Psych 215L: Language Acquisition

Lecture 14
Poverty of the Stimulus

Reminder: Poverty of the Stimulus

Language
Can be thought of as the set of legal items in the language (sentences, strings, etc.). The child’s job: figure out the rules that generate that legal set and don’t generate illegal items.

Legal Items
Hoggle is an ornery dwarf
Fairies bite adventurers
Fairies bite adventurers
Fairies bite fairies
Can the girl who can summon the Goblin King solve the Labyrinth?

Illegal Items
Bite adventurers
Bite fairies
Hoggle a dwarf ornery is
Can the girl who can summon the Goblin King solve the Labyrinth?

Reminder: Poverty of the Stimulus

The Logic of Poverty of the Stimulus (The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition)

1) Suppose there are some data.
2) Suppose there is an incorrect hypothesis compatible with the data.
3) Suppose children behave as if they never entertain the incorrect hypothesis.

Addendum (interpretation): Or children converge on the correct hypothesis much earlier than expected (Legate & Yang 2002).

Conclusion: Children possess prior knowledge ruling out the incorrect hypothesis from the hypothesis space considered.

Addendum (interpretation): The initial hypothesis space does not include all hypotheses. Specifically, the incorrect ones of a particular kind are not in the child’s hypothesis space.

Reminder: Poverty of the Stimulus

The argument for having innate biases to guide language acquisition

Legal Items
A fairy who flies around the Labyrinth walls bites anyone who passes by.
Hoggle is an ornery dwarf
Can the girl who can summon the Goblin King solve the Labyrinth?

Illegal Items
Fairies bite adventurers
Fairies bite adventurers
Fairies bite fairies
Can the girl who can summon the Goblin King solve the Labyrinth?

Idea: The data available to the child are compatible with a number of generalizations. However, children only seem to pick the right ones. Therefore, they must have some other constraints guiding their language learning.

The innate part: The guiding information must be available prior to learning.
Reminder: LPLA

Induction Problem: Logical Problem of Language Acquisition (Standard Theory)

Children don’t get access to all the data in the language by the time they have the correct generalization. They learn from a subset of the legal items in the language. And still they seem to converge on the right generalizations...without trying out many (or all) of the wrong ones.

Pullum & Scholz (2002)

“...linguistic nativism is the view...that human infants have at least some linguistically specific innate knowledge

“...issue is whether a full description of that predisposition incorporates anything that entails specific contingent facts about natural languages

[poverty of the stimulus]

“...argument...turns on the claim that during the language acquisition process, children often come to know things about the language they are acquiring despite not having access to the crucial evidence that shows these things to be true of the language.”


“Instead of clarifying the reasoning, each successive writer on this topic shakes together an idiosyncratic cocktail of claims about children’s learning of language, and concludes nativism is thereby supported. Most of the frequently encountered claims are about children’s observable accomplishments or aspects of the child’s environment.”


Children’s observable accomplishments

Speed: Children learn so fast.
Reliability: Children always succeed.
Productivity: Children learn a system.
Selectivity: Children pick the correct option from a bunch of incorrect (and "seductive") alternatives.
Underdetermination: Children arrive at systems of knowledge underdetermined by the data.
Convergence: Children end up with the right system.
Universality: The system acquired has a lot of properties in common with other language systems of the world.
Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Frustration with PoS Proponents

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Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Frustration with PoS Proponents

Children’s observable accomplishments

**Speed:** Children learn so fast.
- Relevant Interpretation: Faster than expected, given available data.
**Selectivity:** Children pick the correct option from a bunch of incorrect (and “seductive”) alternatives.
- Relevant Interpretation: Seductive because also compatible with data.
**Underdetermination:** Children arrive at systems of knowledge underdetermined by the data.
- Relevant Interpretation: Alternative hypotheses also compatible with data.

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Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Frustration with PoS Proponents

Aspects of Child’s Environment

**Ingratitude:** No explicit payoff for correct language usage.
**Finiteness:** Children don’t get infinite data to learn from.
**Idiosyncrasy:** The subset of data children encounter varies from child to child.
**Incompleteness:** Children don’t hear everything in the language.
**Positivity:** No explicit instruction of what isn’t in the language.
**Degeneracy:** Input to children has noise.

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  Relevant Interpretation: Make generalization from incomplete data set.

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Pullum & Scholz (2002):
The Version Chosen To Attack

“People attain knowledge of the structure of their language for which no evidence is available in the data to which they were exposed as children.” - Hornstein & Lightfoot (1981)

“We replace total lack of evidence by lack of evidence that is adequate to the task…would not emerge in conversational data near often enough to guarantee that any particular child would ever encounter it.” - Pullum & Scholz

“…the APS to stand for ‘the Argument Selected by Pullum & Scholz’ ”

Pullum & Scholz (2002):
How to Support APS

Step 1: Describe in detail what is known.

Step 2a: Identify the crucial data that would lead a data-driven learner to that knowledge.

Step 2b: Give reason to believe that’s the crucial data.

Step 3: Show learners don’t have access to that crucial data.

Step 4: Show that learners nonetheless acquire the right knowledge.
### Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

#### Case 1: Plurals in noun-noun compounds

3-6 yr olds behavior:
- Irregular plural pattern (plural marker on first noun okay)
  - 1 tooth-eater or 1 *teeth-eater*
  - 1 mouse-eater or 1 *mice-eater*
- Regular plural pattern (plural marker on first noun not okay)
  - 1 toy-eater (but not 1 *toys-eater*)
  - 1 rat-eater (but not 1 *rats-eater*)

Knowledge of incomplete paradigm:
- *tooth-eater*
- *teeth-eater*
- *toy-eater*
- *toys-eater*

Important point: No generalization to regular plural nouns.

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#### Gordon (1986):

Brown corpus (1,000,000 words):
- Irregular sg compounds [tooth-eater] (153 tokens)
- Irregular pl compounds [teeth-eater] (3 tokens)
- Regular sg compounds [toy-eater] (…more…?)
- Regular pl compounds [toys-eater] (0 tokens)

Argument: Irregular pl compounds appear so rarely, they are similar in frequency to regular pl compounds (which never appear because they’re ungrammatical.) But children still produce the irregular pl compounds and do not produce the irregular sg compounds. This is hard to explain if they’re data-driven. (Though see Foraker et al. (2009) for an example where an ideal learner can make use of even slight differences in data distribution, and then Lidz, Waxman, & Freedman (2003) and Pearl & Lidz (2009) for discussion about how “informative” data that have very low frequency may not be helpful to real learners…)

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#### Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

P&S rebuttals:
- Not clear 3-6 yr old behavior was really true outside the experimental setup (method flaws).
- Point: Not children’s behavior.
- Point: Not adult’s behavior either.
Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies
Case 2: Auxiliary sequences

Kimball 1973:
It rains, It may rain, It may have rained, It may be raining, It has rained, It has been raining, It is raining, It may have been raining,....

Rule: (...Aux Verb: {rains, may rain, may have rained, ...}  
Aux --> Tense (Modal) (have +en) (be +ing)  
(present) (may, might) (have VERBen) (be VERBing)

(present) + {Modal} = may rain
Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

Case 2: Auxiliary sequences

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(present)  (may, might)  (have VERBen)  (be VERBing)
(past) + {have + en} = had rained

Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

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It rains, It may rain, It may have rained, It may be raining, It has rained, It has been raining, It is raining, It may have been raining,...

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Aux --> Tense (Modal)  (have +en)  (be +ing)
(present)  (may, might)  (have VERBen)  (be VERBing)
(past) + {Modal} + {be+ing} = may have been raining

P&S rebuttal:
Is that rule really what children are acquiring? Instead, children may be able to abstract the necessary sequence from other sequences of not exactly that type.

Also, data not so vanishingly rare: hundreds of examples in adult literature (Moby Dick, Wuthering Heights) and many in children’s literature (Peter Pan, Alice in Wonderland, The Wizard of Oz)

Estimate: 1 approximately every 3000-4000 sentences

The real question: How many is enough? Need a quantitative claim from the linguists (see Legate & Yang 2002, Hsu & Chater 2010 for some attempts at this).
Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

Case 3: Anaphoric One

Originally, Baker 1978
Recently described accessibly in Foraker et al. (2007, 2009) and Pearl & Mis (2011)

“I liked the debate about acquisition. You liked the one about modeling.”
* I’ll walk by the side of the road and you can walk by the one of the river.*

Syntactic distribution distinction: Difference between complement-taking nouns (side) and modifier-taking nouns (debate).
Syntactic distinction: complement-taking nouns = Category N0, modifier-taking nouns = Category N' (larger than N)
Semantic distinction: Complement-taking nouns are conceptually different from modifier-taking nouns. (side = side of what?, debate can stand by itself)
Anaphoric One structure

Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

Case 3: Anaphoric One

Originally, Baker 1978

Necessary Data:
Baker 1978: rule out one = N0

Need specific utterance & world situation:
Utterance:
"Look – a red bottle! We want another one and there doesn’t seem to be one here."

Reasoning:
one ≠ "bottle", since another bottle is present.
Therefore, one = "red bottle", which can only be N’ (not N0)

Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

18-month olds behave as if they have the right interpretations
(Lidz, Waxman, & Freedman 2003)

Unambiguous data are pretty rare in child-directed speech:
(Lidz, Waxman, & Freedman 2003; Pearl & Lidz 2009)

≈0.25% of anaphoric one utterances are unambiguous for
one ≠ category N0, but instead one = something larger like N’

Similar P&S rebuttal as before: How rare is too rare?
(see Legate & Yang 2002, Hsu & Chater 2010 for some suggestions for
how to quantify “too rare”)

Rebuttal of another kind: this is not the crucial evidence

*Can be learned from other available data*

*...but not without some other learning constraints/knowledge, too*
Foraker et al. 2009, Pearl & Lidz 2009

*...unless you broaden your idea of what counts as informative data...and even
then, you may need still need some additional knowledge*
Pearl & Mix (2011, 2012 Ms)
Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

Case 4: Auxiliary Fronting

Chomsky 1971: Adult Knowledge

The girl is easily fooled. Is the girl easily fooled?

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled. Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?

Someone who is not easily fooled could trick someone who is. Could someone who is not easily fooled trick someone who is?

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Chomsky 1971: Child Behavior (Crain & Nakayama (1987))

The girl is easily fooled. Is the girl easily fooled?

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled. Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?

* Can the girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?

Rule: Move first auxiliary?
Rule: Move main-clause auxiliary?
Rule: Move odd-numbered auxiliary?
Rule: Move auxiliary next to female noun?

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Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

Case 4: Auxiliary Fronting

Chomsky 1971: Child Data

The girl is easily fooled. Very frequent

Is the girl easily fooled?

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled. Very frequent

Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?

* Can the girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?

I could borrow your pencil when you’re done. When you’re done, could I borrow your pencil?

Rules out “front first aux” hypothesis: Should be very frequent

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled. Very infrequent

Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?

* Can the girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?

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P&S rebuttal:

Very infrequent
Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

Case 4: Auxiliary Fronting

P&S rebuttal:

The girl is easily fooled.  
Is the girl easily fooled?  
Very frequent

The changes these events portend are how fundamental.  
How fundamental are the changes these events portend?  

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled.  
Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?  
* Can the girl who solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?  
Very infrequent

Rules out “front first aux” hypothesis, though not in yes/no questions:  
15th sentence in WSJ corpus

Legate & Yang (2002):
Rebuttal

Data set = 500 sentences of the Wall Street Journal  
“How fundamental are the changes these events portend?”  
“Is what I’m doing in the shareholders’ best interest?”

Not really a good sample of child-directed speech, unless you have a very unique child.

Also, Legate & Yang (2002) found that 1% are of this data type (5 of the 500 sentences).

Pullum & Scholz (2002):
Case Studies

Case 4: Auxiliary Fronting

P&S rebuttal:

The girl is easily fooled.  
Is the girl easily fooled?  
Very frequent

What I’m doing is in the shareholders’ best interest.  
Is what I’m doing in the shareholders’ best interest?  
Rules out “front first aux” hypothesis:  
180th sentence in WSJ corpus

The other doll that was in here is where.  
Where’s the other doll that was in here?  
Rules out “front first aux” hypothesis, though not yes/no question:  
Child-directed speech

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled.  
Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?  
* Can the girl who solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?  
Very infrequent

Looking at the Nina corpus:
46,499 sentences
20,651 questions
14 unambiguous data examples (all of wh-question type)

Frequency of unambiguous data: 0.068%


Looking at the Brown-Adam corpus:
20,372 sentences
8,889 questions
4 unambiguous data examples (all of wh-question type)

Frequency of unambiguous data: 0.045%

Pullum & Scholz (2002): Case Studies

Case 4: Auxiliary Fronting

P&S rebuttal:
Main point (similar to previous ones): How much data is enough?

The girl who can solve the labyrinth is easily fooled.
Is the girl who can solve the labyrinth easily fooled?
* Can the girl who solve the labyrinth is easily fooled?

Very infrequent

Pullum & Scholz (2002): Summary

Linguists should be careful about what knowledge they think children are acquiring.

It's not that there is no evidence for the child to learn from in most cases. It's just that it's rare. It's an open question about how rare is too rare.
Additional Note: Larger point about PoS (from Crain & Pietroski (2002))

"...it's not enough to mention ways in which children could learn some things without Universal Grammar. To rebut poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments, one has to show how children could learn (everything) adults actually know; and as close investigation reveals, adults know a lot more than casual inspection suggests. That is the nativist's main point."

Examples of linguistic knowledge that some researchers believe is hard:
- restrictions on meaning interpretation (Crain & Pietroski 2002)
- restrictions on syntactic case (Valian 2009, ch2, section 2.4)
- restrictions on syntactic islands (Pearl & Sprouse 2011, 2012)

Bias = Innate + Domain-Specific?

Poverty of the Stimulus (the existence of an induction problem) is usually used as the motivation for Universal Grammar. But just because an induction problem exists doesn’t mean innate domain-specific knowledge like UG is required to solve it. The knowledge required could be derived from prior knowledge (domain-specific or domain-general) or simply be domain-general to begin with.

Exploring the Nature of the Necessary Bias(es):
Computational Modeling Work

Domain-general biases explored:
- prefer subset hypothesis: Regier & Gahl 2004
- prefer simplicity: Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier 2006, 2011
- use only maximally informative data: Pearl & Weinberg 2007, Pearl 2008, Pearl & Lidz 2009, Pearl & Mis 2011, 2012 Ms

Domain-specific biases explored:
- ignore certain kinds of ambiguous data that are identified using domain-specific (linguistic) knowledge: Regier & Gahl 2004, Pearl & Lidz 2009, Pearl & Mis 2011
- ignore embedded clause data: Pearl & Weinberg 2007
- prefer syntactic information over semantic information: Foraker et al. 2009

Continuing discussion about Universal Grammar

Pullum 2011 comments on a lecture by Chomsky about Universal Grammar (continued frustration)

"These recent talks and papers share a steadfast refusal to engage with anything that might make the debate about the poverty of the stimulus (POS) an empirical one."

"It would give a POS argument some empirical bite if one could specify ways in which the child's input was demonstrably too thin to support learning of particular features of language from experience of language use. That would seem worthy of attention."

"It certainly seems to me sufficient to justify including at least a brief introduction to Bayesian statistical reasoning in the education of every theoretical linguist."
Continuing discussion about Universal Grammar

Brenchley & Lobina 2011 reply to Pullum's comments

"It is true, of course, that Chomsky seems to have little interest in what we might call empirical "number crunching" with respect to POS (e.g. quantifying the actual syntactic patterns in the child's environmental input and relating these quantifications to the actual frequencies of equivalent patterns within the child's developing output). However, the fact that he himself has not undertaken such research is entirely orthogonal to the claim that he has not provided empirical grounds for debating the POS."

"The basic schema of the argument would, therefore, seem to be something like this: (1) As linguists, we are interested in the nature of human linguistic knowledge. (2) Our analyses of actual natural language syntax lead us to believe certain facts to be true of this knowledge (e.g. structure dependent movement), which we account for in a certain way (e.g. Merge). (3) The computational cognitive science literature has so far failed to provide domain-general learning models that adequately capture these facts about human language. (4) Therefore, they do not constitute POS counterarguments."