HYDERABAD
The Mulki–Non-Mulki Conflict

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The collapse of Hyderabad state in 1948 has continued to puzzle observers of Indian politics. As the largest of the princely states in both size and population, why did the state not engage more actively and constructively in the political conflicts which ended in partition and independence for India and Pakistan in 1947? Why, in particular, did the Nizam of Hyderabad not build upon a promising indigenous cultural nationalist movement, the Mulki movement, to negotiate or fight more successfully for autonomy?

Hyderabad’s limited political goals and achievements in the crucial pre-independence decades were rooted in the Mulki-non-Mulki conflict, which began in the nineteenth century. Mulkis were countrymen, citizens of Hyderabad; non-Mulkis were outsiders, men brought in to reform the Hyderabad government. An understanding of the process of administrative modernization and its relationship to vigorous cultural and political movements in the twentieth century clarifies the crucial role of the Mulki–non-Mulki conflict in the ‘series of astonishing miscalculations’ of the Nizam and the Diwani bureaucracy in the 1940s, miscalculations which led to the state’s incorporation into India. This analysis begins with the Diwanship of Salar Jung in the mid-nineteenth century, because both administrative modernization and the Mulki–non-Mulki conflict began then; it moves through two more historical periods to show the changing social composition of the groups competing for political power, and the increasingly differential rates of administrative and political modernization in the state.

In the first stage, from 1853 to 1883, the efforts of the Diwan Salar Jung to modernize the administration required men trained in British India. They established an Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and became a new social category, non-Mulkis, in the city; the Diwan successfully denied them political power.
During the second stage, from 1884 to 1911, the non-Mulki administrators seized political power while Muliks tried to gain administrative positions. The Diwani administration became a largely autonomous bureaucracy, constituting itself as an elite and generating its own behavioural norms. No longer checked by the Nizam, the Diwan, or powerful nobles, it made decisions which affected the structure of Hyderabadi society. The Mughlai bureaucracy was effectively dismantled and its personnel disinflicted at all levels. The educational and professional differences between Muliks and non-Muliks did not lessen. The non-Mulki Diwani officials devised regulations which would perpetuate their continued dominance of the Diwani administration and allow their descendants to claim positions as Muliks. The accelerated modernization and expansion of the bureaucracy after 1884 only enhanced its political power and retarded other processes of political development.

In the third period, from 1911 to 1948, there were three major developments within Hyderabad state. First was the broadening of the Mulki category to include men from the Hyderabad districts, accompanying the extension of effective administration to the rural areas of the state. But the professional, social, and political integration of these district Muliks was only partial. Second, the government continued to concentrate only on administrative modernization, not political modernization. The Nizam and his officials confined their goals to the efficient performance of minimal government functions: the collection of taxes, the maintenance of law and order, and the provision of limited public services (education, communication, and transport facilities). They did not formulate a concept of government as representative of the state as a whole, and they made no commitment to the development of governmental institutions or political organizations which could broaden participation in decision-making. Although the Hyderabad administration in the twentieth century was more modernized than many have thought, its political vision was limited, and more importantly, it continued to be controlled by non-Muliks.

The third crucial development in this period was the establishment of Osmania University and the cultural nationalism it produced. The non-Mulki administrators intended the inauguration of this Urdu-medium university in 1918 to advance administrative modernization, but scholars there created and elaborated upon two political ideologies which dominated intellectual and political discussion in the capital city during the crucial decade preceding Indian independence. These ideologies, a concept of Deccani nationalism supported by Mulki Hyderabadis and a concept of Muslim sovereignty in the Deccan supported initially by non-Mulki Muslims, allowed the reinterpretation of the long-standing insider-outsider conflict along communal lines and dealt a death blow to the indigenous Mulki movement.

These essentially cultural ideologies inspired a fervour which obscured the political realities confronting Hyderabad state. Both were elitist views, still focused upon the administration and its political control of the state. An ideological controversy between two Urdu-speaking groups helped blind members of both to the pressure for political participation from the non-Urdu speaking rural population of the state. In the Hyderabad districts, western-educated activists were building mass political organizations directly linked to nationalist organizations in British India. They pressed for responsible government and civil liberties within Hyderabad state, using the term Mulki and asking for greater Mulki participation. But these Muliks in the districts did not share the cultural assumptions of the Deccani nationalist movement, and the political leadership of the two Mulki movements never fully coalesced. Also, in this third stage, the non-Mulki administrators secured the firm support of the Nizam, whose chief interests lay in administrative efficiency and the maintenance of law and order.

I. The Diwan as Mediator of Political and Administrative Conflict

The policies and practices of the Diwan Salar Jung, effective ruler of the state from 1853 to 1883, initiated both the original Mulki-non-Mulki distinction and the modernizing administration. When Salar Jung became Diwan in 1853, Hyderabad was in desperate financial straits, and the British Indian government threatened to take over the state through loans, cession of land, or direct administration. To preserve Hyderabad's independence, the young Diwan had to modernize the Mughlai revenue system and bureaucracy, both to achieve financial stability and to meet British criticism of its corruptions and inefficiencies. The strategy he adopted was to construct a new (or Diwani) administration, utilizing British advice,
administrative practices, and knowledgeable personnel from outside Hyderabad. The revenue system was his first concern, especially the substitution of salaried collectors for the revenue contractors, including many bankers and military men, who controlled the land revenue.

Salar Jung has gone down in history as the ‘modernizer’ of Hyderabad, but he was from the old ruling class of predominantly North Indian Muslims and Hindus who had settled in the Deccan in the eighteenth century, and his modernization efforts were in fact limited. He did begin to construct the new Diwani administration, but he also preserved the Mughlai institutions, their personnel, and the nobility of Hyderabad state. The persistence of these traditional elements might be thought limiting to the Diwan’s own power, but he used them to fend off direct British interference and to check the new class of administrators brought into Hyderabad to run the Diwani administration.

Salar Jung required a British-trained group of Indian administrators to carry out bureaucratic modernization. Such men had to come, at least initially, from outside Hyderabad. Indians with British training and experience were recruited, primarily after 1869, when the death of the Nizam Afzal-uddaula and the minority status of the heir gave Salar Jung as regent more power to institute administrative changes. Salar Jung recruited many of these men personally, sometimes accepting advice from the Resident or the Government of India. Most were English-educated, though a few did not know English. There were Parsis and Hindus among them, and some Europeans as well, but most were Muslims and most were from North India. After the Mutiny of 1857, with the Mughal administration in Delhi finally abolished, many Delhi Muslims took jobs in Hyderabad. Others came upon retirement from British administrative service, and their relatives followed them. Some of the Muslim newcomers were associated with Syed Ahmed Khan and his newly-founded Aligarh Muslim University, and Aligarh became a major source of recruitment in the 1870s. The group was almost immediately termed ‘non-Mulk’, although the term ‘Hindustani’ was also used because of the predominance of North Indians.

The Diwan understood that the importation of British Indian administrative practices and personnel could have significant cultural and political impact upon Hyderabadi society. Like many of his class in Hyderabad, he was personally opposed to the cultural changes accompanying western education and the use of English elsewhere in India, and his major goal was to preserve Hyderabad’s Mughlai political traditions and culture. Therefore he developed policies to prevent and control change, policies designed to keep the Hyderabad nobles, the new administrators, and British officials isolated from each other, from the Nizam, and from political power as centralized in the Diwan.

Salar Jung made every effort to deny the non-Mulk Diwani employees access to traditional sources of power in Hyderabad, and he tried not to draw too heavily on any one source of recruits. Diwani employees were accorded no official standing at court. They received salaries, not hereditary stipends or mansabs; they commanded no troops; they received no jagirs (land grants) or titles. To ensure the political isolation of the newcomers, the Diwan issued regulations forbidding Diwani officials to visit the Resident or important nobles without special permission from the Diwan. He viewed the newcomers as mere employees and outsiders, men who ‘should on no account have anything to do with his private affairs or with the Royal palace’, and whom he wished to utilize ‘. . . in administrative matters only’. Only Hyderabads were entrusted with particularly important political responsibilities, positions which should have functioned as part of the Diwani administration. Men from Salar Jung’s own jagir headed the new Accountancy and Treasury positions. They used the old Mughlai accounting system and worked under his close supervision. Another Hyderabadi was chosen to reorganize the Customs Department, a major source of revenue and an influential post in urban government. A hereditary Mughlai serrishhadar was entrusted with organization of a new Regular Force for the Nizam’s military, an undertaking opposed by the British. And Salar Jung’s choice for an English-speaking vakil to represent him to the Resident was a locally-born Tamilian, a man intensely disliked by many North Indian Muslims.

The Diwan sharply resisted administrative innovations which threatened Hyderabad’s court culture. He disagreed vigorously with some North Indian Muslims who urged that Urdu replace Persian as the language of administration. When Salar Jung chose an English tutor for the young Nizam, an appointment long urged by the Resident, he did so with great apprehension.
Salar Jung strove to avoid opposition from the Nizam, the nobility, and the old Mughal officials as he constructed a modern Diwani administration. Political expediency prevented him from dismantling the Mughal bureaucracy or displacing its hereditary personnel, though the newer structures and personnel gradually took over the functions of the older Mughal offices. He was particularly careful in his treatment of the nobility, some of whom were his strongest rivals for power within the state. Viewing the nobles as threats to the centralization of power by the Diwan, Salar Jung believed that their exercise of political power had been disastrous for the state. But he also believed that the nobles were the living representatives of the court culture and political traditions of Hyderaband, and Salar Jung wished to preserve them in that role. The policy of separation between the new administrative personnel and the nobles accomplished both goals. First, it kept the Diwani administration free from intrigue and under his own control; second, it preserved the values and traditions of old Hyderaband. Thus the social and ceremonial life of the court continued to flourish, despite a demonstrable and increasing erosion of the nobles' political power in the state.

The Diwani's general policy of restricting political and social contacts between the new Diwani officials, the nobles, and English officials promoted the development of two separate societies in the city. This contrasted with social life in the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries, when individual Europeans and early British Residents had adapted themselves to Hyderabadi society. After the 1820s, the increasing exercise of power by the British Indian government caused its local representatives to be more restricted in their contacts with Hyderaband nobles and officials. The Diwans immediately preceding Salar Jung had denied the Resident access to members of the nobility to prevent intrigue and interference, and Salar Jung continued and reinforced this policy from 1853 until his death in 1883.

In addition to the regulation of social contacts, there was a strong prohibition on British entry into the old walled city. The consideration advanced, in view of the armed and unruly Irregular Forces, was the safety of Europeans there. Another consideration was the insulation of the nobility and the court from English political and cultural influence. In fact, the insularity of the old city and its inhabitants provided politically useful arguments for Salar Jung. Just as the British did not enter the walled city, nobles seldom left it. Salar Jung was especially solicitous of the Paigah nobles (the leading Muslim noble family) and the ladies of the royal household. Both households were strongholds of conservatism, and upon occasion Salar Jung presented them as obstacles to Residency proposals. On several controversial issues during his thirty-year Diwanship, Salar Jung forestalled reform measures urged by successive Residents by citing cultural backwardness on the part of the Nizam or nobles.

Since the British and the new Diwani officials were denied access to the Mughal culture and its leading representatives, they became allies, for both structural and cultural reasons. The Diwani officials had been brought into Hyderaband to construct a modern bureaucracy. They were constrained by a strong Diwan, a powerful traditional aristocracy, and a Nizam secluded with his palace retainers. Many of the non-Mulki administrators came from the Indian Civil Service, an institution with its own elitist values, and the Hyderaband Diwani administration was modelled upon the British Indian administration. In some respects the non-Mulki department secretaries in Hyderaband had even more power than did their counterparts in British India. These administrators were familiar with the modernizing policies of British India and their implementation, and they were aware of the developments occurring in other Indian states. There was an impatience with the obstacles to modernization so well personified by elder members of the Hyderaband nobility.

The non-Mulkis also shared cultural orientations which set them apart from traditional Hyderabadi society and drew them to the British officials. In Hyderaband, they were confronted with a civic culture which they judged to be a regional and inferior version of the Mughal heritage then disintegrating in British India. Most had had an English language education. That, and their careers in the British Indian service, gave them a common distaste for the antiquated Urdu and old-fashioned ways of Hyderabads. The barriers between the newcomers and the Mughal official class had been reinforced by other factors. The new men tended to settle outside the crowded old city, in suburbs near the Residency and beyond it. As the numbers of western-educated non-Mulki officials grew in the city, the Residency society proved attractive to them, and there were continual attempts to modify the restrictive social regulations.

Salar Jung's policies largely succeeded in insulating the inhabit-
Diwani administration. Only half of the land in Hyderabad was Khalsa, or public, under the Diwani revenue administration; the other half was privately administered by jagirdars, tributary rulers, and the Nizam. The Nizam’s personal estate had its own large administrative structure which retained Mughal practices and personnel. The Diwani administration was thus one of several competing administrative and political institutions, and Salar Jung used them to check each other throughout his long career as Diwan.

II. The Non-Mulki Administrators
Seize Political Power in Hyderabad

With Salar Jung’s sudden death in 1883, the Diwani administrators became politically dominant, and conflicts broke out among non-Mulkis and between non-Mulkis and Mulkis. The gradual consolidation of the new Diwani administration and the central political position of the Diwan had created a possibility Salar Jung could not have foreseen: should a future Diwan become the ally or puppet of the non-Mulki officials, power would pass decisively to the Diwani administration and its non-Mulki administrators.

For one year, from 1883 to 1884, a Council of Regency ruled until the young Nizam Mahbub Ali Khan turned eighteen and could be enthroned. A new Diwan was to be recognized at the same time, and this was a critical selection, for the young Nizam was still a minor, more interested in sports than in studies, and he was not likely to be an effective check upon the administration. The choice of the next Diwan became a matter of lively contention. Salar Jung’s young son and an elderly Hindu nobleman were the leading candidates. Non-Mulki Muslim officials and members of the old Hyderabad nobility battled openly on many issues through their representatives on the Council of Regency during that year, and British indecisiveness sharpened their conflicts. But the Government of India finally chose to support the western-educated candidate, the twenty-one-year-old Salar Jung II, who was backed by the non-Mulki officials; thus it was Salar Jung’s own son through whom the non-Mulki seized power in Hyderabad.

Paradoxically, a more open and integrative social life was an immediate and welcome result of the installation of the young Nizam and almost equally young Diwan. Connections between the non-Mulki administrators and the social order in Hyderabad had
initially been weak, but freed from the former restrictions, Diwani officials and the younger generation of Hyderabad nobles participated together in the English-oriented culture of the new city and Secunderabad, in marked contrast to the days of Salar Jung I. Some members of the nobility, both Muslim and Hindu, began to acquire western education and participate in the modernizing society, primarily for social reasons. Some of the enthusiasm carried over into Persian and Urdu literary societies and other voluntary associations in the old city as well. For a brief time at the close of the nineteenth century, a vigorous and eclectic Hyderabad society seemed to be developing, in which all men of some wealth and standing could participate.

But Salar Jung II and his Diwani department secretaries took political actions which proved divisive. They were determined to carry forward the modernization of the state, and they now had the means to do so. Almost all major reductions of Mughlai civil and military positions occurred after 1884, rather than in the time of Salar Jung I. As the cumulative result of thirty years of reorganization, almost all of the Mughlai mansabdars and other servants had become concentrated in old-fashioned Mughlai units, such as the Nizam's personal estate and the Irregular Military Forces. From 1883 to 1885, the Mansab Department was merged into the Accountant General's office; a Managing Board was established for the Nizam's estate; the Irregular Forces were merged with the Regular Forces; and a Court of Wards was established to supervise the estates of nobles and jagirdars when legitimate heirs were disputed or under age. Even inside the palace, long-standing practices were ignored and new regulations enforced; and the young Diwan took on a North Indian Muslim and a European as his private secretaries. Traditionally powerful groups found their positions insecure and their political power usurped.

The replacement of Persian by Urdu as the language of administration and the courts in the 1880s also worked against the Muliks, whose specialized knowledge of Persian had been a valued and necessary skill in the old Hyderabad Mughlai administration. The old Hyderabad officials, both Hindu and Muslim, had a decided advantage so long as Persian remained the state's official language. Urdu, while still a vernacular widely spoken and understood throughout northern India and Hyderabad, was becoming associated with the Muslim community in North India, and its selection to replace Persian in Hyderabad had implications for administrative recruitment.

By 1890, it was clear that non-Mulkis dominated the Diwani administration. Salar Jung II had begun his Diwanship as an old friend of the young Nizam, but his apparent manipulation by Diwani and Residency officials soon provoked conservative opposition to him. Palace officials and others of the old order who had the ear of the Nizam turned Mahbub Ali Khan against his Diwan. The statistical domination by non-Mulkis of the Diwani positions, particularly the highest and most lucrative ones, became the central political issue. The non-Mulki dominance was true not only in the earliest civil lists but increased as the administration expanded. In 1886, the first Hyderabad Civil List showed the 476 civil officers according to origin and salary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% of all salary disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All outsiders</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindustani</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 52 per cent who were Muliks received only 42 per cent of all salary disbursements, while the 48 per cent who were non-Mulkis received 58 per cent of the salaries. In particular, Europeans were disproportionately highly paid, followed by the Hindustanis.

A separate list of those appointed since October 1884 revealed even greater discrepancies. Of these 421 new appointments, 274, or 65 per cent, were Hyderabadis, receiving only 37 per cent of the total salaries. The 147 foreigners, or 35 per cent of the new appointees, received 63 per cent of the total salaries. Salar Jung II attributed this pattern to the large number of appointments being made to the Judicial, Survey and Education Departments, for which local talent was not available.

Despite explicit instructions from the Nizam, expansion of the Diwani bureaucracy continued to favour non-Mulkis. Political in-
trigues centered on this issue forced the resignation of Salar Jung II, but his successors faced the same issue. The Civil List of 1894 included 680 gazetted officers, an increase of just over 200. The number of non-Mulkis had nearly doubled, from 230 to 447 men, in the eight-year period from 1886, but the number of Hyderabadis had actually decreased, with only 233 recorded as Mulkis.45

This 1894 Civil List also noted that some of the Mulkis were 'of only one generation', suggesting that this category was being redefined as non-Mulkis settled in the state and their sons began to enter government service. From 1884 to 1886, a series of government resolutions defined 'Mulkis' and outlined procedures for government employment.44 A Mulki was defined as a person who had permanently resided in Hyderabad state for fifteen years or who had continuously served under the government for at least twelve years; he and his lineage male descendants to two generations were legally Mulkis. While no non-Mulkis were to be appointed on a high or low post, either permanently or temporarily, without special government permission, a non-Mulki could apply for such permission by detailing his special knowledge and experience not yet available in Hyderabad. The successful applicant received a certificate of domicile, known as a Mulki certificate.45 These regulations enabled non-Mulkis and their sons to retain their monopoly on administrative positions.

In legal terms, then, the non-Mulki group became a transition category, through which recent immigrants moved themselves and their children as soon as service or bribery secured a Mulki certificate. But regardless of legal certification, most descendants of those who had come as non-Mulkis continued to be regarded as non-Mulkis by those of longer residence in the state. As the legal definitions of Mulki and non-Mulki became more explicit and rigid, the terms became more and more flexible in popular usage, so that an individual's status could be one or the other depending upon the circumstances and the viewpoints of others. Although the Civil Lists continued to classify officials by origin, statistics based upon place of birth no longer reflected social perceptions of group membership. Contemporary accounts speak of 'bona fide' Mulkis and 'first generation' Mulkis, of sons of the soil and sons of non-Mulki officials, and all were legally Mulkis.46

Educational and professional differences between the two groups were also perpetuated into the next generation by the slowness of Mulki acquisition of western education. While some Hyderabad men had been able to enter the new social life, it proved far more difficult for them to secure good positions in the new bureaucracy for which English was becoming essential at higher levels. The Education Department had hardly expanded since its initiation in 1860 and placement under the Revenue Department; Missionaries and non-Mulkis had found a few English-medium schools, but they were concentrated in the new city of Hyderabad and in Secunderabad. Even Salar Jung I's palace school had moved into the new city before 1880. In the old city, the first two private schools offering English were begun only in 1880 and 1882; there were no English-medium schools in the old city.47

In 1883-4, a non-Mulki educator became secretary of the Education Department and persuaded the government to inaugurate a hierarchical school system throughout the state based on vernacular primary schools. He threatened that without an adequate primary and secondary school system, the state could have no institution of English-medium higher education.48 Once the lower levels were started, the system was topped by the amalgamation of several local English-medium schools (including that started by Salar Jung I) into Nizam College. Nizam College was affiliated to Madras University in 1886-7, becoming part of the British Indian educational system. This small English-medium college enrolled 2,264 students at the turn of the century, mostly Eurasians and non-Mulki Hindus and Muslims.49

That non-Mulkis and Mulks, and specifically those associated with the Diwani and former Mughlai administrations, valued or utilized western education very differently is clear from an analysis of children enrolled in the state’s modern educational system, contained in the Administration Report of 1897. This report classified the 55,797 children then in school according to their fathers’ occupations, and the old Mughlai courtiers and employees were clustered at the bottom of the list. Diwani government officials, numerically a much smaller group than the three occupational categories above them, were near the top.50 With respect to women’s education, a controversial social reform issue in the nineteenth century,51 the government officials and the Mughlai officials were again at opposite ends of the range. Almost 8 per cent of the children in school at that time were girls, and the daughters of government officials constituted 20 per cent of them (879 of 4,414).
The daughters of the mansabdars, jagirdars, and nobles combined constituted only 2 per cent (83) of that total.22

The continued educational differences meant that the Diwani bureaucracy could recruit the better-educated non-Mulki sons of those who already dominated it. Furthermore, explicit government regulations discouraged Mughlai employees from moving into new educational and career patterns, requiring mansabdars to forfeit a percentage of the family’s mansab payments if they entered government schools (1877–8)23 and, cutting a family’s hereditary mansab according to a member’s new position in the Diwani administration (1896).44

Another educational measure was the awarding of state scholarships to Muliks for study in England, and here religious factors combined with Mulki–non-Mulki definitions to complicate public perceptions. An early issue concerned whether or not Hindus were even eligible, due to the orthodox ban on ocean travel. Western-educated Hindus criticized the committee appointed by the government to resolve that question because the Hindus put on it were old city Muliks.55 The seventeen state scholars in England between 1897 and 1902 were in fact all Muslims, and critics pointed to the repeated choice of the sons of high-ranking non-Mulki officials and members of the Muslim nobility.56 The contemporary press at the turn of the century took great interest in such matters; the career of the first ‘bona fide’ Mulki to receive his B.A. degree in 1885 was closely followed and applauded.57

Other modern governmental structures were being instituted in Hyderabad, some of them presumably intended to serve as checks upon the bureaucracy: the judicial system, a Legislative Council, and later an Executive Council. Educated Muliks might have looked to these alternatives for employment and as countervailing forces to the powerful bureaucracy, but they proved ineffective for several reasons.

In the case of the Legislative Council, instituted by the Nizam and a non-Mulki adviser in 1892,58 the problem was one of both limited powers and personnel. While outlining the few functions delegated to the Legislative Council, the Nizam stated, ‘Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect in any way the prerogatives of H.H. the Nizam which he will exercise whenever he may think fit in any manner he likes.’59 Furthermore, the majority of its members were officials and it had no executive functions. It outlined and clarified duties of several assistant ministers, each responsible to the Diwan for several departments, but ultimately the department secretaries initiated policy and procedures and controlled the timing and manner of submissions to the assistant ministers and the Diwan.60 The 1898 clarification of Legislative Council functions also gave the power of initial recommendation for appointments and promotions to the secretaries of the departments.61 The Executive Council initiated in 1919 was similarly ineffective, with eight of its nine members officials.62 The ultimate dependence of the Legislative and Executive Councils upon the Diwani bureaucracy for membership and for initiation of policies and appointments to administrative service reinforced non-Mulki power in the state.

The same limitations characterized the judicial structures and personnel. Although a modern judicial system was gradually built in Hyderabad city from the 1870s, the Anglo-Indian legal system won public acceptance very slowly. In 1883 and 1884 exams for pleaders were instituted, and in the 1890s a High Court was established.63 Judicial powers were exercised at lower levels by revenue officials until the separation of the Judicial from the Executive in 1921.64 Again, most of the higher level judicial officials had been drawn from British India, and the educational qualifications tended to maintain non-Mulki domination.65

The nineteenth century ended with increasing public awareness of the pervasiveness of non-Mulki domination of Hyderabad’s political institutions and increasing confusion about the role of religion in the conflict.66 Contemporary comment focused upon highly visible new positions or appointments. When the Nizam named a Mulki Hindu, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, Diwan in 1901, there was great public rejoicing;67 yet this position had become a relatively weak one. Another example of the additional emphasis on Hindu-Mulki considerations comes from the 1898 contest for the two pleaders’ seats on the Legislative Council, where the winners were two non-Mulki Muslims, to the great indignation of the local press which had supported one Mulki Muslim and one Mulki Hindu.68

The best example of the way the Hindu-Mulki issue exacerbated Mulki–non-Mulki tensions comes from a local newspaper’s comments on the 1894 Civil List. Noting that only 63 of the 680 were Hindus, and of those only 20 were Mulki Hindus, the article went on to argue that non-Mulki Muslims in the
Hyderabad service should not be considered foreigners, for they lent strength to the Nizam’s government. This religion was combined with the Mulki–non-Mulki conflict in a manner prejudicial to the Hindu majority of the Nizam’s population, by reasoning which was to become familiar in Hyderabad.

III. Administrative Control, Cultural Nationalism, and Political Mobilization

After the death of Nizam Mahbub Ali Khan in 1911, Nizam Osman Ali Khan came to the throne, and under him the Mulki–non-Mulki conflict entered a third stage. The educational gap between Mulkis and non-Mulkis began to close, but their conflict was no longer limited to the bureaucracy; it became diffused more broadly throughout Hyderabad politics and society. Delineation of the Mulki and non-Mulki categories in the twentieth century reveals increasing divergence between legal and cultural definitions and the addition of religious, and urban and rural distinctions; but the fundamental cleavage continued with respect to administrative and political power.

The non-Mulkis were best defined as those in power. Most non-Mulki administrators now considered Hyderabad their home, and their dominance in the Diwani administration made the rewards of a career there considerable. After the death of Salar Jung I, some non-Mulkis had received titles, and Diwani officials had greater access to the Nizam and the nobles. The community and caste representation in both the non-Mulki category and the Hyderabad nobility meant that Muslims benefited disproportionately from increased association with non-Mulkis. The two earliest schools offering western education, the Dar ul Ulum and the Madrasa-i-Aliya, and the establishment of close ties with Aligarh, had strengthened this tendency. While Salar Jung I had refused to allow Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to be introduced to the young Nizam because Sir Syed would not put on Hyderabad court dress, by the 1890s the North Indian sherwani had become customary dress for Hyderabad’s officials. Salar Jung II himself spoke at Aligarh and personally pledged a large increase of Hyderabad state’s grant to the school, and his successors strengthened the relationship.

In this period the non-Mulkis’ earlier closeness to the British turned to rivalry. Many non-Mulkis and their families continued associations with people, institutions, and religious or political movements based outside Hyderabad state, particularly Aligarh politics and other Muslim educational endeavours. Political developments in British India led to changed relationships with British officials in Hyderabad. As the ruling class in Hyderabad, non-Mulki officials needed the Resident’s support less, and they thought of the native states as rivaling British India in administrative modernization. The Nizam Club, founded by non-Mulki officials and with few or no Englishmen as members, prospered, while the more inclusive Hyderabad Club foundered. The Masonic Lodges, which had integrated Englishmen, officials, and nobles in the 1880s and 1890s, produced several separate English and Indian lodges, and finally lapsed almost entirely.

Intermarriages were occurring between non-Mulki and Mulki families, but rather than working to erase distinctions between the two categories, they appear to have highlighted their differential access to power. First, they emphasized the higher ranking of the non-Mulkis, as non-Mulki officials took promising young Mulkis as sons-in-law and placed them in administrative positions. This was true for both Hindus and Muslims. Such conspicuous alliances and their political consequences, while insignificant in terms of the numbers of Mulkis so favoured, heightened resentment of non-Mulki power in the state. Second, and again because of the Muslim majority involved in such intermarriages and occupational advancement, it emphasized Muslim dominance as well. These intermarriages confirmed non-Mulki social and political dominance in Hyderabad society in a highly personal way.

In contrast to the narrowing legal and political perceptions of non-Mulkis, the Mulki category was obviously expanding and diversifying. Its unity lay in its weakness, its members’ lack of access to sources of administrative and political power. But attempts to unify the Mulkis organizationally failed, primarily because a narrowly-conceived cultural nationalism was chosen as the unifying theme by the urban-educated Mulkis.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Mulki category legally included: 1) people whose families had been resident in the old city of Hyderabad for generations; 2) people from rural Hyderabad moving into urban administrative and professional positions; 3) people whose forebears had come to Hyderabad as non-Mulkis in the nineteenth century; 4) more recent immigrants who
had been able to secure Mulki certificates. Originally the term had meant the residents of the old city, most of whom had been employed in the Mughlai bureaucracy. These long-term Hindu and Muslim subjects of the Nizam had been slow to react to the changes occurring within Hyderabad, let alone those throughout India; with few ties outside the capital city, these Muliks wanted to regain their traditional places in the politics and society of Hyderabad. As western education became available throughout the city, with many new caste and community schools begun between 1900 and 1915, young urban Muliks acquired the skills necessary to compete for Diwani positions. With the establishment of Osmania University in the city in 1918, they had access to higher education in Urdu, the state’s official language, which presumably enhanced their opportunities for state service.

This younger generation of urban Muliks was augmented by an incoming group of district Hyderabadis, also western-educated but bringing the indigenous vernacular cultures much more strongly into the capital city than formerly. These men were legally Muliks, and in fact they represented the majority of the Nizam’s subjects: the Telugu-, Marathi-, and Kannada-speaking Hindus of the Hyderabad districts. Drawn by the expansion of the educational system, the Diwani bureaucracy and professional opportunities, these subjects of the Nizam sought careers in Hyderabad city and other administrative centres. Not all tried for government service, many were educators and lawyers. Those who had gone to neighbouring British Indian presidencies for higher education retained contact with their schoolmates and followed political developments there, somewhat blurring the boundaries between Hyderabad state and British India.

The place of these district-born Muliks in Hyderabad politics and society was ambiguous. They did not share the urban background, the fondness for Mughlai culture, and the deep loyalty to the Nizam characteristic of the original Muliks. They knew Urdu and/or English for professional purposes, and they founded vernacular libraries and cultural associations in the city. By their residence in the newer sections of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and in their social and political interests, they shared characteristics with the non-Muliks. But like the old city Muliks, they were confronted by non-Mulki domination of the government.

In this third period, the non-Mulki administrators showed little concern for public participation in politics, and it proved difficult for even the staunchest of Hyderabad’s supporters to argue that political reforms of significance were made. Only administrative modernization, not political modernization, was the goal. The officials did not view themselves as part of a political system with a specified and limited role in the process of political modernization of the state. Rather, they were an administrative elite, with training and ideological orientations of their own. Composed almost entirely of non-Muliks and their descendants, connected by educational experiences and by marriages, they ignored the demands of Muliks for wider participation. Like the elite cadre of ICS officers in British India, they emphasized the maintenance of law and order and felt responsible only to themselves.

The Hyderabad administration failed to decentralize existing structures and functions or to initiate new and broader political institutions and processes. The Executive Council formed in 1919 reflected the larger administration in that the nominal and less important positions were held by Mulki nobles while non-Mulki officials held the Finance, Revenue, Political and Public Works positions. Also from 1919, there was discussion of legislative devolution, but no actions were taken to expand political participation.

Government regulations limited and repressed political activities, apparently dating from the Khilafat agitation in the state, but intensified by the Arya Samaj Hindu revivalism. From the point of view of the Hyderabad government, these regulations were aimed at non-Mulik or external interference, and many non-Muliks, both Muslim and Hindu, were deported from Hyderabad for inciting communal disturbances. Of major concern to the Hyderabad government, and to the British Resident as well, was the expansion of Arya Samaj activities. Arya Samaj membership grew in the Hyderabad districts, rising from under 10 in 1921 to 3,700 in 1931, while membership in the city fell from 539 to 400 in the same decade. Newly-begun Arya Samaj schools and gymnasiums became centres of anti-government propaganda and were a major cause of the government’s new regulations governing the recognition of private schools in 1924. Yet many privately-run Hindu schools continued to exist and receive government aid, and the long-established Hyderabad City Arya Samaj continued vigorous religious and social reform activities under the leadership of old
city Mulki. There was increasing co-ordination between Hyderabaddi Aryas and those outside the state, and writings and pamphlets produced outside about Hyderabad were distributed widely within the state. Their inflammatory nature was cited by the government as reason to censor printed materials entering the state.

From the 1920s, a series of regulations subjected all public meetings to government clearance and permission, and at times public speeches were subjected to prior approval or disapproval by government officials. Lists of prescribed periodicals and books were issued and reissued periodically. When communal incidents did occur, the government responded with committees to investigate and formulate new policies, for example with regard to the observance of Muslim and Hindu religious functions falling upon the same days. Almost invariably, the Hindu members appointed to such committees were old city Mulki from Urdu-speaking communities, showing the government’s preference for a certain type of loyal Hindu subject, and leading to results more acceptable to the government than to some of the Nizam’s other Hindu subjects.

The administrators in Hyderabad city functioned in an environment not representative of the state as a whole. Census figures for 1921 illustrate the differences between Hyderabad city and the state in terms of religion and language.

1921: Religion and Language of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Mother Tongue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad city</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad state</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The literacy figure for Muslims more than doubled from 1881 to 1931, while that for Hindus increased by only 0.4 per cent. The criteria of community and language were used to assess the state’s educational policies and progress, and private schools were subjected to similar scrutiny. Numerical expansion and modernization were accompanied by the disproportionate geographical, religious, and linguistic orientation of the educational system.

For the non-Mulki officials, Osmania was a modernizing educational institution, both a symbol of Hyderabad’s traditions and an experiment in modern education. No modern higher educational institution in India taught through the vernacular medium then, and the non-Mulki officials and largely non-Mulki faculty viewed Osmania’s establishment as an experiment in the modernization of
a backward population. They hoped that use of the vernacular would improve the quality of higher education for more Hyderabad students and that Osmania might provide a model for the expansion of higher education in British India as well.\textsuperscript{99} Importantly, Osmania would be independent of the British Indian educational system, teaching and examining institution with total control over its curriculum. The British government learned of this plan only after its sanction by the Nizam had been announced by the vernacular press in North India.\textsuperscript{100}

Osmania’s planners justified their choice of Urdu not only because it was the official language, but because it was the only vernacular ‘more or less understood throughout the Dominions, especially in those urban areas from which His Highness’s subjects who generally take to secondary education are mainly drawn …’. English, however, was a compulsory subject because graduates of the new university ‘should not be inferior to those of the existing Indian universities as regards their practical acquaintance with a language which has become essential in every department of life’.\textsuperscript{101}

The student body envisioned, then, was urban and familiar with Urdu; the utility of an Osmania degree was initially unclear. Since the plan for Osmania had been developed in relative secrecy, not only the British but Mulki Hyderabadis were suspicious of it at first. ‘… No mulkis have any hand in shaping the constitution of the University, [so] that the work is entirely in the hands of officers who come from British India.’\textsuperscript{102} The Nizam’s government sought to dispel local objections by officially stating that the examinations for Osmania were to be considered equivalent to similar qualifications of other universities in India for purposes of employment, departmental service, and educational scholarships.\textsuperscript{103} Osmania could be viewed, then, as providing opportunities for more Mulki students to enter the government service.

Yet since English was now ‘essential in every department of life’, an Osmania education still ranked below that afforded by English-medium institutions. Accordingly, most of the non-Mulkis appear to have sent their own sons and daughters to English-medium schools, Nizam College, or others in India or England. While Osmania had a larger student body from its initiation, Nizam College continued to attract the best students in the state. Thus in 1936 and 1937, every pupil who passed with a First Class in the Higher Secondary School Leaving Certificate exams joined Nizam College. The government allegedly favoured Osmania,\textsuperscript{104} but apparently saw it as a source of educated citizens rather than officials. That Aligarh should have been the Haileybury of the Hyderabad Civil Service,\textsuperscript{105} rather than Osmania or even Nizam College, was ironic confirmation of the continuing dominance of the original non-Mulki administrators.

Inauguration of Osmania contributed most immediately not to the amelioration of the Mulki–non-Mulki conflict, but to its intensification and further elaboration. The first problem came with the Translation Bureau and the preparation of textbooks for the new university. The head of this Bureau was a non-Mulki, as were many of the translators, and they utilized North Indian rather than Hyderabadi Urdu. This ‘pure’ form drew upon classical Persian and Arabic sources, while Mulkis advocated drawing upon Deccani Urdu and the vernaculars indigenous to the Deccan. Most translators and faculty members were non-Mulki, however, and North Indian Urdu became the standard for both texts and lectures.\textsuperscript{106}

From this initial disagreement, factions developed within the faculty, and the argument moved beyond language to broader cultural and historical questions. Mulki scholars, led by Dr Zore of the Urdu department, developed the idea of a ‘Deccani synthesis’ composed of Hindu and Muslim cultural elements and fostered by tolerant Muslim rule in the Deccan. Opposition to this came from the non-Mulki faculty, particularly Dr Abdul Haq, also of the Urdu department and former head of the Translation Bureau.\textsuperscript{107}

Literary and cultural institutions and political movements were founded in the city which embodied these conflicting views. The Mulki scholars established the Idara-i-Adabiyat-i Urdu, or Aiwan-i Urdu, in about 1930. This local library and research institution had both Hindu and Muslim members, and it collected and published materials supporting the idea of a ‘Deccani synthesis’. This idea assigned a major creative role to the Muslim rulers in the Deccan for their patronage of Deccani Urdu and their development of a category of loyal subjects, or Mulkis, which cut across religious and caste lines. Hyderabad state was viewed as a unique and well-integrated society which, like earlier Deccani kingdoms, had to defend itself against intolerant and narrow-minded non-Mulkis.\textsuperscript{108} There were historical limitations to this theme, but Mulki scholars and politicians found it relevant and useful in the 1930s and 1940s. It furnished the slogan of the Mulki political movement: ‘Long live
the Nizam, the Royal Embodiment of Deccani Nationalism’. Those who opposed the ‘Deccani synthesis’ theme were originally non-Mulkis scholars at Osmania, but Mulki Muslims also became prominent in the political movement which emphasized the special position of Islam and Muslims in Deccani history. There were several local institutions and organizations which contributed to this. The Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i Urdu, founded in 1903 at Aligarh primarily to translate western literature and science into Urdu, had moved to Hyderabad state with its second honorary secretary, and its fourth secretary was Mouli Abdul Haq, of the Osmania Translation Bureau’s Urdu department. From about 1935, the Anjuman changed its mission from publishing learned books to ‘vigorously [promoting] ... the popularization of the Urdu language among the masses of the people’. In 1936, the headquarters moved to Delhi, but the branch of the Anjuman left in Hyderabad, Urdu Hall, was linked to the militant Ittehad ul Muslimin in the 1940s. The scholarly journal, Islamic Culture, begun in Hyderabad in 1926, also reflected the development of Muslim patriotism in Hyderabad. Its editorial board was heavily dominated by Osmania faculty members and high government officials, all Muslims and almost all recent immigrants.

The Ittehad ul Muslimin, a Muslim cultural organization founded in 1927 by a Mulki Muslim, developed into the most powerful political expression of Muslim patriotism. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung was a jagirdar whose traditional Islamic education concluded with a pilgrimage to Mecca and Islamic countries. This well-liked young Hyderabadi developed a theory of Hyderabad as a Muslim state. The slogan of the Ittehad contrasted with that of the Mulki movement: ‘Long live the Nizam, the Royal Embodiment of Muslim Sovereignty in the Deccan’. An inspired orator, Bahadur Yar Jung organized branches of the Ittehad in the Hyderabad districts, and after his death in 1944, the movement became more political. Others who assumed its leadership encouraged a militant wing which became the Razakar movement of the 1940s. This Muslim terrorist movement tried to influence the public and the Nizam in the delicate negotiations with the British, the Indian and Pakistani nationalists, and, ultimately, the Indian Union.

Mulki political organizations began in the 1920s with the formation of a local Osmania Graduates’ Association, and, in London, the Society of Union and Progress. The Society was founded in 1926 by a small group of Hyderabadis studying in England, both Hindus and Muslims; it excluded people belonging to ‘communal’ organizations. The Society of Union and Progress had no commitment to democratize the state. Its sole aim then was to educe public opinion to the desirability of ‘responsible government’, meaning the responsibility of the executive to the legislative branch, and it worked for the Legislative Council reforms promised in 1919. The formal inauguration in Hyderabad of the Nizam’s Subjects’ League, or the Mulki League, occurred in 1935, with printed materials and large public meetings.

This Mulki movement seemed potentially able to win the recognition of the Nizam and the support of Mulki Hyderabadis, with an ideology and membership including all major elements of the population and a long-standing grievance to exploit. Loyalty to the Nizam and to a Deccani culture and language were basic tenets of the Mulki League. It had many Muslim participants, men who had studied at Osmania or in England. The movement focused upon replacing non-Mulkis with Mulkis in a responsible government, avoiding British advice and pressure, and retaining the Nizam and the old aristocracy as allies.

The Mulki League’s working papers show the political thought of these young Hyderabadis and the political limitations of the League. Opening quotations point to double enemies, the British and the non-Mulkis: ‘heaviest of all yokes, is the yoke of the stranger. ...’. Defining itself as a constitutional movement in the best interests of the sovereign and the state, the Mulki League called for Hyderabad’s continued existence as a sovereign state and for a constitutional government under the Asafjia dynasty. The League was willing to retain not only the Nizam but the aristocracy, including Samasthan rulers and jagirdars.

The Mulki League was less interested in political modernization than in participation in the administration. Mulki discontent was attributed to acute unemployment and the continued dominance of North Indian non-Mulkis.

Thanks to the Osmania University and to the liberal educational policy of the Nizam’s government in granting scholarships and loans to candidates desirous of prosecuting higher studies abroad there are thousands of highly educated Hyderabadis who naturally resent bitterly their claims to enter State service being lightly passed over.

The League advocated ‘Deccani Nationalism’ and believed that
"Hindustani should be encouraged and fostered as the common language of Hyderabad", both for its contribution to Deccani Nationalism and its potential use to Indian federalism. The Asafia rulers earned praise for saving Hyderabad from foreign rule and for having developed a common culture and common language in Hyderabad. The Mulki League deplored communalism as an import from British India, an attempt to divert Hyderabadis from the basic and more important distinction between Muliks and foreigners.11

A Mulki League proposal which found official favour was that economic interest groups should serve as the basis for constitutional representation. This alternative to communal representation was later adopted by the government’s Reforms Committee of 1937–8 to justify retention of a disproportionate number of government positions for Muslims. The Mulki League, the Ittehad ul Muslimim and the Hyderabad administration were in essential agreement on this point: since Hindus dominated in all other lucrative occupations in the state, such as trade and money-lending, the liberal professions, the landed zamindars and agriculturists, they could agree upon a continuation of the ‘historic’ share of official government positions for Muslims.12

Only three years later, in 1938, the Hyderabad State Congress was formed, an apparent continuation of the Mulki League. Some of the same leaders were involved,12 but in fact the leadership and the goals were far broader and differed significantly from those of the earlier group. The new political coalition presented itself as a Mulki organization and called for responsible government under the Asafia dynasty, yet it came into existence primarily to coordinate the growing regional organizations and to replace the leaders from Hyderabad city, whom the provincial leaders found uncertain.12 A provisional committee which included some of the city leaders was set up to form the Hyderabad State Congress; it spent time negotiating with the Hyderabad government, while district organizers pushed for action.12 The district Muliks controlled the Hyderabad State Congress, and their rapid replacement of the urban leaders reflected the pace of political events in Hyderabad state.

The position of the Hyderabad administration until 1938 had been one of defensive reaction to events. After the 1935 British Indian decentralizing political reforms, it constituted a Reforms Committee in 1937 to recommend increases in the elective and non-official membership of the Hyderabad Legislative Council.126 But the Executive Council’s concerns were seriously limited and lagged far behind political developments in British India and even within the state. First, the administration still failed to employ an adequate proportion of the indigenous population or to reflect the social order within Hyderabad state. From its inception, the decision-making levels had been largely closed to members of long-standing Mulki families. Under Nizam Osman Ali Khan, successive prime ministers were recruited from outside Hyderabad, professional administrators with British Indian experience and reputations.127 Second, the administration failed to accommodate local political and social demands and convert them into programmes and action.128 Since it was unchecked by legislative or judicial review, there were few ways for residents of the state to influence the administration. Third, by the late 1930s the ideology of a Muslim state which motivated many high-ranking officials was not compatible with continued popular support by a majority of the state’s inhabitants.

Yet the government was not entirely unresponsive, nor was it clearly pro-Muslim, before the Hyderabad sitaagraha of 1938. That it had no consistent policy for dealing with popular local leaders and social and political movements is clear from the progress of this sitaagraha. It did appoint a committee at the request of the Hindu Civil Liberties Union to investigate the communal riots which opened the year in 1938.129 It placed restrictions upon public speeches by particular local leaders—Bahadur Yar Jung of the Ittehad ul Muslimim and Pandit Narinderji of the Arya Samaj.130 At the same time, it lessened censorship of the press and eased restrictions upon public meetings, so that notification but not prior approval was required for non-political meetings. The first public meeting held under these new rules was a celebration of Tilak’s anniversary, ironically justified as lauding a Mulki since Tilak had been part-proprietor of an industrial concern in Hyderabad.131 Sarojini Naidu, a (first generation) Mulki and a well-known member of the Indian National Congress, presided over a civic affairs conference while a Provincial Congress Committee member was banned from the state.132 Bahadur Yar Jung was prevented from speaking to a crowd of 15,000 people celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, but Pandit Narinderji was allowed to lead a
Dasara procession of 20,000 sponsored by the Arya Samaj through the city, and the Nizam himself gave darshan along the way.\textsuperscript{133} In the midst of these apparently ad hoc responses to specific events in 1938, the Reforms Committee presented its report to the government, and political consequences followed swiftly. The report contained provisions which perpetuated ‘the peculiar political and historical position of the Muslims in Hyderabad’.\textsuperscript{134} Only a week later, the provisional committee negotiating to form the Hyderabad State Congress was officially notified by the Nizam that such an organization would be unlawful.\textsuperscript{135} While the provisional committee debated possible appeals, district leaders went ahead with plans for a satyagraha in Hyderabad city and for immediate formation of the Congress anyway, knowing it would be banned. Many of these leaders were associated with the Arya Samaj or were in active communication with the Indian National Congress and Gandhi himself.\textsuperscript{136}

The State Congress leaders’ decision to go ahead with the satyagraha confirmed the major differences between the new Hyderabad State Congress and the Mulki League. Their attitudes towards the Indian National Congress and a future independent India differed. The Mulki League of 1935, like the Ittehad ul Muslinim, wanted a free and sovereign Hyderabad; the State Congress foresaw an inevitable and close union with formerly British India. They differed concerning culture and language, matters on which the Mulki League had strong views and on which the Hyderabad State Congress was silent. The strength of the State Congress was in its regional organization, and most of the leaders communicated better in their regional languages and English than in Urdu. Finally, the two organizations differed in their willingness to tolerate ‘communalism’ in allies or members. The State Congress took direct action in the 1938 satyagraha in conjunction with Hindu communal organizations and spoke out against the ‘irresponsible autocratic, and medieval’ government of Hyderabad,\textsuperscript{137} showing its disinterest in local Muslim and Mulki League support. The State Congress was not, then, a greatly expanded and more powerful Mulki League which offered the Nizam an attractive ideological and organizational basis for his continued rule in the Deccan.

The satyagraha began in October 1938, initiated by the Hyderabad State Congress with participation from the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Civil Liberties Union.\textsuperscript{138} In the last week of that month, the formation of the Hyderabad State Congress was announced at a large public gathering by the president and four satyagrahis; they were immediately arrested. Groups of five, always including a popular leader and followers from all three linguistic regions of the state, repeated this announcement three times a week.\textsuperscript{139} After about two months, partly in response to Gandhi’s advice, the Congress suspended sponsorship because of the increasingly communal character of the satyagraha. Leadership passed to the Arya Samaj, whose out-of-state members were providing the largest number of volunteer satyagrahis.\textsuperscript{140} The government of Hyderabad ultimately arrested some nine thousand people, more than 80 per cent of them non-Mulkis.\textsuperscript{141}

Local support for the satyagraha came from Hindu shopkeepers, who observed hartal to protest the arrests,\textsuperscript{142} and from college students who sang the forbidden Vande Mataram in their hostels, both at Osmania and in the district colleges.\textsuperscript{143} As the arrests continued and funds and volunteers from the Arya Samaj dwindled, both sides looked for a settlement. The satyagraha was finally declared officially withdrawn by the Arya Samaj in July 1939.\textsuperscript{144} It had succeeded in decisively altering political relationships within Hyderabad state.

From this point on, administrative control of politics in Hyderabad state was never regained. Pointing to the participation of outsiders in the 1938 satyagraha, government officials viewed predominantly Hindu political organizations in the state as the work of outside politicians. The ban on the Hyderabad State Congress was not lifted; the Reforms of 1938 were not implemented, postponed allegedly because of World War II.\textsuperscript{145} The 1938 satyagraha both demonstrated and solidified existing political divisions; it dealt a death blow to an indigenous all-inclusive Mulki movement. It also demonstrated and consolidated the vastly different political goals of the central administrators and the district political leaders.

At this point, too, the Nizam and leading non-Mulki administrators firmly committed themselves to the political ideology of the Ittehad ul Muslinim, which stressed the special role of Islam and the Muslim community. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Nizam Osman Ali Khan had come to believe in administrative modernization as a strategy to retain political independence. He was the first Nizam fully to accept the argument, advanced since the 1840s, that the nobles, jagirdars, and others with hereditary lands and incomes
were financial burdens on the state rather than proof of the religious
tolerance of his court. Nizam Osman Ali Khan was by all accounts
a more orthodox Muslim in both religious and political spheres than
most of his predecessors, and an efficient modernizing bureaucracy
based upon an ideology of Muslim sovereignty in the Deccan which
maintained law and order gained his strong support.

The Nizam and the administrative officials found it preferable to
listen to the Ittehad ul Muslinin, the Muslim League, and, occasion-
ally, to the old Mulki loyalists. The Ittehad ul Muslinin advocated
Muslim sovereignty vested in the total Muslim community, and it fell under the control of Muslim communists. Some of these
men held high government positions and have been termed 'ruth-
less fanatics', responsible for the Hyderabad government's mis-
managed negotiations with the Government of India in

That the Nizam and other Muslim officials in Hyderabad should perceive Muslims from outside the state as more legitimate participants in government than loyal Hindus and other members of the indigenous population was one of the ironies of these final years. Muslim refugees from the 1947 partition of India
and Pakistan were welcomed in Hyderabad; Jinnah and others from
the Muslim League advised the Nizam; and the Prime Minister who
presided over Hyderabad's downfall was on special loan from the
government of Pakistan.

Many non-Muslims continued to support the Nizam's government,
despite its increasingly pro-Muslim ideology and policies. Some of the leading Hindu nobles defended their concept of a
Deccani nation to the end, rebuffing attacks on the Nizam's role as
the mistaken interpretations of outsiders and welcoming the
Nizam's abortive proclamation of independence in 1948. Others
may have had little choice, given the urban demography, employ-
ment patterns, and Razakar terrorism in the city. But many
genuinely believed that a Deccan cultural synthesis had been
achieved in Hyderabad; the Nizam and his administration accepted
their loyalty, but did not reward them by accepting their political advice or participation.

We have seen that the continued use of the terms Mulki and
non-Mulki to designate conflicting groups in Hyderabad has served
to oversimplify historical realities. The groups so designated have
changed radically over time, in both legal and popular definitions:
the most consistent meaning centered on possession of political

power. Yet the creation of Osmania University gave fresh life to the
old Mulhild Mulki culture and spurred cultural elaborations of the
Mulki-non-Mulki conflict that emphasized its latent communal
aspects. These new ideologies, of Deccani synthesis and Muslim
rule in the Deccan, helped limit political debate in the capital city to
the Urdu-speaking educated men, while district politicians de-
veloped ideological and organizational ties with the Indian
nationalist movement outside Hyderabad state. In short, it is the
Mulki-non-Mulki conflict which best explains the narrowed politi-
cal vision of the administration precisely when both structural and
cultural considerations called for a broadening of political vision
in Hyderabad state.

NOTES

Note: I am especially indebted to Professors Carolyn Elliott and John G. Leonard
for informed criticisms of this article in its final stages. Helpful criticisms of
earlier drafts came from Professors Burton Stein, Haroon Khan Sherwani,
Mahender Raj Suxena and Sri Roy Mahboob Narayan, the latter three of
Hyderabad city.

1. Carolyn M. Elliott, 'Decline of a Patrimonial Regime: The Telugu
Rebellion in India, 1946-51', Journal of Asian Studies, XXXIV, 1

2. In an early paper, 'Mulki-non-Mulki Conflict in Twentieth Century Politics in
Hyderabad State', I emphasized that possibility. Association of Asian Studies
meetings, Boston, 1969.

3. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy', The Middle East
Journal, IV, 1, January 1950, p. 50.

4. See similar cases in Ralph Brailbanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems
Emerging from the British Imperial Tradition, Durham, 1966, particularly
David C. Potter, 'Bureaucratic Change in India', pp. 141-208, and Robert
Tilman, 'Bureaucratic Development in Malaya', pp. 594-603.

5. See Manik Rao Vithal Rao, Bostan-i Asafiyah, Hyderabad, 7 vols., 1909-32;
Nawab Jivan Yar Jung's English translation of his father's Urdu autobiog-
raphy, Server-el-Mulk, My Life, London, 1932; and my dissertation, 'The
Kayasths of Hyderabad City: their Internal History, and their Role in Politics
and Society from 1850 to 1907', University of Wisconsin, 1969, chapters
7-10.

6. A good detailed coverage of Salar Jung's Diwanship is Y.K. Bawa,
'Hyderabad in Transition under Salar Jung I, 1853-83: An Indian State

7. For recruitment patterns, Server-el-Mulk, My Life, pp. 78-81, 111, 116-19,
132-3, 153-6, 158, 181-2, 184, and 200-2. The author was one of the few
who did not know English, and many of his references are to his own relatives
and other Delhi Muslims. For the Aligarh connection, see also J. F. Gotri,
PEOPLE, PRINCES AND PARAMOUNT POWER

8. H. Fraser, Memoir and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser of the Madras Army, London, 1885, appendix, xxi.
10. Ibid., p. 98.
12. This was Kundaswamy Mudaliar, first with the Secunderabad banking firm of Koti Ramswamy and then with Palmer and Company. He became Salar Jung's vakil in 1857 and served until his death in 1876, Theodore W. La Touche in 'Of Cabbages and Kings', The Deccan Chronicle, 16 May 1965. For the North Indian view, see Server-el-Mulk, My Life, pp. 80-1.
15. [His opponents] were the nobles, who were pillars of the State, and equal to him in prestige and rank. He agreed that these were the men in whose hands lay the destiny of the nation, but, sunk in erasure, ignorance, and utterly oblivious of the duties and responsibilities of life, they led such selfish and pleasure-seeking lives that they were not a good example to the people.' Ibid., p. 271.
16. Ibid., pp. 97 and 100.
18. Fraser, Memoir and Correspondence, pp. 41-2, and 162-3.
19. (a) Files of the Chief Secretariat, installment 22, list 6, serial number 1, file C2/d1, memo from Salar Jung to J. G. Cordy, 5 March 1869, Andhra Pradesh State Archives.
(b) Hindustani, 23 July 1895, refers to the brief revival of Salar Jung's original order in the 1890s for political reasons. This and other articles have been collected in a Clippings Collection (hereafter referred to as CC) in the A. P. State Archives, which covers the period from 1890 to about 1903.
21. Server-el-Mulk, My Life, pp. 91-2; Fraser, Memoir and Correspondence, p. 317.
22. Server-el-Mulk, My Life, p. 104. By pointedly consulting the Nizam's grandmother and other ladies of the zenana, 'in certain important political matters ... [Salar Jung] was able to protect himself from the unreasonable interference of the Resident, by the use of her ladyship's name.' Ibid., p. 98. See also, H.R.H. The Prince of Wales' Visit to India, London, n.d., pp. 19 and 26.
23. See Bawa, 'Hyderabad in Transition': Richard Temple, Journals kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikhim, and Nepal, London, 1887, 2 vols., I; and Thomas Henry Thornton, General Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatory States of Central and Southern India, London, 1898. Recurring issues were the implementation of judicial reforms, reduction of Arab troops, use of the Hyderabad Contingent, construction of the railroad through Hyderabad, and substitution of salaried tahdirdars for revenue contractors.
24. Report on the Administration of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions, for the years 1908 to 1912 Fasli (1898-1903), Hyderabad, 1907, p. 10.
27. Files of the Chief Secretariat, installment 22, list 6, serial number 2, file C2/d1, vol. II, labelled confidential, A. P. State Archives.
29. Server-el-Mulk, My Life, p. 95.
32. Syed Husain, Belgrami Motamam Jung, History of the Operations of His Highness the Nizam's Educational Department for the last 30 years together with a detailed Report and Returns for 1883-84-85, Hyderabad, 1886, p. 17.
34. The judicial and revenue systems operated differently in these areas, though Diwani officials were sometimes lent to them.

49. "The Nizam College and Madras-i Aliya", in The Deccan Mail, 11 November 1896, in CC, A. P. State Archives. A very small Arts College at Aurangabad, also affiliated to Madras University, and the Oriental Darul Uloom College, affiliated to Punjag University, completed the governmental institutions at that level in the 1890s. Report on the Administration of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions, for the four years 1304 to 1307 Fasli (8th October 1894 to 7th October 1898), Madras, 1899, pp. 345-6.

50. Report on the Administration... 1304 to 1307 Fasli, p. 231. I have converted the numbers into percentages, and the total population of eligible school children for each occupational group was not taken into account.

Children in School: Breakdown by Fathers' Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Labourers</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamindars</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


52. Since the sex of the school children was given, the proportion of daughters to all children in school by parental occupation could be ascertained.

53. Two per cent of the monthly income had to be forfeited if a mansabdar joined a government school, according to an order of 1876-7. Rao, Bastan-i Asafya, 1, p. 341.

54. The Deccan Mail, 23 September 1896, in CC, A. P. State Archives.

55. [P.V. Naidoo], Hyderabad in 1890 and 1891, Bangalore, 1892, pp. 5-9, where the Hyderabad correspondent to the Hindu reprints his objections to 'orthodox and ill-informed' representatives who do not have the confidence of the "intelligent and educated Hindus".

56. Report on the Administration... 1308 to 1312 Fasli, pp. 357-8; and Hindu, 15 February 1895, when a Hindu was proposed but evidently was not sent. CC, A. P. State Archives. In some instances the 'alien' winners were still in primary school or had failed essential examinations. CC, Times of India, 21 February 1898. See also CC, The Deccan Mail, 13 December 1896, naming deserving Hindu youths who failed to gain state support.

57. CC, The Deccan Mail, 2 September 1896. This was Rai Balanukund, whose B.A. was from Madras University. An old city Khatri, he became a High Court judge in 1908.

58. H.K. Shrivastw, 'The Evolution of the Legislature in Hyderabad,' Indian
PEOPLE, PRINCES AND PARAMOUNT POWER


59. Jareeda Extraordinary, or Hyderabad Gazette, XXIX, 51, 16 September 1898, Installment 7, list 1, serial number 217 of 1896, Public Service, Europeans, Miscellaneous files of the Chief Secretariat, A.P. State Archives.

60. Report on the Administration ... 1308 to 1312 Faali, p. 10; see note 24.

61. Jareeda Extraordinary, XXIX, 51, 16 September 1898, see note 59.


64. This change resulted in an actual decrease of judicial officers and courts, as talukdars and tehsildars were subtracted while some new district judges and munisifs were appointed. The separation did not occur in the Surfi Khas areas, Dezennial Report ... (1912–1922), pp. 119–21.

65. Biographical materials on members of the High Court confirm this in K. Krishnaswamy Mudiraj, Pictorial Hyderabad, Hyderabad, 2 vols., 1929 and 1934. II.

66. In the CC, A.P. State Archives.

67. Hindi, 28 August 1901; The Times of India, 7 December 1901, CC, A.P. State Archives.

68. Hindi, 3 March 1898; Hindi, 18 March 1898, CC, A.P. State Archives.

69. The Deccan Bazar, 1 June 1894, CC, A.P. State Archives.

70. This happened in 1877, when the young Nizam and his Diwan went to the Delhi durbar. Another representative of Aligarh was introduced to the Nizam, Server-EL-Mulk, My Life, p. 182.

71. Nar Singh Raji, Durdi-Bei Qaumi Durdi-Saafi, Hyderabad, 1933, p. 35, where the Resident points to the old-fashioned court dress of a traditional courier, Bansi Raja.

72. Speeches of His Excellency Nawab Salah Jung (II), Secunderabad, 1907, p. 2, where in October 1884 he increased the annual grant by Rs 3,000. The Salar Jung Estate left Rs 116 a month to Aligarh. Lutfa Purshad, Nazim (manager), Report of the Administration of the Estates of the late Nawab Sir Salar Jung Bahadur for Faali 1306 (1889–97), Hyderabad, 1898, p. 5. When Nawab Vikar ul Umra visited Aligarh, it was mentioned that given the largest permanent endowment to the College, Aligarh Institute Gazette, 6 September 1895.

73. See Mudiraj, Pictorial Hyderabad, II, p. 28, where Finance Minister Sir Akbar Hydar'i views of the states and British India illustrate this.

74. For the Hyderabad Club and the Nizam Club, see Rao, Bustani-Asifiyah, II, pp. 675 and 685; The Advocate of India, 22 May and 27 May 1899, and Madras Mail, 10 August 1899, CC, A.P. State Archives; Hyderabad Chronicle, 27 and 30 July 1898, Asifiyah State Library. The General Rules of the Hyderabad Club, printed in 1884, are in the Asifiyah Library. For the Masons, see J.D.B. Gribble, History of Freemasonry in Hyderabad (Deccan).

HYDERABAD

Madras, 1910, which I have seen only in the Salar Jung Library. For their integrative function, see The Pioneer, n.d. (in sequence of pasting into the CC, about 1 November 1898), CC, A.P. State Archives.

75. I am indebted for this observation to Professor H.K. Sherwani and Roy Malloob Narayan. Both remarked upon prominent Muslims; from my research on Kaysen families, it is true for Hindus too (descendants of Raja Mame Lal Ashian, for example).

76. Two English sources for this impression are Zeenath Fatcally, Zohra, Bombay, 1951, a novel dealing with marriages and occupational modernization, and Muhammad Abdur Rahman Khan, My Life and Experiences, Hyderabad, 1951.


78. See Mudiraj, Pictorial Hyderabad, II, for biographies published in 1934. This is also clear from later publications dealing with politicians active from this period, such as Swami Ramananda Tirtha, Memoirs of the Hyderabad Freedom Struggle, Bombay, 1971 and Our MLA's (members of the Legislative Assembly), Hyderabad, 1952.

79. Elliot, 'Decline of a Patrimonial Regime,' p. 34; see note 78.


81. See, for example, Sherwani, 'The Evolution of the Legislature', published in 1940.

82. David Potter, 'Bureaucratic Change in India', pp. 141–208 in Brainbanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems, emphasizes these two characteristics of the I.A.S.

83. Mudiraj, Pictorial Hyderabad, II, picture facing p. 21 and biographies of those pictured.

84. Elliot, 'Decline of a Patrimonial Regime', pp. 28–32; Sherwani, 'Evolution of the Legislature'.


86. Rao, Bustani-Asifiyah, V, p. 272, provides a list.

87. Before the 1920s, Residency reports to Hyderabad's officials stressed the swadeshi movement coming into the state from Maharashtra through the jagirs of the Paigah noble Vigar ul Umra. Instalment 22, list 5, serial number 70, file H1/1/17, confidential reports from 1969; instalment 22, list 5, serial number 102, file H1/1/17, confidential reports from 1911, to the Political and Private Secretary Fardoonji from the Resident, A.P. State Archives. Later, the Fortnightly Reports focused on the Aarya Sumaj; for example, those for 1937 in the India Office Library.


89. Rao, Misrule, p. 94, citing the Indian Daily Mail, 20 April 1926; Hyderabad men Aarya Samaj ki Tehrik, Hyderabad, n.d. [1931], pp. 82–6, where the rules for establishment of private schools in Hyderabad are reprinted.
90. See the government’s Report on Public Instruction for these decades. In 1921, a sacred thread ceremony was performed publicly by the Arya Samaj Secretary (city branch) for his daughter, and many prominent nobles and officials were invited. Rao, Bustan-i Asafiyah, IV, p. 302. This Pandit Gaya Pershad left an Urdu manuscript, Halai-i Gaya Pershad; it and Captain Surya Pratap, The Tragedy of Arya Samaj, Hyderabad, 1960, convey an idea of factions within the city branch. Pandit Narinderji, active in the 1930s and winner of the struggle for control, is writing his own history of this branch.


92. For policy on speeches, see A Peep into Hyderabad, Lahore, [1939], p. 26; for 1926, see Rao, Misrule, pp. 96–100; and for changes in 1938 in the well-known Gashiti No. 53 of 1930, which stated that all public meetings needed prior government permission, see The Deccan Chronicle, 10 July 1938 et passim. For prescribed writings, see Rao, Bustan-i Asafiyah, IV, pp. 226–8 for a 1920 list; Rao, Misrule, pp. 26, 111–12 for lists covering 1903 and 1923.


94. Decennial Report . . . (1912–1922), pp. 60 and 64 for the urban areas and state. For the city, Census of India, 1921, XXI, Hyderabad State, Part 1, pp. 4 and 192.


96. S. Ram Chari, ‘Education in Hyderabad’, Modern Review, 66, August 1939, pp. 177–81. I have combined three of his tables.

97. Ibid., pp. 179–80. The increased proportion of Muslim literates can be partly explained by the urban concentration of the Muslim population in the state, the expansion of both private and government educational institutions in urban areas, and the higher literacy of non-Mulki immigrants.


101. Memorandum by Sir Akbar Hydari, Home Secretary, to the Nizam, 1917, instalment 36, list 5, serial number 11, A.P. State Archives.

102. Files of the Chief Secretary, instalment 36, list 5, serial number 9, file 014/1, correspondence between governmental departments.


104. Hyderabad Residency records in the India Office Library, R/120/163, enclosed a passage from Principal Turner’s last report on Osmania College, which argued that the government’s limitation of the Osmania College student body to 300 forced Mulki students to go out to Aligarh, Madras, Benares, Poona, and elsewhere to secure an English-medium education.


106. Descriptions of the early endeavours and faculty members are in Decennial Report (1912–1922), pp. 197–200, and Sherwani ‘The Osmania University’, pp. 243–6. See also the Classified List of Officers of Civil Departments of H.E.H. The Nizam’s Government for 1931–32, Hyderabad, 1932, pp. 106–21. Most of the initial 13 faculty were non-Mulki, and in 1932 only 17 of the 71 faculty had Hyderabad listed as birthplace. Also in 1932, only 11 of the 17 were Hindus.

107. Interviews with Dr Mohammed Khalidi, of the Department of History at Osmania, and Mohibboob Naryan, a local scholar of Persian and Urdu, in 1966; subsequent written comments from Professor H.K. Sherwani and Professor Mahender Raj Suxena, and Mohibboob Naryan in 1971.


111. An article in Islamic Culture, XIII, 2, April 1939, p. 234, included two pages about this Urdu-promoting organization, while including only seven lines about the (Mulki) Aiwan-i Urdu. See references in [Jung], Hyderabad in Retrospect; and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, p. 380.

112. The Cultural Activities section, begun about 1939, shows clear evidence of this influence, as the conquest of Mecca Day and similar events were celebrated in Hyderabad, Arabic broadcasts on the Hyderabad Radio began, and so forth. Since 1948, some Hindus have served on the Board.

113. An obituary appeared in Islamic Culture, XVIII, 3, July 1944, pp. 234–5; there are many Urdu biographies of him. See also Tarikh-i Majlis Inshad ul Musalman, 1928–40, Hyderabad, 1941.
114. [Jung], *Hyderabad in Retrospect; Sadath Ali Khan, Brief Thanksgiving; and Sir A.C. Lothian, *Kingdom of Yesterday*, London, 1951, have good accounts.

115. The association published a quarterly magazine, and later a Mulki Industries’ magazine in Secundabad in the 1930s; they helped sponsor a Mulki Industries’ Exhibition in 1938. *Deccan Chronicle*, 2 October 1938.

116. [Jung], *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, pp. 1–2.

117. Two of the five signers of the League’s initial circular had helped form the Society for Union and Progress. Some efforts had been made earlier in Hyderabad to organize the Society or a similar association. C. Sri Kishen, *Forty-five Years a Rebel, Hyderabad*, n.d. [1953], pp. 110–12; Abud Salam, *Hyderabad Struggle*, Bombay, 1941, pp. 26–7.


119. Ibid., five introductory pages.

120. Census statistics were used to document the North Indian dominance. Ibid., pp. 37–43. The Osmania quote is on p. 160.

121. Ibid., pp. 71–2. The question of the script in which Hindustani was to be written was ‘a mere matter of detail’ to be settled later, although the ‘Abul Kalam Azad type of Urdu (North Indian standard)’ was criticized.

122. Ibid., pp. 56–7 and 75–6 for the Mulki League’s position. For the Itchad, see Sherwani, ‘The Evolution of the Legislature’, and [Jung], *Hyderabad in Retrospect*.

123. One of their early contacts had been the Educational Conference, which brought together urban and provincial western-educated men for annual conferences. Tirtha, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

124. Ibid., pp. 81–2.

125. Ibid., pp. 85–6. Regional leaders like Tirtha were not members of the provincial committee, which resigned when notified by the Hyderabad government that the proposed Congress would be illegal and when the regional leaders asked it to do so to ‘pave the way for action’.


127. [Jung], *Hyderabad in Retrospect; Mudran, *Pictorial Hyderabad*, 1* biographies of the prime ministers.

128. Elliott, ‘Decline of a Patrimonial Regime’, pp. 31–2. I concur, despite considerable government publication concerning municipal government, urban housing, co-operative societies, etc.

129. *Deccan Chronicle*, 22 May 1938, p. 11.


134. The phrase is that of Sherwani, ‘Evolution of the Legislature’, p. 434. *The Report of the Reforms Committee 1938*, Hyderabad, 1939, provided for representation according to economic, not communal, constituencies. Joint electorates were proposed, and elected members would account for 42 of the 85 legislators, but 50 per cent of the seats were reserved for Muslims.

135. The government had warned earlier that no movement aimed at responsible government would be tolerated. More specific objections were to the name ‘Congress’ and to the ‘communal’ or almost entirely Hindu membership. Swami Ramnandandi Tirtha, *First Class Tragedy*, Poona, 1940, printed the correspondence between the State Congress and the government; his *Memoirs*, pp. 85–6, recounts this episode. A justification of the government’s policy appears in Salam, *Hyderabad Struggle*, pp. 47–57.


139. Tirtha, *Memoirs*, p. 100. But the leadership was with the Maharashtra Conference, as senior leaders from Hyderabad city or from the Andhra and Kanyakumari areas did not ‘come forward’. The leadership of the Andhra Conference at this time rested with urban Muliks, members of the Mulki League. *Deccan Chronicle*, August 1938, p. 11.

140. Tirtha, *Memoirs*, pp. 100–13, for the relationship to Gandhiji; Salam, *Hyderabad Struggle*, pp. 70–5, for the Arya Samaj’s increasing role.


142. *Deccan Chronicle*, 23 October 1938, recounting the arrest of Pandit Narinderji, whose Arya Samaj was in the heart of the Sultans Bazar area. As he was a ‘pucca Muluk’, the article notes, he could not be deported.

143. *Deccan Chronicle*, 4 December 1938, pp. 4–10, tells of Hindut hostel inmates at Osmania singing this, with the result that 115 were expelled and all Osmania students save ten or twelve then observed a hartal. Also Tirtha, *Memoirs*, pp. 97–103.

144. Salam, *Hyderabad Struggle*, p. 74.

145. *Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*, Hyderabad, 1956, IV, p. 196, cites the role of the Itchad in keeping the State Congress banned. Lothian, *Kingdoms of Yesterday*, p. 184, states that the government used the war as an excuse to delay reforms, as both the Itchad and the Congress opposed various aspects of them. Only the *Deccan Chronicle* responded positively to the satyagraha, inaugurating a section titled ‘News from the Districts’.


147. Smith, *Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy*, p. 50; his views are shared by [Jung], *Hyderabad in Retrospect*.

148. For the refugees, see Smith, *Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy*, p. 45; and Kishen, *54 Years a Rebel*, pp. 146 and 164.


150. Raja Pratap Karan welcomed the ‘statesmanlike move’ as head of the Relig-
BARODA
The Structure of a ‘Progressive’ State

DAVID HARDIMAN

I
Baroda had a reputation for being one of the most progressive of the Indian states. It was in advance of British India in many fields of material progress. Even today, many people who live in what used to be Baroda state sigh nostalgically for the days when the Gaikwad ruled. However, one needs to ask what kind of person preferred the Baroda Raj, and why Baroda was ahead of British India in some respects but lagging in others, especially in the field of representative government. This chapter will examine a few aspects of the society and politics of Baroda state during the two hundred years of its existence. Our main task will be to map out the social alliances on which the stability of the state depended, and to use this analysis to throw light on political developments within the state.

II
The rise of the Gaikwad family dated from the early eighteenth century when it produced two able warlords, the father and son, Pilaji and Damaji Gaikwad, at the time when Maratha power was expanding most rapidly. The family, which was of a minor agricultural caste, came from the area around Poona, where they served as village headmen. Pilaji Gaikwad began his career as an officer in the Maratha army in command of about fifty horsemen. In 1722, he managed to forge several clever and effective alliances between his Maratha war-band and some local Gujarati powers, against the Mughal viceroy of Gujarat. These alliances led to the Gujarati war of 1724-5, in which the Mughals were defeated, although not driven from Gujarat. Pilaji's success was consolidated over the next forty years by his son Damaji Gaikwad. However, the Peshwa in Poona continued to claim half the revenues of Gujarat, and forcibly prevented the Gaikwads from becoming its unchallenged rulers. After Damaji died in 1768, a succession struggle followed between