THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED: THE FALL AND RISE OF EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY*

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In recent years sociologists have made great strides in studying the emotions that pervade social life. The study of social movements has lagged behind, even though there are few arenas where emotions are more obvious or important. We hope to understand this lag as well as make some suggestions for catching up. To do this we examine the history of scholarship on social movements, finding that emotions were poorly specified in the early years, ignored entirely in the structural and organizational paradigms that emerged in the 1960s, and still overlooked in the cultural era of the 1980s and 1990s. Despite isolated efforts to understand the emotions of social movements, they remain today a fertile area for inquiry.

Just when we’re safest, there’s a sunset-touch,
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one’s death,
A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
And that’s enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as nature’s self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul,
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,
Round the ancient idol, on his base again,
The grand Perhaps.

— Robert Browning, “Bishop Blougram’s Apology”

Emotions are perhaps the ultimate Rorschach test for sociologists, revealing their basic theoretical assumptions about social life. This is especially true in the study of social movements. Once at the center of the study of protest, emotions have led a shadow existence for the last three decades, with no place in the rationalistic, structural, and organizational models that dominate academic political analysis. In these models, humans are portrayed as rational and instrumental, traits which are oddly assumed to preclude any emotions. Even the recent rediscovery of culture has taken a cognitive form, as though political participants were computers processing symbols. Somehow, observers have managed to ignore the swirl of passions all around them in political life. How have we come to this neglect? And what can we do to reverse it? Should we try?

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Analysts of social movements are treating emotions more seriously these days, and we wish to encourage this trend. But not by uncritically resuscitating the flawed perspectives on emotions which colored analyses of collective action through the 1960s. We need a new theoretical framework in which emotions play a significant role. In this paper, we review the main perspectives on social movements of the past century. Then we examine some of the more fruitful ways in which contemporary sociologists are bringing emotions back into the study of social movements.

THE WRONG KIND OF ATTENTION

Until the 1960s emotions were considered central to virtually all political action that occurred outside normal institutions. In nineteenth-century images of the mob, normal, reasoning individuals were thought to be transformed in the presence of a crowd, becoming angry, violent, impressionable, and generally unthinking. Crowds were assumed to create, through hypnotic processes such as suggestion and contagion, a kind of “primitive” group mind and group feelings shared by all participants. These overwhelmed individual personalities and moved them beyond reason and normal sensibilities. Well into the twentieth century, crowds and their dynamics were conceived as the heart of protest movements, the core around which other forms of action were built. One finds a stark contrast in this literature, as in so much Western thought, between emotions and rationality. In this vision, individuals were calmly reasonable, crowds were emotional and irrational.

The classic and most influential expression of this pathologizing perspective was Gustave LeBon’s *The Crowd* (1960 [1895]). LeBon described crowds as impulsive, irritable, suggestible, and credulous. Crowds, he claimed, are guided primarily by unconscious motives and exhibit “very simple and very exaggerated” emotions: “A commencement of antipathy or disapprobation, which in the case of an isolated individual would not gain strength, becomes at once furious hatred in the case of an individual in a crowd” (p. 50). Given these traits, crowds are susceptible to the emotional appeals of demagogues. “Given to exaggeration in its feelings,” wrote LeBon, “a crowd is only impressed by excessive sentiments. An orator wishing to move a crowd must make an abusive use of violent affirmations. To exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never to attempt to prove anything by reasoning are methods of argument well known to speakers at public meetings” (p. 51).

Sigmund Freud’s group psychology (1959 [1921]) contained some insights into the affective ties or “libidinal constitution” of groups (see Goodwin 1997), yet Freud adopted uncritically the pathologizing perspective on crowds of LeBon and like-minded authors. Like them, he pointed to the simultaneous “collective inhibition of intellectual functioning and the heightening of affectivity in groups” (p. 19), emphasizing again the allegedly irreducible antagonism between reason and emotion. “When individuals come together in a group,” wrote Freud, “all their individual inhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal and destructive instincts, which lie dormant in individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification” (p. 15).

In Herbert Blumer’s (1939) formulation, crowds short-circuit symbolic communication, with participants instead responding directly to each other’s physical actions. As a result, they easily can be driven by anxiety and fear, especially when spurred by rumors. They are also, Blumer believed, irritable and prone to excitement. Others argued that frustration leads inevitably or frequently to aggression, especially when reinforced by crowd dynamics (Miller and Dollard 1941).

While some scholars focused on crowd dynamics, others looked for peculiar individuals who might be susceptible to mass movements. They are alienated (Kornhauser 1959), for example, or predisposed toward violence (Allport 1924). Other efforts depended on
Freudian psychology to show that participants are immature: narcissistic, latently homosexual, oral dependent, or anal retentive (Lasswell 1930). What some reduced to a stage of life, others reduced, just as dismissively, to personality traits. Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948) was only the most explicit in elaborating a political “type” for whom politics is an effort to fulfill needs not met in private life.

In a work that summarized popular conceptions, Eric Hoffer (1951) saw a desperate fanatic who needs to believe in something, no matter what. Because they are driven by inner needs, especially by frustrations due to a lack of a stable identity or to “barren and insecure lives,” Hoffer’s “true believers” can never be satisfied. They hope to lose themselves in a collective identity, a “mass movement” that they must believe in with utter certainty. When one movement ends they move on to others. Participation itself is the motivation; the goals of protest hardly matter. Part of Hoffer’s evidence for the irrationality of true believers was that “self-sacrifice is an unreasonable act,” avoided by normal people with full lives (p. 79). Hoffer saw a charismatic leader as “indispensable” to a mass movement, for “he articulates and justifies the resentment dammed up in the souls of the frustrated” (1951: 114). “Passionate hatred” is also useful, as the emotion that “can give meaning and purpose to an empty life” (p. 98). Participants lose their individuality, becoming part of a tribal mass in a “throwback to the primitive” (p. 63).

But this is not an emergent crowd dynamic: only certain personality types are susceptible. Hoffer’s list of “undesirables” included emotional states as well as structural positions: “the poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent youth, the ambitious, those in the grip of some vice or obsession, the impotent (in body or mind), the inordinately selfish, the bored, the sinners” (p. 25).

Such pejorative views of participation were developed into a model of “mass society” in which individuals are “atomized,” cut loose from ties to others through formal organizations and left vulnerable to charismatic leaders like Hitler, who can manipulate them directly through mass media (Kornhauser 1959). Causal priority shifted from personality to social structure, but the vision was the same as Hoffer’s. The “masses” sweep aside traditional sources of authority in order to rule directly or through their leader in “extremist” style. The affective ties of community break down, leaving many with an ill-defined sense of self. As was apparent when William Kornhauser (1959: chap. 12) tried to explain the propensity of isolated communities of miners and maritime workers to strike or vote communist, these theorists confounded the solidarity of community and the formal organization of “normal” politics, dismissing the affective ties of informal networks on the grounds that they open workers to the appeals of rabble-rousers. Like Hoffer, Kornhauser and others (Fromm 1941; Adorno et al. 1950; Riesman 1950; Huntington 1968; Shils 1954) set out to explain a form of politics which they knew was dangerous, and thus everything associated with it was dangerous too, including strong emotions. Psychological dynamics such as “self-estrangement” or “alienation” were poorly specified. Misleadingly, Kornhauser applied them not to socially isolated individuals but to those whose primary groups (such as family and friends and coworkers) had no broader linkages. Those with the strongest local bonds would therefore have less allegiance to broader social institutions or the existing state.

Even Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1957), who explicitly rejected the distinction between rational individuals and irrational crowds (1957: 17), often expressed hostile attitudes toward "mobs." As individuals "mill" about in crowds, according to Turner and Killian, their emotions are intensified and focused by their "circular reaction" to one another. Such individuals become suggestible and uninhibited in their actions. Crowds come to be "dominated by a uniform mood and uniform imagery" (p. 58) and, when frustrated, become angry and aggressive. "Crowd behavior consists, in essence," they wrote, "of deviations from the traditional norms of society" (p. 143). From this vantage point, it was difficult to see that protesters often fully accepted and even sought to defend traditional norms.
In trying to deal with emotions or psychology, researchers of this period had little to use except a simplified form of Freudian psychoanalysis. Neil Smelser opened a 1968 essay on a promising note, calling for an integration of the social and psychological dimensions of collective behavior. Protest “has a psychological dimension,” he observed, “since the deepest and most powerful human emotions—idealistic fervor, love, and violent rage, for example—are bared in episodes of collective behavior, and since persons differ psychologically in their propensity to become involved in such episodes” (1968: 92). His Theory of Collective Behavior, he now acknowledges, failed to explain why the same social strains might affect different individuals in different ways or why people might choose different forms of participation; as a corrective, Smelser laid out some of the “psychodynamic meanings of the common elements of social protest movements.” These turned out to be classically Freudian. Oedipal ambivalence felt toward one’s father reemerges, split between two objects: “On the one hand there is the unqualified love, worship, and submission to the leader of the movement, who articulates and symbolizes ‘the cause.’ On the other hand there is the unqualified suspicion, denigration, and desire to destroy the agent felt responsible for the moral decay of social life and standing in the way of reform, whether he be a vested interest or a political authority” (p. 119-20). Oedipal anxiety disappears as strong positive and negative feelings toward the father are now aimed in different directions. The Oedipal fantasy of attaining the mother, usually severely repressed, can appear in the movement's utopian vision of “bliss, peace, and harmony.” “The striking feature of the protest movement,” says Smelser, “is what Freud observed: it permits the expression of impulses that are normally repressed” (p. 121). External circumstances such as strain only provide an opportunity for the expression of internal emotional dynamics.

If crowds were largely acting out or responding to contagion or internal Oedipal drives, someone had to be making decisions, and these theorists often focused on the leader. For Hoffer and Kornhauser, the existence of a demagogue was a defining element of extremist politics. This implied rich emotional dynamics. Even Smelser saw idolatry of the leader as a crucial psychological mechanism. Like other features of 1950s scholarship, this emphasis came from analysts’ efforts to make sense of Nazism, as well as from their fears of communism. From that perspective, however, even the social movements of the 1960s did not always arouse sympathy, since they could be dismissed as the work of confused youngsters suffering from Oedipal fantasies. As late as 1969 Orrin Klapp (1969: 11-13) described the signs of “identity trouble” that led people to seek fulfillment in collective action: a feeling of being blemished, self-hatred, oversensitivity, excessive self-concern (including narcissism), alienation, a feeling that “nobody appreciates me,” a desire to be someone else, a feeling of fraudulent self-presentation, Riesman’s “other-directedness,” and an identity crisis. In academic traditions like these, protest was either a mistake, a form of acting out, or a sign of immaturity.

By the 1960s, a few scholars were straining against the bounds of these traditions. Relative deprivation explanations were appealing precisely as a counter to the prevalent pejorative tone. For example, Searles and Williams (1962) emphatically rejected a view of black student participants in sit-ins as alienated and disaffected. Instead, students protested in response to their unequal status relative to middle-class white students. This was a reasonable and legitimate response: “Given the similarity of socioeconomic background and of values and goals between Negro and white students; given the legitimacy of implementing equal opportunity; given the current emphasis on higher education and on utilizing talent, there is ample reason for Negro college students to feel deprived” (p. 217). Searles and Williams still explained protest in terms of individual participants’ psychological needs and viewed it as expressive rather than instrumental (as a “means of demonstrating their anger” [p. 219]). But this explanation sat uncomfortably with their presentation of protestors as rational, political, and honorable.

In 1963 Joseph Gusfield also pushed the limits of the current paradigm in his study of the temperance movement. Feelings such as “hostility, hatred, and anger toward the enemy,”
said Gusfield (1963:110), “nurtured” the movement, and he analyzed the dynamics of moral indignation in some detail. He moved beyond crowd theories by linking these emotional responses to the declining status of parts of the middle class. He also anticipated later theories (but in the same stroke limited the importance of emotions) by seeing the issue of drinking as a “symbol” of underlying—and more economic, structural—shifts in society. He famously, and perhaps misleadingly, distinguished symbolic from instrumental action (and by implication movements themselves), implicitly suggesting that strong emotions were a hallmark of the former but not the latter. The symbolic politics of status were not entirely irrational, but they were clearly not rational in the way that “normal” interest politics were.

These portrayals of emotions were flawed in many ways. In the crowd tradition, emotions come directly from crowds (or demagogues), having little to do with individuals’ own lives and goals. They appear and disappear in response to what is happening in one’s immediate surroundings, with little lasting resonance. In the Freudian tradition, emotions result from individual personality conflicts rather than as responses to the social environment. Thus only certain kinds of flawed people are susceptible to movement appeals. Their emotions are inevitably negative or troubled rather than positive and joyful; they reflect a psychological problem, albeit one that might go away with maturity. Participants do not enjoy protest, they are compelled to it by their inner needs and drives.

In both traditions, there were severe methodological problems: the salient emotions are often vague and difficult to identify except through the very actions they are meant to explain. Can we recognize a propensity to violence except when it results in violence? Can we identify states of anomie or alienation before they lead to movement participation? In the absence of empirical investigation, what LeBon and Hoffer thought they saw in crowds was more a projection of their own fears and anxieties than an accurate psychological portrait of protestors.

While efforts to bring psychological insight to bear on politics usually reduced the latter to little more than internal personality dynamics, group psychology ignored individual traits altogether. Little was recognized between the individual and the social: no social networks, organizations, shared cultural meanings (including most emotions), processes of negotiation and interaction. Driven by forces outside their control, whether subconscious forces or the mysterious pull of the crowd, protestors were not rational agents with purposes of their own. The more emotional an individual (or crowd) became, the less rational she (or they) became, ipso facto. The actual stuff of contentious politics—moral principles, stated goals, processes of mobilization, the pleasures of participation—was ignored. Such views would not survive the explosion of non-institutional politics in the 1960s.

Yet along with these early theories, some of the topics they had addressed would disappear, including the power of strong emotions to either mobilize or inhibit collective action. Even if they pathologized the emotions accompanying protest (indeed emphasized emotions in order to pathologize protest generally), early theorists had at least paid attention to them. This would not be the case for the next generation of movement scholars.

THE GREAT SILENCE

By the early 1970s, many sociologists had either been active in or were sympathetic to the movements they studied. Civil rights, antiwar, new left, and feminist activists were clearly not atomized individuals, defeated in their personal aspirations and swept up by charismatic leaders. On the contrary, they were politically shrewd and instrumentally rational. In the new models, activists campaigned outside of institutional politics because they are blocked from pursuing their interests effectively through regular political channels, not because they are personally alienated. Rather than being studied alongside fads, crazes, and panics, social movements were now seen as “politics by other means.”
To replace pathological explanations, sociologists turned to rational-actor and organizational models, shifting from motivational "why" to strategic "how" questions. Given scarce resources and people’s tendency to free ride on the efforts of others, how are activists sometimes able to mobilize people around longstanding grievances? The grievances themselves were rarely viewed as causally important or interesting. Grievances, and the emotions that accompanied them, were seen as “relatively constant and pervasive” (Jenkins and Perrow 1977:250). Their existence could not explain why frustration only sometimes leads to collective action. Indeed, said John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (1977:1215). To account for the emergence of social movements, “resource mobilization” theorists turned instead to the occasional largesse of elites. Lacking resources themselves, powerless groups are dependent on the donation of time, money, and political clout by powerful sponsors like foundations, organized labor, and the government (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

In one of the most comprehensive statements of the resource-mobilization position, Anthony Oberschall (1973) briefly mentioned a number of emotions in discussing the dynamics of conflict. He cited, for instance, trust, impatience, and the bitterness of protracted conflicts. But Oberschall mentioned these emotions without dissecting their dynamics.

Political process theorists (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984) were less impressed with the role of elite allies in spurring protest. Aggrieved groups are likely to mobilize not when the powerful decide to assist them but when new political opportunities are exploited by people within indigenous networks, networks which provid ordinary people solidarity incentives to participate. The emphasis is on the previously unrecognized political capacities of protesters. Beholden neither to the munificence of elite allies nor to the power of their irrational drives, they are rational actors pursuing longstanding interests. They mobilized when opportunities present themselves.

In his influential "mobilization model," Charles Tilly depicted collective action as a function of interests, organization, the mobilization of resources, power, repression (or facilitation), and opportunities (or threats). Tilly presented these variables, including even interests, as "structural" in nature, or independent of individuals' beliefs and feelings. He recognized, if implicitly, that emotions matter for what people want (i.e., their interests) and for their collective identities (a component of organization in his scheme), and that emotional reactions mediate between repression, opportunities, and threats, on the one hand, and actual collective action, on the other. Yet Tilly's rationalistic and organizational language and formulas discouraged sustained analysis of emotions.

The view of protestors as rational calculators was applied to ongoing movement dynamics as well as mobilization. In Herbert Kitschelt’s view (1986), for instance, blockage of political channels in some countries pushed antinuclear protestors to more radical tactics in the 1970s. They were rationally searching for effective strategies, with no emotional loyalties to their tactics. Similarly William Gamson in his celebrated The Strategy of Social Protest (1975) treated strategic choice as a purely cognitive exercise. Emotions are absent from his discussion of factionalism, for example. Instead, internal divisions arise because participants “will disagree on strategy and tactics. They will differ in the priorities they give to different subgoals and in their emphasis on the pursuit of short-range or long-range solutions. And they may compete for control of the organizational apparatus with power as an end in itself” (pp. 99-100). Gamson says nothing of the allegiances, jealousies, hatreds, demonizations, disappointments, hopes and so on that not only accompany but help create schisms.

In resource mobilization and political process accounts, emotions dropped out of view. Presenting activists as rational seemed to prevent their being emotional. Instead, resource mobilization theorists depicted shrewd entrepreneurs, rational actors coolly calculating the costs
and benefits of participation, and people mobilized by incentives rather than by passionate anger or righteous indignation (see Ferree’s [1992] critique). McCarthy and Zald’s organizational focus displaced individuals altogether in favor of movement organizations driven by an instrumental logic.

Much as they disliked everything else the crowd tradition had done, the new generation of theorists shared with the older ones one big assumption, namely, that emotions are irrational. While the earlier theorists had portrayed protestors as emotional to demonstrate their irrationality, the new theorists demonstrated their rationality by denying their emotions.

Political process theorists were uncomfortable with resource mobilization’s indifference to grievances, and Doug McAdam’s concept of “cognitive liberation” was intended to capture the subjective processes by which people suddenly come to believe that protest is possible. However, he defined those processes as purely cognitive: “the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of ‘cognitive cues’ signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge” (McAdam 1982: 49). Even though the term seems to imply a radical change in perspective, cognitive liberation was portrayed as a relatively instrumental reading of available information about the likelihood of repression. “Liberation” implies heady emotions that “cognitive” then denies. All that potential protestors need, it seems, is a cognitive signal that they can succeed or will not be severely repressed (see also Klandermans 1984). This would be fine for calculating automatons, not human beings.

It is ironic that emotions disappeared from social-movement research around the time that the sociology of emotions was emerging as a distinct subfield in the discipline. The late 1970s saw considerable work in the sociology of emotions that would lead to the formation of a section in the American Sociological Association in the following decade (e.g., Kemper 1978; Hochschild 1975, 1979). Only strong theoretical presuppositions could prevent movement scholars from a serious recognition of emotions in those whom they studied.

Ignoring emotions led researchers to misunderstand the causal mechanisms by which their own key concepts operated. For example, McAdam argued that the series of Supreme Court decisions favoring black petitioners which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) demonstrated to black southerners the government's new amenability to black claims. Such decisions were thus a key political opportunity for black insurgency. But the 1954 Brown decision was followed by a wave of repression in the South and the formation of the notorious White Citizens Councils. Counting 80,000 members within two years, the Councils relied on economic reprisals and physical intimidation to quash desegregation and registration efforts. Seven black activists in Mississippi were killed in 1955 alone. While over 20,000 blacks were on the Mississippi voting rolls in the early 1950s, the number had dropped to 8,000 by 1956. Between 1955 and 1958, the NAACP lost 246 southern branches and 48,000 members (Payne 1995). Brown served as a potent symbol and effective tool in subsequent southern organizing, not as an objective or cognitive indicator of the odds of success (as McAdam would have it), but as an emotional spur. Brown stood for the possibility of change, for the triumph—however incomplete—of justice over bigotry (Jasper 1997: 118).

Part of the inattention to emotions was methodological. It is hard to identify them from brief newspaper accounts of protest events. Nor can questionnaires always do the trick. Historical research precludes the participant observation that may be the best way to identify the emotions of protest. But the problem was also a conceptual one. Metaphors of formal organizations and conflict over material interests encouraged an assumption of strategic purpose that did not seem to require attention to emotions. A view of collective actors as rational, political, and organized made sense as a counter to crowd theories and collective behaviorism. Activists are rarely crazy. But by defining rationality in contrast to—and as incompatible with—emotionality, resource mobilization and political process theorists missed powerful springs of...
collective action.

**COGNITION WITHOUT EMOTIONS**

In the 1980s, American scholars began to recognize the cultural dimensions of social movements. They were partly inspired by European researchers who saw a range of “new social movements” as efforts to transform dominant cultural codes and identities rather than as bids for political power or economic resources (Cohen 1985; Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield 1994). As the economy has shifted from manufactured goods to the production of knowledge, “new social movement” theorists argued, domination has taken the form of an increasing penetration of “technocratic power” into all spheres of life (Touraine 1981). In this context, movements do not seek material economic gain or greater participation in the system, but attempt to create or preserve spaces of autonomy. Movement participants seek the space in which to enact new lifestyles and relationships, lifestyles which by their very existence pose a challenge to normalizing systems of power.

These theorists’ characterization of an “information society,” with power vested in the control of information, led them to view resistance mainly in terms of challenges to ideational “codes” rather than also to the affective neutrality of modern systems. Melucci drew attention to actors’ “emotional investment” in the new collective identities that are the chief product of mobilization, and he cautioned that “there is no cognition without feeling” (1995: 45). Yet his view of collective identity as an “interactive and shared definition...concerned with the orientation for action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the actions take place” (1995: 44), emphasizes rather its cognitive components. Nevertheless, Melucci’s recognition of emotions was a departure from resource mobilization and political process analyses. And new social movement theorists’ focus on culture, identity, and intersubjective processes encouraged attention to those processes even in “old” movements. Sociologists of social movements began to draw attention to structuralist models’ indifference to cultural processes, calling for culture’s integration into process models (see for example, Morris and Mueller 1992; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Johnston and Klandermans 1995). Culture has a distinctly cognitive cast in these writings, however. It is made up of “customs, beliefs, values, artifacts, symbols, and rituals” (Johnston and Klandermans 1995: 3); “belief systems and symbols” (Tarrow 1992:174); “ideas and beliefs” (Mueller 1992:13); “ideas, ideology, [and] identity” (McAdam 1994: 36), and so on. Culture influences activists and potential activists by reshaping their understandings, not by galvanizing their emotions. This is also true of other concepts that appeared alongside “culture” to capture some of the same dynamics. For example, Walsh (1981) used the term “suddenly imposed grievances” to describe dramatic, unexpected, and highly publicized events (court decisions, technological accidents, or instances of state repression) that encourage participation. Such events both increase public awareness and change people’s opinions about a topic. However, the mechanism by which they operate is cognitive, with their suddenness important as a kind of cognitive heuristic for attracting attention rather than for its emotional effect.

A cognitive bent has also been apparent in “framing” scholarship. The term describes the cognitive and rhetorical processes by which movement organizational members are recruited (Snow et al. 1986). Snow and Benford (1992:137) defined a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” Of the three types of framing they identified (1988) as necessary for successful recruitment—diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational—the latter, motivational framing, implicitly refers to emotions. Yet it is rarely discussed—even though it is apparently what gets people actually to do something. Agreement with the goals and legitimacy of action, after all,
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does not necessarily result in action.

As Benford himself has recently observed, “those operating within the framing/constructionist perspective have not fared much better than their structuralist predecessors in elaborating the role of emotions in collective action. Instead, we continue to write as though our movement actors (when we actually acknowledge humans in our texts) are Spock-like beings, devoid of passion and other human emotions” (1997: 419). In fact, Gamson and his collaborators argued that “injustice frames,” essential to protest, depend on “the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (1992: 32). In experiments which exposed ordinary people to transgressions by authoritative figures, Gamson and his collaborators (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982) found that hostility to authority preceded the development of an injustice frame. Suspicion, anger, and other emotions may arise even before blame is allocated through more cognitive processes. Gamson (1992: 33) later elaborated on the sources of injustice frames, including “concreteness in the target, even when it is misplaced and directed away from the real causes of hardship.” The need to elicit strong emotions, in other words, may lead organizers to distort their analyses. They may “exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets.”

Recent studies on collective identity may partly reflect a desire to capture the emotional motivations for protest, even though these are rarely discussed (see Polletta and Jasper 2001). Identity is usually contrasted to “interest” in accounts of participation, suggesting a connection to movement aims that is closer to kinship than material interest. It is also used to describe a sense of solidarity among members of a social movement itself, again suggesting bonds of trust, loyalty, and affection. However, most discussions define collective identity as the drawing of a cognitive boundary rather than as a set of positive affects toward other group members on the grounds of that common membership.

Emotions’ absence in recent sociological scholarship is not limited, of course, to the study of social movements. Few of those responsible for the cultural turn in the discipline more broadly have recognized the importance of emotions in social life, contentious or otherwise. Even as terms and concepts for understanding culture have proliferated—schemata, codes, toolkits, narratives, discourses—cultural analysts have shied away from feelings, apparently still accepting the view that emotions are inconsistent with rational action (see, for example, Lamont and Fournier 1992; Crane 1994). Raymond Williams’ (1977) concept of “structures of feeling,” widely adopted by sociologists, would seem an exception. However, Williams only meant to contrast structures of feeling with more formal concepts such as ideology, not with more cognitive ones. Structures of feeling were a fleeting moment just before they were given a more definitive cognitive form, a subjective sensibility that is about to crystallize into a shared cultural construct. They had little to do with feelings!

Methodological barriers to getting at emotions have also persisted since the rigorous questionnaires favored by social psychologists who study emotions are not always appropriate in protest studies. The result is that emotions have remained unrecognized and untheorized, even as they have supplied much of the causal force behind some of the key mechanisms identified in recent years. This is as true of cultural concepts such as collective identity and frames as it is of structural concepts such as political opportunities, social networks, cognitive liberation, and abeyance structures (Jasper 1998).

RECENT EFFORTS AT BRINGING EMOTIONS BACK IN

Sociologists have occasionally remarked on the absence of emotions from models of protest, but their analytical responses have been inconsistent or incomplete. For example, in 1981, John Lofland pointed out the repression of emotions in research, and in 1982 described
the joys of crowds in some detail, a nice counter to older images of what propelled crowds. But when he turned to other aspects of social movements, emotions disappeared. In a catalogue of social movement culture several years later (1985), the only emotion addressed was compassion. And in a book-length treatment of social movement organizations (Lofland 1996:234-236), emotions appeared primarily as the affective bonds that make social networks such important mechanisms for recruitment. Other sociologists have analyzed movements in ways that reveal affective bonds motivating participation and solidarity, but without theorizing those processes explicitly (McAdam 1988; Epstein 1991; Lichterman 1996).

Sociologists interested in emotions, however, have been able to draw conceptual tools from fields outside the study of social movements, especially feminist scholarship on the relations between emotions, reason, gender, and politics. Taking the opposition between rationality and emotions as a claim rather than an assumption, feminists have explored the institutional processes by which emotions and women have been made—and are continually remade—devalued partners in male-female, reason-unreason dichotomies (Rorty 1980). They have probed the relations between emotion and cognition (Bartky 1990), challenged a common view of emotions as private (Jagger 1989; Scheman 1980), and explored the place of anger in women’s activism (Frye 1983; Hercus 1999). Of particular interest for students of social movements is how women’s emotions (and those of other powerless groups like racial and ethnic minorities, the physically disabled, etc.) are characterized in ways that blunt the challenges they mount. Women are particularly susceptible, Campbell (1989) argues, to having their opinions dismissed as bitterness or sentimentality. To say that someone is “bitter” is to say that her anger is without effective expression as well as to blame her for her own failure to be taken seriously. Bitterness, along with emotionality and sentimentality, “are used to interpret our expressions narrowly and critically as always either being on the edge of excess, or already excessive” (p. 55). Sentimentality, viewed as action not appropriately governed by the nature of the occasion, is paradoxically encouraged in women but only in certain (domestic) spheres—it is thus used to control and limit the occasions on which women may express emotions. This line of investigation suggests that activists’ capacity to use emotional displays strategically is limited by dominant “social epistemologies of emotion” (Gordon 1989), which include not only rules for expressing emotions but also beliefs about how emotions are elicited, experienced, and controlled.

Recent work has examined relations between gender and emotion in the daily operations of social movements and alternative organizations. In her study of a holistic health center, Sheryl Kleinman (1996) found that men and women were rewarded differently for expressing the same emotions. Predictably, men were praised for exhibiting caring emotions (or emotions at all!), while women were discouraged from being too emotional. Emotions, she found, were often used to attribute problems to personal failings rather than to structural inequities. In her study of women in the civil rights movement, Belinda Robnett (1997) pointed out that while formal leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., used emotional appeals to mobilize audiences, grassroots leaders who were predominately women did a different kind of emotion work. Their day-to-day interaction with local residents built the emotional intimacy necessary for persuading them to act in dangerous circumstances.

In other cases, gendered emotions were part of the goal or self-presentation of the movement. The animal protectionists studied by Julian Groves (1997) were worried that their movement would appear too emotional because of its preponderance of women. Kathleen Blee’s (1991) study of the 1920s Ku Klux Klan showed how the Klan joined a rhetoric of women’s rights with a virulently racist agenda through inflammatory (and sexually titillating) portrayals of the sexual abuse of white Protestant women by blacks, Catholics and Jews. Some movements, such as the self-help groups of women suffering from postpartum depression (Taylor 1996) explicitly aim at transforming the emotions associated with certain gender roles (see also Hochschild 1975, 1983).
Taylor's work on the “abeyance structures” revealed the emotional ties that permeate and sustain such structures (Taylor 1989; also Rupp and Taylor 1987). In her example, the National Women’s Party provided the resurgent women’s movement of the 1960s with activist networks, goals and tactical choices, and a collective identity. These contributions were made possible by the group’s continuity over time, purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and culture. But emotions were important to all these dimensions. “Personal ties of love and friendship among members were an important cultural ideal,” she observed. “A willingness to shape personal relationships around the cause was, in large measure, what made possible the intense commitment of members” (Taylor 1989:769). Many activists were actually couples, and many had an intense devotion to the party’s leader. Like other efforts to understand the effects of internal movement culture, this one would benefit from a more direct examination of emotional dynamics. In her history of radical feminism, Alice Echols (1989) showed that the intense bonds of “sisterhood” promoted by the movement also ended up alienating some activists who felt stifled by those bonds. This suggests an important line of inquiry into the emotions that accompany and propel movement disaffiliation.

Since Stonewall, "pride" has been the normative emotion among lesbians and gay men (Munt 1998). However, as Debbie Gould (forthcoming) shows, pride can mandate different forms of protest. Whereas after Stonewall, expressions of pride accompanied militant and confrontational protest, in the early years of the AIDS crisis, activists invoked pride to call for volunteerism, remembrance of the dead, and quiet lobbying. According to Gould, lesbians and gay men's continuing ambivalence about their homosexuality—proud but also ashamed—discouraged expressions of anger in favor of demonstrating a quiet nobility in the face of a deadly epidemic. Five years into the epidemic, however, the movement's emotion rules changed again. Shocked by the Supreme Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick anti-sodomy decision, government inaction, and state legislatures' willingness to consider quarantines, gay men and lesbians began to express indignation and outrage, and to form activist groups like ACT UP. "Pride" once again demanded militant confrontation.

Social movement scholars can also draw upon recent historical research on the invention and transformation of emotions. Such shifts in emotions and their expression have created new vocabularies of motive, new subjects, and new targets of protest. Barker-Benfield has argued that “sensibility,” the capacity to be swept up by excesses of pathos, pity, and sympathy, was promoted in the eighteenth century by British manufacturers purveying luxury entertainments and goods. Sensibility “discipline[d]” women’s attachments “into tasteful domesticity,” stimulating the demand for domestic objects (p. xxvi). But it also drew women out of the house and into a public world of shopping and luxury entertainment. And it encouraged middle-class women to speak publicly and collectively of their sufferings at the hands of men, nurturing a proto-feminism. Stearns and Stearns (1986) noted that worker unrest as well as growing female employment in the twentieth century prompted concerns about workers’ emotions. Preventing anger became an important labor relations goal. Thus, collective action changed institutionalized practices in part through its association with particular emotions.

Another, more micro-focused, line of inquiry was inspired by Hochschild’s (1979, 1983) discussion of “emotion work” by airline attendants. Hochschild drew attention to the ways in which individuals consciously “manage” emotions, inducing or suppressing them “in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” that is necessary for continued interaction (1983: 7). Such emotion management, which also occurs at a group level, is shaped not simply by interests or psychological needs, but also by shared norms about appropriate or legitimate feelings and emotional displays—what Hochschild terms “feeling rules.” Due to the popularity of her book, The Managed Heart (1983), Hochschild’s emotion-management perspective is probably the most influential paradigm in the sociology of emotions. This perspective has had its greatest influence among sociologists of work (e.g.,
Leidner 1993 Pierce 1995), but it has also had some impact on social movement scholars (Goodwin and Pfaff, forthcoming; Whittier, forthcoming).

Thomas Scheff (1994a, 1994b) has put pride and shame at the center of his theories of collective action. These two emotions are eminently social, having to do with our attachment to others (pride issuing from positive connections, shame from disconnection). When shame is not acknowledged, it can lead to aggression, even at a group or national level. And when people feel ashamed of their rage, a “shame-rage” spiral can quickly get out of control. Scheff (1994b) has applied his ideas to nationalist movements and to Nazism in particular, arguing that "Such movements involve an intense and passionate quest for belonging," as "individuals and groups seek to increase their pride/shame balance" (pp. 282, 286). "Descriptions of nationalist movements," he writes, "note the passion, indeed the very pages crackle with it. But these descriptions do little to conceptualize, analyze, or interpret it" (p. 282). For Scheff, "Hitler's appeal [to Germans] was that he promised that pride and community would replace shame and alienation"; "the promise of ending Germany's shame after the Treaty of Versailles and raising its pride formed the core of virtually all of his speeches and writings" (pp. 286-287).

Reinterpreting insights of Freud (1959 [1921]) and Slater (1963), Jeff Goodwin has shown the causal importance of the structure and “economy” of affective ties in social movements and in the populations that movements seek to recruit. Unlike analysts who emphasize how affective ties help to recruit and retain participants, Goodwin stresses the potentially disintegrative impact of affective ties, pointing to the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines as a case in point. More generally, Goodwin suggests that the causal impact of social networks on movements, which much recent literature has touted, depends critically on the emotional valence of the social ties that comprise them.

Connecting movement emotions to broader theories of culture, Francesca Polletta (forthcoming) argues that the stories activists tell are critical in configuring mobilizing emotions. In an analysis of students’ contemporaneous accounts of the 1960 sit-ins, she shows how black students’ “apathy” was reinterpreted as the repression of political aspirations—they were “tired of waiting” for the rights denied them—and thus transformed into a motivation for action. Narratives supply a guide to our own feelings, she argues, a kind of emotional propaedeutic.

James Jasper has addressed several emotional dimensions in his attempt to integrate emotions and culture (1997, 1998). For example he tries to replace Walsh’s “suddenly imposed grievances” as a factor in recruitment with the idea of “moral shocks,” which occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997). Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electrical shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. Jasper also analyzes negative emotions produced by threats and blame, so important because they generate the strong emotions of Gamson’s injustice frame. For example, when pro-choice and anti-abortion newsletters “identify concrete and specific adversaries, characterize enemy action in an entirely negative light, attribute corrupt motives to the foe, and magnify the opponents’ power” (Vanderford 1989: 174), they enhance protestors’ outrage and sense of threat. They transform emotions at the same time as understanding.

Jasper also distinguishes two kinds of collective emotions generated within a social movement. Reciprocal emotions concern participants’ ongoing feelings toward each other. These are the affective ties of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and the specific emotions they give rise to. Together they create Goodwin’s “libidinal economy” of a movement, yielding many of the pleasures of protest, including erotic pleasures. Shared emotions are held by a group at the same time, but they do not have the other group members as their objects. The group nurtures anger toward outsiders, or outrage over government policies. Reciprocal and shared emotions reinforce each other and thereby build a movement’s culture. Each measure of shared
outrage against an injustice reinforces the reciprocal emotion of fondness for others precisely because they feel the same way. They are like us; they understand. Conversely, mutual affection is one context in which new shared emotions are easily created. Because you are fond of others, you want to adopt their feelings. Both kinds of collective emotion foster solidarity within a protest group. They are key sources of identification with a movement.

Finally, we have recently organized a conference and edited a volume devoted to emotions and social movements (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, forthcoming). Scholars of movements ranging from nineteenth-century Irish land wars to the 1990s American Christian right and Salvadoran peasant rebels trace the role of emotions in movement emergence, dynamics, and impacts. Their analyses attest to emotional constraints on activists and to the strategic use and transformation of emotions (to recruit, challenge authorities, and sustain commitment). For example, U.S. civil rights activists engaged in a great deal of “emotion work”—sometimes self-consciously, sometimes not—aimed at creating or suppressing various emotions, including fear (Goodwin and Pfaff, forthcoming). In another example, adult survivors of child abuse who filed lawsuits have found that they must temper in the courtroom the emotions that they have been encouraged to express at retreats for fellow survivors (Whittier, forthcoming). Our contributors’ analyses also point to the need for more work on the historical contexts of what are considered appropriate emotions (Polletta and Amenta, forthcoming). Did a humanitarian sensibility sweep Europe and North America after 1750, with abolitionism its most spectacular expression, because, as Thomas Haskell (1985) suggests, the capitalist market expanded people’s capacities to do good? Did black nationalist movements of the 1960s make attractive to subsequent feminist and gay movements a “politics of rage” (Frye 1983; Browning 1993)?

Most of the work on emotions in social movements remains scattered and ad hoc, addressing one emotion in a single kind of setting. It has yet to be integrated into general frameworks for studying mobilization and movements. In the dominant frameworks, there is no obvious place for emotions (Goodwin and Jasper 1999), although process theorists have begun to try to incorporate emotions into their work (e.g., Aminzade and McAdam, forthcoming). At the other extreme, in the sociology of emotions there have been systematic efforts to develop general theories (e.g., Kemper 1978), but no one has yet figured out how to apply those theories to social movements.

WHY NOW? AND WHERE NEXT?

The growing interest in emotions among many analysts of social movements—the “return of the repressed,” as we have called it—poses an interesting puzzle for sociologists of knowledge. Why is this interest emerging now? Arguably, the more interesting question is why social movement scholars have taken so long to rediscover emotions. It is hard to think of activities and relationships that are more overtly emotional than those associated with political protest and resistance. The sociology of emotions, moreover, has existed as an identifiable research tradition for more than two decades. Although the renewed interest in emotions in the social movements field undoubtedly has many causes, three deserve special emphasis.

First, increasing numbers of women have entered the field in recent years, bringing with them a socialization that encourages a greater sensitivity to emotion; we think it no coincidence that scholars such as Taylor, Whittier, Kleinman, and Robnett have emphasized the role of emotions in movements and “alternative” organizations. Feminist scholarship, we have seen, is especially sensitive to emotional sensibilities and displays as both strategy and sources of oppression.

Second, the “cultural turn” of recent years has opened up a conceptual space in which emotions may be analyzed, or at least recognized. To be sure, the rediscovery of culture in the
last decade, as we have seen, has not altogether brought emotions back into models of political action, but it has put forth frameworks for reconceptualizing their role. Like other aspects of culture, emotions can be seen as an aspect of all social action. They accompany rational acts as fully as irrational ones, positive experiences just as much as negative ones. Like other aspects of culture, such as cognitive meanings or moral principles, emotions are shaped by social expectations as much as they are emanations from individual personalities. They depend on traditions as well as on cognitive assessments. In other words, both the Freudians and the crowd theorists were wrong in where they located emotions. Emotions mediate between the individual and the social world, without being reducible to either. The empirical task now is to look at the interaction of emotions with other kinds of cultural dynamics but also with organizational and strategic dynamics. Emotions are central to all of these.

Finally, sociologists have recently begun to write about the self again, inserting psychological issues into the heart of social theory. Some of this literature is a postmodern critique of the concept of a unitary self, but some of it is a defense of the self against this same critique (Flax 1993; Wiley 1994). These debates are distant from Freudian images of emotions as generated by a self in inner turmoil, allowing us instead to see a combination of internal urges and external constructions or constraints. Emotions come from both directions.

How might we incorporate emotions into future research on social movements? The studies discussed in the previous section provide some important leads. We believe, in fact, that attending to emotions will improve all of the on-going streams of research in this field, including studies of:

- **Political opportunity structures.** These “structures” shape protest activity through emotional as well as cognitive means—by fostering (or quashing) hope or urgency, for example, or by reducing (or heightening) fear. Scholars need to examine how political events and ties contingently influence collective emotions—and emotion cultures—of the specific groups that they study, rather than assuming that such events and structures mechanically induce or inhibit protest “behind the backs” of actors.

- **Indigenous organization and social networks.** Rather than simply totting up their resources or social ties, scholars have begun to probe the complex internal cultures of movements and of the populations from which they recruit. But scholars also need to study movement cultures as, in part, emotion (sub)cultures and webs of affective ties, themselves embedded in larger emotion cultures and affective networks. How do specific emotion cultures and affective ties promote or inhibit collective action? Can activists shape collective emotions and emotional bonds in ways that renders protest more likely or durable? Can the bonds of imagined community mobilize as well as those of familiar relations?

- **Framing processes.** The framing of issues in particular ways actually generates protest when frames “resonate” with people. This is another way of saying that frames generally work only when they have an emotional impact on people. Accordingly, scholars of framing processes need to examine not just why some people accept or agree with certain frames, but also why these frames spur action. Some movements, furthermore, explicitly frame emotions in specific ways, sanctioning their expression as either positive or negative for the movement as a whole. So scholars also need to determine when and why emotions themselves become the object of framing processes, and the consequences thereof.

- **Identity formation.** Identities matter to people, and sometimes facilitate collective action, partly because of the strong feelings associated with membership in specific groups. Group identity is typically defined in opposition to one or more out-groups—“others” who are generally the target of negative feelings, including hatred. Scholars who study identity formation, accordingly, need to be explicit about the emotions as well as the beliefs that contingently attach to specific identities.
• Repertoires of protest. Scholars who have studied protest repertoires have generally neglected their emotional aspects. Yet specific protest tactics generally entail (and are sometimes effective precisely because of) specific forms of emotional display (see Young 1999). Movements may stick with certain tactics, even when they have become relatively ineffectual, because of their emotional resonance—and they may adopt new tactics for the same reason. Jasper (1997) refers to this as protestors' "tastes in tactics." Accordingly, scholars who study protest repertoires need to attend to their emotional as well as symbolic dimensions as a complement and corrective to more purely instrumental analyses of movement tactics. They should also examine how broad emotional cultures shape activists’ very understandings of efficacy and appropriateness.

• Movement outcomes. For all the reasons we have noted, emotions shape how movements pursue their goals. Moreover, emotions themselves are often transformed by movements. Scholars need to study much more systematically how movements change (or fail to change) the emotion cultures of their participants and of the wider societies in which they are embedded. For example, when do movements “liberate” emotional expression in a society, and when do they stifle it?

Bringing emotions into the study of social movements has its pitfalls and challenges. One problem is that so many diverse things are grouped under this single rubric. Fleeting reactions to events and people are grouped with abiding affective ties such as love or hate and long-lasting moods such as resignation or depression. Kemper (1978: 47) defines an emotion as “a relatively short-term evaluative response essentially positive or negative in nature involving distinct somatic (and often cognitive) components.” But these “reactive” emotions seem to us but one form, with well-defined objects and settings. Another category includes longer-lasting feelings like love or hate, trust or respect, which accompany—and even help to define—lasting social relationships. While some emotions are reactions to specific objects or events, others are more generalized feelings about the world that transcend specific objects. Moods, which lack a clear object, may be short or long in duration—for example, a panic attack compared to depression. All these kinds of emotions are relevant to political action.

One thrust of recent debates (see Thoits 1989; Griffiths 1997) is that emotions differ in their sources and forms, implying that the cultural view of emotions must sort out its relationship to other perspectives ranging from the biological to the social-structural. Anger and surprise may be more immediate and universal than “higher order” emotions such as indignation or shame. Even the “same” emotion may take different forms. The anger that one feels toward an inanimate object that has just fallen on one’s toe is not the same anger one feels toward a politician caught in a lie. Some emotions are more constructed involve more cognitive processing than and others. Little cognitive processing is required to fear a lunging shadow, whereas quite a lot is necessary to fear a hazardous waste dump planned for one’s neighborhood.

The emotions most relevant to politics, we suspect, fall toward the more constructed, cognitive end of this dimension. Moral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities or the pride of refurbished ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and better society—none of these are automatic, somatic responses. They are related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects. It is for this reason that most recent efforts to look at the emotions of protest and politics are distant from much work in the sociology of emotion, the majority of which involves intimate settings and longstanding affective relationships, as well as from experimental work in psychology that tries to probe the more “instinctive” emotions. We needed the cultural turn of recent years before we could begin to get at the complex constructed emotions of protest and politics.

Another reason why protest emotions are hard to study is that they are repressed, not only in our theoretical models but also by most protestors, who tend to be ambivalent about
them. On the one hand, activists work hard to present themselves to outsiders as rational, even instrumental: they are only responding in an objective way to real threats, outside of any personal bias or interpretation. They do not want to be labeled “soft-hearted” when that is dismissively opposed to “hard-headed.” On the other hand, organizers are often quite explicit about the emotional techniques they use both inside the group and outside. Inside, they try to build solidarity, loyalty, and love among members, as one part of trying to make participation a pleasurable experience (Epstein 1991). As for outsiders, protest leaders hope to manipulate their feelings—their compassion, anger, outrage, fear—as much as their beliefs.

It is no surprise that protestors express the same suspicion and devaluation of “emotionality” as the society at large. Science, not feeling, is the dominant language of legitimation and persuasion in today’s liberal societies. Measurable costs and benefits, atmospheric data, with occasional reference to legal precedents or God thrown in, work well (Jasper, 1992). You cannot sue a manufacturer because its pollution makes you sad or upsets you.

In the end, though, emotions are the “stuff” through which humans are connected with one another and the world around them, coloring thoughts, actions, and judgments. As Scheff and others have pointed out, the emotions most directly connected to moral sensibilities, such as shame, guilt, and pride, are especially pervasive as motivators of action. Other emotions help channel action because they offer familiar situations and narratives: we know what indignation is, or compassion, and act in certain ways once we know we have these emotions (although the causal direction here is not always clear).

We hope this capsule history of theories of contentious politics provides insight into how paradigms work to reveal some things while they conceal others. The most demeaning and opaque kinds of emotions interested crowd theorists and their immediate successors. Mobilization theorists shared little with their predecessors except a dichotomized opposition between rationality and emotion, which led them to deny emotions altogether in the politics they studied. Today, after the cultural turn, we can begin to see emotions in a new, less pejorative, and hopefully more fruitful way.

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