"China's Floating Population: Implications for State and Society"

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Chapter Ten
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Introduction
The persistent penetration of market forces into once-socialist China since the early eighties, as replacement for the domination of the state plan
in dictating economic activity—and the attendant shift toward relatively freer and freer flows of the factors of production—has brought in its wake a set of new juxtapositions. First, the collapse of old oppositions and the obliteration of once-rigid boundaries; and second, a collision between elemental institutions. The juxtapositions are regional, sectoral, and occupational. In each case, categories that were forced to be separate since the Communists reorganized Chinese society in the fifties have been (as they always had been before 1949)1 thrust into contact, while social categories that were clearly drawn have become blurred, as brand new collectivities, such as the "floating population," have come into being, producing a major social change.

At the same time, the economic institution of the market has challenged the hitherto seemingly unshakeable political institution of urban citizenship, determined for decades by the city hukou. With its weakening, a repositioning of the state, and of the extent of its authority, is taking place. This potentially major political consequence is especially apparent in the confrontation between the agents (and agencies) of the state, on the one hand, and the urban-dwelling, unlicensed migrant laborers, the "floating population," on the other.

To understand the nature and magnitude of these rearrangements and this confrontation, I begin by presenting some key features of the pre-reform period. I then spell out the nature of the changes—in policy and in practice—of the last dozen years or so, as the floaters have participated in, been affected by, and contributed to them. Next I show how the relationship of the transients both to markets and to the state, has gradually mutated over time.

I conclude that the outcome for the foreseeable future is a hollowing out of the state and a narrowing down of its authority in regard to the migrants, as it cast them outside its embrace despite permitting them to move into its municipal sanctum. The emergence of parallel, largely non-intersecting realms
of dailiness within the city--sojourners in one realm and the state, its officers, and its beneficiaries in another, even as they share the same space--has already begun to unfold.\textsuperscript{2}

Boundaries and Oppositions

The Pre-Reform Period

Once the state had conquered the capitalist class and confiscated its property and resources by the mid-1950's, state officials possessed the wherewithal to direct the allocation of productive factors, cancelling the operation of market forces for the most part. Soon upon that victory, the regime was able to sequester the various segments of the populace into one of two sorts of locations, either a city or a spot in the countryside, and conferred a corresponding label, a kind of graded citizenship, upon the residents of each. By late 1955, everyone in China had either an urban or a rural hukou (household registration).\textsuperscript{3}

At various junctures in the first Communist decade, vigilant associations--neighborhood committees and \textit{danwei} in urban areas, communes in the countryside--nailed these assignments into place, making any hopes of their members' departure from their homeplaces nearly futile. The famine of the late 1950's--which brought home to the leadership the absolute priority of keeping tight control over grain supplies, especially for urbanites--climaxed and clinched the division of the populace into two huge groups, indelibly delineating people's places within either "urban" or "rural" areas of the map.\textsuperscript{4} Thus, by the early sixties, people were definitively pinned into position, as the walls around the city thickened and hardened,\textsuperscript{5} and "peasant" and "urbanite" became unbridgeable classifications. Regardless of the actual content of one's labor, only those in cities could be called "workers"; all those in the rural areas, whatever their real line of occupation, were stamped "peasants."
As for the regions of the country, during the fifties as the capabilities for planning were collected into bureaucrats' hands, the leadership established what one scholar labelled a "circular resource allocation system." This system worked in terms of oppositions, as it masterfully redistributed the profits of the more productive coastal areas, especially Shanghai, to the more backward but resource-rich provinces of the interior, and from the places where light industry had higher returns to the locales where heavy industry was stronger, supplying the coast with raw materials in turn. This combining of contradictory parts was a highly interdependent, integrated arrangement that guided the movement of materials, funds, and personnel by administrative fiat for the purposes of the state.

Even the migration of ordinary people had to fit into this plan and be sanctioned by its executioners. Indeed, formal, officially recognized geographical mobility, in the sense of changing one's address, in the sixties and seventies generally occurred only administratively, just in accord with the aims of the state. And east and west China, or "coastal" and "hinterland/interior" China, though interlocked into a synchronized mechanism, became dichotomous and wholly distinct.

By means of these various segregations, seemingly fixed in stone until the eve of the initiation of economic reform, the state thus succeeded within less than a decade in fashioning a series of starkly structured oppositions, which helped make the nation it ruled generally manageable and marketless. Consequently, the state was able to anchor its legitimacy in its own ability (without the aid of a market) to provision or subsidize the residents of the urban sector. It also rested its authority (with the exception of the period at the height of the Cultural Revolution) in its capacity to control (or relatively rapidly bring under control) the behavior of urbanites, while barring uninvited outsiders from trespassing. The state's clout in the cities in the pre-reform period was firm, ultimately uncontested, and simplistic.
The Reform Era: The Collapse of Oppositions and the Obliteration of Boundaries

The Policies. With the opening of markets after 1978 the segregations began to break down, as some rural residents made their way into town. But it took until April 1983, with rural reform attained nationwide, for central politicians to begin to relent on the policy on migration. The State Council's "Regulations Concerning Cooperative Endeavors of City and Town Laborers" was the first to permit rural residents to move into market towns, albeit without shedding their rural registrations. Once there, unlike the towns' "proper residents," they would have to rely not on the state's grain rations but on food they had brought in themselves.

A more lenient ruling appeared at the end of the next year. At this point, the state offered peasants a chance to obtain a new kind of nonagricultural registration. According to this 1984 circular, this opportunity came as a result of "urgent demand" from the growing numbers of peasants who by that time were "streaming into the market towns." Like all the later decisions of the regime on this topic, this one was probably more a recognition of a fait accompli than it was a license for a sudden change in peasants' behavior.

This decision, a "State Council Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns and Settling" of October 1984, however, had its limitations. First, it was specifically aimed at those who could raise their own funds, take care of their own grain, and find a place of abode in the market towns. It was also narrowly targeted just at those who had the ability to run a business or who had served in rural enterprises. And it specifically excluded peasants from moving into county seats.

In July 1985 a new document, the "Provisional Regulations on the Management of Population Living Temporarily in the Cities," represented an effort by the Ministry of Public Security to ensure its control over the
floating population and to increase its data on it. Perhaps this measure's greatest significance lay in its implicit recognition that the coming of peasants to towns was now a fact of life, and, thereby, tacitly legitimized the indefinite presence of peasants in cities of all sizes. It created a category of peasants whose work would keep them in town for more than three months and gave them their own special certificate, labelled the "card for residents living with others" [jizhu zheng].

In 1986, it became legal to sell grain at negotiated prices to peasants at work in the cities; this did much to facilitate longer stays. Thus, by the middle of the decade, the state had acquiesced in the right of ruralites to make at least a temporary home in the cities. It took no responsibility, however, for their material or physical well-being. Another big change was the citizen identification card, which the government introduced in the mid-1980's in addition to--and to strengthen--its control over household registration; it became mandatory for everyone over 16 years of age on September 15, 1989.

In 1988 the State Council and the Ministry of Labor put still another stamp of approval on the outflow from the countryside, this time with a recommendation that provinces with impoverished populations "export" their labor. As with the earlier reform announcements, this one too was very probably the legitimization of practices already underway. Though spurred along by the market in advance of action by the state, the official permission surely gave further impetus to the practice.

In 1989 and again in 1991, the State Council issued rulings on the management of temporary labor in state enterprises, which, in contrast to similar measures of the 1950's, allowed managers to sign contracts directly with the worker him/herself, and only afterwards report this to the local labor department for approval. Certainly the authorization to hire peasants one by one (instead of in groups from communes) enhanced the likelihood that these rural workers would leave home, once again something that had already
been occurring on a sizable scale by that time. In less than a decade, from 1978 to 1987, more than 10 million rural residents got urban jobs following legal procedures. The numbers who did so without reporting their employment is unquestionably far, far higher.

The direction of policy evolution was obviously toward greater and greater liberalization over the first decade after reforms began. This process was also one in which the leadership simply accepted developments that were the product of other decisions, paired with its inability to brake the effects of market forces which those decisions had set into motion. It spelled a shrinking, and, it appears, a progressively overwhelmed state. Yet despite the increasingly lenient policies, state leaders retained their urge to monitor and regulate the migration, and, by keeping peasants temporary residents, to ensure that this mobility would be cheap and fiscally advantageous. Thus, in the design of those determining their status, the peasants in the cities were to be maintained as floaters, as impermanent outsiders for whom the state was not responsible, in order to serve the state's own fiscal and modernization needs.

The Byproduct of Other Policies. Certainly the state's explicit sanction for sojourning propelled many peasants to desert the soil. But their migrations were also a byproduct of practically all of the other policies that made up the general program of economic reform—the termination of the communes in the countryside, the pro-coastal developmental strategy, profit-consciousness in urban firms, and the creation of urban labor markets. All of these various moves upset the totality of the state's power over what now were newly and quite suddenly grossly expanded urban populations: Over the course of a decade, the average proportion of peasants in the largest cities shot up from 12.6 percent in 1984 to 22.5 percent in 1987 and to 25.4 percent in 1994. As their numbers multiplied, "floaters" chipped away at the oppositions,
segregations, and heretofore inexorable perimeters keeping peasants as a group apart.

Each of these related economic reform policies had at least one of two effects, both of which were crucial for enticing peasants to live and work in urban areas. First of all, several of these measures provided channels for obtaining the necessities of daily existence outside the state's monopoly: by legitimizing markets for necessities, the various reforms made feasible the livelihood of farmers in the cities, even if that had not been their initial intention. And secondly, these policies engendered an urgent hunger for low-paid and flexible labor which the peasants were particularly well placed to provide.

For instance, new financial arrangements after 1980 allowed local governments to retain a portion of the revenues from tax receipts; and enterprises were allowed more leeway, including the right to keep some of their own profits, along with less supervision over their hiring practices. These various incentives propelled a feverish construction drive that cried out for extra labor. Judith Banister calculated that between 1978 and 1988 nonagricultural employment increased at more than six percent a year. Capital construction alone rose in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai 2.3-fold, but the urban-based labor forces in those cities went up from 16.65 million to only 18.2 million, a growth of just nine percent between 1981 and 1988. Obviously, outside workers would have had to make up the difference.

It was not just that jobs increased in the cities; other factors were also at work. After 1978, the Ministry of Labor relaxed the former recruitment system, whereby young people were forced to wait for job assignments from their local labor bureaus. With the reforms inviting foreign investors into the country, city youths found new employment opportunities on their own in classy occupations such as tourism and foreign trade and therefore rejected careers in the traditional trades, such as textiles, machinery, silk manufacture and building materials. As one source
decried, "City people would rather do nothing than this" (referring to such arduous jobs as drilling waterways or repairing roads and bridges). This attitude, of course, created openings for the peasant workers.

The termination in 1979 of the Cultural Revolution-era policy of sending city youths to the countryside meant that rusticated young people started returning home. That summer, economic advisor Xue Muqiao proposed permitting young people to set up their own privately-funded and operated enterprises to remove from the shoulders of the state the strain of creating jobs for them all. The Party Central Committee's assent to urban outside-the-plan employment in summer 1980 laid a foundation for private enterprise that peasants soon built upon as well.

Contributing to this same outcome was a sharp reversal in official attitudes toward commerce. By the early eighties produce marketing and the service sector in general in the cities were decimated after twenty-five years of denigration and banning. But once legitimacy was lent the realm of circulation and competition after 1978, for the first time in decades big cities got a chance to satisfy their gaping demands for fresh food as well as for services of all sorts.

Moreover, once having launched the floaters on their move, the state's investment decisions did much to influence the direction of their flow. In very large part, the phenomenon of floating has involved a transfer of excess rural labor from the more backward provinces of the interior eastward to the coast. This surge derived directly from state policies of 1980 and later which privileged the seaside, where the potential for rapid wealth generation seemed greatest. This they did by offering preferential treatment to foreign (especially compatriot Hong Kong and Taiwanese) financiers in that region alone.

All these switches in programs that came with the post-Mao leadership's validation of markets as the engine of growth had payoffs for peasants whose labor could now bring much better returns off the farm. Their cumulative
effect was to intermingle categories that had been pried apart and kept isolated under the prior, pre-reform regime. Now urban and previously-rural folk freely walked the same streets, ate food from the same markets, and shared the same city facilities and structures; people (still) called "peasants" labored on urban construction projects and toiled in municipal plants. Though income differences, even among the peasantry itself, showed wide and growing gaps between regions as of the mid-1990's, at least now there was a chance for an inlander with the means to travel and adequate information to journey eastward voluntarily, enter the coast and work there.

What we see, then, with the unfettering of market forces, and in the consequent creation of the floating population in the cities, is a melding of the contradictions and an evisceration of the borderlines among opposed categories that had helped to undergird the domination of the Maoist regime.

Institutional Collision

The economic reforms did more than destruct long-standing divisions. They also caused a collision between two forms of institutions. That is, the new economic institution of the market that let farmers, entirely on their own, flood from the fields, clashed with the old statist, political institution of urban citizenship (privileges, prerogatives, and public goods just for those born in the city to city-born parents), as structured for decades by the hukou. The migrants are poised at the intersection of these two institutions, just where they collide: markets, in bringing ruralites to the urban areas, thereby undermined the former exclusivity of urban residence. So without any political pressuring, but just by subsisting in the city peasants pushed for a shattering of urban citizenhood as it was understood in China for nearly half a century. We can chart a significant transformation over time in the relationship of migrants to urban labor markets, as well as one in their stance with respect to the state. Below we treat first the one, then the other of these alterations.
Migrants and Labor Markets

As of the start of the reform period, peasants' principal entree into the city was via contracts between their rural units and urban state enterprises. Sometimes this meant their serving as supplemental or seasonal labor in state factories; other times it entailed digging on subcontracted building projects. As the impetus for "modernization" swelled, by the middle of the eighties, rural builders and excavaters hired by state construction firms nationally had already amounted to nearly a third of the permanent construction workforce.

Rural migrant laborers continued to take on contracted work in state industrial firms in the cities as well, in increasing, if difficult to document, numbers as time went on. An official report noted that 12.8 million of 107.4 million total workers, or 11.9 percent of the payroll, were holding temporary jobs in state industries as of the start of 1993. Regional variation complicated the picture, but one 1994 study of peasants working in cities in Henan found that a full 30 percent of them there were employed in state-owned firms in that province. The types of work sites in urban settings and the avenues for arriving at them quickly expanded beyond state channels. Well before the eighties had come to a close a wide array of urban opportunities for finding odd jobs had appeared, wholly separate from any form of official employment. These included marketing and services; cottage-style garment processing; manufacturing in foreign and other non-state factories; nursemaiding in private homes (baomu); and begging and scrap-collecting.

Landing a spot in most of these trades usually involved no contracts or ties with the state at all. Instead, most peasants acquired their positions either through their personal connections (by far the more common method) or else on anonymous "spontaneous" labor exchanges held out in the open in city streets and squares. It wasn't long before even construction labor for a state-owned firm might be arranged through a series of deals whereby work
teams successively further and further away from any licit transaction obtained "subcontracts" by bribing.\textsuperscript{40} Once country folk were commonly encountered in the cities, a myriad of labor markets developed and supplemented, even overwhelmed, the official one and its cadres in placing peasants in work posts.

The Range of Occupational Options Outside the State. To begin with, the numbers of former farmers supplying eatables, small consumer goods, and petty services on city sidewalks grew rapidly. As just one sign of this, by early 1993, an official source reported that of all the workers at the 140,000-odd stalls and booths operated by Beijing City's self-employed individuals, more than 70 percent were nonlocals.\textsuperscript{41} More than 90 percent of them had relied on such informal modes as getting help from relatives or friends, or just coming to the gate of the employer in seeking their jobs.\textsuperscript{42} Others, especially those from the south and the coast, traveled on their own to northerly regions where crafts and services were scarce, and either set up their stands, solicited jobs as they strolled through the streets, or appeared at "spontaneous" labor markets, offering their artifacts or their knack at repair. Yet others settled down in strange locations, organizing themselves into native-place clusters.

In the carpentry trade, which flourished in the mid-1980's, incessant streams of tradespeople had led to the supply of them outpacing demand by the late 1980's.\textsuperscript{43} As a result, many people from Zhejiang who had earlier landed in Lanzhou, for instance, found that they could no longer go on there, and departed for Ningxia and Inner Mongolia.\textsuperscript{44} The case suggests the vitality of this particular labor market. Cobbblers, who mostly come from Zhejiang and congregated together, operated under yet another sort of labor regime. In Tianjin, allegedly 10,000 of them were making their homes in rented rooms around the north train station in the early 1990's.\textsuperscript{45}
A different kind of life and workstyle belonged to the sweatshop stitchers from the south, sojourning away from home. Large concentrations populated Beijing and Tianjin, where they lived and worked in "Zhejiang Tailor Villages," which began to take form by 1983. They grew so rapidly that by 1987, over one third of the legally licensed proprietors in the Beijing garment industry were ruralites, mainly from Jiangsu and Zhejiang and Anhui, while as many as 90 percent of the employees were peasants from Zhejiang. Already by the late 1980's, these outsider tailors had begun to take over the trade.

In their urban "villages" (as in Beijing's Fengtai district's Dahongmen township), a coordinated division of labor prevailed, perfected by the late 1980's, totally disconnected with state commercial channels. Wenzhou natives obtained their cloth from their Zhejiang villages, and then produced, retailed, wholesaled, and transported the products exclusively through networks of fellow townspeople. Simple partnerships, graduating into large-scale mutually interdependent partnerships, undergirded the businesses. Not just hiring but even credit relationships were sometimes based upon blood and geographical ties.

Recruitment of peasant temporary labor into the non-state-and-foreign sector also involved personal ties, sometimes accompanied by bureaucratism. As a general statement, according to journalists writing from Guangzhou, "In enterprises in the Pearl River Delta, processing firms and town and village enterprises hire mostly from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan, and they mainly go through friends and relatives in doing so." Two Chinese journalists offer a graphic account of rural hiring by one of these non-state firms:

Last year, the director of the labor bureau in Guizhou's Bijie county went to Dongguan twice to try to arrange for the export of his county's surplus labor...Bijie is in the mountains, cursed with little land and many people...Its labor surplus is monumental...In 1987, Guangdong and
Guizhou agreed that Guangdong would accept surplus labor from Guizhou in the form of "using labor recruitment to support poverty."...When the news spread that Dongguan would be hiring...many household heads, facing fierce competition, sent gifts. The county labor bureau, as if recruiting formal labor, let individuals apply, so the household head or a town or village presented certificates, and then the girls went through examinations and formal procedures. But when the recruiter made his selection...the urban girls' cultural level was higher...plus they mostly had connections and a patron, so Bijie had to favor them. So the majority chosen were the urban girls.\textsuperscript{55} [Emphasis added]

In the case of the nursemaid \textit{[baomu]} trade, we find two channels of recruitment outside the official one, each with its own rules and practices. The first one formed from the informal interactions of maids who were already employed. Since most in a particular city came from the same home area, casual associations grew up naturally among them. In a number of cities, \textit{baomu} associations had taken shape by the early 1990's, organized as loose networks based on hometown origin, which spread information on wage levels and job opportunities.\textsuperscript{56}

The other channel--also outside the state--was structured by the spontaneous labor markets that became common in Chinese cities in the reform period. Although quite risky, and unlikely to yield positions that afforded decent treatment, this was the channel offering jobs where earnings might be the highest.\textsuperscript{57} It was in these markets that women could be preyed upon by "illegal elements," be raped, robbed, abducted, cheated, or, at a minimum, be forced into unsavory employment situations.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, journalistic writers portray beggar bands and "garbage kingdoms" as much more tightly regulated (but certainly not by the state) than one encountering individual vagabonds on the street might imagine. The pictures refer to turf, gang warfare among competing regionally-based bands (and between local and outsider beggars), and chieftains who live in glory.
Their bosses lorded it over frequently shifting and rank-ordered underlings, who had to placate them with booty; scavengers from outside the band were forced to ingratiate themselves with gifts.⁵⁹

A survey of the city's beggars in 1994, undertaken by an independent pollster in Beijing working with Horizon Market Research, revealed that nearly a third were members of such tightly organized cartels.⁶⁰ But not all the beggars and trash collectors were cozily knitted into cliques; there were also many who were isolated and anomic, passing their days at the constant mercy of marauding official functionaries.⁶¹

This description of various lines of work uncovers a rich and vibrant realm of markets that floaters themselves fashioned, once freed from the commune and the contracts with state units that commune cadres once had arranged for them. Thus, not only did migrant laborers from the countryside quickly embrace means of finding work in the city once this possibility was presented to them; they also devised markets fully separated from the state's surveillance and managed them among themselves, completely by their own dictates. Their mastery of this process is just one sign of the growing incapacity of the state to encompass—or even to regulate—the activities of its entire urban populace.

Migrants and The State: New Forms of "Citizenship"

In one definition, offered by Bryan S. Turner, citizenship has two critical components: it is possessed by those who have authoritatively been determined: a) to belong to the community, and b) to have rights to a share in the public distribution of its goods.⁶² Put otherwise, the concept of citizenship is about the rights and privileges of "members," who are, most fundamentally, simply those legally living within specifically designated borders.⁶³ According to this characterization, because floaters from the countryside who have taken up residence in cities lack the urban hukou, they are certainly not citizens there, and are by no means treated as such.
This deprivation is evident when we consider the total official ineligibility of peasant migrants for any medical, housing, educational, welfare, or services of any sort in the cities up through the first half of the 1990's. This stark picture was only softened if a migrant was willing—and able—to extend payments of variable amounts, the sum depending on the city in question and the level of assistance or service desired, or if s/he curried favor and cultivated connections with cadres in charge of dispensing these benefits. The contrast with the treatment of "proper" city dwellers who had urban household registration was especially sharp given the continuing minimal cost of these benefits for them. For, despite a decade and a half of economic reforms, these rights for the most part remained practically equivalent to entitlements for urbanites.

I go on to review what the transients did in the face of the state's denial to them of these services. Many of their solutions and substitutions harked back to the miserable lives of China's urban underclass, also ignored by the state, in the first half of the twentieth century.\footnote{64}

Housing. The relevant rulings were particularly strict in the case of housing: only short-term, registered sojourning with relatives or in hotels, rentals arranged by contracted agreements with landlords, or work-unit-provided beds were legal. Regulations forbade outsiders not just from building or buying houses (unless one was an Overseas Chinese), but even from occupying land.\footnote{65} But the practical severity of these regulations lessened as transgressions against them increased with time. By the end of 1993, some outsiders were "buying or building houses in Beijing and acquiring properties in the hopes of settling down and striking root in the city."\footnote{66}

This was true in the famous "Zhejiang Village" in Fengtai district of Beijing, temporary home of some one hundred thousand outsiders as of late 1995 (about half of them from Zhejiang),\footnote{67} where peasants took to buying old, broken-down dwellings for use as combined living and working quarters. In 1992, the local
authorities (illegally, since without higher-level consent) in this region actually permitted wealthier, share-pooling residents to construct some 40 buildings in large courtyards on village land and even signed leases with them.\textsuperscript{68} In Guangzhou and Shenzhen as well in the early 1990's the practice of throwing up structures and shantytowns had taken root, but an observer categorized this behavior as "illicit."\textsuperscript{69}

Besides the bar against building, the massive proportion of floorspace owned by either urban governments or work units was off-limits even for rental by outside peasants.\textsuperscript{70} But these rules too were undergoing change by 1991.\textsuperscript{71} So even if Chinese stipulations on the books, left over from the time of the planned economy and the walled-up privileged city, were most inhospitable, the creeping progression of market relations, with which the migrants joined forces, tended to obliterate their impact.

Alongside this informal rewriting of laws on the books, sojourning peasants also opened up a range of novel housing options offered by Chinese cities in the reform era (usually not following legal procedures), most of them linked to the sprouting of new kinds of urban jobs. By the end of 1995, in Shanghai, a survey of 4,714 employed persons found that almost half were renting accommodations, one quarter were in dormitories, and one fifth in shelters on worksites.\textsuperscript{72} As in pre-1949 days, for many work routine and rest shared the same paltry space.\textsuperscript{73}

There were others, however, who were less fortunate. These were the jobless people, those whose work did not afford some form of shelter, or those who lacked the money to rent a room or a bed. By the mid-nineties, their numbers had multiplied in the cities. They holed up in hidden back streets, in tunnels, under trucks and buses in parking lots, in the waiting areas of railway stations, and under bridges. For instance, Cheng Li reports on shacks of just 300 square meters in Beijing holding more than 500 people, or offering just one toilet for over 6,000 people.\textsuperscript{74} When sheltered at all, this marginal, undomiciled group made do with the rudest of adaptations of scrap
metal, cardboard, and wood.75 But one way or another, alternatives to the state's designs had been devised.

Health Care. Since state funding for public health facilities, medications, and personnel was pegged to a planned level based on the official urban populace per city, it appeared to local bureaucrats to be out of the question to arrange for health care for unattached newcomers from the outside. Even as responsible authorities decried the implications for the settled population of ignoring the epidemics and contagious diseases carried in by the migrants, they were too strapped for resources to do anything much about it.76

Consequently, migrants had to find other options. Into the early 1990's, chances for at least some modicum of health care were by far the best if a floater were able to land a position in a successful state-owned firm. Such individuals could qualify for basic attention, at any rate, even if the level of care varied with local regulations, the financial standing of the firm, and management decisions.77

But those ensconced in a thriving migrant enclave where entrepreneurial ventures had been undertaken became members not just of residential, but also of collective occupational communities, sharing many traits with what are termed "ethnic enclaves" elsewhere.78 Those who lived in the urban "village" of the Zhejiang people in Beijing, for instance, had created their own clinics and hospitals by the mid-1990's, where treatment was provided by fellow Zhejiangese, all holding medical licenses from home.79 Rumor held that most without collectivities of any kind (whether public or private) surrounding them were forced to try their luck with untrained traveling "doctors" who floated among migrant communities and treated maladies, such as venereal disease, believed to be common to this segment of humanity.80

Education. Reinhard Bendix targeted "the right and duty to receive an elementary education" as "perhaps the most universally approximated
implementation of national citizenship," since it is a benefit over which the
government itself has authority and it is an obligation which all parents with
children in a certain age group are required by law to fulfil. Indeed, China's "Law on Compulsory Education" stipulates that all children aged seven
to fifteen must enroll and receive education for nine years. For these
reasons, the quite uneven availability of basic schooling—more often absent
than present—for the floating folk from the country underlines their lack of
valid membership in the official urban community. In Beijing, for instance,
where 100 percent of native five to 12-year-old children were enrolled in
schools in 1995, only 40 percent of migrant ones were.

For in formerly-planned-economy China, despite the press of market
relations, educational funding, like that for health care, was allocated
officially at the local level just for licensed city residents up through the
mid-1990's, leaving behind—at least legally—the two-three million school-
age children of the floating population (as of mid-1995). As late as 1996,
there was no national policy or any regulations on educating the offspring of
the floating population. A few local governments had set up unstable,
unaccredited make-shift schools, whose quality varied greatly—hardly a case,
even, of "separate but equal"—but the central government had provided no
funding for the migrants. In the words of a cadre in the Beijing Municipal
Bureau of Education:

Beijing is very short on money for education. Looking after the present
1.5 million middle and primary school students in the city already
strains resources, and there are 300,000 school-age children among the
migrant population. Middle and primary schools in the city have already
taken in more than 30,000 migrant children. Though the parents of some
have paid, the amount of money paid is far from enough to educate these
students...formerly these [children] were the responsibility of the
receiving area, but nowadays Beijing can't possibly solve the education
problems of 300,000 migrant children.
Since the offspring of the floating population had domiciles that were registered in the countryside, city officials had no sense of legal obligation to teach them in the cities. Therefore, because they were without a local residency permit, migrant children found that schooling was legally unavailable for them up through the mid-1990's. 87

Furthermore, even the urban immigrants who lived in clusters were technically forbidden to establish their own schools beyond the level of day care centers and kindergartens through 1996. 88 But in two districts of Guangzhou migrants did cobble together some 40 "shack schools"—though they were soon ordered shut down by the local authorities. 89 In defiance of local regulations, in 1992 the newly established large courtyards in the Zhejiang Village set up educational facilities of their own. 90 A nursery was run by junior high school graduates in the Village, and staffed by hometown teachers, despite that it was not even permitted to register. 91

Services. Transients huddled in the midst of the city, or taken care of by work units or landlords, could partake of at least some of the basic amenities of city life—water, sewerage, transportation, electricity, though certainly not in comfortable quantities. But those on the outskirts, as in Zhejiang Village, depended entirely on their own resources. As such inhabitants built up a life of their own, their need for outside assistance steadily decreased. 92 Instead of waiting vainly for the Beijing authorities to service them, migrant entrepreneurs in the village had established some fairly complex undertakings by 1993: daily buses to and from the home counties, rudimentary toilets, and long-distance phone lines. And in the large courtyards constructed in 1992, even water, electrical, sewerage, postal, educational, and recreational facilities appeared. 93

"Villages". The foregoing survey of services demonstrates that, by the early 1990's, in a corner of Beijing, as well as in scattered other sites elsewhere,
well-organized sojourning peasants with skills and means had substituted communities of their own for the one from which they were barred. The very existence of what were called co-provincial "villages" openly challenged the state's wonted capacity to overwhelm--indeed, to prohibit--the formation of groups outside its aegis.

Here in the midst of the once tightly regimented urban areas, places where officialdom had for decades prided itself on its ability to contain and suppress incipient non-state organizations, burgeoned an array of what amounted to nascent, ascriptive and corporate associations. For, unlike its stance toward the other folk who populate the cities, the state did not--indeed could not--fit floating and often very transient migrants into the neighborhood associations that customarily had structured and kept up a steady oversight over the "proper" urban residents' domestic existences. Nor were the itinerants, for the most part, members of the workplace danwei that directed daily behavior at the office or the plant. 94 Thus, not only were no city services supplied to their areas of congregation; neither were there any official associations there that could absorb and direct their energies or see to their social needs.

Though the agencies of the state periodically essayed to obliterate these settlements, they never did so with lasting success. 95 There was thus a great paradox that characterized floaters living in collectivities. They were at once constrained by the state's registration system, excluded from its privileges, and neglected by its service network. And yet at the same time, they were freed, if to a limited but growing extent, by falling altogether outside the pale of the state's organizations of administration and often beyond its watch. They were also empowered by their own growing numbers and their autonomous success in markets they themselves had made.

Thus, intentionally barred by the state's hukou prohibition from acquiring city citizenship and its trappings, including, of course (as was true of all Chinese citizens), the right or the means to press their needs
legally on urban and higher-level governments, those with the wherewithal to do so were forced to form alternate societies, nearly totally unconnected with the mainstream. As one researcher explained, "The population [in the Zhejiang Village] has no sense of belonging to Beijing society." Ninety-six percent of the respondents of a sample of 290 had not established any relations whatever with Beijing people as of 1992. Treated as foreigners, and seeing themselves that way too, some even felt they would benefit from setting up an ambassadorial organ to protect their interests!

Conclusion: The Impact of the Market Economy

In the transitional era, as the Chinese state was forsaking its socialist pattern, by the very act of sanctioning markets, its leadership was also involuntarily relinquishing its ability to mold society into rigid, contradictory categories. The result in this case was that markets, with their own modes of pulling around productive forces, worked to erase state-imposed oppositions between regions, sectors, and occupations. Markets also became available to outsiders venturing into settlements previously strictly delimited against them. Consequently, peasant sojourners collided against and proceeded to knock down the intangible but once terribly solid barricades around the cities that state fiat had erected against them.

By activating markets, the state was also forced to abandon its monopoly position as the only source of the trappings of urban citizenship, defined in terms of membership and a right to a share in a community's jointly-allocated goods. The upshot was that a multi-tiered social structure came into being, at least insofar as citizenship was concerned: one tier of urban residents, more or less embedded in the state, the extent of whose take from the state might be diminishing, but who still could generally count on a basic entitlement; another tier of floaters from the fields who were somehow bonded to the state, whether through contract or personal connections, who were second-class members; a third tier of sojourners who were part of well-
articulated communities of their own, and who derived their services and their unauthorized badge of belonging just from that enclave; and finally a range of stragglers bereft of any form of citizenship whatsoever.

What is most important for our purposes here is the solution devised by this third group, the most emblematic of whom were the urban "villagers" who inhabited the Zhejiang Village. For they were rewriting the rules of city life. In their daily praxis these "villagers" were forging an interim, alternative, non-authoritative, ersatz form of urbanhood for themselves, one that was materially (for most) poorer than that of state-paid temporary workers, but better than that of vagabonds.

As this new sort of non-state "citizenship" replaces that granted by the state, at least for these tens of thousands of people, it could also be said to be confronting the state, in demonstrating by its very existence the diminishing scope of the state's authoritative command over the lives of city dwellers. In time, this confrontation must be the seed from which some brand new style of citizenship--and citizens--are born, some so-far unseen sort of city community in post-1949 China.
Endnotes


2 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 8, 210, 213.

3 Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, China's Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 296-310; and Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou system," The China Quarterly, (hereafter CQ), no. 139, pp. 644-668 (September 1994). See also "Huji yanjiu" ketizu ["Household Registration Research" Task Force], "Xianxing huji guanli zhidu yu jingji tizhi gaige" [The

5 Kam Wing Chan, Cities With Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994).


10 The document, in Renmin ribao (People's Daily) September 8, 1985, p. 4, translated in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS), September 12, 1985, pp. K12-14, is discussed in Judith Banister and Jeffrey R. Taylor, "China: Surplus Labor and Migration," Asia-Pacific Population Journal vol. 4, no. 4, p. 14 (no year), and in "Huji yanjiu," p. 88. This new card was to be distinguished from the "temporary domicile card" [zhanzhu zheng], which was meant for anyone planning to stay at least three months for unstated reasons, not necessarily for work.

11 Taylor and Banister, p. 27. Even before this measure legalized such purchases, they were taking place: according to Tian Xueyuan, "Reform and Opening Gives the


"Huji yanjiu", 87 states that from 1978 to 1987, there are records of 10,165,000 such people, though there are no statistics for the years 1979 and 1981. This means that nationwide, an average of 1,270,000 peasants were hired legally in state firms per year. Also, Jeffrey R. Taylor, "Rural Employment Trends and the Legacy of Surplus labour, 1978-86," CQ, no. 116, p. 743 (December 1988).


Dutton introduction, in Zhang, "Basic Facts," p. 15; and Kirkby, p. 32.

Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The


25 See Hu Teh-wei and Elizabeth Hon-Ming Li, "Labor Market Reforms in China." Paper to be presented at the Center
for Chinese Studies, Spring Regional Seminar, University of California, Berkeley, April 11, 1992, p. 49.


Wang Feng and Zuo Xuejin, "Rural Migrants in Shanghai: Current Success and Future Promise," Paper prepared for presentation at International Conference on Rural Labor Migration in China, Beijing, June 25-27, 1996, p. 8 states that migrants in Shanghai in late 1995 were earning more than three times what they earned at home.

In 1985, the per capita income of the rural population was 497 in the east, 343 in the center, and 355 in the west; by 1990, it had changed to 812 in the east, 538 in the center, and only 497 yuan in the west (see Zhongguo tongxunshe, April 1, 1993, reprinted in *FBIS*, April 5, 1993, p. 42); at the end of 1994, the differences had widened even more: eastern ruralites were taking in 1,617 yuan per year, central China rural residents 1,087, and westerners only 856, on the average (see *Eastern Express*, March 25-26, p. 7, in *FBIS*, March 27, 1995, p. 3). See Yang Xiaoyong, "The Flow of Migrant Labor and the Development of China's Urban and Rural Economy," *RKYJJ*, no. 5, p. 27 (1995) for a slightly different index.


36 Chan, p. 131.


39 In two 1995 surveys, one in Dongguan, in the Pearl River Delta, and one in Jinan, an average of 81 percent of the respondents were informed of job opportunities before they migrated by relatives and friends (Xin Meng, "Regional Wage Gap, Information Flow and Rural-Urban Migration," presented at International Conference on the Flow of Rural Labor in China, Beijing, June 25-27, 1996, p. 20).


42 Shi, p. 38.


45 Street interviews, Tianjin, May 1992.


47 By way of comparison, in the catering trade, only 75 percent of the employees were outsiders; in other services, 60 percent, and in repairs, only 44 percent. Li Yu and Tang Bu, "Floating Population among the Beijing Urban Individual Proprietors," *Shehuixue yanjiu* (Sociology research), no. 2, pp. 21, 22 (1988). Li and Hu, p. 41 have the same figure of over 90 percent for employees, for 1989.

48 Li and Hu, p. 358.

49 Xiang Biao, "How to Create a Visible 'Non-State Space' Through Migration and Marketized Traditional Networks: An Account of a Migrant Community in China," presented at

50 Li and Hu, p. 358; interview, August 5, 1994.

51 Xiang, p. 16.

52 Min; interview, August 5, 1994. Xiang, p. 15 states that there were interest rates charged among relatives, but that they ran in the range of two to three percent.

53 The reference is to "sanlai yibu" firms. The "sanlai" or "three imports" are the materials, the patterns and the equipment; the "yibu" or "one compensation" stands for compensatory trade. This term is best simply translated as processing enterprises.


55 Ge and Qu, pp. 139-40. For a story on Bijie as a poverty prefecture, and as part of a special state program to help such places, see FBIS, June 26, 1996, p. 30.

57 A maid hired in a spontaneous market might land a salary as high as 200 yuan in that city's unofficial markets (interview, Tianjin Women's Federation, June 15, 1992).


61 Zeng, p. 25 says that, "Those not in a bang are excluded and get low incomes." See also Huang Ruide, "The Next Generation Among the Floaters," *NFC*, no. 9, p. 21 (1989) writes of a garbage father collecting junk with his 12-year-old son, who does this job in lieu of school.

62 Thus, he states, "the modern question of citizenship is structured by two issues": The first of these has to do with social membership, or, one might say, with the definition of community; the second concerns the allocation of resources, broadly conceived (Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship," in Bryan S. Turner, ed., *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: SAGE Publications, 1993), p. 2).


65 Interview, Tianjin Housing Bureau, June 19, 1992; and with Gu Shangfei, New York, February 14, 1994; and Xu Xue-qiang and Li Si-ming, "China's Open Door Policy and Urbanization in the Pearl River Delta Region," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, no. 1, p. 56 (1990), though they note exceptions in the towns of the Pearl River Delta.

66 JPRS-CAR-93-091, p. 53; Xu and Li.

67 Xiang, p. 4.

68 Xiang, pp. 16, 22, 34; Beja and Bonnin, "The Destruction," p. 22.


70 As of 1982, the state owned 82.3 percent of floorspace in cities nationwide (28.7 percent by city housing bureaus and 53.69 percent by enterprises or other work units). This is in Kirkby, p. 166. Yok-shiu F. Lee, "The Urban Housing Problem in China," *CQ*, no. 115, p. 397 (1988), puts a
date of 1981 on this data. In Tianjin in 1992, 60 percent of
the housing was city-owned and 32 percent unit-owned,
according to the Housing Bureau, interview, June 19, 1992.

71 Interview, Tianjin Housing Bureau, June 19, 1992.

72 Wang and Zuo, p. 9.

73 Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1946), p. 84; Hershatter, Chapter
Three.

74 Li Cheng, "Tidal Wave of Migrant Laborers in China,
Part II," Institute of Current World Affairs, CL-10 (1994),
pp. 12, 14; idem., "Under Neon Lights: Street People in
Shanghai," (CL-16) (Shanghai: Institute of Current World
Affairs, 1994), p. 3. See also Zhongguo xinwenshe [China News
Agency], March 15, 1995, in FBIS, March 16, 1995, p. 64 (4,000
to 5,000 were sleeping in Guangzhou's streets during the
Spring Festival that year).

75 Mobo C.F. Gao, "On the Sharp End of China's Economic
Boom--Migrant Workers," Human Rights in China (Spring 1994),
p. 13.

76 Liaowang no. 48, pp. 20-23 (1995), in FBIS, February
12, 1996, p. 23.
Zhao Minghua and Theo Nichols, "Management Control of Labour in State-Owned Enterprises: Cases from the Textile Industry," The China Journal, no. 36, pp. 1-21 (July 1996), throws even this option into question, as of the early and mid-nineties.


Interview, Gu Shangfei, New York, February 14, 1994; and JPRS-CAR-93-091 (December 29, 1993) from RKYJJ, no. 4, p. 45 (1993); Xiang, "How to Create," p. 16; Min, "A Village," p. 4; Yuan Yue et al., Luoren--Beijing liumin di zuzihua zhuangkuang yanjiu baogao [The exposed--a research report on the condition of the organization of migrants in Beijing] (Beijing: Beijing Horizon Market Research and Analysis Company, 1995), 16-18, 24.


In mid-1996, the State Education Commission decreed that most school-age children of migrants could attend local schools as "temporary students," in exchange for enrollment fees, a practice that had already been in use for some years anyway (Xinhua, June 6, 1996, in FBIS, same date, p. 22).

Ibid.

Zhao Yaqin, "Floating Population and Compulsory Education," Renmin jiaoyu (People's Education), no. 380, pp. 16-17 (June 1996), in FBIS, no. 159, 1996 (received on Internet, no page) Thanks to June Dreyer for sending me this article.


Dede Nickerson, "Migrant Workers Said 'Flocking' to Beijing," South China Morning Post, November 16, 1992, p. 10, in FBIS, November 16, 1992, p. 38. An official from the Tianjin Markets Section of the Industrial and Commercial Management Office of the city held that children were not
permitted to go to school without a hukou (interview, June 22, 1992).

88 The Zhejiang Village had established its first kindergarten as early as 1988 (Xiang, p. 16); by 1995, there was a nursery school and five kindergartens there (Min, "A Village," p. 4); interview with Gu Shangfei, New York, February 14, 1992. Wong states that temporary dwellers organized makeshift schools in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the early 1990's, but does not indicate whether these were kindergartens or at a higher level. In late 1997 Haidian District in Beijing approved the first migrant school in Beijing.


90 Xiang, How to Create, 34.

91 Yuan Yue et al., Luoren, 16.

92 Xiang, How to Create

93 Ming Lei, The "Zhejiang Village" of Beijing that I Have Seen," ZM, 2, p. 25 (1994); Zhu, Suhong,"Chengshizhong di nongmin: dui Beijingshi zhanzhu nongcun renkou di yanjiu" [Peasants in the City: An Investigation of the Peasant

43

94 Though, according to recent research, even among city residents the power of the danwei was receding by the mid-1990's. See Lowell Dittmer and Lu Xiaobo, "Personal Politics in the Chinese Danwei Under Reform," AS, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 246-67 (March 1996).

95 In Guangzhou, city officials attempted on several occasions to wipe out "shack villages" (or what might be called shantytowns), beginning in 1989 (interview, Guangzhou Urban Automated Planning Center, May 11, 1992). In Beijing, the city government restricted people from Zhejiang to the outskirts of town; but could not prevent their construction of a huge and versatile community. Even the city government's effort to wipe out the Zhejiang Village in November 1995 (Beja and Bonnin, "The Destruction") was largely erased within a few months as the original residents gradually returned (information from Li Zhang).


99 Xiang, "How to Create" has a somewhat different, but very detailed and compelling, analysis with the same conclusion.