Our goal over these two quarters is to think through a series of possible positions on the nature of logical truth. We will focus on the most fundamental questions: what is the ground of logical truth? (what makes logical truths true?), and how do we come to know these truths? I have in mind here the simplest of logical truths -- if it’s either red or green and it’s not red, then it must be green -- or the simplest of logical validities -- any situation in which all men are mortal and Socrates is a man is a situation in which Socrates is mortal.

This is a reading course in format, which leaves us the flexibility to spend more or less time on various views and writers as we go along and leaves you the freedom to pause and focus more intensely on any of the topics we survey in passing. Here’s a tentative list of readings.

**Topics**

1. **A Kantian view of logic**

Maddy, ‘Logic and the discursive intellect’.

(Unfortunately, chronological order puts one of the very hardest views first. We’ll all need to dip into the relevant parts of the *Critique*. For a capsule Kant and references, you might look at ‘Naturalism and the a priori’, pp. 92-102. For beginners, Körner’s Kant can be helpful.)

2. **Naturalized Kant**

Maddy, ‘A naturalistic look at logic’.

(For some background on naturalism, see ‘Naturalism: friends and foes’ and/or ‘Three forms of naturalism’.)

3. **Bolzano**

(Proust, *Questions of Form*, chapter 2, discusses Bolzano’s notion of analyticity. See also ‘From Kant to Boole’, §III, for discussion and references.)

4. Mill


(See also ‘From Kant to Boole’, §IV, for discussion and references.)

5. Boole


(See also ‘From Kant to Boole’, §V, for discussion and references.)

6. Frege


‘The thought’.

(Frege gets a Platonistic reading, e.g., from Burge, ‘Frege on knowing the third realm’, and a Kantian reading from many, beginning with Sluga’s *Gottlob Frege*.)

7. Early Wittgenstein


First meeting: 1-3.3.

Second meeting: 3.3-5.01.

Third meeting: 5.1-5.135, 5.1363-5.143, 5.3-5.5571, 6-6.13. (For philosophy of math, see 6.2-6.241.)


Summerfield, ‘Thought and language in the Tractatus’.
Fourth meeting: the rest of the Tractatus, and
Stenius, ‘Wittgenstein as Kantian philosopher’, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, chapter XI.

Summerfield, ‘Wittgenstein on logical form and Kantian geometry’.

(For those who can’t get enough Kantianism, here are a couple other relevant pieces:
Kannisto, Thoughts and their Subject, pp. 114-130.
Garver, ‘Wittgenstein and the critical tradition’.)

Fifth meeting: the new Wittgenstein.
Goldfarb, ‘Metaphysics and nonsense: on Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit’, and/or


8. Carnap/Quine

First meeting:
Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language, §§1, 2, 17, 50-52, 62, 71-73.
‘Empiricism, semantics and ontology’.

Quine, ‘Truth by convention’.

Second meeting:
Quine, ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’.
‘Carnap and logical truth’.

(Quine’s empiricism gets a particular case in Putnam’s ‘Is logic empirical?’, but many of you will hear about this in David’s ‘Probability and determinism’. Quine’s views softened somewhat in later years. See Philosophy of Logic, chapters 6 and 7, and Pursuit of Truth, §6.)

Friedman, ‘Analytic truth in Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language’, chapter 7 of his Reconsidering Logical Positivism.
Third meeting:


9. Late Wittgenstein

First meeting:

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§109-133, 185-243. (§§243-317 is the private language argument.)


Second meeting:

Stroud, ‘Wittgenstein and logical necessity’.

Canfield, ‘Anthropological science fiction and logical necessity’.

Third meeting:


(Kripke sees Wittgenstein as putting forward a new skeptical paradox and a skeptical solution to it. This skeptical solution in turn generates an argument against the possibility of a private language.)

Fourth meeting:

Blackburn, ‘The individual strikes back’.

Hoffman, ‘Kripke on private language’.

(These two question the effectiveness of Kripke’s skeptical solution.)

Summerfield, ‘Philosophical Investigations 201: a Wittgensteinian reply to Kripke’.

Fifth meeting:

Goldfarb, ‘Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules’, especially §III.

Diamond, ‘Realism and the realistic spirit’, chapter 1 of The Realistic Spirit.
Maddy, ‘Wittgenstein’s anti-philosophy of mathematics’.

(These three outline an interpretation of Wittgenstein at the extreme opposite from Kripke’s, an interpretation pioneered by Diamond, Goldfarb and others.)

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