved; it’s just a short walk from the campus to the nearest polling station but almost a two thousand mile drive to go across country where he had volunteered.

These stories illustrate some of the ways that the patterns of citizenship are changing. Many young people in America—and in other Western democracies—are concerned about their society and others in the world. And they are willing to contribute their time and effort to make a difference. They see a role for themselves and their government in improving the world in which we live. At the same time, they relate to government and society in different ways than their elders. Research in the United States and other affluent democracies shows that today’s citizens are the most educated, most cosmopolitan, and most supportive of self-expressive values than any others in the history of democracy. So from both anecdotal and empirical perspectives, most of the social and political changes in the American public over the past half-century would seem to have strengthened the foundations of democracy.

Despite this positive and hopeful view of America, a very different story is often told today in political and academic circles. A recent essay in The Economist lists the mounting problems of contemporary democracies and then put the blame for what’s gone wrong with democracy directly on its citizens: “The biggest challenge to democracy . . . comes from the voters themselves. Plato’s great worry about democracy, that citizens would ‘live day to day, indulging the pleasure of the moment,’ has proved prescient.” Similarly, a host of political analysts bemoan what is wrong with America and its citizens. Too few of us are voting, we are disconnected from our fellow citizens and lacking in social capital, we are losing faith in our government, and the nation is in social disarray. The lack of good citizenship is the phrase you often hear as an explanation for these disturbing trends.

What you also hear is that the young are the primary source of this decline. Authors from Harvard professor Robert Putman to former television news anchor Tom Brokaw extol the civic values and engagement
of the older “greatest generation” with great hyperbole. Putnam along with many others hold that the slow, steady, and ineluctable replacement of older, civic-minded generations by the disaffected Generation X is the most important reason for the erosion of social capital in America. These political experts seemingly agree that young Americans are dropping out of politics, losing faith in government, and even becoming disenchanted with their personal lives. A recent *Time* magazine article on the Millennial Generation began with the following introduction:

Here are some broad descriptions about the generation known as Millennials: They’re narcissistic. They’re lazy. They’re coddled. They’re even a bit delusional. Those aren’t just unfounded negative stereotypes about 80 million Americans born roughly between 1980 and 2000. They’re backed up by a decade of sociological research.

Perhaps not since Aristotle held that “political science is not a proper study for the young” have youth been so roundly denounced by their elders.

At the same time, other experts are more positive. Ronald Inglehart, for example, says that younger generations are more committed to participatory values and democratic ideals, more concerned with the well-being of others, and more cognitively sophisticated than previous generations in the United States and other affluent democracies. Other analysts discuss a younger generation that is politically engaged, albeit in different ways than their elders. Contemporary research points to the rising levels of volunteerism among the young, ranging from Teach America to the Peace Corps to local community activities. Youth are also more positive toward the political and social diversity of America, more tolerant of others. Thus, *The Economist* recently had a special article on youth that began with a different tag line: “Today’s young people are held to be alienated, unhappy, violent failures. They are proving anything but.” So the debate continues, and it is an important debate because it portends our country’s future.

We have two very different images of American society and politics. One perspective says American democracy is at risk in large part because of the changing values and participation patterns of the young. The other side points to new patterns of citizenship that have emerged among the
young, the better educated, and other parts of American society. These opposing views have generated sharp debates about the vitality of our democracy, and they are the subject of this book.

Perhaps the subtitle for this volume should be: “The good news is . . . the bad news is wrong.” Indeed, something is changing in American society and politics. But is it correct to conclude, as many do, that if politics is not working as it did in the past, then our entire system of democracy is at risk? To understand what is changing, and its implications for American democracy, it is more helpful first to ask that simple but fundamental question:

What does it mean to be a good citizen in America today?


This book examines how the American public answers this question—and the fact is, people answer it in different ways. I argue that the changing definition of what it means to be a good citizen—what I call the norms of citizenship—are the key to understanding what is really going on.

Let me begin by summarizing the social restructuring of American society since the mid-twentieth century (Figure 1.1). Changing living standards, occupational experiences, the entry of women into the labor force, expanding civil rights, and other societal changes are producing two reinforcing effects. First, people possess new skills and resources that enable them to better manage the complexities of politics—people today are better educated, have more information available to them, and enjoy a higher standard of living. This removes some of the restrictions on democratic citizenship that existed in earlier time periods when these skills and resources were less commonly available. Second, social forces are reshaping social and political values. Americans are more assertive and less deferential to authority, and they place more emphasis on participating in the decisions affecting their lives. The expansion of these self-expressive values has a host of political implications.\(^\text{13}\)
The figure suggests that as the characteristics of citizens and society have changed, this reshapes political values including the norms of good citizenship. Citizenship norms essentially define what people think is expected of them as participants in the political system, along with their expectations of government and the political process.

Most definitions of citizenship typically focus on the traditional norms of American citizenship—voting, paying taxes, serving on a jury—and how these seem to be eroding. I call this duty-based citizenship because these norms reflect the formal obligations, responsibilities, and rights of citizenship as they have been defined in the past.
However, it is just as important to examine new norms that make up what I call engaged citizenship. These norms are emerging among the American public with increasing prominence. Engaged citizenship emphasizes a more assertive role for the citizen and a broader definition of citizenship to include social concerns and the welfare of others. As illustrated by the Katrina volunteers, many Americans believe they are fully engaged in society even if they do not vote or conform to traditional definitions of citizenship. Moreover, the social and political transformation of the United States over the past several decades has systematically shifted the balance between these citizenship norms. Thus a second observation is that duty-based norms are decreasing, especially among the young, but the norms of engaged citizenship are increasing.

Third, Figure 1.1 suggests that changes in citizenship norms affect citizens’ political values and behaviors. For instance, duty-based norms of citizenship stimulate turnout in elections and a sense of patriotic allegiance to the elected government, while engaged citizenship may promote other forms of political action, ranging from volunteerism to public protest. These contrasting norms also shape other political values, such as tolerance of others and public policy priorities. Even trust in government itself is influenced by how individuals define their own norms of citizenship.

American politics and the citizenry are changing. Before anyone can deliver a generalized indictment of the American public, we need a full understanding of how citizenship norms are changing and the effects of these changes. It is undeniable that the American public at the beginning of the twenty-first century is different from the American electorate in the mid-twentieth century. However, some of these differences, such as increased political tolerance and acceptance of diversity in society and politics, actually benefit American democracy. Other generational differences are just different—they’re not a threat to American democracy unless these changes are ignored or resisted. A full examination of citizenship norms and their consequences will provide a more complex, and potentially more optimistic, picture of the challenges and opportunities facing American democracy today.

In addition, we need to place the American experience in a broader cross-national context. Many scholars who study American politics only
study American politics. This leads to an introspective view of what is presumably unique about the American experience and how patterns of citizenship may, or may not be, idiosyncratic to the United States. American politics is the last great field of area study research in which one nation is examined by itself. Many trends apparent in American norms of citizenship and political activity are common to other affluent democracies. Other patterns may be distinctly American. Only by broadening the field of comparison can we see the similarities and the differences.

The shift in the norms of citizenship does not mean that American democracy does not face challenges in responding to new citizen demands and new patterns of action. Indeed, the vitality of democracy is that it must, and usually does, respond to such challenges, and this in turn strengthens the democratic process. But it is my contention that political reforms must reflect a true understanding of the American public and its values. By accurately recognizing the current challenges, and responding to them rather than making dire claims about political decay, American democracy can continue to evolve and develop. The fact remains that we cannot return to the politics of the 1950s, and we probably should not want to. However, we can improve the democratic process if we first understand how Americans and their world are really changing.

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA

On a cab ride from Ann Arbor to the Detroit airport the cab driver told me the story of the American dream as his life story. Now, driving a cab is not a fun job; it requires long hours, uncertainty, and brings in typically modest income. The cab driver had grown up in the Detroit area. His relatives worked in the auto plants, and he drove a cab as a second job to make ends meet. We started talking about politics, and when he learned I was a university professor, he told me of his children. His son had graduated from the University of Michigan and had begun a successful business career. He was even prouder of his daughter, who was finishing law school. “All this on a cab driver’s salary,” he said with great pride in his children.

If you live in America, you have heard this story many times. It is the story of American society. The past five decades have seen this story repeated over and over again because this has been a period of exceptional
social and political change. There was a tremendous increase in the average standard of living as the American economy expanded. The post-war baby boom generation reaped these benefits and, like the cab driver’s children, were often the first in their family to attend college.

In addition, a rights revolution empowered a large share of the public that had been limited to the periphery of politics. The civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s ended centuries of official governmental acceptance of racial discrimination. The women’s movement of the 1970s and 1980s transformed gender roles that had roots in social relations since the beginning of human history. (In the 1950s and early 1960s it was unlikely that the cab driver’s daughter would have attended law school regardless of her abilities.) America became an even more socially and ethnically diverse nation, building on its immigrant past. Today, the definition of equal rights is expanding to include homosexuals through the legalization of gay marriage and protection from other forms of discrimination.

In *The Rise of the Creative Class*, Richard Florida discusses how a time traveler from 1950 would view life in the United States if he or she was transported to 1900, and then again to 2000. Florida suggests that technological change would appear greater between 1900 and 1950, as people moved from horse-and-buggy times all the way to the space age. But cultural change would seem greater between 1950 and 2000, as America went from a closed social structure with limited standards of living to a very affluent society one that gives nearly equal status to women, blacks, and other minorities. Similarly, I am fairly certain that if Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson returned to observe the 2012 U.S. presidential election, they would not recognize it as the same electorate and politics as they encountered in their 1952 and 1956 campaigns for the Oval Office.

In the same respect, many of our scholarly images of American public opinion and political behavior are shaped by an older view of our political system. The landmark studies of Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes remain unrivaled in their theoretical and empirical richness in describing the American public. However, they examined the electorate of the 1950s. At an intellectual level, we may be aware of how the American public and politics have changed
since 1952, but since these changes accumulate slowly over time, it is easy to overlook their total impact. The electorate of 1956, for instance, was only marginally different from the electorate of 1952; and the electorate of 2012 is only marginally different from that of 2008. As gradual changes accumulate over five or six decades, however, this produces a major transformation in the socioeconomic conditions of the American public—conditions that are directly related to citizenship norms. None of the trends described below is likely to surprise you. But you may be struck by the size of the total change across a long span of time.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of change, and the carrier of new experiences and new norms, is the generational turnover of the American public. The public of the 1950s largely came of age during the Great Depression or before and had lived through one or both world wars—experiences that had a strong influence on images of citizenship and politics. We can see how rapidly the process of demographic change reshapes the public by following the changing generational composition of the public from 1952 to the present in Figure 1.2. In the 1952 electorate, 85 percent of Americans had grown up before the outbreak of World War II (born before 1926). This includes the “greatest generation” (born between 1895 and 1926) heralded by Tom Brokaw and other recent authors. Each year, with mounting frequency, some of this generation leave the electorate and are replaced by new citizens. In 1968, in the midst of the flower-power decade of the 1960s, the “greatest generation” still composed 60 percent of the populace. By 2012, this generation has all but left the electorate. In their place, a third of the contemporary public in 2012 are post–World War II Baby Boomers, a quarter is the Flower Generation of the 1960s and early 1970s, and another quarter are the Eighties generation who followed. Generation X came of age at the end of the twentieth century and comprises about a fifth of the adult public. Most recently, a new Millennial Generation—born in 1982 or later—is entering adulthood; about a fifth of the adult public were Millennials in 2012.17

The steady march of generations across time has important implications for citizenship norms. Anyone born before 1926 was raised in a much different political context, where people were expected to be dutiful, parents taught their children to be obedient, political skills were limited, and social realities were dramatically different from contemporary
life. These Americans carry the living memories of the Great Depression, four-term president Franklin Delano Roosevelt and World War II and its aftermath—and so they also embody the norms of citizenship shaped by these experiences.

The Baby Boomers experienced a very different kind of life as American social and economic stability was reestablished after the war. In further contrast, the 1960s generation experienced a nation in the midst of traumatic social change—the end of segregation, women’s liberation, and the expansion of civil and human rights around the world. The curriculum of schools changed to reinforce these developments, and surveys show that parents also began emphasizing initiative and independence in rearing their children.18 And most recently, Generation X and the Millennial
Generation are growing up in an era when individualism appears dominant, and both affluence and consumerism seem overdeveloped (even if unequally shared). If nothing else changed, we would expect that political norms would react to this new social context.

Citizenship norms also reflect the personal characteristics of the people. Over the past several decades, the politically relevant skills and resources of the average American have increased dramatically. One of the best indicators of this trend is educational achievement. Advanced industrial societies require more educated and technically sophisticated citizens, and modern affluence has expanded educational opportunities. University enrollments grew dramatically during the latter half of the twentieth century. By the 1990s, graduate degrees were almost as common as bachelor’s degrees were in mid-century.

These trends have steadily raised the educational level of the American public (Figure 1.3). For instance, two-fifths of American adults in 1952 had a primary education or less, and another fifth had only some high school. In the presidential election that year, the Eisenhower and Stevenson campaigns faced a citizenry with limited formal education, modest income levels, and relatively modest political sophistication. It might not be surprising that these individuals would have a limited definition of the appropriate role of a citizen. By 2012, the educational composition of the American public had changed dramatically. Barely a tenth have less than a high school degree, and more than three-fifths have at least some college education—and many of these have earned one or more degrees. The contemporary American public has a level of formal schooling that would have been unimaginable in the 1950s.

There is no direct, one-to-one relationship between years of schooling and political sophistication. Nonetheless, education tends to heighten a person’s level of political knowledge and interest. Educational levels affect the modes of political decision making that people use, and rising educational levels increase the breadth of political interests. A doubling of the public’s educational level may not double the level of political sophistication and engagement, but a significant increase should and does occur. The public today is the most educated in the history of American democracy, and this contributes to a more expansive and engaged image of citizenship.
Even more provocatively, social scientists have found that the average person’s IQ has risen over the past century in the U.S. and other affluent democracies. The average American in 2012 had an IQ that was 18 points higher than the average American in 1952. This is a very large increase such that the average person in 2012 scores at what was the 85th percentile in 1952! We are getting smarter according to this evidence, which should make it easier for people to follow politics, participate in the process, and understand the complex issues we face. This rise in IQ is due to many factors, such as improving living standards, improving health, and the lessening of negative environmental conditions, but a major factor is the expansion of education and the development of a scientific way of thinking about the world.

Source: ANES Cumulative File, 1952–2008; 2012 ANES.
Social modernization has also transformed the structure of the economy from one based on industrial production and manufacturing (and farming) to one dominated by the services and the information sectors. Instead of the traditional blue-collar union worker, who manufactured goods and things, the paragon of today’s workforce is the “knowledge worker” whose career is based on the creation, manipulation, and application of information. Business managers, lawyers, accountants, teachers, computer programmers, designers, database managers, and media professionals all represent different examples of knowledge workers. If one takes a sociological view of the world, where life experiences shape political values, this shift in occupation patterns should affect citizenship norms. The traditional blue-collar employee works in a hierarchical organization where following orders, routine, and structure are guiding principles. Knowledge workers, in contrast, are supposed to be creative, adaptive, and technologically adept, which presumably produces a different image of what one’s role should be in society. Richard Florida calls them the “creative class” and links their careers to values of individuality, diversity, openness, and meritocracy.

These trends are a well-known aspect of American society, but we often overlook the amount of change they have fomented in politics over the past six decades. Figure 1.4 plots the broad employment patterns of American men from 1952 until 2012. (We’ll track only males at this point to separate out the shift in the social position of women that is examined below.) In the 1950s, most of the labor force was employed in working-class occupations, and another sixth had jobs in farming. The category of professionals and managers, which is an indirect measure for knowledge workers (the actual number of knowledge workers is significantly larger) was small by comparison. Barely a quarter of the labor force held such jobs in the 1950s.

Slowly but steadily, labor patterns shifted. By 2012, blue-collar workers and professionals/knowledge workers are at rough parity, and the proportions of service and clerical workers have increased (some of whom should also be classified as knowledge workers). Florida uses a slightly more restrictive definition of the creative class but similarly argues that their proportion of the labor force has doubled since 1950.
nothing else had changed, we would expect that the political outlook of the modern knowledge worker would be much different than in previous generations.

The social transformation of the American public has no better illustration than the changing social status of women. At the time Angus Campbell and colleagues published *The American Voter* in 1960, women held a restricted role in society and politics. American women had limited economic and political power, and most women were homemakers and mothers. One of the coauthors of *The American Voter* noted that their interviewers regularly encountered women who thought the interviewer should return when her husband was home to answer the survey questions, since politics was the man’s domain.
The women’s movement changed these social roles in a relatively brief span of time. Women steadily moved into the workplace, entered universities, and became more engaged in the political process. Employment patterns illustrate the changes. Figure 1.5 tracks the percentage of women who were housekeepers, in paid employment, or another status across the past five decades.²⁶ In 1952, two-thirds of women described themselves as homemakers. The image of June Cleaver, the stay-at-home-mom on the popular TV show *Leave it to Beaver* was not an inaccurate portrayal of the middle-class American woman of that era. By 2012, however, two-thirds of women were employed and only a sixth described themselves as homemakers. The professional woman is now a staple of American society and culture. The freedom and anxieties of the upwardly mobile women in the TV programs *Girls* or *The Good Wife* are more typical of the contemporary age.

The changing social status of women also affects their citizenship traits. For instance, women’s educational levels have risen even more rapidly than men’s. By 2012, the educational attainment of young men and women was essentially equal, with slightly more women attending college. As women enter the workforce, this should stimulate political participation; no longer is politics a male preserve. For instance, although women are still underrepresented in politics, the growth in the number of women officeholders during the last half of the twentieth century is quite dramatic.²⁷ Rather than being mere spectators or supporters of their husbands, women are now politically engaged and create their own political identities. Though gender inequity and issues of upward professional mobility remain, this transformation in the social position of half the public has clear political implications.

Race is another major source of political transformation within the American electorate. In the 1950s, the American National Election Studies found that about two-thirds of African Americans said they were not registered to vote, and few actually voted. By law or tradition, many of these Americans were excluded from the most basic rights of citizenship. The civil rights movement and the transformation of politics in the South finally incorporated African Americans into the electorate.²⁸ African Americans’ voting participation surged with Barack Obama’s candidacy in 2008 and 2012, but black and white Americans already voted at
roughly equal rates in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. In other words, almost a tenth of the public was excluded from citizenship in the mid-twentieth century, and these individuals are now both included and more active. Moreover, Hispanic and Asian Americans are also entering the electorate in increasing numbers, transforming the complexion of American politics. If Adlai Stevenson could witness the Democratic National Convention in 2008 and 2012, he would surely be amazed at the change in the party that nominated him for president in both 1952 and 1956.

Though historically seismic, these generational, educational, gender, and racial changes are not the only ingredients of the social transformation of the United States into an advanced industrial society. The average living standard of Americans has more than tripled over this period as
well, closely linked to changes in the structure of the economy and rising levels of skills and knowledge. Michael Shermer summarizes some of the most striking changes in living standards:

We also have more material goods—SUVs, DVDs, PCs, TVs, designer clothes, name-brand jewelry, home appliances and gadgets of all kinds. The homes in which we keep all our goodies have doubled in size in just the last half a century, from about 1,100 square feet in the 1950s to more than 2,200 square feet today. And 95 percent of these homes have central heating, compared with just 15 percent a century ago, and 78 percent have air conditioners, compared with the numbers of our grandparents’ generation—zip.\textsuperscript{30}

In addition, the growth of the mass media and now the Internet has created an information environment that is radically different from that of the 1950s. Information is now instantaneous, and it’s available from a wide variety of sources. The advancement of transportation technologies has shrunk the size of the nation and the world and increased the breadth of our life experiences.\textsuperscript{31} These social changes inevitably increase the skills and resources that are useful in being an active democratic citizen.

These trends accompany changes in the forms of social organization and interaction. Structured forms of organization, such as political parties run by backroom “bosses” and tightly run political machines, have given way to voluntary associations and ad hoc advocacy groups, which in turn become less formal and more spontaneous in organization. Communities are becoming less bounded by geographical proximity—think of your Facebook friends. Individuals are involved in increasingly complex and competing social networks that divide their loyalties. Institutional ties are becoming more fluid; hardly anyone expects to work a lifetime for one employer anymore.

None of these trends is surprising to analysts of American society, but too often we overlook the magnitude of these changes cumulated over decades. In fact, these trends are altering the norms of citizenship and the nature of American politics. They have taken place in a slow and relatively silent process over several decades, but they now reflect the new reality of political life.
THE PLOT OF THIS BOOK

This study uses public opinion surveys to examine citizenship norms in America. Its goal is to make this information accessible to anyone interested in American politics, even if they are not well versed in statistics and research methodologies. The basic theme is quite straightforward: The modernization of American society has transformed the norms of citizenship, and this is affecting the political values and actions of the public—often in positive ways that previous research has overlooked.

The book has three sections. The first section describes citizenship norms in theory and reality. The idea of citizenship has a long history in political research and an equally long list of meanings and uses. Chapter 2 summarizes the key principles of citizenship in contemporary political thought, then introduces a battery of citizenship norms developed through an international collaboration of scholars. These questions appeared in the 2004 and 2014 General Social Surveys (GSS) of the American public as well as in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which includes other nations. These surveys are the central evidence for this study. In addition, the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) at Georgetown University included similar questions in its 2005 Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey; at points we provide evidence from this survey as well.

These surveys identify two clusters of citizenship norms—duty-based and engaged citizenship—that organize the analysis in this volume. The first, citizen duty, reflects traditional norms of the citizen as loyal to, and supportive of, the political system. The second cluster typifies the new, challenging values found among younger Americans. We describe which groups of people lean toward these two rival definitions of good citizenship.

The second section (Chapters 4–7) considers some of the potential consequences of changing norms of citizenship. We are limited to the topics included in the General Social Surveys, but this fortunately provides a wealth of evidence on important political attitudes and activities. Chapter 4 challenges the idea that political participation is broadly declining; it presents new evidence that Americans are engaged in different ways than in the past. Except for voting participation, more
Americans participate in politics than ever before, especially direct, policy-focused, and individualized forms of activity. Changing norms of citizenship affect the choice of political activities.

Chapter 5 examines the link between citizenship norms and political tolerance. Popular political discourse suggests that Americans have become polarized on ideological grounds, divided into red and blue states and comparable states of mind, intolerant toward those who are different. In fact, political tolerance has increased markedly over the past several decades, and this tolerance is concentrated among the young and better educated. These findings provide a much more positive image of how the American public has changed its political values over the past several generations.

Chapter 6 examines the implications of citizenship norms on the making of public policy—what policies people favor at both national and local levels. Long-term trends show that people have actually expanded their policy expectations of government over the past several decades, despite the efforts by some public officials to roll back the scope of government action. Moreover, citizenship norms are clearly linked to these expectations. The norms of citizen duty are linked to a restrictive image of the government’s policy role. Engaged citizens, meanwhile, see the need for greater government activity, especially activity in distinct policy domains. Citizenship norms shape our expectations of government and what it should provide.

Some of the loudest voices in the crisis-of-democracy literature have focused on the decline of trust in government and political institutions since the late 1960s as an ominous sign for our nation. Chapter 7 tracks these trends and analyzes the relationship between citizenship and political support. Again, changing citizenship norms are related to these sentiments, but in complex ways. The engaged citizen is less trustful of politicians when compared with duty-based citizens, but engaged citizens are also more supportive of democratic principles and democratic values. This suggests that changing citizenship norms are pressuring democracy to meet its ideals—and challenging politicians and institutions that fall short of these ideals.

While these analyses largely focus on the American experience, Chapter 8 places the U.S. findings in cross-national context. Using data
from the 2004 International Social Survey Program, I compare the patterns of citizenship norms of Americans and Europeans and their consequences. This shows what is distinct about the American experience and what is part of a common process affecting other affluent democracies.

The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for the democratic process in America. We cannot recreate the halcyon politics of a generation ago—nor should we necessarily want to. New patterns of citizenship call for new processes and new institutions that will reflect the values of the contemporary American public.

CONCLUSION

In many ways this book presents an unconventional view of the American public. Many of my colleagues in political science are skeptical of positive claims about the American public—and they are especially skeptical that any good can come from the young. Instead, they warn that democracy is at risk and that American youth are a primary reason.

I respect my colleagues’ views and have benefited from their writings—*but this book tells the rest of the story*. Politics in the United States and other affluent societies is changing in ways that hold the potential for strengthening and broadening the democratic process. The old patterns are eroding—as in norms of duty-based voting and deference toward authority—but there are positive and negative implications of these trends if we look for both. The new norms of engaged citizenship come with their own potential advantages and problems. America has become more democratic since the mid-twentieth century, even if progress is still incomplete. Understanding the current state of American political consciousness is the purpose of this book. If we do not become preoccupied with the patterns of democracy in the past but look toward the potential for our democracy in the future, we can better understand the American public and take advantage of the potential for further progress.