This course will trace the history and examine the present of naturalistic philosophy. Along the way, I’ll lay out my own pet version, Second Philosophy, and use it as a foil for the rest.

The default requirement is three short papers (3-5 pages, that is, 750 to 1250 words) due at the beginning of classes in the 4th, 7th, and 10th weeks. Each of these should focus on one point in the readings and include some commentary or critique as well as exposition. Alternatives can be negotiated. Please come to the first meeting (10/2) prepared to discuss Topic (1).

Topics:

1. Descartes and First Philosophy

   Broughton, Descartes’s Method of Doubt, introduction and chapters 1, 3, and 4.

   (You may also want to review Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, especially the First Meditation.)

2. Neo-Cartesian Skepticism

   Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, chapters I and II.
   (Stroud, ‘Understanding human knowledge in general’.)

   (Broughton, Descartes’s Method of Doubt, pp. 82-93.)
   Williams, ‘Epistemological realism and the basis of skepticism’.
   Stroud, ‘Epistemological reflection on knowledge of the external world’.

   (Those bitten by this bug might look into Williams’ Unnatural Doubts, and the other essays of Stroud.)
3. Humean Naturalism

(Mounce, *Hume’s Naturalism*, chapter 1 and pp. 131-132.)
Broughton, ‘Hume’s naturalism about cognitive norms’.

(You might want to brush up your Hume, especially the introduction and I.IV of the Treatise, even more especially, sections I, II, and VII, or the Inquiry, especially section XII.)

4. Kant and Reichenbach

(Maddy, ‘Naturalism and the a priori’, pp. 92-102.)
Coffa, *To the Vienna Station*, chapter 10.
Reichenbach, ‘Logistic empiricism in Germany and the present state of its problems’.
Friedman, ‘Truth and confirmation’.

(Körner and Ewing give introductions to Kant. Stroud treats Kant’s response to skepticism in chapter IV of *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*.)

5. Carnap and Quine

Carnap, ‘Empiricism, semantics, and ontology’.
‘Elimination of pseudo-problems from the theory of knowledge’, (part II of ‘Pseudo-problems in philosophy’).
Stroud, *Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*, chapter V.

Wedberg, ‘Decision and belief in science’.
Quine, ‘On what there is’.
‘Carnap’s views on ontology’.
‘Carnap and logical truth’, sections V, VI, and X.
(Richardson, *Carnap’s Construction of the World*, chapter 1, pp. 198-206, and chapter 9).
6. Metaphysics naturalized

Quine, ‘On what there is’.
‘Five milestones of empiricism’.
‘Posits and reality’.
*Naturalism in Mathematics*, II.6.
‘Naturalism and the a priori’, pp. 108-111.
(‘Ontological commitment: beyond Quine and Duhem’.)

Azzouni, ‘On “On what there is”’.
Yablo, ‘Does ontology rest on a mistake?’.
Maddy, ‘Metaphysics naturalized’.

7. Epistemology naturalized

Quine, ‘Epistemology naturalized’.
(Maddy, *Naturalism in Mathematics*, pp. 178-181.)
(Sosa, ‘Philosophical skepticism and epistemic circularity’)
Stroud, ‘Skepticism, “externalism”, and the goal of epistemology’.

(One prominent version of naturalized epistemology is reliabilism: a belief is justified if it is generated by a reliable process. This position is also externalist, as the reliable process may be one, say a perceptual process, that the knower is unaware of. Stroud argues that externalism can’t answer the traditional epistemological question.)

‘The nature of natural knowledge’.
Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*, chapter VI.
Quine, ‘Reply to Stroud’.
(Fogelin, ‘Quine’s limited naturalism’.)

8. Peirce

Peirce, ‘Fixation of belief’.
‘How to make our ideas clear’.
(‘Some consequences of four incapacities’.)

Barrett, ‘Toward a pragmatic account of scientific knowledge’, sections II-IV.

9. Putnam vs. Putnam

‘Why there isn’t a ready-made world’.
‘Why reason can’t be naturalized’.
Barrett, ‘Toward a pragmatic account of scientific knowledge’, section V.

10. van Fraassen and Fine

Fine, The Shaky Game, pp. 142-147.
Maddy, ‘Second philosophy’, pp. 31-41.

Fine, The Shaky Game, chapters 7 and the rest of chapter 8.
(Fine, ‘Unnatural attitudes: realist and instrumentalist attachments to science’.)
(Fine, ‘Science made up: constructivist sociology of scientific knowledge’.)

11. Naturalizing scientific methodology

Kitcher, ‘The naturalist’s return’.
Laudan, ‘Normative naturalism’.
(‘Progress or rationality’.)
Worral, ‘Two cheers for naturalised philosophy of science’.

12. Stanford’s naturalistic instrumentalism

Stanford, ‘Duhem’s worry’.
(Salmon, ‘The common cause principle and molecular reality’,
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, pp. 213-227.)
Achenstein, ‘Is there a valid empirical argument for scientific realism?’.
Maddy, Naturalism, pp. 135-143.

(We’ll be asking, does Stanford give the naturalist a reason to abstain from belief in atoms?)

13. Sklar on philosophy in science

Sklar, Theory and Truth, chapter 2.
Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics, pp. 188-190.
Halliday and Resnick, Fundamentals of Physics, 952-958.
(Malament, Geometry and Spacetime, available from his course web site: [http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/lps/home/fac-staff/faculty/malament/geometrystaltime.html](http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/lps/home/fac-staff/faculty/malament/geometrystaltime.html).

(We’ll be asking, does Sklar make his case against naturalism?)
14. The problem of induction


(We’ll be asking what the Second Philosopher should say in response to questions like ‘why think the future will be like the past?’ or ‘why think tomorrow’s emeralds will be green rather than grue?’)

15. Kitcher’s real realism

   Kitcher, ‘Real realism: the Galilean strategy’.
   (Kitcher, ‘On the explanatory role of correspondence truth’.)
Papers and excerpts will be available for photocopying in the mail slot outside my office. The main books will be on reserve in the library. Some of these books would make good additions to your personal philosophical library.

Achenstein, Peter


Azzouni, Jody


Barrett, Jeffrey


Broughton, Janet


Carnap, Rudolf


Descartes, René


Ewing, A. C.


Fine, Arthur


Fogelin, Robert


Friedman, Michael


Goodman, Nelson


Halliday, David, and Resnick, Robert

Hume, David
[1740]  A Treatise of Human Nature
[1748]  An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Kitcher, Philip

Körner, Stephan

Laudan, Larry

Livingston, Paul, and Barrett, Jeffrey

Maddy, Penelope
Malament, David


Mounce, H. O.


Norton, John


Peirce, Charles Sanders


Putnam, Hilary


Quine, W. V. O.


Reichenbach, Hans


Richardson, Alan


Salmon, Wesley


Sosa, Ernest


Stanford, P. Kyle

[DW] ‘Duhem’s worry’, introduction to his [EOG].


Sklar, Lawrence


Strawson, P. F.


Stroud, Barry


van Fraassen, Bas C.


Wedberg, Anders


Williams, Michael


Worrall, John


Yablo, Stephen