Political Reform: A Partial Theory
and the Coverage of U.S. SMOs
in the New York Times

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Abstract

What explains broad historical patterns of national newspaper coverage of U.S. SMOs? We address whether resource mobilization, political process/protest cycle, and new social movement theories can explain coverage, which is in part a measure of discursive influence. We also present a political reform theory, a partial political contextual argument, based in historical institutional thinking, holding that policy changes sustain movements and alter discursive struggles. In examining new data from the *New York Times* for all covered U.S. SMOs across the twentieth century, we provide the first extensive over-time mapping of the coverage of SMOs as well as across SMO families and “new” and non-conservative SMOs and find that patterns in coverage are partly consistent with the main theories. However, coverage has not co-varied with disposable income or assumed a regular cyclical pattern, and recent SMOs based on post-material values have not displaced previous SMOs in newspaper attention. We find that the political reform theory helps to explain these anomalies. In pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression analyses across 34 SMO families and 100 years we find that political reform measures, along with some measures from other perspectives and control measures, significantly influence coverage.
Scholars argue that SMOs and political advocacy organizations are key to social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Staggenborg 1988; Gamson 1990; Skocpol 2003; Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe, and Weffer-Elizondo 2005) and that the mass news media are critical to the struggles of challengers (Lipsky 1968; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht 2002; Koopmans 2004). New institutionalists (see reviews in Hall and Taylor 1996; Clemens and Cook 1999) argue that political interests are largely fashioned and understood through their organizational expressions. With the mass media being a central means through which organizational claims about political interests are upheld, the coverage of SMOs in newspapers constitutes key data in mapping political interests and identities. In addition, gaining coverage is a mark of the discursive influence of SMOs—in being treated as legitimate spokespersons for the groups or causes they claim to represent (Berry 1999). Coverage also increases their support (Vliegenthart, Oegma, and Klandermans 2005).

With new data on all articles in which U.S. SMOs were mentioned across the twentieth century in the New York Times, we address several empirical and theoretically informed questions: What is the overall pattern of SMO coverage and how has it changed over time and across movement families? Are the historical trajectories of coverage consistent with some of the main images and claims of macro-social theories of social movements? We address resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977), new social movement (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1995; Berry 1999), and political process/protest cycle (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; Meyer and Minkoff 2004).
theories, all of which make claims about a wide variety of movement outcomes and have been used to explain the consequences of social movements and challengers (see Giugni 1998; Andrews 2004; Amenta 2006). We examine both the imagery and the causal claims of these theories.

We also elaborate a “political reform” explanation that builds on these models, but attributes patterns in SMO coverage to the uneven historical rhythms of U.S. political reform and domestic state building and policymaking. The political reform model relies on the historical institutionalist insight that changes in policy alter politics (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Domestic policy reforms provide extensive legitimation and staging bases for action among existing SMOs, as well as “critical discourse moments” (Ryan 1991; Gamson 1992; Sawyers and Meyer 1999) that provide recurrent occasions for old and new SMOs to gain coverage (see also Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Berry 1999; Amenta and Young 1999). The political reform theory is a partial one concerned with macro-sociological developments, but is designed particularly to help in explaining the trajectory of SMOs and movements after their emergence. We argue that a precondition for the rise to prominence of SMOs in general was the decline of America’s nineteenth-century patronage-oriented party system, and that SMO coverage overall and by movement family has followed waves of social policy and domestic state reform.

With the extensive data on coverage, we provide some basic assessments, appraising the imagery of these theories by tracing historical trajectories of coverage and examining correlations with measures associated
with the main theories. We find that each of the three main theories helps in part to explain coverage of U.S. SMOs. Coverage has been increasingly spread among greater numbers of organizations, in keeping with the expectations of resource mobilization theory, and upsurges in coverage of SMOs took place in the 1930s and in the 1960s, as expected by political process/protest cycle theory. Also, in the postwar period, there has been a tremendous increase in the coverage of SMOs based on post-industrial values, as some new social movement theorists would expect. But the coverage of SMOs often diverges from theoretical expectations. Even in the postwar period, the coverage of SMOs does not track increases in disposable income, the main driver of SMOs according to resource mobilization theory. Also, there are only two main waves of coverage, and coverage correlates only partially with systemic political measures employed by political process scholars to explain movements. The changing of the guard to coverage of SMOs based on post-material values is far from complete, with organizations based on labor notably persisting in attention.

We find that the political reform explanation helps to fill these gaps. Notably, social movement coverage is much “stickier” than the cycle imagery of the political process model expects. Also, political reform ideas help to explain why SMO coverage was so lacking in the early part of the century and, especially, why there was no wave of social movement coverage in the 1990s. The latter is due largely to the failure of Democrats to dominate politics since the end of the 1960s and a lack of major policy innovation since then. Finally, although pooled time series and cross-sectional regression analyses of 100
years and 34 movement families provide some support for the established perspectives, they also provide key support for the political reform theory.

**MOTIVATION AND PREVIOUS WORK**

Social movement organizations have been key to social movement research since the 1970s (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1977). SMOs not only help to fashion interests and build imagined political communities, but also constitute a central means by which elected officials and the public come to understand these interests and communities. The mass media have the widest gallery of all forums in the policy-making process, and all players in it assume the media’s importance (Gamson 2004), and so the attention that SMOs receive in mass media bolsters their position as representatives for the interests and constituencies they claim. National newspaper coverage also indicates the SMOs that achieved the greatest prominence in elite debates and among the informed public (Ferree et al. 2002). The mass media are especially important for SMOs and their legitimation in a democracies, where most organized groups can gain some access to political institutions, such as appearing before a congressional committee or regulatory board (Berry 1999), though only few break through into the consciousness of officials and the public (Amenta, Caren, Fetner, and Young 2002). Thus media coverage in itself is a marker of influence for SMOs, akin to their “acceptance” (Corbett 1998; Gamson 1990).

Media coverage is also often held to be necessary for movements to be influential in policymaking, because of their power deficits in comparison with other groups and organizations (Lipsky 1968). SMOs seek in part a hearing on
their cause from relevant third parties, and typically take action designed to showcase their organizations and cause (Vliegenthart et al. 2005), transmit alternative framings of social problems and issues (Ryan 1991; Cress and Snow 2000; Ferree et al. 2002), or discredit opponents and their framings (Gamson 2004) to gain purchase in discursive contests. Movement organizations that receive major newspaper coverage also tend to gain supporters (Vliegenthart et al. 2005). Although research on the newspaper coverage of social movements has focused on protest events, SMOs can gain coverage by way of other political action, and can influence policy debates in multiple ways (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Andrews 2004; Amenta 2006).

In addition, the new data on newspaper coverage makes it possible to provide an overall, if necessarily partial, appraisal of the more successful and powerful macro-social theories of social movements. Needless to say, there is no theory of social movements that sets out explicitly to explain the newspaper coverage of SMOs, but the main general theories, resource mobilization and political process, have been used to explain the success and influence of social movements (see reviews in Giugni 1998; Amenta 2006), and coverage is a marker of a kind of influence. Also, newspaper coverage correlates highly at the SMO family level with some measures of SMO family scale that scholars have used to test general theories of movements (Authors 2008). In addition, many of the most prominent longitudinal studies of movements and collective action are based on newspaper data on “protest events” (Kerbo and Shaffer 1992; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins and Perrow 1977), though studies of coverage relying
on more detailed accounts of movement activity find that newspapers over-report collective action that is large or violent or draws the participation of larger groups (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004).

Following this scholarship, we in no way expect SMO coverage in the national newspapers to be a simple reflection of an SMO’s scale or activity (Ferree et al. 2002; see review in Schudson 2002). An SMO appears in the paper as a function of the practices of newsgathering organizations, which are concerned with generating “stories” and “news” (Gans 1979). Challengers hope to exploit these practices to provide alternative framings (Ryan 1991; Gamson 1992) of issues and groups, and thus persuade potentially influential bystanders and third parties (Lipsky 1968), and to discredit targets (Gamson 2004). SMOs also seek the legitimacy that newspaper coverage provides the organization as a spokesperson for groups and issues it claims to represent (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) and the new supporters coverage helps to generate (Vliegenthart et al. 2005). Although there is no way to compare all the politically relevant activity of SMOs, or their scale, with coverage in the newspaper, even if there were scholarly consensus as to what constitutes politically relevant movement activity, SMOs are most frequently covered in ways that go beyond protest events (Corbett 1988; Ferree et al. 2002), and their coverage will correspond to a far wider range of activity. Though limited like all measures of movement scope, activity, or influence, coverage is worth understanding and explaining.
IMAGES AND THEORIES OF MOVEMENTS, AND SMO COVERAGE

Scholars have not tried seriously to account for the overall large-scale changes in the public profiles of SMOs, or any aspect of SMOs across movements and long periods of time. This is due perhaps to difficulties in generating a big picture and the fact that theoretical claims are often pitched at the meso or organizational level of explanation. Many scholars, however, have offered images of and causal claims about the macro-historical trajectory of social movements, SMOs, and their changing forms and activities. These scholars include proponents of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977), political opportunity and protest cycle (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994), and new social movement theories (Kriesi et al. 1995; Berry 1999). We draw out these images and claims in order to ask whether they correspond to the overall coverage of U.S. SMOs across the last century. From there we outline our political reform ideas.

Resource Mobilization, New Social Movement, and Political Process Theory

The resource mobilization perspective expects increases in both the number of SMOs in existence and the degree of specialization among the SMOs as disposable income rises and citizens use it to seek social change by contributing to causes (McCarthy and Zald 1977). As income rises, SMOs are expected to appear and compete to fill niches within social movement sectors, filling in the social movement industry as a whole. The imagery is of ever-larger numbers of organizations and activity as conscience constituents gain increasing means to act on their beliefs and as organizations respond. These expectations largely correspond with the growth of advocacy organizations appearing in successive
editions of the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, as income has risen throughout the postwar period. Attention on SMOs also would be expected to become more dispersed across ever-growing numbers of SMOs and movement industries. It would be consistent with the imagery that individual SMOs would also receive attention commensurate with their ability to attract members and resources.

The three theories are in many ways complementary, and some imagery and claims of new social movement theory may fill in gaps in resource mobilization theory about the direction of change in movement orientation. New social movements act on preferences for social change based on post-industrial values and are expected eventually to displace more materialistic movements (Inglehart 1977; Melucci 1980). Needless to say, many new social movement scholars and arguments do not focus on political change or organizations and focus instead on the influence of smaller-scale networks and groups on cultural change. But some scholars (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi *et al.* 1995; Berry 1999) adhering to some of these basic ideas do address national organizations and political and discursive struggles and expect that as economies become post-industrial and transform social values away from materialism and toward quality-of-life concerns, labor, veterans, and pensioners movements and the like will be eclipsed by identity, peace, and environmental movements, etc. To put it in terms of resource mobilization theory, these scholars focusing on new SMOs expect that conscience constituencies would turn their attention and increasingly larger incomes toward contributing to social change in accordance with post-
material values. Thus it would be consistent with both theories for old-line SMOs to lose coverage, while new SMOs increased coverage.

However, there is no consensus on what constitutes a new social movement or SMO, even among those new social movement scholars who focus on organizations. Among them there are three views, in increasing order of inclusiveness. Proponents of the most restrictive view identify left-libertarian causes of the 1960s and 1970s (Kitschelt 1985), including environmentalism, second-wave feminism, abortion rights, peace, gay rights, other identity movements, and animal rights (Kriesi et al. 1995; Giugni 2004), as being quintessential new social movements. A more inclusive view (Berry 1999), based on the United States, adds African-American and other civil rights movements, as well as postwar conservative SMOs based on moral values, including those in the Christian right and the anti-abortion movement. A third group (Calhoun 1993; Young 2002) sees new social movement activity as seeking the transformation of cultural codes or personal reform, regardless of date of origin, organizational label, or ideology. This view would include the others, but add longstanding SMOs such as prohibition and nativist organizations to the ranks of “new” SMOs, and sees such movements as endemic in U.S. history. Thus it expects no displacement of the old by the new.

We also address the political process theory and the related idea of protest cycles. These arguments hold that variations in movement activity, typically protests, will correspond primarily to changes in political contexts related to social movements. There are some stable elements to political contexts (see
Kriesi 2004), but they are also expected to vary dynamically (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). Movement activity is expected to take the form of cycles, in which favorable changes in political contexts—notably changes in partisanship—spur the formation of some movements, which in turn encourage others. Then eventually all movements recede as political contexts become generally unfavorable for movements (Tarrow 1994). Such waves are expected to recur regularly in a cyclical pattern. Scholars tend to agree as to which broad factors constitute favorable political contexts or opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), as well as on the existence of cycles of movement activity in the 1930s and the late 1950s through 1960s. Moreover, labor and unemployed worker “popular front” protest is held to be at the core of the 1930s wave, and the civil rights movement beginning in the late 1950s is expected to be at the center of the second wave, providing a boost to other movements, especially anti-war activism (Tarrow 1994:166-67; McAdam 1982).

**Political Reform, Movement Organizations, and Coverage**

Our political reform alternative supplements these other views with a wider perspective on political contexts that sees movement organizations as shaped by the structure of the polity, changes in it, the rhythms of state-building (Tilly 2005; Skocpol 2003), “durable shifts of governing authority” (Orren and Skowronek 2004), and policy-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). From this historical institutionalist angle, SMO trajectories depend on large-scale alterations in the polity and are closely tied to the rhythms of policy-making, but because policy-making alters politics and often works in a self-reinforcing way (Pierson 2000),...
the policy-making process influences SMOs in ways that are neither gradual nor symmetrical (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Amenta and Young 1999; Berry 1999). Historical institutionalists see the U.S. polity as exceptional in its historical barriers to national social policy (Mayhew 1986; Skocpol 1992; Amenta 1998; Lipset and Marks 2000), including the authority exerted by states and localities, the electoral system’s disadvantages for new political parties, an under-democratized polity, the early dominance of patronage-oriented political parties, the overall right-wing slant of the party system, and America’s emergence as a geopolitical hegemon after the Second World War. The circumstances and changes in them have each influenced the possibilities of SMOs.

The key preliminary conditions to the rise to prominence of national SMOs in the U.S. setting were the attack on the patronage party system in the first two decades of the twentieth century and the nationalization of the polity. The U.S. state was run largely through patronage-oriented parties in the nineteen century (Skowronek 1982; Mayhew 1986; Shefter 1983). Their decline enabled the rise of national SMOs by promoting alternative forms of political organization (Clemens 1997), as well as providing elected officials more strongly inclined toward programmatic policy reform (Mayhew 1986; Amenta 1998). The hollowing of parties in combination with electoral rules that discourage new party formation—the presidential system, the Electoral College, and winner-take-all districts (Lipset and Marks 2000)—led to a political organizational power vacuum, promoting national SMOs as well as interest groups. Also hindering the growth of national SMOs was that federal government did not emerge out of the fiscal
and functional shadows of the localities and the states in a major way until the New Deal and the Second World War (Skowronek 1982; Amenta 1998). Before then, SMOs of national sweep, including those regarding alcohol (Szymanski 2003), women’s suffrage (McCammon et al. 2001), and mothers’ pensions (Skocpol 1992), typically focused on states and localities and often took a federated framework (Skocpol 2003). State and city federations of labor were far more politically active than the national AFL (Clemens 1997).

Although the post-New Deal American party system is skewed to the right (Hicks 1999), with a Democratic party a coalition of left, right, and center, and a Republican party constituted mainly of the right, the U.S. party system since the Progressive Era has strongly encouraged the formation of SMOs, including those of the left. The major parties remain weak as organizations, but cannot easily be displaced by new parties, and remain catchall entities, trying to win voters across the political spectrum and opening them to the extensive influence of political organizations. The major parties have also been increasingly atomized, as candidates and incumbents control their own campaigns and political messages and can defect from the national party line; in any case, a major party with no sitting president or nominee for president holds few definitive party positions. Yet because of extreme barriers to entry due to electoral rules, reinforced by administrative authority over elections by the major-party-dominated Federal Elections Commission, challengers cannot create national parties to contend with the Democrats and Republicans. Since the middle of the nineteenth century,
U.S. SMOs have never “graduated” to become major parties, as is sometimes the case in European polities (Kitschelt 1992).

These barriers have produced a slow and lurching process of domestic state formation, in which new policies are initiated in “big bangs” of legislation (Skocpol 1992) or in “punctuated equilibrium” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), due in large part to the infrequency of “reform-oriented regimes” gaining power in the U.S. setting (Amenta 1998). According to the political reform model, these new policy initiatives then are fought over by political organizations and either retrenched or institutionalized. A threshold of movement activity is a necessary component of any reform-oriented regime, but the policy and bureaucratic results of these breakthrough periods more strongly influence the prospects and activity of SMOs in their discursive and political contests. The major waves of SMO coverage and public presence are expected to be driven by major periods of policy reform after the Progressive Era reforms of the party system—moments when Democrats, which became the major non-right party during the 1920s, overwhelmingly dominated in Congress and held the presidency.

On these occasions it was possible to overcome the effective opposition to national social policy initiatives and state building from Republicans and conservative Democrats from the under-democratized South (Amenta 1998; Hicks 1999; Hacker 2002). Their exile from power happened only twice: from 1935 through 1938, and again from 1965 through 1966, when a reformist Democratic president was in power leading an overwhelming Democratic majority in Congress. The major New Deal and Great Society legislation
followed. Social movements of the left, notably the labor movement and the African-American civil rights movement, were also active in these periods—and indeed were necessary and contributed to the wave of reforms—but were not sufficient and tended to benefit from reform. These policy changes have influences on SMOs that are “sticky,” in that policy in favor of SMOs will help to keep them in the news and encourage their stability, especially those SMOs that seek leverage through policy.

Right-wing regimes that follow in the wake of policy breakthroughs are expected to spur SMO coverage and other forms of presence, but less extensively than left regimes, for two reasons. The right seeks to retrench the domestic state (Pierson 1996), and programmatic retrenchment efforts incite the defensive action, mobilization, and coverage of SMOs with previous policy gains threatened through the rolling back of protective legislation or unfavorable administrative rulings. When in power, however, the right also seeks systemic retrenchment, which hinders the building of a right-wing state. In the two major periods of Republican control in the post New Deal period, in the early 1980s and early 2000s, the main political and fiscal strategy has been to starve the government of revenue through regressive tax cuts, in addition to programmatic retrenchment. These fiscal maneuvers do not provide state sites for movement influence for the right, and efforts to build the state in a right-wing direction conflict with anti-state ideology and are not as dramatic, and thus gains by SMOs of the right are not symmetrical to those of the left when a left regime is in power.
It should be noted that the political reform theory is only a partial macro-political argument, is complementary with other arguments, and cannot address many important questions about social movements. The political reform theory has no implications, notably, for movements not seeking organization, or SMOs and movements that are not politically oriented. The theory has little to say about which specific SMOs within a given movement family will be encouraged by state activity. These issues likely are more easily addressed by way of the meso level claims in the literature about resources (McCarthy and Zald 2002), resourcefulness (Andrews 2001; Ganz 2000), and framing processes (Cress and Snow 2000; Gamson 2004; Ferree et al. 2002). And the political reform theory is not explicitly about the origins of social movements. It suggests that movements that have an organizational foothold will both help to produce reform when larger political conditions are ripe for it, and the reform in turn will spur much further organization, activity, and coverage of the SMO family for which reform benefits. In short, the theory is a partial one, but fills a theoretical hole and seeks to explain macro patterns and historical trajectories in political movement organizations.

To address these arguments and others, we ask a series of questions regarding coverage of the major macro social movement theories. Has coverage become more diverse and increased steadily along with disposable income, which would be another explanatory success for resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), or moved in waves in the wake of partisan political alignments, according to frequently confirmed political process/protest cycle
arguments (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994)? Have SMOs based on cultural issues or post-material values grown in attention along with the rise of the service sector and displaced old SMOs, as would be consistent with the ideas and findings of some new social movement scholars (Kriesi et al. 1995; Berry 1999)? Do political reform ideas help to explain these broad patterns?

DATA AND METHODS
We approach these issues by examining the coverage of U.S. SMOs in articles in the New York Times, following a longstanding tradition in newspaper studies of movements (see review in Earl et al. 2004). To conceptualize SMOs, we rely on long-standing definitions (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1990). For McCarthy and Zald (1977), SMOs are formal organizations whose goals are allied with those of a social movement and attempts to implement those goals (cf. Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004), a definition that is far from uncontested, but has widespread currency. For Gamson (1990; see also Berry 1999), a challenging group is a formal organization that seeks the mobilization of an unmobilized constituency and has an antagonist in authority outside its constituency. These largely similar definitions include only politically inflected organizations, and like Gamson we included organizations with national goals. We also include what Gamson might refer to as an “established” challenging group, or what McCarthy and Zald call an “established SMO.” Included in this definition, an amalgam of McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) “social movement organizations” and Gamson’s (1990) “challenging groups,” are what others call “advocacy organizations” (see
Andrews and Edwards 2004), but not all “interest groups” (Granados and Knoke 2005), such as political organizations representing business interests or professions, or the major parties. SMOs that engage in or threaten non-institutional or transgressive action (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) form a distinct subset to which overall results do not generalize. Indeed below we examine the degree to which disruption influences the coverage of an SMO.

To identify the relevant SMOs, we used sources ranging from examining extant lists of SMOs to more than 100 monographs on movements to seeking advice from colleagues. We then searched over the twentieth century for all articles mentioning SMOs in the Times through ProQuest Historical Newspapers, often using articles to help identify additional organizations. We identified 953 SMOs with coverage in the Times in the twentieth century. We also located another 294 organizations that qualified, but received no coverage whatsoever, for a total of 1246 SMOs. Altogether we identified almost 300,000 article mentions of SMOs. From here we divided the article mentions into 34 different movement families or industries according to well-known categories in the field. Three of the categories, however, were residual: “progressive,” “conservative,” and “civil rights other.” The most covered SMO families were, in order, labor, African-American civil rights, veterans, feminism, nativist, and environmental. Labor was by far the most covered family, and the AFL-CIO was the top covered organization, followed by the American Legion, the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Ku Klux Klan (for details, see Authors 2008).
APPRAISING BASIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY

Next we array the data in different ways to see whether they support versions of the main theories of social movements. In comparing patterns of coverage with expectations from the resource mobilization, new social movement, and political process/protest cycle theories, we examine first whether coverage over time and across movements largely corresponds to the imagery and broad expectations of the three theoretical perspectives. Then we examine bivariate correlations between coverage of different, relevant kinds and the central explanatory variables provided by the theories. We also compare SMO coverage to overall coverage and political coverage in the Times to ensure that the patterns were not due to simple changes in newspaper practices. We identify anomalies and puzzles in coverage and address whether the political reform theory helps to explain them. Finally, to give a stronger appraisal of all the arguments simultaneously, we employ pooled time-series cross sectional regression analyses of SMO coverage across 34 movement families and 100 years.

First, we address the imagery and expected overall trajectories of SMO coverage from the main theories of movements. Because coverage allows us to gain a big picture, across time and across movement families of different sorts, we can appraise the theories in a broad way, at least with respect to this one movement outcome or consequence. We begin by addressing some of the key imagery and claims of resource mobilization theory, by examining whether coverage among SMOs has become more dispersed over time and closeness of the relationship between SMO coverage and disposable income. From there, we
address the three arguments from the new social movement literature regarding whether values-related SMOs have displaced older line SMOs. Finally, we address the cycle imagery of the political process/political cycle theory, and the related issue of whether systemic changes in partisanship can explain the historical trajectory of SMO coverage.

The first results provide some support for resource mobilization theory. As Figure 1 shows, the dispersion of coverage among organizations has changed in ways expected by the theory. The inequality of coverage, as tracked by a GINI coefficient among the top 20 SMOs in coverage, has declined across the century, as income has increased. What is more, there has been a steady increase in the number of “current” organizations, defined as the period from first coverage until an SMO folded or stopped receiving coverage. (To avoid right censoring we counted all SMOs current in 1990 and afterward that did not fold as current until the end of the century, though reducing the figure for each year by the average rate of attrition for the 90 previous years.) However, as Figure 1 also shows, the overall coverage of SMOs is not closely connected to the growth of income, as would be expected by the application of resource mobilization theory. Income has trended consistently upward, whereas post-World War II SMO coverage peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Clearly something other than the ability to make contributions is driving overall coverage.

Next we examine each of three views of new social movement coverage. It seems possible that the leveling off of coverage may mask steady increases in
coverage of new SMOs, with decreases in the coverage of old SMOs accounting for the aggregate pattern. For instance, coverage of SMOs based on labor and veterans’ movements declined in the second half of the twentieth century, whereas the coverage of feminist and environmental movements steadily increased (results not shown). Also, from two versions of the argument, the coverage of new SMOs should ultimately overwhelm coverage of old SMOs. As noted above, the first view restricts the understanding of new SMOs to postwar left and libertarian ones, and the second view includes a much wider range of postwar SMOs, including the civil rights movement, second-wave feminist, and Christian right movements. The third view is not restricted to the postwar and includes the conservative anti-alcohol and nativist movements. As can be seen by Table 1, the most restrictive conceptualization of new includes only nine of the 34 SMO families and parts of three others, whereas the other two versions include the bulk of the families. The second version includes 21 and part of the residual “progressive” family, and the most inclusive definition includes 23 and part of the progressive family.

As Figure 2 indicates, the most restrictive view of “new” shows that the coverage for left-libertarian SMOs has gained steadily on the coverage of other SMOs in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In addition, the coverage of these recent new social movements does track the rise of service employment. Both the percentage of the labor force in the service sector and new SMO coverage trend upward, and the correlation is relatively high, at .95. However, the
coverage of left-libertarian SMOs peaked around 1990 at only about 38 percent of SMO coverage and has since declined, indicating that left-libertarian SMOs are unlikely soon to eclipse other SMOs in coverage. This result, however, might be expected from the more expansive second view of new SMOs as being post-World War II in origin and oriented toward values, identity, or cultural change. As Figure 2 also shows, the coverage of this larger group of new social movement families, including highly covered African American civil rights SMOs, outdistanced the coverage of movement families of labor, veterans, etc., by the early 1960s and received 60 percent of all SMO coverage by 1970. Since then, however, largely due to the decline in coverage of the civil rights movement, new SMO coverage remains at about 60 percent of coverage. The correlation between this way of measuring new SMO coverage and service employment is somewhat lower, but still very high at .86.

The third and least restrictive view of new social movements defines new as meaning broadly cultural and values-based and sees “new” social movements as being prominent throughout history. As Figure 2 also indicates, as expected by these scholars there is no particular pattern in the coverage of new social movements across the century, and these movement families have been covered extensively throughout the century, notably reaching more than 50 percent of the coverage in the 1920s when the anti-alcohol and nativist movements were prominent. In short, SMOs based on post-material values have made great gains in coverage in recent decades, and the coverage of these SMOs have
tended to increase along with economic transformations, but these SMOs far from dominate SMO coverage. The most expansive view of new social movements is supported by the fact that cultural SMO families have been very prominently covered throughout the century, notably the 1920s.

In turning to political cycle/political process theory, we assess first the cycle imagery. Figure 3 provides the first big comparative picture of any outcome of SMOs over a long period of time, showing the historical profile of SMO coverage across the twentieth century. (See Figure 3.) We employ a three-year moving average to smooth out year-to-year spikes in coverage, and juxtapose it to a hypothetical curve of 30-year cycles. The big picture is in many ways congruent with the political process/protest cycle imagery. There are, as expected by proponents of the theory, identifiable coverage waves, one peaking in the 1930s and another around 30 years later. In addition, the 1930s wave is centered on labor, and the 1960s wave is built upon the African-American civil rights organizations and to a lesser degree among SMOs protesting the Vietnam War.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Other evidence runs against expectations, however. Notably, there is no big rise in coverage before the 1930s, despite successful women’s suffrage and Prohibition movements in the 1910s, and no wave in coverage after the 1970s, suggesting that the imagery of waves is more fitting than that of cycles (Koopmans 2004). Moreover, the initial wave of coverage peaked in the late 1930s, later than indicated, and lasted longer, taking a hiatus for World War II,
before ending in the early 1950s. Also, the 1960s wave peaked in the early 1970s, later than suggested by political process theorists. Finally, there was a kind of echo wave of coverage in the early 1980s, smaller and briefer than that of the 1960s, but with no additional wave of coverage in 1990s, when coverage decreased back to the levels of the 1950s.

We turn from imagery to causality, assessing whether changes in coverage are propelled by dynamic changes in political contexts. Although political opportunity concepts have been criticized as being difficult to operationalize and idiosyncratic to specific movements (Goodwin and Jasper 1999), systemic political opportunity in the United States has been understood by way of political formations and contexts favorable to the claims of all movements, at least non-conservative ones (Jenkins et al. 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Amenta et al. 2005). In the U.S. setting, these political formations have been operationalized as Democratic party representation in Congress, not including the historically under-democratized South, congressional ideology, and Democratic presidential terms. We operationalize the political context in these three ways: according to the years a Democrat was in the White House, the percentage of House representatives who are not Republicans or white southern Democrats, and the “median representative ideology” score of each Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 2005), or the DW-Nominate score, based on roll call votes, ranging from one to minus one, (reversed in sign, as it is higher for conservative Congresses). The last two measures are correlated at .87. As expected, SMO coverage is partly responsive to political contexts. The overall
coverage of SMOs across the century is fairly highly correlated with the Congressional scores, .57 with percent left in Congress, .50 with median ideology], but less so, .28, with Democratic presidential terms. For the coverage of non-conservative SMOs, which constitutes almost 90 percent of SMO coverage, and 27 of the 34 SMO families, the correlations are only slightly higher: .59 with percent left in Congress, .52 with median ideology and .30 with Democratic presidential terms.

[Figure 4 about here.]

However, we also find that the results are historically variable. Figure 4 shows scatter plots and best-fit lines for the representative ideology score and non-right coverage for each quarter of the twentieth century. (See Figure 4.) For the entire century, the relationship is reasonably strong, and is especially close during the middle half of the century. For the second quarter and third quarters of the century the correlation is .52. During the century’s beginning (1900-1925) and end (1975-1999), however, the relationship is either negative (-.27, for the first quarter) or non-existent (.07 for the last). Quite possibly this is due to the fact that partisanship did not vary as greatly in these quarter centuries. Also, if only the non-conservative SMO families are included, the correlation for the final quarter increases, but only to .27. In short, there is some support for the political process/political cycle arguments, but they fall short of predicting coverage, even only among non-conservative SMOs, across the entire century.

Although each main macro perspective on social movements is helpful in making sense of SMO coverage over the century, there are key anomalies. The
resource mobilization perspective is supported by the increasing number of SMOs covered over time and the decrease in inequality of coverage, but coverage has not increased along with the steady rise of disposable income. The new social movements arguments help to fill the gaps, as post-World War II values- and identity-related movements have increased, but they have not completely displaced old-line movements like labor in coverage. The political cycle arguments are supported by the existence of waves of coverage and the moderate correlation between political circumstances and SMO coverage, especially movements of the non-right, but fall short in that the 1930s and 1960s waves peak somewhat later than expected, and that there was little coverage of national SMOs in the first two decades of the century, despite reform being associated with the period, known in U.S. historiography as the Progressive Era. Also, there has been no wave since the one in the 1960s, despite the rise of new social movements and citizen advocacy groups. All in all, there is a layered, cascading, and delayed pattern of coverage, in which SMOs remain in the public eye long after their emergence and peak in attention later than expected.

Do large-scale changes in newspaper practices directly explain these patterns? We checked to see whether coverage is simply of function of the number of articles published or of political coverage, as measured by the coverage of the major political parties. The correlations are fairly strong with both measures, though not overwhelmingly so. Coverage of SMOs correlates .65 with the number of articles published and .50 with the mentions of the major political parties. However, the correlation between overall articles and SMO
mentions drops to insignificance for the post World War II period. Also, there is no major wave of coverage in the post-Watergate era, the last quarter of the century when journalism is widely viewed as taking a more critical, investigative approach. We are in no way arguing that key interactions between movements, political contexts, and changes in the nature of newspapers and reporting are unimportant to making sense of coverage. Indeed, newspapers routinely over-report violent and extensive collective and the protest of large organizations (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Earl et al. 2004), and in our analyses below, we seek to control for this selection bias. But for now it is clear that the overall pattern of coverage of SMOs is no straightforward function of the growth in the newspaper or basic changes in newsgathering.

This wider political institutional perspective clears up a few aspects of the historical trajectories of coverage of SMOs that are anomalous from standard theories. First, it helps to explain the lack of coverage during the Progressive Era, a time when parties were first declining and before the polity had become nationalized. It also helps to explain the fact that coverage wave of the mid-1930s was more sustained than the 1960s wave; the earlier period of reform was longer and Democratic presidents remained in power from 1933 through 1952, with resurgences in Congress in 1945 and 1949. Democrats suffered key losses in 1966; the Democrat Lyndon Johnson decided he was too unpopular to seek reelection in 1968 and was replaced by Republicans in the White House. It also makes sense that civil rights organizations would continue to gain attention after
the passage of new policies, notably the Civil Right Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. The relative lack of coverage of anti-war SMOs is no major surprise either from this point of view. Although they may have contributed to the end of the Vietnam War (McAdam and Su 2002), they did not gain any major new domestic legislation or bureaucratic footholds, a pattern not unique to the United States (Giugni 2004). All in all, from the political reform point of view, the "late risers" in a wave of protest are expected to benefit less from legislative and bureaucratic breakthroughs, as they appear when the political coalition is dissipating.

[Figure 5 about here.]

As expected, the right-wing rule during the early years of the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s led to a minor wave of social movement activity. Under the Reagan administration, new government initiatives were few and thus it did not provide the same pattern of rise to power, major legislative and bureaucratic growth, and then greater SMO prominence of the right. In their bids at retrenchment, their moves to reject weapons agreements and bids for war, however, these regimes have provoked some left-wing resistance and coverage. In Figure 5 we break down the 1980s “echo” wave of coverage between conservative SMO families and all others. Although the coverage of conservative SMOs shows an increase as does the percentage of SMO coverage that is conservative in the early 1980s, the non-conservative coverage also rises in response. The implication of the theoretical claims is that the George W. Bush administration of the early twenty-first century would lead to
some gains, but not major ones for right-wing and Christian right SMOs and would produce further activity among SMOs whose constituents’ policies were being rolled back or suffered unfavorable administrative rulings. We would expect an uptick of activity similar to that of the early 1980s.

At the most macro level of analysis, the political reform perspective helps to explain the big dog that failed to bark—the non-existent third wave of SMO coverage that presumably would center on new social movements. There was no political formation in the 1990s analogous to the Democratic dominance of the 1930s and 1960s, despite a Democratic president in the 1990s. Not only was the Clinton administration unaccompanied by such a super-majority of Democratic support; it faced Republican House majorities after 1994. Also, there were no major policy breakthroughs. From the political reform perspective it is not surprising that a new wave of social movement activity never happened. What is more, a crisis of Depression proportions under Republican rule would seem the best candidate to provide overwhelming Democratic control, new reform breakthroughs, and their spurs to social movement activity. The unpopular war in Iraq combined with the 2008 recession and the mishandling of Hurricane Katrina may produce that sort of crisis, but that remains to be seen.

POOLED TIME SERIES AND CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSES

To provide more extensive and sophisticated appraisals of these arguments we examine pooled time series analyses across 34 movement families over a 100-year period. Our dependent measure is coverage counts. Not all movement families appear across the entire century, and we considered a family's first
appearance to be once two SMOs in it were covered, yielding 2337 family-year observations. For some analytical purposes we divide the movement families into theoretical categories, notably conservative and the three versions of “new.” In Table 1 we list the 34 families and indicate how they are categorized by ideology and different understandings of newness. (See Table 1.)

Next, we address the main theories. For the resource mobilization perspective, we employ two measures. The first is real personal income per capita, a measure that varies only over time, not across movement families. The second is a measure of organizations “active” in a given movement family, determined by the first and last mentions of an organization. We of course cannot use the actual yearly counts of all organizations in SMO families, as they are unknown, but the measure does not mirror the dependent measure in that any given year about a third of “active” SMOs go unmentioned. However, as an added check, in our analyses we also employ a secondary dependent measure that subtracts the number of SMOs mentioned any year. For new social movement theories we examine the percentage of the labor force in service employment, but also examine this measure with respect to the “new” SMO families and also only for the post-World War II period.

For political process/cycle theories, we employ two of the three previously mentioned systemic measures of partisanship, the percent left in Congress and Democratic White House (Poole and Rosenthal 2008). Although these measures do not vary across movement families, we achieve some variation across families by scoring them positive for non-right-wing movement families and
negative for conservative families. We also omit the DW nominate score because of its high correlation with the percent left in Congress measure. As for the political reform arguments, a measure scores one for the two major periods of reform when Democrats completely dominated and when Republicans dominated (1935 through 1939, and 1965 through 1966), and one during the periods of conservative ascendancy (1921 through 1930, and 1981 through 1985). They are scored similarly to the measures of partisanship. A second political reform measure, enacted and enforced policy, scores one for each year during and after the enactment of a major policy in favor of the movement family’s issue or main constituency; this is understood as any year in which a national bureau or department was in place to enforce or administer laws regarding the constituency (Aberbach and Peterson 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 2008).

We include several control measures concerning the practices of newspapers and their coverage of movements and politics. As noted above, many scholars have found that newspapers are more likely to cover actions that are illegal, cause disruption, or involve violence. To address this issue of selective coverage on disruption, we score one if any organization in the movement family was engaged in either illegal collective action or disruptive action such as strikes, boycotts, occupations, and unruly mass protests drawing the reaction of authorities, and/or collective action in which violence was involved, whether or not it was initiated by the movement. The scores for this measure were generated from our reading of monographs about the families and
other sources of information and vary across time and family. We also employ a yearly measure of the total number of articles published and the number of articles mentioning the two major parties. Like the dependent measure of coverage, each of these final two control measures is logged. We estimated the models using linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors and an AR1 autocorrelation structure (using the Stata 10.0 xtpcse command) given that the time dimension was greater than the cross-sectional one, though each is fairly substantial (Greene 2007; Long and Freese 2005; Wooldridge 2001). We also include dummy measures for each family and year and can do so without jeopardizing our degrees of freedom.

[Table 2 about here.]

The first tests, in models 1 and 2 of Table 2, indicate some support for each of the three perspectives. Model 1 includes all the measures, including the controls, though does not show the results for the dummy measures. At least one of the coefficients for the measures representing the three perspectives is significant, despite all the control measures. Turning to the resource mobilization measures, the coefficient for organizations is positive and significant at the .01 level. The measure of per capita income is positive, but not significant. As for the political contextual model, the allied Congress measure is positive and significant, though only at the .10 level, though the impact of a Democratic White House is negative. Finally, for the political reform model, the coefficient for enforced policy is positive and significant at the .01 level, and the coefficient for the reform era measure is positive, but significant only at the .10 level, falls short
of significance. Each of the three control measures, disruptive histories, articles on political parties, and total articles also have positive and significant effects. The results were also similar replacing the AR1 disturbance correction with a lagged dependent measure, as some scholars (Beck and Katz 1996) recommend. (See model 2.) The lagged dependent measure helps to explain a great deal of variance, and the significance level of some of the coefficients unsurprisingly are lower, but not out of line with the previous model. The exception is that the coefficient for allied Congress becomes negative, if small.ii

In short, there is some support for each of the perspectives in these results.

Next we turn to analyses of new SMOs. We use the same modeling techniques as before, but with the dependent measures being the coverage of the new SMO families in the postwar period and the regressions also including the independent measure service employment. In models three and four, using the wider of the two definitions of postwar new SMO families, we regress coverage of the 22 families against all the previous independent measures along with service employment. In model 3, with the AR1 specification, the coefficient for the service sector employment measure is positive and significant as are its counterparts for the organizations and enforced policy measures; also significant are the coefficients for the control measures disruption and the total number of articles. However, neither of the coefficients for the two political process partisanship measures is positive. The results with the lagged dependent variable specification are similar, though again with the lagged dependent measure explaining a great deal of variance. In this model, however, the reform
era coefficient is both positive and significant. The results are quite similar when we employ the narrowest definition of new SMO families, which greatly reduces the number of cases. (See models 5 and 6.) Again with the AR1 specification, the coefficient for the service sector employment measure is positive, though just short of being significant; so are the coefficients for the organizations and enforced policy measures and for the control measures disruption and the total number of articles. With lagged dependent specification, the results are similar, though as before the coefficients for individual measures are generally and unsurprisingly smaller (see model 6).

The results thus show support for each of the theories. The resource mobilization argument is aided by the positive influence of the organizations measure in almost all specifications. The new social movement arguments are supported by the fact that service employment helps to explain the newspaper coverage of SMOs. The partisan political context measures for the political process model have some influence for all SMO families, but little influence on postwar new SMO family coverage. This theory may not apply as well to new SMOs, which may be less partisan than more material SMOs. Alternatively, the limits on the influence of postwar partisanship may be due to its limited variation. The political reform perspective is supported by the fact that enforced policies are influential in explaining coverage in almost all specifications, including for postwar new SMO families. The measure of reform era has less consistent influence, possibly because reform eras lead to enforced policies, which may in turn influence SMOs and their coverage. Possibly, new SMOs in the most
narrow sense are less likely to be influenced by the sort of reform eras that brought such influence to the labor movement and civil rights movement.

CONCLUSION

New data on almost 300,000 *New York Times* articles citing nearly 1000 SMOs across 34 families allow us to make new appraisals of general macro-sociological theories of social movements in explaining a key consequence of social movements—the form of influence represented by national newspaper coverage. The results show these theories to have considerable explanatory power even regarding an outcome they do not explicitly address. Resource mobilization theory is supported by the fact that the coverage of SMOs has become increasingly diverse as more and more SMOs vie for attention. Also, SMOs based on non-material issues have become very prominent in the last decades of the twentieth century, as expected by new social movement theorists. In addition, the 1930s and 1960s registered large increases in SMO coverage, as expected by protest cycle models, and there are moderately strong correlations between measures of changes in systemic political contexts and coverage.

Yet the results also provide some anomalies from the point of view of these theories. The coverage of SMOs has not generally increased along with income as would be expected by resource mobilization theory, and the dominance of left, libertarian, and identity-centered SMOs, as expected by some new social movement theorists, has yet to happen. As for political process and cycle arguments, the waves of coverage broke later than expected. Also, there was no early-century wave, despite the great reforms associated with the era,
and there has been no major wave since the 1960s-1970s one. In addition, there was an echo of the 1960s wave in the early 1980s during right-wing rule, which would not be expected from this theory.

Our political reform model, a set of partial theoretical claims based on macro-political theorizing, locates patterns of coverage in changes in the polity and domestic state-building, as state-related SMOs capitalize on episodes of state-building. For national SMOs to appear in a big way on the political scene and in the newspaper, it was necessary first to transform the party system and nationalize the polity. Thus the Progressive Era, during which the party system was under attack and the polity was not greatly nationalized, did not result in a wave of national SMO activity or coverage. It was not until the 1930s that the national state took charge as the main source of political authority, particularly over domestic policy. Because the U.S. polity has major barriers to domestic state development, periods of policy reform have occurred only during the two brief periods when Republicans and conservative southern Democrats found themselves out of power. The movements best situated to take advantage of these bursts of reform did so, notably the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s, and the civil rights movement in the 1960s. This argument also helps to explain the persistence of such “old” SMOs as veterans’ organizations and why conservative SMOs do not follow the same political logic.

Each of the perspectives also proved to help explain overall coverage over time and across movement families. Even when controlling for all articles, articles about the major parties, and disruption surrounding movement families,
measures from each of the theoretical perspectives had significant influences on coverage. Notable among these influences were the number of organizations “alive” in the SMO family, for the resource mobilization model. In support of political process/cycle models, partisanship helped to explain the coverage of all SMO families across all time periods. In accordance with the expectations of some parts of new social movement theory, service employment was helpful in explaining the coverage of new SMOs in the postwar period. The existence of an enforced policy supporting the constituents of an SMO was influential in explaining the coverage of all SMO families across the century as well as the coverage of new SMOs in the postwar period, lending support to the political reform perspective. The results suggest that the existing theories are powerful and complementary, and the political reform arguments can help to fill in their gaps.

One key theoretical task for the future is to address further the role of newspapers in the coverage of SMOs. Any complete model of coverage of SMOs will have to address newspapers as both sites of cultural production and nodes of political power (Schudson 2002; Ryan 1991; Gamson 2004). Most theories of the state-related consequences of movements theorize about their political mediation, incorporating structural and dynamic aspects of politics into explanatory models, specifying interactions between the characteristics of SMOs, their strategies, and the changing political contexts they face (see review in Amenta and Caren 2004). Addressing theoretically the mediating influence of news organizations and specifying similar interactions between political contexts,
organizations, strategies, and changes in the structure and practices of newsgathering will be needed to explain fully the coverage of SMOs. The professionalization of journalism and changes in the organization of the work of covering the news, for example, likely mediate the influence of the larger political context, the structure and goals of SMOs, and their framing and other strategies on the amount and character of coverage received.

In addition, theories regarding the new advantages movements gain through politics often see attention by the mass media as a necessary step (Lipsky 1968; Giugni 2004; Andrews 2004), and winning framing battles does not necessarily lead to policy advances (Ferree et al. 2002). With these data it will be possible to appraise these arguments by examining all manner of coverage SMOs generated, including through institutional and reactive means as well as the more widely studied coverage gained through protest events (McAdam and Su 2002). These investigations have the potential of more fully incorporating action and claims making into research on the political consequences of movements.
REFERENCES


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Table 1: Times Coverage of SMO Families with New Social Movement and Conservative Families Identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Family</th>
<th>Percent of Coverage</th>
<th># of SMOs in Family</th>
<th>NSMO 1</th>
<th>NSMO 2</th>
<th>NSMO 3</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Labor</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civil Rights, Black</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Veterans</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Feminism/Women's Rights</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nativist/Supremacist</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Civil Rights, Jewish</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Civil Liberties</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Anti-War</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Progressive</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Conservative</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Anti-Alcohol</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Farmers</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Communist</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Animal Protection/Rights</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Abortion/Reproductive Rights</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Civic</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Old Age/Senior Rights</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Civil Rights, Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Children’s Rights/Protection</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Christian Right</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Democratic Party—Left</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Consumer</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Anti-Smoking</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Anti-Abortion</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Gun Owners’ Rights</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Civil Rights, Native American</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Welfare Rights</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Civil Rights, Hispanic</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Civil Rights, Disability</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Prison Reform/ Prisoner’s Rights</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Gun Control</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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Table 2: Prais-Winsten Regressions of SMO Coverage on Selected Independent Measures, with Correlated Panels Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>0.069</td>
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<td>(2.425)</td>
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Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests).
Figure 1: New York Times Coverage of SMOs, Inequality of Coverage, “Current” SMOs, and Real Personal Income, 1945-1999.
Figure 2: *New York Times* Coverage of Three Conceptions of New SMOs and "Post-Industrial" Employment, 1900-1999
Figure 3: *New York Times* Coverage of Labor, African-American Civil Rights, and Anti-War SMOs and Hypothetical 30-Year Waves
Figure 4. SMO Coverage and Congressional Partisanship by Quarter Centuries, and by Non-Conservative and Conservative SMO Families.
Figure 5: *New York Times* Coverage of Conservative and Non-Conservative SMOs, 1976-1992.
Our conceptualization of social movement organizations also includes national advocacy organizations that make claims on or in behalf of mass constituencies, based on definitions by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Gamson (1990). We employ the term “social movement organization” for simplicity’s sake, though we are cognizant of the fact that other scholars (McAdam 1982) reserve the term for organizations that threaten or engage in disruptive collective action, a set of organizations subsumed by our definition. See below for further details and Authors (2008) for an extensive discussion of our conceptualization and how it compares to others employed in the field.

We ran a series of checks on these models. Notably, the results for a random-effects and fixed-effects linear models estimated with corrections for AR1 disturbances, using Stata’s xtregar commands, yielded similar results (not shown, available). The results were also robust when bootstrapped through 33 trials eliminating each family in turn (not shown, available). We also used a dependent measure that subtracted the number of organizations mentioned in a given SMO-family year to ensure that the organizational measure was not simply replicating the dependent measure. The results (not shown, available) are again similar and the organizations measure remains significant throughout.