Research Note:
Why We Cannot Count the Unemployed?

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April 2001

As of mid-2001, after six or seven years of massive bloodletting from the rolls of state-owned firms, one stark outcome is apparent: No one, and certainly not the central government, knows how many once-state workers have been removed from their posts. This article aims to characterize the chaos rampant in discussions of this program, the human side of the dismantling of the state enterprise system, from a number of angles. My material leads me to argue that it is impossible to come to any kind of statistical judgment about China's current unemployment, particularly one drawing upon official statistics, which, because they are based upon extremely restrictive definitions, are fundamentally flawed. Government-generated data also throw into question any inferences about the plight of those moving in and out of the state of joblessness.

I use several approaches: I begin by reviewing what other outside scholars have concluded, and the discrepancies between their findings and estimates, and point to some crucial caveats about what can be known; then demonstrate the disarray that characterizes official data; and next display the set of perplexing terminology that Chinese authorities (both national and local) have devised, which in practice acts to disaggregate those discharged (whether officially or de facto). Finally, I contend that--much as there once existed a hierarchy of the urban employed, as Andrew G. Walder uncovered in an article published nearly two decades ago--so today, at least in Wuhan, but probably also in other inland cities where state firms are numerous and their debts high, there obtains a very similar implicit scale, rank-ordering workless laborers in terms of the benefits and treatment they might hope to receive.1

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2 Andrew Watson, "Enterprise Reform and Employment Change in Shaanxi Province." Presented at 1998 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March 1998, 7, 8, 23. Watson speaks of a "hierarchy of urban employment" and a "continuum of employment conditions," and on 16 lists the terms in use in Xian...
Together, definitional narrowness, the use of a broad array of differentiating labels for laid-off people, and much disparity in official handling of those who lost their jobs combine to make both the numbers of redundancies and the numbers unemployed at any given time virtually unknowable. Thus, I aim to illustrate the complexity of fathoming what it has actually meant to be furloughed in China over the past decade and in the present. My information comes from the work of scholars outside China, from the Chinese press and journals published in China, and from about six dozen interviews that I conducted in the late summers of 1998, 1999, and 2000 with local administrators and laid-off people in Wuhan.

Scholarship done outside China

Outside analysts, grappling for clarity, only converge on a few dismal facts: first and most critically, they uniformly agree that official statistics—both for the numbers of what is labelled "unemployed" [shiyé] and the figure of the furloughed or "laid-off" [xiagang]—are far from the mark and are decidedly too low. A second point of convergence in their accounts is that national averages, for those whose jobs have disappeared and for those supposedly "reemployed" [zaijiuye] obscure vast regional differences.

And third, a number of them demonstrate that the army of the "job"less [meiyou gongzuo, with gongzuo understood in the traditional sense of job security, regulation, and welfare provision] has been officially broken up into numerous, variously defined, subdivisions, each with its own distinctive name. Besides these problems, most recognize that confusion arises for the analyst because data for those dismissed is generally not delivered with

in 1997. But he does not spell out how the categories of what are really former workers were actually each treated in that city. Tang Jun, Sarah cook, Ren Zhenxin, and Wang Lu, however, do find in "Chengshi pinkun wenti yu zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu yanjiu baogao" [Research report on urban poverty problems and the minimum livelihood security system] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, April 2000) that Wuhan is much less generous with its disbursal of funds for the poor than is Tianjin, Shanghai, or Lanzhou.
information on whether the numbers announced refer to people let go in the one year cited or those released cumulatively; neither do they specify whether the totals made public pertain to the people whose jobs are gone, or just to the smaller numbers of persons who remain without work as of the time when the news is disclosed.

Given these obstacles, there is no foreign scholar writing on the phenomenon of furloughs who believes there is any way to calculate accurately the true numbers either of the people pushed off their posts, or of the rate of "unemployment" in China today or, indeed, that at any time since the mid-1990's. This has not stopped an array of scholars from making estimates, some taking off from official statistics, as available in labor and general national yearbooks; others drawing on books or journals, whether open or internal, published in China or in Hong Kong; still others relying on their own interviews and the surveys of Chinese researchers; and some using more than type of source. The very range of resources informing their studies only reinforces the anarchy of information.

Thus, Antoine Kernen and Jean-Louis Rocca reckon that the count could be as high as 23 to 31 million sacked in 1998 and 1999. But in two single-authored pieces Rocca repeats the same figure, after adding together "all categories of 'jobless'" (including workers considered normal workers but who are not being paid or who are paid just a small part of their proper wage since, he explains, such people are de facto laid off and are often later reclassified as such), and claims it was current in 1997. He adds that this would amount to an unemployment rate of around 14 percent.³

In a similar vein, a small box in the sometimes questionable Hong Kong journal, Zheng Ming reports that participants at a February 1998 research and discussion meeting held by the State Planning Commission admitted that those unemployed and laid off together reached a shocking 35 percent of all staff and workers, presumably meaning all of those in state firms, and that, without taking forceful measures, the state would find itself confronted with 31 millions of these people as early as the year 1998. According to Rocca, though, surveys undertaken by the State Council and labor departments found that 20 million had been laid off "until 1997." Thomas G. Rawski cites Chinese economist Hu Angang as having worked out that the unemployment rate, including those laid off, was in the region of 5.7 to 7 percent in 1997 (when the official figure was just 3 percent), which Rawski notes is too low, since Hu omitted workers idled by plant closures, as well as peasant migrants. By the next year, Hu's "conservative estimate" was that real unemployment, taken as the sum total of the officially registered unemployed, the laid-off unemployed (i.e., those known to the authorities who had not yet found new work), and the unemployed peasant laborers in cities and

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4 The term "staff and workers" [zhigong] is always used in this limited sense.


6 Rocca, "Old Working Class," 6. Since Rocca, a French national, wrote in somewhat awkward English, it is not clear if he means up to January 1, 1997, or by the end of the year 1997.

towns came to about 15.4-16 million people, at a "real unemployment rate of about eight percent."^8

Similarly, the United Nations' "Human Development Report" on China for 1999, adding together the same three groups, offers a total of 15.4 to 16.4 million and a rate of 7.9 to 8.5 percent.^9 And Hong Yong Lee also comes up with a rate of eight to nine percent representing those he terms the "total actual unemployed" in 1999. He arrives at this rate by using the government's figures for the "registered unemployed," plus the number of those "laid off" that he deems remained out of work that year. He also opines that 19.5 million were laid off in 1999, not including those whose wages were not being issued or those not in possession of a xiagang zheng ([laid-off certificate]; more on this below).^10 But I would maintain that all these numbers are woefully incomplete, precisely because they are based upon government statistics which fail to tabulate what must be millions, merely because their situations do not accord with the very narrow official definitions for "laid off" and "unemployed."^11

One more statistical analysis done by a scholar outside China is a piece by Wang Shaoguang, who counted "about 10 million" laid off by June 1999, of whom 7.42 million had come from state firms and 2.4 million from urban collectives. Wang relies on an article in the 2000 Chinese economic bluebook written by the Chinese scholar Yang Yiyong. But again, it is uncertain to the reader if Wang and Yang mean this to be a cumulative figure, or one current at

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^11 I give the official definitions for these terms below.
the moment they mention. Wang's paper works with the number of those who are officially tabulated as having been laid off; combining the official number of laid-off with the number of "registered unemployed," he comes up with 14 to 16 million for 1998 and 18 to 19 million for 1999.\textsuperscript{12} There is, once again, no way to determine whether he means that those numbers of people were let go in each of those two years, respectively, or whether, because of some people becoming reemployed, the total pool has increased only slightly from 1998 to 1999.

Fascinating field reports from Shaanxi and Sichuan by Andrew Watson, and by Robert Weller and Jiansheng Li, respectively, provide accounts of conditions and categories among the workforces and the furloughed in firms in these locales,\textsuperscript{13} but are not concerned with conjecturing about larger patterns or numbers. Marc Blecher and Ching Kwan Lee have both written penetrating and creative interpretative pieces about the state of labor and the laid-off in Tianjin (Blecher) and Guangdong and Shenyang (Lee), also without offering any numerical computations\textsuperscript{14}; and William Hurst has done a pioneering statistical

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study showing a positive inverse correlation between rates of layoffs and rates of entering "reemployment service centers"\textsuperscript{15} at the provincial level, based solely on official data from 1997.\textsuperscript{16} So, in part because their authors employed different methodologies and in part because they had varying concerns, it is difficult to rely on secondary work in order to reach any general or solid conclusions about statistics on the unemployed in China today. Nor do Chinese sources provide any enlightenment.

Chinese sources and their flaws

Whether intentionally to obfuscate or because its own data is inadequate, official figures on the numbers without work are enormously elusive and contradictory. In general, as do some of the accounts referenced above, they fail to indicate whether their figures are per annum or cumulative, and whether they pertain to people who once were severed from their work situations or to once workers now dismissed and still awaiting new placement. A chronological sampling of official announcements can supply a sense of the problems.

\textsuperscript{15} Each firm that has laid off some or all of its workers is supposed to create a "reemployment service center," to which its xiagang workers are to be entrusted for a period up to three years. The center is to provide a basic living allowance [\textit{jiben shenghuofei}], again, for up to three years, using funds donated by the enterprise, and, where this is not possible, from the city's financial departments and/or banks, and, if an enterprise has contributed to the city's unemployment insurance fund, from the fund. Second, the center is also to train the workers for a new occupation, and to help them locate new work posts. And third, the center should contribute to the pension, medical, and social security funds on behalf of each laid-off worker entrusted to it. See Yang Shucheng, "Zaijiuye yao zou xiang shichanghua" [In reemployment we must go toward marketization] \textit{Zhongguo jiuye} [Chinese unemployment] 3 (1999), 19, for one description.

To begin with, in mid-1997, even before the mass separations that the September 1997 Fifteenth Party Congress spurred later in the year, Vice Premier Wu Bangguo declared in a national meeting on employment issues that there were then already nine million workers out of work and nearly 11 million unpaid or being only partially paid.\textsuperscript{17} Then a news release from the official Xinhua News Agency of December 9, 1997 reported that state-run firms had already laid off a full 25 million workers by that time\textsuperscript{18}; though another notice, dated February 5, 1998, gave the figure as 12 million.\textsuperscript{19}

But two years later, in early 2000, one account asserted that 5.64 million state workers had been laid off or diverted in 1995, 8.9 in 1996, 9.4 million in 1997 (which would amount to 23.9 million as of early 1998), plus an additional 6.1 million in 1998.\textsuperscript{20} Another article in an official journal noted that in 1998 and 1999 combined, there was a figure of 24.28 million xiagang workers, a figure reached by adding the 12.54 it said were laid off in 1998 (a number more than twice as large as the one just cited for that same year) to the 11.74 in 1999. Yet, most puzzling, it then goes on to explain that in 1998, 5.62 million joined this pool, plus another 5.64 million in

\textsuperscript{17} SWB FE/2950, S1/1, June 20, 1997, from Xinhua [New Chinese News Agency] (hereafter XH), May 28, 1997.

\textsuperscript{18} Translated in SWB FE/3098, G5, December 10, 1997.

\textsuperscript{19} From Sing Tao Jih Pao, February 4, 1998, in SWB FE/3143, G/3, citing the State Statistical Bureau. This figure is about the same as one in an official journal, which states that, "A study of all state-owned single-venture enterprises' diverted and laid-off [personnel] found that they totalled 12.74 million workers, representing 17.2 percent of the number of workers in such firms as of the beginning of the year." This is No author, "Guoyou qiye zhigong fenliu ji xiagang qingkuang di tongji diaocha" [Statistical investigation of the situation of state-owned enterprises staff and workers' diversion and layoffs] Zhongguo laodong [Chinese Labour] (hereafter ZGLD) 6 (1998): 45.

\textsuperscript{20} Luo Zhuanyin, "Jiaru WTO zhongguo jiuye mianlinde jiyu yu tiaozhan" [Chinese employment is facing opportunity and challenge in entering the WTO], ZGLD 3 (2000), 9.
1999.\textsuperscript{21} And, oddly enough, and without an explanation for the discrepancy, on March 7, 2000, Xinhua News Agency reported that "China's laid-off workers totalled 6.5 million at the end of last year."\textsuperscript{22}

At the end of 1999, however, apparently citing an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China News Digest disclosed that a full 30 million had been laid off over the three years 1997 through 1999.\textsuperscript{23} But then Minister of Labor and Social Security Zhang Zuoyi said at a press conference at the 2000 annual session of the National People's Congress in March that there were a total of 11.74 million laid-off people in 1999, while the official New China News Agency proclaimed on the same day that 6.5 million workers had been laid off that year.\textsuperscript{24}

But two Chinese researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, whose article was published in early 2000, state that there were "some people" roughly estimating that by the end of December 2000, 27 million people in China will have been laid off, amounting to about a quarter of the whole body of state-owned enterprise staff and workers. In reaching this conclusion, they present a time series that is consistent with some of the earlier official numbers: three million laid off in 1993, 3.6 million in 1994, 5.64 million in 1995, 8.91 million in 1996, 11.51 million in 1997, 8.9 million in 1998, and nine million in 1999.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{22} In SWB FE/3784, S1/4, March 9, 2000.

\textsuperscript{23} China News Digest, Global News GL99-172, December 27, 1999.

\textsuperscript{24} SWB, FE/3784, S1/5, March 9, 2000, from XH, March, 7; and SWB, FE/3784, S1/4, March 9, 2000, from XH, March 7, 2000, respectively.

\textsuperscript{25} Cheng Liansheng and Liu Xuemin, "Zhongguo chengzhen di liuci shiyue gaofeng ji qi techeng" [China's sixth urban high peak in unemployment and its special characteristics], Jingji yanjiu
But the most important fact is this: The officially counted xiagang staff and workers—the public numbers we hear—relate only to those the government knows about and so amount to just a portion of this group, excluding what are probably millions of other individuals who have lost their jobs since the late 1980’s. The core of the problem is the official definition, which renders what the regime terms a genuinely "laid-off" or xiagang worker to be only one who is known to the authorities and who belongs to a very special and privileged category among those who have been thrown out of work. And it is just the number of these people that officialdom propagates as having been laid off.

Thus, an authentic xiagang person must be one who meets all three of the following officially designated conditions: 1) s/he began working before the contract system was instituted in 1986 and had a formal, permanent job in the state sector (plus those contract laborers whose contract term is not yet concluded); 2) because of his/her firm’s problems in business and operations, has been let go, but has not yet cut off relations with the original firm; and 3) has not yet found other work in society.26

It is only these workers, but, to make matters worse, just some of them, who are entitled to receive a "laid-off certificate" [xiagang zheng]. This credential provides them with a set of preferential policies and permits them to enter a reemployment service center, which is supposed to distribute livelihood allowances to them, contribute pension, unemployment, and medical insurance money for them, and help them obtain retraining and a new job, while paying for their welfare benefits.

But, as at least one Chinese scholar has acknowledged, the official figures do not include fully qualified "laid-off" workers who are unwilling to enter an official "reemployment center"; nor, and more critically, those from ziliao [Economic research materials] 1 (2000), 5. Many thanks to Thomas Rawski for sending me this article.

26 This is in Guo Jun, "Guoyou qiye xiagang yu fenliu you he butong?" [What's the difference between laid-off and diverted workers in the state firms?] Zhongguo gongyuan [Chinese workers' movement] (hereafter ZGGY), 3/99, 32, among many other places.
firms unable to raise funds for these centers, and which therefore did not arrange for their staff and workers to enter a center; nor the workers once in centers who earlier signed agreements to retain social insurance relations with their original firms but then left the center. The figure also omits workers furloughed from urban collectives, since, by definition the xiagang category is meant to apply only to ex-workers who were once state-employed.27

An "unemployed" [shiye] worker, on the other hand—according to the official designation—is only one whose firm has gone bankrupt,28 so that the

27 Quanguo zonggonghui diaoyanzu [All China General Trade Unions (hereafter ACFTU) research group], "Guanyu guoyou qiye xiagang zhigong jiben shenghuo baozhang he zaijiuye gongzuo di diaocha" [An investigation of state enterprise laid-off staff and workers' basic livelihood insurance and reemployment work], ZGGY 2 (2000), 14 reported that according to statistics from the ACFTU, as of the end of June 1999, nationwide there were then 6.41 million staff and workers laid off. See also Weller and Li, op. cit., 92.

28 After the mid-1990's, there was a surge in enterprise bankruptcies. Into the 1990s only a scant number of bankruptcies were permitted to occur (see Leonard J. Hausman and Barry J. Friedman, "Employment Creation: New and Old Methods." Unpublished ms. (n.p., n.d. [1996 or 1997]), 36); as of the end of 1995, 18 experimental cities had laid off some 100's of 1,000's of workers, but this had only made a small dent in the more than 100,000 state-owned firms. But a sharp increase in numbers took place in 1996 and 1997, with over nine thousand firms (quite likely an exaggerated figure) reportedly applying for bankruptcy in the one month of September 1997, when the Communist Party's Fifteenth Congress announced an intensification and acceleration of reforms in state firms. See Hang-Sheng Cheng, "A Mid-Course Assessment of China's Economic Reform," in Congresss of the United States, ed., China's Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 29-30; Loraine A. West, "The Changing Effects of Economic Reform on Rural and Urban Employment." Paper to be presented at "Unintended Social Consequences of Chinese Economic Reform" conference, Harvard School of Public Health and the The Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University, May 23-24, 1997 (draft), 6; and Lo Ping, "Document Reveals Enterprises in a Bottleneck," ZM 242 (1997), 17. An official source claims that a total of 675 state enterprises were declared bankrupt and closed
post s/he held has disappeared altogether, and thus there is no question of holding onto ties with the plant. 29 And then of all such people, what must be just a fraction—those who are known as the "registered unemployed"—are actually counted in official statistics. These are people over 18 years of age, who hold an urban household registration, are registered at their local labor departments, and have not yet found new work. Many whose firms have collapsed, but which did not formally go through bankruptcy procedures, are ineligible; there must be others who fail to register for unknown personal reasons.

Moreover, according to the head of the department of insurance in the Wuhan city trade union branch, furloughed workers who would seemingly qualify as unemployed according to this definition, but whose firms have not contributed to the city's unemployment insurance fund, are not counted as unemployed.30 Other unemployed people who are not counted (in addition to workless people living in the city but whose household is reanothergistered as rural) are those from firms that had to cease production or have been merged with another enterprise, but which have not officially gone bankrupt. Given policies to minister to the needs of workers from bankrupt firms—after the costs of the proceedings are paid off, the workers and retirees of a firm legally have the first claim on any remnant assets of the firm31—truly desperate firms are often not even permitted to go bankrupt. For, if they were, they would be unable to pay the unemployment insurance funds that would

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30 Interview, September 13, 2000.

31 West, op. cit., 8.
have to be disbursed to sustain their workforces.\textsuperscript{32} In words that appeared in the \textit{People's Daily} in 1997, but which remain apt today,

As most cities and regions in China have yet to perfect a social security system, China still faces difficulties in resettling staff and workers of bankrupt enterprises, having a direct and adverse impact on social stability. If they spent a large amount of enterprise auction income on resettling staff and workers, bankrupt enterprises would have to write off more debts owed to the banks. Given this situation, for a long time to come, China's state-owned enterprises will not be allowed to declare bankruptcy in light of the balance of assets and operational conditions alone, as enterprises under a Western market economy structure do, in accord with the law...China should only let state-owned industrial enterprises go bankrupt in accord with the Bankruptcy Law [of 1986, which went into effect in 1988] in some cities with a sound social security system.\textsuperscript{33}

In yet another way the national statistics on the numbers laid off are seriously deficient; this is that they are derived from a procedure filled with incentives for misreporting. For one, some localities or units deliberately report high numbers of layoffs to increase their eligibility for subsidies for those in need.\textsuperscript{34} There also appears to be an incentive for overreporting the numbers who receive training and become reemployed, as an official document prescribes "link[ing] the amount of capital investment to the scale of training and the rate of reemployment."\textsuperscript{35} Besides, it must

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\textsuperscript{33} Mu Ren, "Go Bankrupt or Dodge Creditors," translated from \textit{Renmin ribao [People's Daily]}, December 9, 1996, 2, in SWB FE/2813, G/7, January 10, 1997.

\textsuperscript{34} Yang Yiyong, "Ruhe kandai dangqian di shiye wenti?" [How to consider the present issue of unemployment] \textit{Neibu canyue [Internal consultations]} (hereafter NBCY) 447 (January 22, 1999), 18.

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redound to the credit of local authorities if they claim to have high rates of reemployment.

Official numbers on layoffs come from the enterprises, which are to relate to their local labor bureaus their numbers of laid-off workers.\textsuperscript{36} By doing so, the firm is allowed to obtain the state's portion of the funds for the basic livelihood allowance (recently renamed basic livelihood insurance) \([\text{jiben shenghuofei} \text{ and } \text{jiben shenghuo baozhang, respectively}]\) for that number of laid-off workers. But since the state's funds are limited, its officials support only workers in state-owned firms, and of those, primarily those in enterprises they believe to worth saving for strategic purposes, whether political or economic.\textsuperscript{37} Firms not getting such support, or firms bankrupted or so indebted that they cannot go on operating, will not register their jobless with the government, for they have no funds with which to contribute their requisite share to these allowances.

Thus, all in all, the notions of "layoff" and "unemployment" are twisted and tortured, and much too restrictive to describe reality, perhaps at times on purpose and perhaps in other ways inadvertently. The upshot is that the numbers of people populating these two categories in the eyes of the government are very much minimized, and so the ranks of those with regime-recognized legitimate claims on the state are vastly diminished.

\textbf{Authoritative euphemisms}

In addition to the more exclusive categories of "laid off" and "unemployed," there is a battery of other terms clouding an understanding of the actual labor market situation. These include fenliu [diverted], applying to those who are still attached to their firms but have received a new work

\textsuperscript{36} Much of the following material comes from interviews with an official in the Wuhan branch of the All China Federation of Trade Unions, September 13, 2000 and with an urban district labor employment center in Wuhan, September 7, 1999.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview, Wuhan, September 7, 1999 with a district labor market official.
assignment, sometimes within the firm, sometimes by being "exported" elsewhere\(^\text{38}\); neitui [retired at an early age and taking a pay cut, but still retaining a bond to the firm];\(^\text{39}\) and tingxin liuzhi [ceasing to receive wages but holding onto one's post] and liangbuzhao [literally, neither party looks for the other], both of which apply to those who have left the firm but retain an indefinite and ongoing tie to it while obtaining income from a new placement elsewhere.\(^\text{40}\)

There are also those on so-called "long holidays" [fang changjia] or who have "retired early" [tigian tuixiu]. All of these categories afford the authorities means of coping with excess laborors at lowered cost, without in name, though often in fact, sending them out to the streets.\(^\text{41}\) Thus, they are

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\(^{38}\) Guo Jun, *op. cit.*, 32.

\(^{39}\) According to Song Xiaowu, "Dangqian jiuye he shiye baoxian de wenti yu yu duice" [Existing problems in present employment and unemployment insurance and measures to deal with them], *NBCY* 461 (May 12, 1999), 13-14, "In recent years some areas and sectors are using early retirement to lighten pressure on the firms from excess workers, allowing (or pressuring) people to quit work as much as 10 years early." Wen Wufeng, "Tigian tuixiu toushi" [A perspective on early retirement] *LDBZTX* 1 (1999), 14-15, in an analysis of statistics on 2,827 "retirees" from "various places," found that 51 percent had retired at ages 39 to 48; another 21 percent between the ages of 29 and 38; and another 1.3 percent even had to leave their jobs at ages younger than 28 in the name of "retirement."

\(^{40}\) "Liangbuzhao" is discussed in Jiang Shunxiang, "Shuoshuo liangbuzhao" [Talking about liangbuzhao] *Laodong neican* [Labor internal reference] (hereafter *LDNC*) 11 (1998), 46-47. One interviewee in this condition reported that he had to pay his firm 150 yuan a month to hold his place. He would prefer to become "laid off," but his enterprise would not permit him to be, for then the firm would have to allocate a basic living allowance to him (interview with cab driver, August 28, 1999).

\(^{41}\) Many of these terms appear in Beijing daxue zhongguo jingji yanjiu zhongxin chengshi laodongli shichang ketizu [Beijing University Chinese Economy Research Center Urban Labor Market Task Group], "Shanghai: Chengshi zhihong yu nongcun mingong di fenceng yu ronghe" [Shanghai: Urban staff and workers
not counted as either *xiagang* or unemployed [*shiye*]. Added together, the existence of so many uncounted categories clearly implies that the true figures of the actually laid-off must be far, far higher than those the state announces.\(^{42}\)

Then there are the categories of the "hidden unemployed" or "excess workers" [*fuyu renyuan*], referring to those who are left with little or nothing to do in the firm, and who generally receive reduced or even no wages, but who have not been formally let go.\(^{43}\) Most estimates have consistently over time put this figure at about one third of the total workers in state enterprises, or around 30 million. Since these people are not fully "unemployed," according to the official definition, and so are ineligible for unemployment insurance, they are actually often poorer than the registered unemployed.\(^{44}\)

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42 Shen Kangrong, "*Yinxing jiuye' qianxi* [A superficial analysis of hidden employment] *Shehuixue* [Sociology] (hereafter *SHX*) 2 (1999), 24-25. Rocca, "Old Working Class"; Watson, *op. cit.*; and Weller and Li, *op. cit.* supply a few other terms, ones that might be used only in the locales they studied.

43 Liu Yongzhu, *Disanci shiye gaofeng* [The third high tide of unemployment] (Beijing: Zhongguo shijì chubanshe [China book publishers], 1998), 75 for one example of many. There are disparities here though, with, for instance, Cheng Xi, "Dangqian wo guo de jiuye yali burong hushi" [My country's present employment pressure is hard to ignore], *RKYJJ* 1 (1999), 60 putting the total figure of urban unemployed and hidden unemployed at about 28 million. For other information on the hidden unemployed, see Deng Baoshan, "Zhengfu, qiye, he xiagang zhidong zai jaijiuye gongcuozhong de cuoyong" [Government, enterprise, and laid-off staff and workers' role in reemployment work], *ZGLD* 3 (1999), 13 (defined here as those whose marginal costs exceed their marginal productivity in a firm).

44 Liu Yongzhu, *op. cit.*, 18. See also Li Bao and Xie Yongjun, "*Yinxing shiye* yu *yinxing jiuye*," [Hidden unemployment and hidden employment] work, *ZGLD*, 4/99, 45-47. They estimate that the hidden unemployed account for 20 to 30 percent of the workforce, totallying some 20 to 30 million
Official statistics on "reemployment" are similarly slippery. One might be suspicious when even those who compile these figures have to admit, in the words of an official at the Wuhan General Trade Union's Professional Introduction Service Center that, one can't be clear about these statistics; they're relative, not absolute. The situation is dynamic and there's no way to count them \[\ldots\text{shuobuging} \ldots\text{xiangduide} \ldots\text{meibanfa tongji}\].

According to this official, who cited a percentage of about 30 percent reemployed in Wuhan, it is actually the "times" of new employment \[\text{renci}\], i.e., the numbers of positions known to be newly filled, and not the number of people with new jobs, that is counted up once each month. Then, each year these figures are added up, eliminating from the total the jobs that are known to labor administrators to have ended. Assembling these data certainly involves counting the same person—who may have held several very short-term posts that year—more than once.

As evidence that there is no certainty whatever as to the quantity of reemployed people, within the same one scholarly article, there is the data that by May 1998, 10 percent of the \[\text{xiagang}\] had "rather stable work," and that as of September of that same year the reemployment rate was 30 percent. And yet another Chinese researcher, working with figures up through mid-1998, states that, "now the reemployment rate, which in the past was 70 percent, has workers, or five to six times the number of the registered unemployed.

45 Admission by an official at the Wuhan General Trade Union's Professional Introduction Service Center, September 13, 2000.

46 Mo Rong, "1999 nian wo guo jiuye xingshi fenxi he zhengce jianyi" [Policy suggestions and analysis of my country's 1999 employment situation] ZGLD 2 (1999), 11, 12 and Laodong he baozhang xinxi zhongxin, "Dangqian xiagang zhigong zhuangkuang ji ying yinqi zhuyi de jige wenti" [The situation of the present laid-off staff and workers and several issues that ought to receive attention], ZGLD 4 (1999), 17, from a sample survey.
fallen to less than 50 percent”; still one more cites a figure of 40.1 percent who had realized reemployment in 1997.47

More recently, an article in an internal publication cited a miserable rate of just 27 percent nationwide who had found new placements as of the end of June 1999.48 Almost simultaneously, an open official pronouncement asserted that 42 percent of state enterprise xiagang—still not a very impressive proportion—had been reemployed in 1999.49 And yet, the same bureaucracy that had made that announcement also proclaimed that a study of 10,000 laid-off workers in 10 cities showed that a full 82 percent of them had performed some income-earning work. The weight of this statistic is sharply qualified, however, by the accompanying information that as many as 68 percent had held their new jobs for just six months or less, a proportion that includes 40 percent of the total who did so for under three months. A mere 17.26 percent managed to hold onto the post for longer than a year.50

And after surveying 160 firms in 16 cities in August 1999, a research group from the All China Federation of Trade Unions found that the reemployment rate in most provinces fell somewhere between a perilous 20 and 40 percent.51 Another cause for concern about the numbers is the amount of time people are spending out of work: In Hubei province, a September 1997 random sampling of 3,000 laid-off workers in 580 firms in 10 cities and counties revealed that, although 47 percent were said to be reemployed, over a quarter of the rest (26 percent) had already been without employment for

47 Liu Yongzhu, op. cit, 18; Cheng Xi, op. cit., 60.


49 Laodong he shehui baozhangbu (2000), 52.


51 Quanguo zonggonghui diaoyanzu, op. cit., 14.
three years or more, and just 29 percent had been looking for under a year.\textsuperscript{52}
And one more trade union study found that 48.7 percent of the "reemployed" it counted were self-employed; of the other 51.3 percent who had been hired, well over half (59 percent) were engaged in work that was purely temporary.\textsuperscript{53}

As for what they were doing, the activities they took up were most unpromising. According to this same study, 18.6 percent were odd-job manual workers, 10 percent did various sorts of hourly work (which usually refers to activities such as picking up others' children from school); 5.2 percent had seasonal jobs; 60 percent were retailers operating stalls; and a mere 6.8 percent had obtained formal, contracted employment. A worrisome 45 percent among the stallkeepers were discovered to be highly vulnerable, mobile peddlers selling in shifting sites without a license.\textsuperscript{54}

Other research in 1997 among 360 reemployed staff and workers in Wuhan found that over a third of them (34.54 percent) had either set up a stall, were operating a pedicab, or driving a taxi,\textsuperscript{55} all jobs subject to arbitrary petty bureaucratic harassment. As one cab driver told me, "The cops are everywhere" [daochu dou you jingcha], and "they'll grab me" [yao zhua wo].

\textsuperscript{52} Hubei sheng zonggonghui shenghuo baozhangbu [Hubei province general trade union livelihood guarantee department], "Yunyong zhengce he falu shouduan, quanli tuijin zaijiuye gongcheng xiang zongshen fazhan--hubei sheng xiangang zhigong di diaocha" [Utilize policy and legal methods, fully promote the reemployment project to develop in depth]--an investigation of Hubei's laid-off staff and workers], Lilun yuekan [Theory monthly], 2 (1998), 18.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 8-9.

\textsuperscript{55} Jianghan daxue ketizu [Jianghan University Project Group], "Wuhan shi shishi zaijiuye gongcheng dulce yanjiu" [Policy research on Wuhan City's implementation of the reemployment project] (Wuhan, 1998), 61.
His hair had even turned white, he claimed, simply from fear of the police!\textsuperscript{56} Besides, by autumn 2000, a pedicab jockey claimed in private conversation that he had a startling 26,000 competitors in his trade in the city!\textsuperscript{57} Such a sum seems likely to be exaggerated; still, what is certain is that the streets of the city are crammed with empty carts, and that their daily take is tiny.

A wonderful illustration of the complexity entailed in coming to an understanding of the concept of "reemployment" occurred in one of my interviews. The still securely employed friend of a woman who had been laid off three times found the definition of the term "reemployed" quite simple: "It means that you work and get an income again, even if it's temporary or short term, unstable." But neither I nor her presently jobless companion could figure out whether or not we should count the latter among those with that label.\textsuperscript{58}

Further cause for suspicion attends the state's claims about its programs of relief. One document alleges that, as of the end of 1998 all of the xiagang staff and workers had "basically entered reemployment centers, of whom 93.2 percent had their basic living costs guaranteed."\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, in the report on 1999, 95 percent were said to have entered reemployment centers, of whom 94 percent had signed basic livelihood guarantee fund and reemployment agreements, and 90 percent of them had, allegedly, received their funds.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} Interview in a Wuhan cab, September 2, 1999.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview, Wuhan, September 16, 2000.
\textsuperscript{58} Interview, September 6, 1999.
\textsuperscript{59} Song Xiaowu, \textit{op. cit.}, 17; N.a., "Guanyu wuhanshi zaijiuye wenti de diaocha bao" [An investigation report on Wuhan City's reemployment question] (Wuhan: n.d. [probably written around mid-1997]), 11.
\textsuperscript{60} Laodong he shehui baozhangbu [Ministry of Labor and Social Security], Guojia tongjiju [State Statistical Bureau], "1999 nian laodong he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao," [Public statistical announcement of the development of the work in 1999 in labor and social security] \textit{ZGLD} 7 (2000), 52.
And yet dozens and dozens of random encounters on the streets, in the markets, and in the cabs of Wuhan in 1999 and 2000 belied such reckonings.

This is not even to mention that, as one furloughed female worker informed me, in Wuhan some centers merely provide a form to fill in but have nothing more to offer; or, as another who had, indeed, some 18 months earlier "entered" his firm's center and signed a contract there lamented, he had henceforth gotten no money, no training, no placement, heard nothing. "Even if it's true that 99 percent of the laid-off entered centers, entering the center is useless," he mused derisively (jin zhongxin meiyong).

So, overall, there appear to be serious inconsistencies and, one might even say, fantasies, in figures on furloughs, and great gaps between these fantasies and the realities out on the roads and in the lanes, at least in Wuhan. I go on to present what my interviews over the past few years in the streets and stalls of Wuhan have exposed as a sort of hierarchy of those whose original jobs have been terminated, describing the graded nature of the treatment, benefits and services they are receiving.

A Layering of Statuses

Despite—or perhaps because of—all the unclarity just recounted, the term xiagang is popularly used, quite loosely, to refer to people no longer at work in their original danwei. But, in accord with the information given above, the regime and local governments appear implicitly to stratify those whose jobs have been terminated into at least seven tiers, the occupants of each of which receive differential treatment. In part, this variation reflects differential handling of workers from different ownership systems; in part it is a product of the level of prosperity or poverty of particular plants, and, of course, regions.

My perception from street interviews that this is the case in Wuhan with respect to ownership systems was confirmed by the head of the Wuhan city trade

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61 Interview, September 1, 1999.

union insurance work department. He explained that the capital of the state firms belongs to the state, so the state subsidizes these firms; collective firms, he elaborated, however, are owned by the "laboring masses," so the state will not provide for them.63

The dependence of a furloughed worker's fate upon the financial state of his/her firm was also illustrated in some of my Wuhan interviews. There were some whose firms simply stopped producing or whose business was very poor, but had not declared themselves bankrupt. Such enterprises let their workers go "without a cent, showing no concern," in the words of one of them.64 As one scholar pointed out,

Some enterprises in difficulty would like to cut off relations with their workers, but because they find it hard to pay off severance wages and medical insurance, and have not paid in social security fees for them, they can only let them go.65

Or, in the words of another, "between enterprises with different economic results there are very big differences in the livelihood treatment of the laid-off."66

In line with these disparities, the actually laid-off appear to be sorted into a range of layers, rankings that eerily parallel the divisions within the prior socialist-era working class, as described by Andrew Walder in

63 Interview, September 13, 2000.

64 Interviews, September 1, 1999 and September 11, 1999. According to Hu Angang, Zhongguo jingji shibao [China economic news], March 31, 1998, in Gongyun cankao ziliao [Workers' movement reference materials] 3 (1998), 12, sample nationwide statistics show that about 15 million city people in need are not guaranteed their basic livelihood, with the main reason being that their enterprise has stopped work and either ceased to issue any wages or issues them only in part.


66 Li Peilin, "Shiye zhidu yu xiagang zhidu ying zhubu binggui" [The systems for unemployment and layoffs should gradually be merged], NBCY 452 (March 10, 1999), 2.
a 1984 article. Those properly, officially labeled xiagang (according to the state's definition) stand in the top two tiers of the hierarchy. At the very peak are those furloughed workers who were formerly employed in firms that remained relatively healthy, and whose leaders have reported their existence to the authorities. These firms have been favored by decisionmakers with imported equipment, graced with the right to retain foreign exchange and conduct their own foreign trade in recent years, and, lately, have been permitted to form joint ventures with foreign firms. Additionally, this tier includes firms whose output is perceived as crucial to the national economy. Once-permanent [guding] workers let go from these places either received very high one-time severance grants when they departed or continue over time to collect steady and reasonably sufficient monthly "basic living allowances." Other benefits accruing to them are the right to enter a reemployment center, accompanied by the allocation of a xiagang zheng. This document is

67 Walder, op. cit.

68 According to my trade union informant (September 13, 2000), only laid-off workers known to the authorities are eligible for state benefits.

69 Interview with official, September 7, 1999.

70 Tian Bingnan and Yuan Jianmin, "Shanghai xiagang renyuan de diaocha yanjiu" [Investigation research on Shanghai laid-off personnel], SHX, 2 (1997), 11.

71 In my interviews, one cab driver had received 8,000 yuan while another got 20,000 (September 4 and 10, 1999, respectively). Certainly these are not the limits of the extremes. For instance, according to Jianghan daxue ketizu, op. cit., a 1997 study of over 700 laid-off workers found that some got 1,000 to 2,000 yuan when they were laid off and the majority got nothing from their units.

72 In mid-2000 Wuhan, the norm was around 260 yuan per month for such people.
supposed to entitle them to the monthly allowance; a range of preferential policies, such as reduction or elimination of fees and taxes; free licenses; a spot on the sidewalk or in a market; and help from the trade unions and local branches of the Women's Federation in finding jobs and sometimes in occupational training. In addition, they will be provided with preferential treatment in taxation and fees should they set up businesses of their own. These workers are eligible for social security and are likely to receive some pension money when they retire, at least for awhile (a function of the health of their former firm).

In the second tier are those released by weaker state firms, that is, enterprises in debt and/or losing money. The state may have decided to let these enterprises wither away. But, since their workers are from the state sector, they are still properly labeled xiagang workers, and so they too are eligible for a certificate; some living allowance, but generally at a lower rate (if in fact the firm has any funds for this); and perhaps entry into a reemployment center (again, if the firm has set one up, which is less likely than in firms whose laid-off are in the first tier). Being state-connected, they might be assisted by the mass organizations and enjoy preferential

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73 One informant, laid off in 1995, only received her certificate in September 1998. Her explanation: "There's so many laid-off people; the country can only afford to pay some people." Interview, September 2, 1999.

74 Among my informants, there was much variation in this regard: some received none, some got a minimal amount when the former unit was doing good business, others got what was in Wuhan in summer 1999 the standard 220 yuan per month (interviews on September 1, 7, 11, and 1999). In a September 1997 study based on 2,447 returned questionnaires (of 3,000) undertaken in 580 firms in 10 Hubei cities, only 36.1 percent of the laid-off were receiving their allowances (Hubei sheng zonggonghui shenghuo baozhangbu [Hubei province general trade union livelihood guarantee department], "Yunyong zhengce he falu shouduan, quanli tuijin zaijiuye gongcheng xiang zongshen fazhan" [Utilize policy and legal methods, fully promote the reemployment project to develop in depth]--an investigation of Hubei's laid-off staff and workers], Lilun yuekan [Theory monthly], 2 (1998), 18.
treatment for their own businesses. Once their basic allowance has expired, they might be able to get unemployment insurance--but only if their firm has contributed to the fund.

As one author lamented,

Enterprises with a lot of laid-off workers are mostly those that have either half stopped or completely stopped production. So they cannot submit money into the social insurance fund, raise their payments for their reemployment center, or supply living allowances for their laid-off workers. Usually their ability cannot match up to their ambitions.75

Similarly, if a firm has not paid into a pension insurance fund for its employees, the pooling area in which it is stationed will not provide for these persons once they retire.76

Third is a set of ex-employees whose situations do not fit the definition of xiagang. This category includes those "diverted" [fenliu] within their firms, or who are in states of neitui or tigian tuixiu.77 Though they are technically ineligible for xiagang privileges (not having left the firm), if the firm can afford it, they may get some living allowance at a rate of about half their previous salary. Since these workers are not qualified

75 Yang Yiyong and Li Jianli, "1999 nian wo guo jiuye xingshi yiran shifen yansu" [In 1999 China's employment situation is still extremely serious], NBCY, 449 (February 10, 1999), 7. There is a similar statement in Liu Yongzhu, op. cit., 19.

76 Wuhanshi fangzhi zaijiuye fuwu zhongxin [Wuhan City Textile Reemployment Service Center], "Wuhanshi fangzhi zaijiuye fuwu zhongxin yuncuo qingkuang huibao" [A Summary report on the operations situation of the Wuhan City Textile Reemployment Service Center], (ms., Wuhan: March 18, 1998), 8.

77 According to Song Xiaowu, op. cit., 13-14, "In recent years some areas and sectors are using early retirement to lighten pressure on the firms from excess workers, allowing (or pressuring) people to quit work as much as 10 years early). See Wen Wufeng, "Tigian tuixiu toushi" [A perspective on early retirement] LDBZTX 1 (1999), on 14-15, who states that an analysis of statistics on 2,827 "retirees" from "various places" found that 51 percent had retired at ages 39 to 48; another 21 percent between the ages of 29 and 38; and another 1.3 percent even had to leave their jobs at ages younger than 28 in the name of retirement).
for any of the usual benefits that accrue to the *xiagang*, if the firm is too feeble financially to distribute these funds, the workers are left wholly on their own. Also part of this set are those from better-off collective firms. They too cannot be called "laid-off" (since they are not from a state firm) and so receive no privileged treatment, even though what has happened to them is just the same as what befell those in the higher levels of the hierarchy. Some of them, at least, might receive social security.

Fourth are the registered "unemployed," people whose firms were allowed to go bankrupt. Since their firms have dissolved, their posts have disappeared, so there is no possibility of holding onto ties with the plant (thus, they too, but for a different reason from the last group, cannot be counted or treated as *xiagang*). If their firms have contributed to the unemployment insurance fund in their locality, they may be given some insurance. But all the "unemployed," even those properly registered, are

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78 If a collective is attached to a major state firm, such as the Wuhan Iron and Steel Company, it may be treated the same way as the state firm (interview, September 1, 1999). According to Song Xiaowu, op. cit., 14, unemployment insurance only covers the urban state workers and some collective-sector workers [emphasis added]. Both Laodong he baozhang xinxi zhongxin, op. cit., 18-19 and Zeng Linghua, "Zaijiuye gongzuo ying yu jiuzheng de jige buliang qingxiang" [Several bad situations that reemployment work should rectify], LDNC 7 (1998), 30 write of the serious difficulties of those in collective enterprises.

79 Social security is generally limited to those from state firms and collectives. According to Li and Xie, op. cit., 46, only 10 percent of social security goes to those working in private firms, in town and village enterprises and as individual entrepreneurs. Another source notes that individual operators, those who did not have a stable job the year before and the longterm unemployed cannot receive unemployment insurance; in 1994, only 14 percent of the registered unemployed and those pushed out because their firms were uncompetitive combined (a total of about 13 million people) got relief, in an amount averaging just 333 yuan per year. See Guo Qingsong, op. cit., 50.

80 Even here there are questions. According to Song Xiaowu, op. cit., 14, only 22 percent of the registered unemployed, at
always slighted in favor of the "laid-off," an outcome that reflects the state's continuing superior treatment of the more successful firms, and its abandonment of the less valuable ones. Apparently only less than one third of those called "unemployed" collect unemployment insurance, for whatever reason.  

Fifth are the personnel from the poorer collectives, the "hidden unemployed," and the laid-off from "double-stop" firms (those that have stopped production and stopped issuing wages). These are the people who belong to factories not permitted to go bankrupt—as noted above, many firms which in actuality have gone bankrupt are not officially recognized as having done so. For that would be too costly, as it would imply that their workers were eligible for unemployment insurance. Thus, though the former workers of such plants have no work to do, the firms still stand, at least in name, and so the employees cannot apply for unemployment insurance. Those without work who have not registered as unemployed are also in this category. But at least all these people have urban registration; most also still were residing in low-cost housing once granted by their firms, as of September 2000.

Urban citizens whose plight is miserable enough to qualify for "especially difficult" status [tekun] are on the sixth layer. These people are part of households where both spouses have been let go, or where illness most, get unemployment relief. This is presumably because their former firms have not contributed to the till.

81 Li Peilin, "Zouchu," 12.

82 One of my informants was from a collective firm and confirmed that, as a collective, her firm could not declare bankruptcy (interview, August 28, 1999). The implication is that the government cannot afford to offer unemployment insurance all around so this procedure relieves it of that responsibility for the workers of collectives.

83 For a definition of this term, see Lei Peng, "Zhigong peixun yu jiuye cuzin—chengshi fupin de zongyao" [Staff and workers' training and the promotion of reemployment—the important path in subsidizing urban poverty] Laodong neican [Labor internal reference] (hereafter LDNC) 11 (1998), 30.
or infirmity prevents one or more adults from engaging in labor and where, consequently, the family's total income fails to meet the city's minimum living standard. Such households in Wuhan were entitled to 150 yuan per month as of late 1999, distributed by the city civil affairs bureau, though in Wuhan allegedly only 10 to 20 percent actually went to collect it.84 This could be because they are ashamed to admit their need for the hand-out, because they are unaware of the policy, or because there was no unit remaining that could report their status to the local civil affairs office.85 But in any event, despite the proclaimed intentions of the regime, surely even among those who do get some funds from the state under this program, many do not find their most critical needs served.86

And seventh and last of all are temporary workers and the peasantry from outside the city bent on eking out a livelihood against the odds in a time of enhanced hostility to outsiders. As one informant remarked, laughing at my question about whether his wife were xiagang, "She's a peasant. Nobody manages them. They just come and go."87 Whatever they achieve is the result entirely of their own efforts in the face of prejudice and discrimination. If they wish to avail themselves of a city-managed labor market they must pay a fee, in distinction to the city laid-off and unemployed.88 They are effectively ineligible for pensions, social security, unemployment insurance, and usually any medical or housing benefits at all.

84 Interview with official, September 12, 1999.


86 One tekun [especially difficult] laid-off worker from a state-owned asbestos plant was too ill to do any labor and was supposed to receive bingtui [retirement money for illness]. But, inexplicably, the social security office suddenly eliminated this benefit without notice. Interview, August 28, 1999.

87 Cab driver, September 12, 1999.

Though presumably devised to cushion the impact of the loss of work, these numerous and imprecise categories, obviously, seriously compromise the analyst's ability to compute correctly the scale of people without work, or to apprehend the appropriate treatment a given individual ought officially to be receiving. For the government, these categories serve a definite function: by significantly complicating any effort to achieve a true measure of the numbers affected by the mass discharge campaign, the government absolves itself of the responsibility of caring for them all. For the recipients, the hodgepodge of terminology seems to justify somewhat that their respective treatment has a rationale. And, perhaps intentionally and perhaps inadvertently, by splitting up the workers severed from their posts into a myriad of situations, each with its own label, the regime may be able to rely on this range of terms to repress any unified mobilization.\footnote{Thanks to Thomas Bernstein for this idea.}

But for all the reasons I have adduced above--inconsistent state statistics; flexible, disaggregating definitions; and multi-layering of the laid-off and jobless--I prefer to remain an agnostic. Unlike other careful researchers who have bravely ventured to calculate or estimate figures for the furloughed, I close by insisting that one must look askance at all statistics about the unemployed or the redundant in post-socialist China, for these numbers are truly unfathomable.

Notes