Citizens, Democracy, and Markets

Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin

*Democracy and the market economy are two sides of a coin, or two wheels of a cart. Every nation that has embraced both democracy and a market economy has been successful.*

—Kim Dae Jung
(Inaugural address, 1998)

Two historic processes are transforming East Asia. The first process, and the better known, is the region’s economic development. Today, East Asia represents one of the most dynamic parts of the global economy. As the world’s fastest growing region, it is rapidly closing the economic gap between itself and the Western advanced industrial societies. In the past two decades, the region has experienced an average annual GDP growth rate of nearly 8 percent. As recently as 1970, some of the now affluent East Asian nations had income levels comparable to many poor African nations. Today, citizens in some East Asian nations are as much as four times wealthier than they were just a single generation ago. East Asia, including Japan, currently accounts for more than 20 percent of the world economy and 24 percent of world trade (World Bank 2002). In terms of both magnitude and speed of change, no other region of the world has recently experienced economic transformation to a greater extent than East Asia.

Japan and the four East Asian tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—are known as ‘miracle economies’ because their accomplishments are unparalleled in the history of economic development. They have registered large, sustained economic growth rates over decades, while keeping relatively low levels of inequality in wealth and income distribution. Following the policies of export-growth and state guidance of industrialization that Japan initiated in the early 1960s, three other countries in the region—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—have achieved rapid and sustainable economic growth. However, these examples of economic development often were based on incestuously close relationships between corporations and the government—sometimes called ‘crony capitalism’ or
directed capitalism—that stopped short of free and open market competition.

In 1997, the worst financial crisis since World War II hit East Asia. The crisis ended the decades of rapid economic expansion and shattered the ideological foundation of crony capitalism (Dore 1998). Consequently, many Asian governments have sought to transform this system of directed or crony capitalism into market capitalism by restructuring financial institutions and corporate governance, privatizing public industries, deregulating private industries, and liberalizing international trade (Weiss 1999; Stigliz and Yusuf 2001). In Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, the costs of restructuring banks and other financial institutions alone range from 16 to 50 percent of their GDPs. Thus, the marketization process has followed an uneven course in Asia.

Communist China and Vietnam also have moved toward market capitalism in recent years with a ‘socialist market economy’ formula. Both countries, for example, are ending the practices of central planning of the economy. These two nations abandoned the collective farming system and granted individual households long-term use rights over land and the freedom to cultivate it as they wished. They also liberalized prices, foreign exchange, and external trade and investment. In the case of China, private enterprises currently now produce 75 percent of its GNP. Most notably, the National People’s Congress amended its Constitution in March 2004 to formally adopt the capitalist principle of private property: ‘Private property obtained legally is inviolable’. At a slower pace, economic policy reforms are restructuring the Vietnamese economic system.

In overall terms, the economic transformation of East Asia has been nothing short of miraculous. Living conditions in many nations are now several times better than a generation ago. From Shanghai to Seoul, people today enjoy a lifestyle and life chances that are far removed from those of their grandparents. There are high-literacy rates in most nations of the region, increased access to information, and a globalized economy is increasing exposure to international norms. These economic changes are the most visible signs of a general process of social modernization in the region.

The second process of transformation has evolved slowly, and is perhaps less recognized outside of the region: Asia’s participation in the third wave of democratization. The democratization wave began in 1986 when the ‘people power’ revolution swept the Marcos regime from power in the Philippines, recreating a democracy system of government. Taiwan and South Korea experienced historic transitions in the following year, with the introduction of free, competitive elections that began a relatively steady process of democratization. Mongolia made a rapid transition from Soviet vassal state to a democracy in the early 1990s. Military rule in Thailand ended in 1992 with a return to a civilian controlled government, and eventually the institution of
free elections. In 1998, antigovernment demonstrations brought an end to the 32-year rule of Suharto, charting Indonesia on a new democratic course that culminated in the 2004 presidential elections.

This democratization wave in East Asia means that more than 400 million additional people now live in new democratic political systems. These developments have significantly changed the political map of East Asia. In 1975 the Freedom House rated only one nation of the thirteen nations in East Asia as a free electoral democracy (this was Japan); by 2005 democracies exist in almost half of the nations in the region.¹ This trend has produced a dramatic change in the political rights and life chances of the people in many East Asian nations—but it is an incomplete process, since half the nations in the region remain nondemocratic or only partly free.

Some scholars argue that social modernization is increasing the potential for further democratization in East Asia (Neher and Marlay 1995; Diamond 2003; cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005). Indeed, the modernization literature has long argued that economic development encourages democratic development (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Increased living standards, a more complex economy, increased literacy, integration into the global system should eventually promote democratization in East Asia if the modernization thesis is correct. Thus, the potential for further democratic development exists. Bruce Gilley (2003), for instance, is provocatively asking how democratization will occur in China, and where it will lead. Imagine how the world could be transformed if China became democratic (also see Tang 2005).

However, other analysts maintain that national traditions and political culture may lead to different developmental courses. Prominent government leaders in East Asia directly challenge the applicability of liberal democratic politics to the region. Confucianism and ‘Asia values’ are regularly offered as a reason for the region’s stunted democratic development (Lee 1994; Emmerson 1995; and see extensive discussion in Chapter 5). The adherence to traditional authority structures, the paternalistic norms, and rejection of individualism have sometimes been cited as factors retarding the development of democracy. Lee Kuan Yew’s and Mahathir Mohamad’s polemic statements on these points were widely cited in the popular and elite press, but more nuanced versions of this same logic have been offered by leading academic scholars of the region (Pye 1985, 1999; Scalapino 1989; Huntington 1996; Zakaria 2003; Chua 2004).

The evolution of political and economic reforms in East Asia will most immediately depend on the actions of political elites and other major political actors in these nations. At the same time, political culture theory maintains that longer-term development should be linked to popular orientations toward the political and economic systems (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye 1965; Inglehart 1997). Previous research has stressed the role of political
culture in the development of democracy in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Richardson 1974; Xu 1998; Shin 1999). Culture can have an influential role in shaping future political and economic development in the region.

Thus, this book examines whether the values and orientations of East Asian publics are congruent with the development of democratic institutions and market economies in these societies? Although survey research on political culture is rapidly developing, the current body of evidence on East Asian political culture is incomplete and often limited to single nation studies. In addition, the questions of cultural congruence are central to understanding current conditions and future prospects for the region—and provide a critical case for testing congruence theory.

Until now, the nature of citizen values in East Asia has been debated by elites—with little systematic, representative cross-national evidence to substantiate claims on either side. The research evidence was often indirect, coming from observation of social norms, or nonrepresentative measurements of opinions. Scientific research on public opinion has typically been limited to nations that had consolidated their democratic development. Without broader evidence on the attitudes of people in the region, contending descriptions of political and economic values are inevitable.

Our project gives voice to the citizens of East Asia and adds this evidence on public opinion to the debate on the region’s development. We draw upon a new set of coordinated national opinion surveys conducted as part of the World Values Survey (WVS) project (Inglehart et al. 2004). The WVS examines public opinion across a wide range of East Asian nations, and compare the Asian findings to the established Western democracies of the Pacific Rim. Most of the contributors to this volume are principal investigators who collected the WVS data or who participate in the WVS network of scholars.

We have two broad research goals. First, much of the modernization literature treats political culture as an integral part of this process. East Asia is an important test case for this theory. To what extent has the past socioeconomic development of the region transformed citizen attitudes and values, or have historical and cultural traditions produced different developmental paths in these nations? Our project describes the level of support for democracy and markets across East Asia using representative national public opinion surveys. Although there is some empirical public opinion research in single nations, cross-national comparisons can improve our understanding of national patterns by placing each nation in a comparative perspective. Thus, our findings should illuminate the match of public values with political and economic systems in the region.

Second, the significance of opinions is partially dependent on the forces that are shaping them. Much of this volume is devoted to analyzing the sources of support for democracy and/or markets, especially the modernization
processes that may be reshaping cultural traditions over time. Again, the WVS is an exceptionally rich resource for these analyses, because of the cross-national and cross-temporal breadth of the surveys, and the rich collection of questions asked in these surveys.

THE FRAMEWORK OF CONGRUENCE THEORY

One of the most powerful social science concepts to emerge in political behavior research—and one central to the study of citizen attitudes and behavior—is the concept of political culture. Tocqueville, for instance, wrote that democracy should develop as a habit of the heart reflecting basic values and patterns of social relations: ‘The manners of the people may be considered as one of the great general causes to which the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States is attributable’ (Tocqueville 1945: 299). Almond and Verba’s seminal study (1963), *The Civic Culture*, contended that the institutions and patterns of action in a political system are closely linked to the political culture of the nation. They described as set of political values—tolerance, participatory norms, and political trust—that supported a democratic political process. Culturalist studies have been especially important in the early study of democratization, as analysts tried to identify the cultural requisites of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, 1980; Eckstein 1966; Pye and Verba 1965). A similar argument could be made for the development of a modern, capitalist market (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Embedded in political culture research are several concepts that we draw upon in our project. Most basic is the concept of congruence. The political culture literature argues that stable political systems tend to have cultures and institutions that are congruent with one another. For instance, authoritarian states often depend on a deferential public that accepts the power of the state (or lacks the political skills and resources to challenge the state). The archetypical authoritarian example is Germany in the early twentieth century, where an undemocratic and intolerant public undermined the democratic Weimar Republic and eventually supported the consolidation of the Third Reich. Thus, the challenge for post-World War II Germany—and other nondemocratic states—is to develop a political culture congruent with a democratic political order.

Even before the Third Wave democratic transitions, political culture studies were demonstrating the general principle of congruence. Drawing on the 1981 WVS, Inglehart demonstrated the congruence between broad political attitudes and democratic stability for twenty-two nations (Inglehart 1990, Chapter 1).2 Putnam’s research (1993) on regional governments in Italy provided even more impressive testimony in support of cultural theory. Putnam used an imaginative array of government performance measures to
show that the cultural traditions of a region—roughly contrasting the cooperative political style of the North to the more hierarchic tradition of the South—were a potent predictor of democratic performance. Even more telling, Putnam showed that cultural factors were more influential than economic conditions in explaining democratic performance, and cultural factors reflected historical patterns of civic association. The Afrobarometer found a strong correspondence between public support for democracy and the extent of democracy across twelve African nations (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

Four aspects of congruence theory are relevant to the topics of this volume, and run through the analyses of various chapters. Briefly we can outline each as a framework for the analyses that follow.

**The Congruence of Social and Political Values**

A first aspect of congruence theory focuses on the sources of political values. The political culture literature views political values as derived from the broader pattern of authority relations in a society. Eckstein (1966, 1998), for example, argued that authority relations in the family, schools, social associations, and the workplace create norms that are then carried over to the world of politics. This is related to them in the political culture literature. Almond and Verba (1963) saw the pattern of authority relations in the family and the schools as sources of the political culture. In the German case in particular, analysts argued that the authoritarian and patriarchal German family disposed the German public to accept these same patterns in the behavior of the Kaiser (Dahrendorf 1967). The literature also claimed that a democratic political culture is based on a highly developed associational life in society, the hallmark of what is now generally called ‘civil society’. This stress on social associations spans the literature from Tocqueville’s description of American democracy in the 1800s to the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock 1998; Howard 2003).

The congruence between social and political relations in East Asia is a central theoretical and political question of our project. Just as the German father was presumably the model for accepting the Kaiser, the hierarchic paternalistic traditions of many Asian families may lead to acceptance of autocratic political leaders. Lucian Pye, for example, summarized this view: ‘Throughout the Confucian cultural area of Asia, the family was considered the proper model of government. Relations between ruler and subject were seen as analogous to those between parent and child’ (1985: 61; also Pye 1999). Similarly, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia argued that Western liberal democratic was incompatible with Asian values and undesirable for the region (Emmerson 1984). More nuanced versions of this same logic have been offered by leading academic
scholars of the region (Scalapino 1989; Huntington 1996; Zakaria 2003). In addition, it is claimed that the limited development of autonomous civil society groups in East Asia, even in democratic regimes, limits the social learning of democratic norms and civic virtues.

This argument about traditional, hierarchic pattern of authority relations in Asia has been challenged on two grounds. First, Friedman (1994a), Sen (1999), and others stress the cultural diversity of East Asia, and the ability of democratic norms to take root in many different types of cultural traditions. In addition, other social values identified with Confucian traditions, such as norms of cooperation and collective interests, may provide a social basis for developing democratic political norms (also Fukuyama 1995).

Second, the social modernization literature suggests that the tremendous economic advances in many East Asian nations over the past generation should have changed public values. Increasing living standards provide new resources to become socially and politically active. An increasingly complex economic system creates new skills and a sense of personal efficacy among the public. And in a world of growing international trade and global interaction, modernization also increases exposure to liberal political norms, where closed states may have limited this exposure in the past (Sandholtz and Gray and 2003). In short, as social modernization transforms social relations and living conditions in East Asian societies, this should produce changes in political norms as well.

Scott Flanagan and Aie-rie Lee (2000, 2003), for example, demonstrated that social modernization variables are strongly related to support for more libertarian (less authoritarian) values in Japan and Korea (also see Nathan 2004; Shin 1999). One sees similar examples of changing family and work relations as a by-product of social modernization in China, Vietnam and other Asian societies. Others claim a substantial growth in civil society groups in East Asia, which are theorized to produce the social wellspring of democratic values (Alagappa 2004). In other words, the tremendous social change that many East Asian nations have experienced over the past generation may have altered the social relations that created ‘Asian values’.

Thus the first application of congruence theory examines whether social authority relations derived from family life and social relations in East Asia are congruent with democratic political norms in East Asia. This considers whether social relations fit the model of Confucian traditionalism as presented in the prior literature, and whether modernization processes are transforming social relations and thus political norms.

The Congruence of Social and Market Values

A second aspect of congruence theory focuses on the social base of economic attitude, paralleling our discussion of the social base of democratic values.
While Confucian traditions are often cited as an impediment to democra-
tization, these same values are seen as conducive to economic growth (Mac-
Faquhar 1980; Tai 1989; Levy Jr. 1992). Feelings of group solidarity and
collective interest are a positive feature in developing economies. These
norms are linked to the development of corporatist market systems in the
Asian Tigers, and an economic model that stimulated growth. In short, while
Confucian norms are supposedly incongruent with democratic values, they
are seen as congruent with the economic growth of the region.

If this economic congruence existed, the restructuring of many East Asian
economic systems after the 1997 currency crisis may have altered this rela-
tionship. A corporatist economic system and protectionist economic policies
are eroding in the face of a global economic system. Reforms in Korea,
Japan, Singapore and other nations also asked economic interests and the
public to accept greater competition, tolerate greater economic risk, and take
greater individual responsibility in a new market system. At the same time,
the Chinese and Vietnamese experienced an even more fundamental transi-
tion from a command economy toward a more competitive market system.
Orientations toward such economic principles and values should broadly
affect the development of the economic system (Harrison 1992; Brook and

Thus, a second aspect of congruence theory is whether social moderniza-
tion is creating economic values among East Asian publics that are more
consistent with the closed economic systems and crony capitalism of the past,
or the trends toward open, capitalist, market systems.

The Congruence of Political and Economic Values

A long theoretical and empirical debate exists about the relationship between
political and economic values (and political development and economic
development). Many scholars subscribe to the classic Seymour Martin Lipset
(1959a) thesis that economic development and the concomitant processes of
social modernization create the conditions in which democracy might de-
velop (e.g. Vanhanen 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). And some analysts
suggest that the movement toward democracy is a course toward the rule
of law and individual rights that underlie economic growth (Diamond 2003).
That is, democratization is a source of economic growth and not just a
consequence. The quote from former South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung at the beginning of this chapter reflects the common belief that democ-
ratization and marketization are inherently linked, even if the direction of the
causal relationship cannot be disentangled.

The possible separation between democratization and marketization is
central to the literature on East Asia, and this dichotomy is a recurring
theme in social science more broadly (Lindblom 1977, 1988). For instance,
Singapore has followed a course of rapid development of a market economy and involvement in the global economic system, while consciously restraining democratization. China and Vietnam are the other prominent examples of where the state attempts to delink economic and political processes. In addition, the examples of crony capitalism in East Asia sometimes occur in nations with a consolidated democratic system.

Because of our interest in public values, this raises the more fundamental question of whether support for democracy and support for a capitalist market economy are congruent values. For instance, Sen (1999) argues that both value systems are built upon the premise of individual freedom and the rule of law, and thus they are reinforcing value systems. In the real world, liberalized economy facilitates new and innovative activities among the masses while democracy restrains extravagant and illegal activities among elites. Democracy and a market economy thus work as ‘the twin pillars on which lasting development can thrive’ (Bhagwati 2002). Bhalla (1997) provides cross-national evidence that neither democracy nor free markets alone produces significant development; such development is likely to occur only when they work together as complementary forces.

Consequently, our third element of congruence examines the relationship between public support for democracy and the values underlying a market economy. Are the individuals who accept the democratic principle also those who endorse the development of competitive market economies in East Asia—or do publics see a tension between these systems as some scholars maintain. In the postcommunist world of Eastern Europe, democratic and capitalist attitudes are moderately interrelated, and the causal flow seems to run more strongly from democratic attitudes to free market preferences than the reverse (Duch 1995; Gibson 1996a). In Africa, however, both attitude sets remain largely unrelated and incoherent, although almost all sympathizers of free markets are firmly committed to democracy (Bratton, Mattes, and Giamah-Boadi 2004, Chapter 14). To date, the nature of relationship between democratic and capitalist attitudes seems to vary a great deal from one region to another. There is little evidence confirming the Washington consensus about the complimentarity of democratic and market reforms.

The Congruence Between Citizen Values and Institutional Structures

Ultimately, the congruence between the citizen values and institutional structures provides the rationale for political culture theory. If democracy is to endure, then it should be based on a political culture of democratic values; an effective market economy also presumes that citizens share the values embedded in this economic system. However, there is an asymmetry in the relationship between culture and regimes; authoritarian states can endure through coercion, since the regime does not rest on popular legitimacy.
For regimes that require popular legitimacy, however, congruence is more important: a democracy without democrats is unlikely to endure, and an open capitalist market system without popular support will be more difficult to sustain.

While we recognize the centrality of this aspect of congruence theory, the congruence between citizen values and institutions is a relationship that functions in a long-term perspective. In the midst of dynamic political changes in East Asia, the fit between mass values and institutional forms will be necessarily imperfect when examined at any single point in time. For instance, Indonesia has made dramatic democratization progress since 1998, moving several scale points on the Freedom House statistics (see Chapter 4). In the short term in such a transition, the culture may be either lag or lead institutional change at various points. However, congruence theory suggests that if Indonesian democracy (or other new democracies in East Asia) is to endure, it will require that the public and the political elites broadly support the norms of the new democratic regime. In other words, Indonesians may have turned away from the authoritarian regime of Suharto, which stimulated the initial pressures for political reform in 1998; but then as democratic institutional reform has quickly changed the political regime, the current challenge may be for citizen values to internalize these new norms (Asia Foundation 2003). Similarly, based on the findings from our project, it appears that the Vietnamese and Chinese publics are relatively supportive of democratic norms and processes, more so than allowed by their current political systems. Thus, there is a potential for further democratization in these nations, but the current elites and political structures restrict these developments in order to retain power. Further social change in Vietnam and China should increase the popular pressure for eventual democratic reform—as congruence theory suggests.

In summary, cultural theory emphasizes broad processes of social change, rather than the immediate actions of political elites and regimes. In the long run, congruence theory should shape political outcomes and the stability of regimes. Otherwise, the institutions or culture will eventually shift to produce congruence. Thus, defining the social and political cultures of East Asia with this first wave of empirical survey data will help chart the prospects for Asia’s future development.

DESCRIBING DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS

Democratization and marketization have transformed the world in the last half of the twentieth century. Where once democracy seemed like a small island in a sea of authoritarian states, with an uncertain future, it now is proclaimed as the inevitable endpoint of human political evolution (Fukuyama 1992). Similarly, the challenges to market-based economies,
from both the left and the right, were a central theme in mid-twentieth century and globally during the Cold War competition. Now, the spread of a global economic system based on the principles of capitalist, laissez faire market economics and enforced by WTO and the IMF seems destined to continue.

As an initial description of institutional conditions for the nations in this project, Figure 1.1 plots each nation on political and economic freedom in 2000 (approximately the time of our surveys), including all the nations of East Asia even if they are not part of the WVS. Democratic development is represented by the Freedom House index of political freedoms and civil liberties along the horizontal axis, which uses a Western, liberal definition of democracy (Freedom House 2002). Economic freedom on the vertical dimension is measured by the Heritage Foundation (2001), which measures the extent of property rights and other market principles. The four Western democracies of the Pacific Rim in our study—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA— all receive high scores on both dimensions, locating them at the upper right quadrant of the figure. As the long-term established democracy and market economy in East Asia, Japan also falls into the upper portion of this quadrant.

The course of economic and political change in East Asia, however, has not always followed global trends, with democratization and marketization tracking a single trajectory. For a substantial period, the tigers of East Asia

![Figure 1.1. Pacific Rim nations on political and economic freedoms](image)

**Sources:** 2000 data on political freedom from Freedom House and 2000 data on economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation. Political freedom is scored (1) low to (7) high; economic freedom is scored (1) low to (5) high.
pursued a course of economic modernization—while consciously resisting concomitant political reforms. Singapore is the most notable example, following a model in which economic development occurs relatively independent of political modernization. Deng Xiaoping’s China is another oft-cited example of this pattern. This pattern carries over at least partially to the present. Singapore is still notable for its high score on economic freedoms and development of a market economy but its relatively lower score on the democracy dimension. Malaysia also fits this pattern and lies in the upper left quadrant of the figure; it has been the other nation most clearly espousing an alternative model of development.

The People’s Republic of China has consciously attempted to disassociate economic and political trends. China is now located above the scale midpoint on economic rights, in part because of the reforms required to become a WTO member. Yet the regime simultaneously limits political modernization. There has been progress in some areas, such as local village elections, but there is continuing resistance to further democratization, and even some examples of regression over the past decade. Thus, China falls just into the upper left quadrant, similar to the position of Cambodia.

For a substantial time, political reform in Taiwan and South Korea also lagged behind the economic development of these two nations. However, rapid democratic progress since the mid-1980s has moved both nations ahead in terms of political rights and social liberties. Figure 1.1 thus plots nations as scoring relatively high on both dimensions; these two nations fall in the upper right quadrant slightly below Japan.

Another possible pattern is for a nation to advance in political democratization, in which economic freedoms and development of a market economy lag behind. In 2000 the Philippines, Indonesia, and Mongolia scored above the democratization midpoint; at the same time, their economic freedom scores were lower than the established democracies. These three nations are not in the bottom right quadrant, but they are close.

Several nations receive low ratings on both scales and thus fall into the lower left quadrant of the figure. The absolute lowest scores on economic and political freedoms occur in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which is located at the bottom left corner of the figure. Vietnam has made sustained efforts toward economic reform since the mid-1980s (đoàn mới), but these economic reforms are kept separate from reforms of the political system (Turley and Selden 1992). In overall terms, Vietnam receives low scores on both dimensions, and as Laos and Myanmar. Southeast Asia thus represents the least developed area on both dimensions.

This pattern also has historical parallels. Zimmerman (2002) describes this pattern as consistent with Leninism in the Soviet context, with strong commitments to state authority in both the domains. Indeed, it is a model widely seen in less developed nations, and sometimes advocated as
a course of government-directed development (e.g. Huntington and Nelson 1976).

In overall terms, there is a clear relationship between both dimensions as the Kim Dae Jung reference at the start of the chapter implies, but the relationship is far from perfect. This figure also suggests that there is not a single pattern to the East Asian experience. Moreover, the congruence between these institutional forms is also uncertain. The Indonesian experience since 1998 is a graphic example of the potential for political development despite prior authoritarian rule and claims of cultural limits to democratization.

While such institutional evidence is generally available, there is unfortunately little empirical evidence on how closely public orientations toward democracy and markets match these institutional arrangements across the region—as well as the causal processes that generate these opinions. Without this evidence, it is difficult to estimate the congruence of political culture with political processes in the region, or prospects for change in the future. This project addresses this void.

THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

In order to study public attitudes in across a set of Pacific Rim nations, this book primarily relies on a new wave of surveys from the WVS project. The WVS is a unique resource in the social sciences. The first wave of the project was a coordinated survey of twenty-one nations conducted in the early 1980s by the European Values Survey group (Inglehart 1980). The second wave in the early 1990s expanded to forty-two nations, including many of the post-communist states in Eastern Europe (Inglehart 1997). The Third Wave in the mid-1990s included fifty-four nations, and expanded the data collection to several nations in the developing world. The fourth wave of the WVS includes representative national surveys examining the basic values and beliefs of publics in more than 65 societies on all 6 inhabited continents, containing almost 80 percent of the world’s population.

An international network of social scientists carries out this project, coordinated by an international directorate. The international board develops the questions to include in the survey, and these are translated into the national language by each research institute. Most surveys are funded from national sources, and conducted by leading survey research firms. The data are then assembled in a single dataset, and made available to the international research community.

An exceptional feature of the 1999–2002 WVS is the range of new nations included in the survey, and in combination with the prior 1995–8 wave the project now includes representative national surveys in eight East Asian nations: China, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Supplemental data are also available from Hong
Kong. This is one of the largest and most diverse set of East Asian nations that has ever been surveyed on political and social values. In addition, researchers conducted the same survey in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, which provides reference points to compare to the opinions of East Asians to Western democratic publics. Table 1.1 lists the nations included in our core analyses, the dates of fieldwork and the sample size for each survey. Additional information on survey sampling, research teams, timeframe, and other facts is presented in the appendix of this book.

Previous academic and political debates about the political culture of East Asian nations have explained the past development patterns of the region, and projected the potential for change in the future. The one missing element however has been to consult the citizens themselves. The WVS enables us to describe and explain how citizens in the region think about democracy and economic markets, and the values underlying their opinions.

### Table 1.1. World Value Surveys in the Pacific Rim

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<td>East Asia</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Western democracies</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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This book analyzes public attitudes toward democracy and markets in four sections. The first section examines global processes of modernization and value change, and places the nations of our study into the global context. In Chapter 2, Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart present a model of human development as a general framework for understanding value change and the modernization process. Pooling all the nations from the WVS, they argue that the development of self-actualizing values is an essential element in
modernization that is strongly linked to the expansion of democracy. Tan Ern Sen and Zhengzu Wang then examine the development of self-actualizing values more explicitly in the East Asian nations in our project. They ask whether this general model of value change equally applies to the nation of the region.

The second section examines support for democracy among the citizens in the Pacific Rim nations. In Chapter 4, Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin describe public orientations toward democracy across the nations of our project. They focus on public support for broad democratic principles and what they call ‘democratic aspirations’. They also examine how the social influences of modernization, such as education and income levels, are related to democratic values. Their findings challenge the common claim about the lack of support for democracy in East Asia, and thus are more sanguine about the prospects for further democratization.

Research on East Asia has debated the impact of Confucian cultural traditions on support for democracy in the region. Chapter 5 by Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong examines the attitudes toward social authority relations, and the impact of these attitudes on support for democracy. This is the most direct empirical test of the Asian values thesis, which heretofore has been debated by elites without evidence of what citizens actually believe. The next chapter examines the development of a civil society within the nations of East Asia, and the benefits of social activity in stimulating social trust, political engagement and democratic values. Wang, Dalton, and Shin analyze the juxtaposition of citizen evaluations of the current government with citizen support for a democratic regime. Their findings highlight the general separation between these two orientations in democratic nations, but a distinctly different process in the Asian non-democracies.

The third section of our research probes into citizen orientations toward capitalist markets. Shin and Dalton assess the broad cultural foundations of a capitalist market system in public values and orientations in East Asia. Chung-Si Ahn and Jiho Jang then use data from the Asian Values Survey to examine public support for market reforms in nine East Asian nations. They also examine the interrelationship between market orientations and attitudes toward globalization. In Chapter 10, Ken’ichi Ikeda and Tetsuro Kobayashi consider how attitudes toward uncertainty avoidance vary across the region, and how these orientations may influence economic orientations and support for capitalist market values. Finally, Vietnam represents a special case of a nation currently experiencing the transition from a command economy to a market economy. Pham Minh Hac and Pham Thanh Nhi probe into Vietnamese orientations toward market reform, and the social distribution of these opinions within the Vietnamese public.

The fourth section of our study considers the intersection of democracy and markets in belief systems of East Asian publics. Shin and Dalton study
the relationship between these two dimensions across the Pacific Rim nations in the WVS. This conclusion discusses the implications of our findings for the future political and economic development of the region.

**CONCLUSION**

Our study adds to two distinct strands of the research literature that converge in East Asia. First, the third wave of democratization has altered the political map of East Asia, although this transformation remains incomplete. Often the explanation for the lack of democratic development focuses on the political culture of the region, claiming that social development or cultural norms were not conducive to democratization. Our findings will challenge this argument of cultural determinism. The contributors to this volume, and the findings of the WVS, speak to the diversity of citizen values across the nations of East Asia. This is not a single, distinct cultural zone when it comes to the democratic and market orientations examined in this book. Moreover, the lack of a distinct East–West gap in values is a theme that is repeated across chapters. Many of the values of democracy and citizen empowerment we examine appear to be ‘human values’ rather than Asian or Western values.

Thus, rather than a congruence of culture and political institutions, East Asia apparently represents a region where this broad systemic congruence is lacking. This suggests that the lack of democratic development in the region may primarily lie in elite power structures, the inability of challenging elites and social groups to erode entrenched autocratic structures, and the resistance to change at the top. Indonesia illustrates this pattern, making dramatic gains in democratic institutional development following the regime change in 1998. Democratic development in Indonesia is still uncertain and evolving, but institutional change apparently lagged behind the popular support for political change—until the regime actually changed. Most Indonesians today favor a democratic regime, and their understanding of democracy has quickly grown as they have experienced a new democratic order (Asia Foundation 2003). Just as institutional change in East Europe in the 1990s, or Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, moved forward the democratization process and built upon social change that was already affecting the citizens of these nations, the same potential is growing in East Asia.

Similarly, there is broad support for the principles and values of a market economy in the region. Indeed, much reform still remains to be done before open markets, property rights, and free and fair trade are established throughout East Asia. However, our findings suggest that the popular acceptance of market competition and belief in the benefits of this system are widespread in East Asia. Again, cultural values do not appear to be the major impediment to further progress.
Finally, this volume gives voice to the citizens of East Asia in a manner that goes beyond past research. This project represents the first major empirical study of public opinion on political issues that compares East Asia to established Western democracies. Moreover, the survey gives voice to publics in several nations where their own government is unwilling to recognize the right of free expression. It is empowering to the public to speak for themselves, instead of only through others. A decade ago, the project presented here would have been impossible—or not even imaginable. We therefore hope this volume stimulates the development of systematic empirical research that can address some of the other important questions of Asian politics and develop a truly comparative study of citizen politics in East Asia. Empirical survey research opens a door to a better understanding of the values, beliefs, and behaviors of the citizens of East Asia that can complement and test our previous understanding of Asia.

ENDNOTES

1 We define East Asia as: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
2 This research has renewed the debate on whether the correlation between culture and democratic institutions is a causal relationship. See the exchange between Inglehart (1990, 1997) and Muller and Seligson (1994).
3 We would like to thank William Zimmerman and his new study of public opinion in Russia for bringing this theoretical framework to our attention (Zimmerman 2002, Chapter 2).
4 Ronald Inglehart is the coordinator of the WVS and an international executive committee oversees the project. We want to acknowledge the Institute for Future Studies in Sweden for support of several surveys in East Asia, and the Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine for support of the Vietnamese project. More information on the project is available at the website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org The data from the surveys are available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and in Inglehart et al. (2004).
5 The 2005 ‘Hong Kong Creativity Index’ survey was commissioned and funded by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and was directed by Ng Chun Hung and Tsang Gar Yin. We received these data after the book manuscript was essentially complete, so these findings are included in the basic tables in Chapter 4, but not in the other substantive analyses of this volume.
6 A list of survey research sources on East Asia is available at: http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/asia.php This website lists sources for the WVS, Asian Barometer, East Asian Barometer, and other national and cross-national surveys covering East Asian nations. Many of these data-sets are available for free download.

Author Queries

[Q1] World Bank 2000 is not listed.
[Q2] Weiss 1999 is not listed.
[Q3] Chua 2004 is not listed.
[Q4] Richardson 1974 is not listed
[Q5] Xu 1998 is not listed.
[Q6] Emmerson 1984 is not listed.
[Q7] MacFaquhar 1980 is not listed.
[Q8] Bhagwati 2002 and Bhalla 1997 are not listed.
[Q10] Inglehart 1980 is not listed.