NGOs, Corporations and Security Transformation in Africa
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Transnational non-state actors interested in maintaining a presence in parts of the world where the state is weak are an important part of the privatization of security that has not been well analyzed. In this article I lay out propositions about how an increasing role for non-state actors in security may transform the conceptualization of security and the use of violence more generally. I argue that international NGOs and transnational corporations conceptualize security and how to achieve it differently than states have traditionally done and that these differences have potential consequences for which problems are addressed, as well as for whether and how violence is used in the communities where they operate. I describe how the efforts of non-state actors to treat issues of protection from loss as ‘apolitical’ have yielded a more inclusive and process-oriented conception of security that rests on the notion of a security triangle – quite different from the absolute divides, enmity and emergency powers associated with state-based security. Because of what they see as the limits to their legitimate claims and actions, non-state actors have tended to use the language of security differently in ways that also portend different behavior.

The way non-state actors have used security suggests potential for the idea of security itself to be transformed where non-state entities play a larger role. The privatization of security has not only diffused control over violence, then, it has simultaneously encouraged appeals to different principles – universal processes to resolve conflicts without the use of violence rather than notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This trend can be seen not only in the NGO community, but also (in the wake of NGO pressure) among some transnational corporations. How the different understandings, imperatives and limits of security planning translate into the local security experience of populations is an issue for further research. In the following pages I simply describe the difference and its roots.
Private security: securitization of new actors or reconceptualization of security?

The 1990s witnessed a debate on how to define security and its study. On one extreme were traditionalists who argued that security was a fixed concept intimately connected with states and their use of violence. On the other, arguments built on the assumption that security was a social construction and thus who is secured and from what depends on the social context. In different contexts security was said to entail economic opportunity, environmental preservation, access to healthcare and more. Many claimed that broadening the conception of security could inject new resources, energy and drive into important areas as well as potentially redraw relevant political boundaries.

In one extension and critique of the social construction of security, what has become known as the Copenhagen School took a position that drew from both sides of this debate. They argued that security was socially constructed, through speech acts. However, the processes of making something a security issue – what they termed ‘securitization’ – brought a fixed conception of security in contact with new issue areas. The concept of security, they claimed, ‘carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape’. Once ‘securitized’, an issue will evoke images of threat, enemies, and defense and allocate the state an important role in addressing it – thus the politics surrounding the issue will be transformed.

This argument agrees that security is not an objective condition but the outcome of social processes. The Copenhagen School sees the definition of security at a particular moment as the product of successful securitizing speech acts. As Ole Waever claims, ‘by uttering “security” a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it’. Speech acts are not always successful; they must be accepted, and this depends on how the claim is made and who is making it. Securitization theory thus shares with social constructivism the view that defining security is a mode of social accomplishment.

As Michael Williams has pointed out, though, the logic of the securitizing speech act also shares elements with the traditionalist concept of security. The rules assume a specific historical meaning of security associated with an existential threat from ‘them’ to ‘us’. This meaning of security, Williams argues, has its roots in an older notion of realpolitik developed in the 1920s and 1930s by Carl Schmitt and carried to its fruition by postwar Realists such as Hans Morgenthau.

The specificity of ‘security’ as a particular kind of speech-act in the work of the Copenhagen School is underpinned by an understanding of the politics of enmity, decision and emergency which has deep roots in Schmitt’s understanding of political order.

Schmitt’s concept of what constitutes ‘political’ is found not in the nature of issues themselves but in the way people relate to them. An issue is political if people feel an intense relation to it – at its most extreme yielding a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Ultimately, the political is intimately related to the state. The role of the sovereign state in Schmitt’s view was to settle contested disputes within the state and ‘decide when a threat to the prevailing political order has reached a point where it constitutes an “emergency” and requires the suspension of normal rules and procedures so that the political order itself can be preserved’.\textsuperscript{10} Rule-bound orders like the state require a sovereign who stands outside the purview of these rules to decide whether and when a normal situation exists.

The Copenhagen School’s notion of security draws from Schmitt’s conception of politics both because it associates security with the state – arguing that state officials have advantages in securitizing speech acts – and in its view of security as a particular form of speech act – one that evokes images of the enemy and thus breaks free of rules, suspends normal social relations and mobilizes the potential for violence. Once an issue is accepted as a security issue, it not only is advantaged vis-à-vis resources and the potential for political action as many of the proponents of broadening security argued, it also evokes a level of intensity that transforms the subsequent options for action around the issue.\textsuperscript{11} As Williams suggests, this argument allows the logic of security to be broadened away from a traditional state-centric military or territorial security, while still retaining its traditional conceptual specificity – security can be attached to the political (governmental legitimacy and autonomy), the societal (identity or ‘we-ness’), or both.

Securitization is at once a theory about the process by which issues move in and out of the security realm and a critique of those who argue for too quick a move to broaden security. The Copenhagen School argues that the process of securitization contains risks for those who try to use it. Inappropriate or ineffective attempts at securitization have political costs (those who attempt to securitize new issues without success will find their future credibility damaged). But successful securitization also contains dangers. By evoking the possibility of violence and implying a ‘them’ against which violence might be employed, securitization portends instability, intolerance, and enmity that render it a morally questionable strategy for many issues.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, the Copenhagen School also developed a notion of desecuritization, which addressed the way in which issues could be moved out of the security realm and back into ‘normal politics’.

While the Copenhagen School’s arguments do not directly address what we should expect from non-state actors’ forays into security, from its logic we can suggest some potential hypotheses. First, private actors may be disadvantaged vis-à-vis state actors in their attempt to use the security discourse. Second, to the degree that private actors successfully invoke the discourse of security surrounding their issue, the securitization of the issue area is likely to lead to a different politics with less tolerance, more consideration of the use of violence, and more enmity between those on different sides of an issue.

Other constructivist arguments, however, suggest an alternative trajectory based on the expectation that an actor’s identity might affect their conceptualization of security.\textsuperscript{13} While states’ identities have historically revolved around the creation of political communities of ‘us’ and ‘them’, many non-state actors have mandates
that stand in explicit contrast to that notion. For different reasons, both NGOs and corporations have specific commitments to ‘apoliticism’; the fulfillment of their respective mandates requires that they do not make enemies or take sides.\textsuperscript{14} One might imagine, then, that this commitment might lead non-state actors – even those facing violent threats – to think of security and how to generate it differently.

Below, I examine the unfolding of debates about security among NGOs and then corporations. I maintain that the Copenhagen School’s logic can explain initial worries among non-state actors about the legitimacy of their participation in dialogues about security. Its logic also sheds light on debates among non-state actors as they faced violence and struggled with how to talk about (and plan for) security. As non-state actors wrestled with security issues, however, they increasingly rejected traditional notions of security. NGOs in particular, but also some corporations, have increasingly attempted to transform the language of security and the political processes that surround it rather than allowing a ‘securitization’ of their issue areas.

Non-state actors, ‘apolitical’ security and a transformed conception of security

Since the early 1990s both NGOs and corporations have increasingly operated in areas where state power is weak or challenged. As instability took hold in many African and former Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, working in something like a Hobbesian state of nature became an increasing part of both NGO and corporate operations.\textsuperscript{15} Non-state actors thus began to consider the need to devote attention to security issues and were increasingly compelled to develop their own security plans in order to achieve their goals. Though the process has been different for each, both NGOs and corporations have searched for ‘apolitical’ security options and, in so doing, have developed a conception of security that is distinct from the traditional conception.

\textit{i. NGOs and security}

Even as they were increasingly drawn to contemplate security, NGOs also registered discomfort with the traditional conception of security. Talk of threat, enemy and the use of violence sat uneasily with the NGO community, which had traditionally relied on passive ‘acceptance’ as a strategy for presence in the field. This was particularly true of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) which pledged to aid all those in need regardless of political belief, but was also true among a range of relief, development and conservation NGOs. Upon getting advice from security experts – many of them former military – some NGOs shied away from talking about security altogether and others opted to withdraw from dangerous areas. A third set, however, began to take security needs seriously but on their own terms. It is this third set that has developed an alternate meaning of security.

Several incidents were key triggers for the NGO concern with security. First was the UN mission in Somalia in 1992. NGOs were crucial actors in the initial
humanitarian response to drought and famine in the country but were beset by banditry and extortion from competing warlords. The initial deployment of 28,000 US troops to the country was designed to establish a secure environment in which humanitarian relief operations could work.\textsuperscript{16} Despite political and security obstacles, by November more than 30 NGOs had projects in regions throughout the country.\textsuperscript{17} The mission to Somalia was fraught with many difficulties but among them was the relationship between NGOs and the military.\textsuperscript{18} Though the mission did allow more aid to be distributed than had been the case before the intervention, the military’s approach to security disrupted NGO acceptance practices and was a vivid example of what would become a quite common clash of cultures between NGOs and the military.\textsuperscript{19} The US military was interested in deploying overwhelming force to provide security, which they saw as a distinct task, separate from the humanitarian relief effort. NGOs saw the overwhelming force as a classic military attempt to ‘swat a fly with a sledgehammer’ and were frustrated with what they saw as a lack of integration between security and relief effort.\textsuperscript{20}

Somalia was also the start of what would later be seen as a sea-change in donor interest from development assistance to humanitarian relief. As reflected on by Bruce Biber of the ICRC, ‘many donors felt disillusioned by development assistance which, despite decades of investment, seemed to produce few tangible results. In comparison, humanitarian action became highly attractive, producing an immediate, visible and (at least on the surface) positive impact.’\textsuperscript{21} With donor interest – and money – came many new ‘humanitarian’ actors, some moving from other areas (like development) and others entirely new. Many of these had little familiarity with humanitarian principles and standards and launched projects in the field that threatened the security associated with the traditional acceptance strategy.\textsuperscript{22}

The ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes’ was a response to this. It spelled out standards to which disaster-response NGOs should aspire, reiterated the conformity of these standards with international humanitarian law and then, in three annexes, elaborated on the responsibilities of host governments, donor governments and international organizations. The foundation of the ‘Code of Conduct’ is the recognition that the humanitarian imperative comes first and that the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, regardless of any other consideration, was not a partisan or political act and should not be seen as such. It denied the legitimacy of using aid to further political or religious standpoints or as the instrument of government foreign policy. It pledged accountability to both donors and recipients and endeavored to respect local customs, build on local capacities, and strive to reduce future vulnerabilities in the delivery of aid.\textsuperscript{23}

The mid-1990s brought new issues and intensified debate. The UN mission in Bosnia, and particularly the siege of Sarajevo, focused NGOs on the dilemmas of relief during war. The fact that humanitarian aid did not insure the safety of the populations in conflict zones led some to question the usefulness of relief work if the results of a mission were ‘well-fed dead’. Another dilemma was sharply illustrated in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. In essence, the humanitarian response there
allowed war criminals to mingle with the refugees and afforded the exiled army resources to rebuild itself in Zaire. What many argued was the complicity of the relief community in the perpetuation of conflict following the genocide in Rwanda led to deep soul-searching in the NGO community.

In the midst of all this, physical threats to NGO personnel intensified. The massacre of six International Red Cross workers in Chechnya in December 1996 demonstrated dramatically the degree to which passive acceptance was not enough to guarantee NGO personnel safety. As the 1999 World Vision Security Manual puts it, ‘The rules of security have changed. And so must our practices.’ Together these concerns – with the implications of relief and development work for manipulation, abuse and conflict in the longer term, as well as concerns for the safety of NGOs working in the field – led some to revisit the acceptance strategy.

This revisiting took different forms. Some chose to withdraw in the face of instability, exploitation and danger – or at the very least to do no harm. This position held to the articulation of responsibilities in the ICRC ‘Code of Conduct’, in effect suggesting that NGO action was dependent on other actors – like states – fulfilling their responsibilities at some minimal level. If that was not the case, and efforts to help could end up hurting, NGOs should withdraw.

Others began to more actively consider traditional security options. For instance, CARE Canada, in the wake of the Rwandan debacle, published a report entitled Mean Times advising that relief INGOs consider the hiring of PSCs (private security companies) directly to maintain ‘humanitarian space’. Some went even further in developing this argument, calling the acceptance strategy and its ‘apoliticism’ untenable and arguing that NGOs, and the international community in general, must seize a more active role that aims to shoulder the ‘responsibility to protect’ when states shirk that responsibility. Some arguments made within NGOs focused on human rights rather than humanitarian relief reflected this logic and spurred a debate about the relationship between humanitarianism and taking sides to promote human rights.

Both of these arguments accept the tradition of security informing the securitization logic in different ways, the former because it recognizes security as the realm of the state (and that their role as non-state actors requires some modicum of a working state), the latter because, even when it argues that when a working state is not always available another grouping (such as the international community) might substitute for a state, it recognizes that security is a separate realm that rests on enmity and requires the use of violence, going outside the rules in order to preserve them.

The third – and now more prominent – approach to security within the NGO community did not accept the traditional view. While advocating the importance of remaining in the field it also remained true to the principles within the classic acceptance doctrine and cautioned against ‘apoliticization’ or enmity. Non-political in the classic doctrine refers to a refusal to enter into just the kind of political relationship Schmitt writes about. The key to NGO security, in this view, is to avoid taking a position as friend or foe, ally or enemy. Instead, NGOs should develop a pragmatic plan to insure their safety that rests on ‘dialogue with all actors involved in or affecting the outcome of a given situation of conflict’.
The process of articulating a conception of security that took violent threats to NGOs seriously but in a way that was antithetical to the traditional notion was difficult. Just as securitization arguments suggest, security language was initially closely tied to the traditional conception. Thus, the two arguments above dominated in the early part of the conversation. Furthermore, discussions of security often led to arguments and misunderstandings within issue communities. Even invoking the language of security led some in the NGO community to feel uncomfortable because it evoked traditional notions that seemed improper for NGOs. In the midst of threatening environments, different members of issue communities perceived different imperatives and varied in their ranking of the most pressing issues.33

The changed environment, combined with the fact that traditional conceptions of security flew in the face of NGO self-conceptions, however, led a small group of people within the NGO community to begin revising the acceptance strategy to create a more pragmatic security plan to deal with increasing violence, but one still based on the acceptance principles. These people realized that passive acceptance was no longer enough to generate safety for NGO personnel in the field. They also believed that either withdrawing or taking ‘political’ action would undermine the missions of their organizations and their long-term mandates. In the increasingly polarized environment, they saw two risks the plan needed to address: the risk of being rejected and the risk of being instrumentalized. Rejection was often a product of the perceived association between NGO staff and other political efforts. The potential for such association was enhanced by the increasingly global nature of violence; correct assessment of local conditions did not insure against targeting by outside affiliated groups. Instrumentalization occurred in two ways: first, when humanitarian aid was siphoned off to support combatants; second, when humanitarian language was adopted by militaries and governments it led to a blurring of lines between action that was solely humanitarian and humanitarian action that was linked to political goals.34

![Security triangle](http://ire.sagepub.com)

**Figure 1**  Security triangle
The framework they developed, dubbed the ‘security triangle’, was centered on the mission. It retained a focus on acceptance but added an emphasis on protection and deterrence. Those who advocated the security triangle also developed principles about security planning and management that began to address both global issues and the interaction between actors in the field. The ICRC was instrumental in these developments as were a number of individual NGOs (including World Vision and CARE) and InterAction (a consortium of American NGOs).

The overall approach focuses, first and foremost, on the mission of the organization. Security is something that is defined by what is required for the mission to be carried forward. Thus, protecting staff from violence is a goal but only because this allows movement toward the organization’s mission. In almost all cases violence is disruptive to NGO missions. As one NGO security officer put it, ‘conflict is always bad for children and families’. This is true for development, relief and even conservation. In the most general terms, this approach uses ‘security’ to mean developing processes to make the use of violence less likely. Rather than developing categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, identifying ‘threats’ and ‘enemies’, or defining issues over which a community is willing to use violence, this approach sees violence as the overall threat and uses the language of security to find ways to resolve conflicts without the use of violence.

This philosophical focus requires engaging with any and all actors who can affect a situation. While this is consistent with the classic acceptance principles, many NGOs during the Cold War had assumed that the ‘actors’ who could undercut their work were ‘states’. They had focused on avoiding antagonism with states – using the language of ‘apoliticism’ – and cultivated a reputation for ‘doing good’ among the beneficiaries of their work. In the new environment, where states were weak or not even present in some areas of their territory, and many of those on the ground did not see themselves as beneficiaries, who NGOs chose to help (and how) often affected power relations within an area – and thus NGOs were perceived as political in the local context.

In recasting the acceptance model, advocates of the security triangle advised going back to first principles and gaining acceptance by stakeholders. This required consent from all belligerent parties including de facto as well as official authorities. It also highlighted community stake in the program and involvement in its development and evaluation. The mission of the organization needed to be clear and transparent to facilitate both acceptance and community stake in the project and NGO personnel needed to adjust their language and behavior to local perceptions. They could not simply assert impartiality but had to be perceived as impartial. Finally, all of these efforts required cultural and political sensitivity on the part of NGO staff.

The increasing complexity of conflict environments, however, also made it difficult for NGO personnel to always be in contact with all the belligerent parties all the time. It thus also became important to insure that NGOs were not easy targets for violence. The protection part of the triangle took aim at this issue. Protection included both materials – communications equipment, reliable vehicles and perimeter security for NGO facilities – and clear policies – on personnel, finances and purchases, vehicle...
operations, curfews, no-go areas, communications pyramids and protocols, and security training for new staff. The overall orientation of protection was not to keep staff and compounds safe, but to insure the continuation of the mission. Thus how best to think about issues like perimeter security required a consideration of the community and its reaction to any steps NGO personnel might take (such as fences and/or barbed wire).  

Finally, the deterrence portion of the triangle (posing a counter-threat) brought to bear the additional resources NGOs had to insure the continuation of the mission – threats. The primary threat was diplomatic. Because of NGO relations with the UN, diplomatic missions and other NGOs, those who threatened them could incur diplomatic costs and pressures. Security advocates sought to make NGOs aware of this resource and encouraged them to use it. Deterrence also included the use of guards. Guards, however, should abide by strong professional guidelines. Though just what these professional guidelines are is not fully defined, there is a strong preference for unarmed guards and for an emphasis on defensive posture. In extreme situations, deterrence might also involve interfacing with military troops to provide an umbrella for NGO operations. The no-fly zone in Iraq was one of these extreme situations.  

The deterrence portion of the triangle has generated the most debate – and is the most similar to traditional security. Some NGOs accept only the diplomatic portions while others maintain that the threat of violence, with extreme restrictions, is something that can abide within widely shared norms of apoliticism.

Given that stakeholders were not only local actors, this strategy also required some fundamental organizational changes. Security defined this way could not be accomplished on the ground without larger coordination. It could also not be simply left up to the skill or gumption of NGO personnel. When violent global currents can threaten local efforts and local efforts have global implications, the requisite information for a successful security strategy is both local and global. This mandates greater coordination with other organizations but also attention within the organization to how information relates to its particular mission and mandate.

Security, as one practitioner put it, is a management challenge. It necessitates sustained effort and must be institutionalized. With the philosophical basis of an NGO security strategy in place (the security triangle), a good deal of effort has been focused on developing security management language, processes and best practices that can be diffused among a wide variety of NGOs (as well as other entities) and institutionalized in each. These processes include information-gathering and analysis (discussions of threats, risks and vulnerabilities focused on mission goals, organizational profile and on-the-ground vulnerabilities – including debriefings), facilities management (site selection and access procedures for offices, residences, warehouses, etc.), personnel management (hiring and firing, holding people accountable, how to mix community acceptance with professional norms), transportation (what kinds of vehicles, drivers, how to deal with improvised explosive devices and checkpoints, tracking), communications (day-to-day, extreme emergency, within organizations and between organizations), incident reporting (what gets reported and to whom), and standard operating procedures for maintaining and updating the entire security planning process.
This perspective on security has become dominant in the NGO community. There are still debates, however, about the wisdom of these principles. Engagement of all stakeholders leads NGOs to sometimes cooperate with actors that have committed horrible acts. For instance, some working for humanitarian organizations in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo argued that the ethics of working with the Mai-Mai and other militia forces was one of the most pressing issues faced by humanitarians. More recently, a prominent conservationist has cooperated with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to secure a plan for saving the last of the world’s northern white rhinos. Some still accept traditional security principles in claiming that this legitimates evil-doers and enhances the power of people NGOs should be working against.

There are also challenges in the implementation of this strategy. It requires financial commitments that many NGOs are loathe to undertake. The structure of power in a given environment can make the execution of the security triangle quite challenging. For instance, while NGOs have had an easier time engaging with stakeholders in Afghanistan, where power structures (warlords) limit the number of stakeholders, they have had a harder time in Darfur, Sudan, where many competing stakeholders make gaining acceptance more difficult. In Darfur NGOs are regarded with suspicion – even by beneficiaries. Lack of education and general (if understandable) paranoia exacerbates the difficulty of community engagement. Decisions by the UN to support what many on the ground see as a disastrous peace accord have led some to see NGOs – by association with the UN – as siding with the government, thus complicating the perceived neutrality of NGOs.

The articulation and dissemination of an alternative approach to security by the NGO community nonetheless suggests more malleability in the concept of security than securitization scholars argued. It has added heft to arguments about redefining security by posing a clear alternative to the very conception of security rather than only the issues to which it attaches. The fact that some NGOs talk about security differently may not be seen as consequential by some, but as the discussion of transnational corporations below suggests, there is some evidence that this model of security is also influencing other actors.

ii Transnational corporations and security

Though changes in the security environment witnessed in the 1990s also affected transnational corporations (TNCs), security per se was not as jarring to these entities as it was to NGOs. TNCs have long been interested in securing their property and investments and have seen security as part of risk management plans. Frequently TNCs developed these plans in concert with their home and host states. When new threats arose, so did new plans. For instance, consider the concept of political risk and political risk insurance. The concept was developed primarily to deal with potential disputes with host governments such as the threat to nationalize facilities. In recent years, however, companies have faced much greater threats from unmediated violence. One way to document this is through political risk insurance and its payouts.
From 1966 to 1990, the number of cash settlements paid out by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) for war damage or civil strife (now part of one category – ‘political violence’) averaged well less than one per year (0.6/year), with all but one claim being war damage settlements. From 1990 to 2004, however, the average number of claims for those categories was more than two per year (2.07/year) with almost all being for civil strife. Though these figures only capture damage to US companies, they suggest that with the end of the Cold War came a different kind of risk to transnational corporations that required more attention to managing violence. The threat of terrorist activities only intensified this trend.

To mitigate the risk from political violence, companies have taken a number of steps. First, as suggested above, they have taken out political risk insurance. They have also developed strategies to protect their employees and property. Indeed, the phenomenal growth in the private security industry providing services to transnational corporations working in risky environments is partly a response to this demand. Companies such as Armorgroup, Group4Securicor, Global Risk and many others provide a wide range of services, from threat assessment, security planning and risk mitigation to site security and guarding. Transnational corporations have also worked directly with host governments, providing financing for a portion of the host state’s security forces that are then deployed to insure the security of particular corporate interests. The so-called ‘Shell police’ in Nigeria would be one example of this.

Though initially aimed fairly narrowly on the protection of property, corporate security strategies have increasingly been drawn to a broader conception of security and one that resembles many of the attributes of NGO security planning. The experience of Shell in Nigeria is both a paradigmatic example and one that illustrates how this new idea of corporate security has unfolded, so the discussion below will be largely based on that experience.

Political violence against Shell was precipitated by both poor governance in the country (an unequal distribution of oil benefits) and specific actions by the oil companies (the devastating environmental consequences of oil extraction in the Niger Delta). Combined, these led to a ‘petro-movement’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s that incited violence against both the Nigerian state and oil facilities. The Ogonis, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to protest massive oil operations accompanied by meager investment in public services (like electricity and water). A variety of associated protest movements have also been formed.

Shell’s initial response to these protests was to generate security for its facilities in concert with the government and supplemented by private security. Though the details of the security arrangements between Shell and public or private Nigerian security forces in the 1990s are opaque, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines. Some have claimed that, ‘on countless occasions, oil companies have called out directly the police, the army and the navy to quell disturbances on their installations, without applying to the government for help’. There are reports that Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (the Nigerian subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies) both purchased weapons and used its helicopters and boats...
to transport the Nigerian military. Shell admitted to paying field allowances to Nigerian military units associated with the disruption of popular protests in particular instances. The so-called ‘Shell police’ were also assigned to protect Shell facilities.

The repressive behavior of the Nigerian police and military had consequences for the company. Local activists implicated the company directly, arguing that Shell money was important to the government’s revenue and that Shell hired security forces that violated human rights. For instance, the 1990 president of MOSOP, Dr G. B. Leton, claimed: ‘[T]he Ogoni case is of genocide being committed in the dying years of the twentieth century by multi-national oil companies under the supervision of the Government ... of Nigeria.’ As local activists made global connections, the behavior of the Nigerian government, troops and police, and the reflection of this behavior on Shell, led to a transnational campaign targeting oil investment in Nigeria. Particularly when the Nigerian government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and ‘the Ogoni 8’, communities in the Niger Delta joined with transnational human rights groups in a campaign for retaliation. The global campaign mounted specific boycotts on Shell worldwide.

In its response Shell adopted many of the principles enunciated in the NGO security triangle strategy. It already had a history of protection and deterrence stretching back into the 1970s but undertook in the 1990s a campaign to better understand its reputation and ‘engage’ with stakeholders. Stakeholders included both international NGOs inciting boycotts and the local communities from which the violence came. In 1998 the company began to hold regular meetings with key institutional investors to discuss non-financial issues such as human rights and the environment. In 1999, Shell reported that it had processes in place to engage with communities on local concerns in 91 countries. Shell has also supported international efforts to address the role of corporations in inciting or preventing conflict such as the United Nations’ ‘Global Compact’ and the US/UK ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’.

As part of a broader international effort to address the role of transnational corporations in conflict zones, International Alert, the Council on Economic Priorities and the Prince of Wales Business Leaders’ Forum produced a document called *The Business of Peace* that outlines the ways in which the private sector might be a partner in conflict prevention and resolution. This document highlights Shell’s efforts and argues that responsible corporations should at the very least comply with national regulations and benchmark their local practices against internationally agreed laws, conventions and standards. Beyond this, companies should be aware of their impacts – particularly as they relate to violent conflict – and should develop policies to minimize damage that may result from their practices. Finally, it suggests that companies can create positive value through social investment, consulting with stakeholders, building civic institutions and engaging in collective action with other companies.

‘The Voluntary Principles’, negotiated between TNCs, NGOs and the US and UK governments further guide TNCs’ security decisions when working in unstable territories. The principles suggest attention to risk assessment, awareness of
the security situation before investing in a territory and a series of consultations with the host country to both assess the company’s impact and communicate the requisite international standards (including transparency and public involvement) the company wishes the government to follow. They suggest that companies should use their influence to promote adherence to applicable international law. In the event that a government cannot provide security and a company engages a PSC, the guidelines suggest that the company ensure that the PSC observes company policy, maintains adequate professional proficiency, acts in a lawful manner, observes rules of engagement, and conducts only preventative or defensive security measures. Furthermore, the company should ensure that a PSC’s employees are screened, and should investigate all uses of force, particularly any reported human rights abuses.64 Shell claims to have abided by these guidelines.65 An increasingly international flavor to the private security options in Nigeria has also contributed to more professionalization within the industry, which has underscored the appeal to global standards.66

As a consequence of the violence they suffered, as well as the efforts of NGOs and other interested groups to educate them, Shell officials have come to believe that the company’s long-term profitability demands that it take some responsibility for the way governance works in weak or challenged states. Since 1998 Shell has self-consciously linked its security efforts to claims about principles of social responsibility. Despite the company’s rather narrow mission – to protect its property and maintain present and future profits – its beliefs about the linkage between these goals and broader social responsibility have led to both the inclusion of more actors in security decisions and the inclusion of international human rights norms to become a part of the discourse of security. Its focus on social responsibility is drawn from processes of engagement similar to those of NGOs. The company has shifted from a strategy of negotiating only with the central government to a strategy that involves more actors – such as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with stakeholders. And its references to the requirements it must meet in achieving security are not only to Nigerian laws and the narrow requirements for international businesses but also international human rights norms.67

In the pursuit of this practice, however, Shell has also maintained a commitment to ‘apoliticism’. Even as it has moved to embrace corporate social responsibility, Shell has been uneasy about political action. Indeed, concerns about this led Shell officials to balk at some of the demands made by government critics.68 While Shell was eager to broaden its role in the community and clean up its image, it was unwilling to exert direct influence on the government, believing that such action was ‘political’ and beyond its proper mandate as a commercial entity. ‘Shell companies should endeavor always to act commercially, operating within existing national laws in a socially responsible manner and avoid involvement in politics.’69 The irony of this stance in Nigeria is that while Shell has become more consultative and willing to negotiate, many would argue that the Nigerian state remains unaccountable.

As in the NGO community, there are debates over the wisdom of corporate involvement in security and in governance more generally – though its outlines are
somewhat different from those in the NGO community. Some have complained that the unwillingness to stand up to repressive behavior by the government allows companies to get the best of both worlds: singing the praises of human rights but reaping the benefits of government repression. Human rights organizations have called for stronger action on the part of companies to take the side of the disempowered. Others have claimed that asking companies to play the role of modern-day missionaries spreading western values is illegitimate and unlikely to work. It is illegitimate because TNCs have no right to be the guardians of democracy and human rights. It is unlikely to work because companies that attend to such issues are unlikely to profit—and, even if they do, are unlikely to be trusted purveyors of democratic values. Critics from the right worry that social responsibility taken too far will undermine profits, and critics from the left worry that asking corporations to guarantee democratic practices is like asking the fox to guard the hen-house.

Despite the debate, many corporations continue to tie their security behavior to these principles. While one cannot say that this is the dominant mode of corporate security planning, a variety of concerns with everything from local violence to long-distance lawsuits has caused more corporations to adopt security policies that engage more actors and limit egregious uses of force. As the potential for local grievances to be taken up by international NGOs has grown, corporations are also more attentive to the long-term impacts of their policies. While more likely than NGOs to engage with military forces to deter threats and deploy forces to protect property, the very nature of transnational corporations, with production spread over many territories, makes them less than eager to align their interests with any one ‘us’, and thus some elements of the acceptance strategy have been incorporated. This, combined with pressure to attend to a longer-term perspective, has led a substantial number of companies to attend to the ‘triple bottom line’.

iii Comparisons

The parallels in NGO and TNC conceptions of security are not accidental. The corporate social responsibility movement was encouraged by those in the NGO community and both have drawn strategies from a large literature on conflict mitigation and management. They are also not identical; the NGO community has been more worried about the inclusion of protection and deterrence strategies. While NGOs began the 1990s with a passive acceptance strategy and added protection and deterrence, corporations began with protection and deterrence and added acceptance. Nonetheless, they have met in the middle and have shared ideas about how to think about non-state security. The ‘security triangle’ has accorded both actors a strategy that can help them work amidst violence to meet their mandate but without violating what they see to be their legitimate role as ‘non-states’. In so doing, however, they have spoken about and developed a conception of security that rejects core elements of traditional security principles.

Non-state actors have not been alone in thinking and talking differently about security. Acceptance, protection and deterrence have found their way into the
discourse of many actors interested in conflict amelioration – even states. Indeed as states became increasingly involved in tasks such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, agents of states drew on a similar logic of conflict management as one of many tools states could use to accomplish their goals in the world. Non-state actors were driven at a more fundamental level to this approach to security, however, because of what they saw as the limits to their authority. For them, the embrace of mission and the security triangle is not part of a larger sphere of security in which enmity might also play a role, but a fundamentally different approach in which enmity is not evoked. Though different non-state organizations have pursued different strategies, many are joined in conceiving of security as a process that reduces the prospect of violence rather than the identification of an enemy against which it is appropriate to use violence.

Rather than ‘securitizing’ new issue areas, the increased attention to security by non-state actors has offered a competing view of security. In this view, security is integrated with the pursuit of other goals and aims to decrease the resort to violence. This requires engagement with all actors who can affect a situation to gain acceptance, protecting staff and facilities and deterring violence through diplomatic and sometimes police or military networks. Because each security situation is different, depending on the overall mission and mandate of the organization, security cannot be developed a priori by specialists, but must be composed of the interaction between security principles and overarching goals. Instead of identifying ‘them’, protecting ‘us’ and defining the conditions of emergency, this conception sees security as developing processes that reduce the use of violence. Securitization scholars were deft at describing the traditional notions of security, its association with states, and the benefits that states would enjoy in security discourse, but they did not predict that non-state actors, precisely because they could not legitimately make the same claims as states in the security arena, might speak of security in different ways and open the way for the transformation of its meaning.

Conclusion: reconceptualized security, transformed experience?

Tying a new conception of security to outcomes in the experience of local actors is beyond the mission of this article. In thinking about the consequences of privatizing security, though, many analyses have considered the transfer of the security mission to non-state actors as changing the interests for which security instruments are deployed. Rather than using violence for general community issues, it will be targeted on particular or private interests, leading more resources to be devoted to security but less to public order. These analysts are not, however, imagining that different actors could think of the security mission itself differently, changing the degree to which the use of violence is considered. In this article, I have suggested that it makes sense to take this step. As non-state actors have developed approaches to security, they have used the concept differently and developed plans that reflect this reconceptualization. Their impact, then, is not only on what issues are attached to security but what security means.
Notes

1 The traditional view of state security presented below is stylized and not really a good reflection of security as practiced by states in the current era. It should be seen not as a fact but as a long-standing view of the essence of security among states.


5 Mathews, ‘Redefining Security’.

6 Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, p. 47.

7 Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, p. 55.


12 Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’; Buzan et al., Security.


14 An organization’s mandate refers to its overall purpose and is often distinguished from its mission, which refers to its reason for operating in a particular situation.

15 Also important for NGO exposure was a shift in development policy in the late 1980s to funnel more aid directly to civil society through NGOs in order to avoid inefficient or corrupt states.


22 Interview with Michael O’Netill, Director of Security, Save the Children, Washington DC (15 August 2006).


27 Interview with Michael O’Neill.


31 Frohart et al., ‘Protecting Human Rights’.


34 Krahenbuhl, ‘Humanitarian Security’.


36 Interview with Mike O’Neill.


38 Anderson, Do No Harm; Van Brabant, ‘Security Guidelines’; interview with Mike O’Neill.


45 Discussion at conference on ‘The Politicisation of Humanitarian Action and Staff Security’.

46 Interview with Michael O’Neill.

47 Interview with Michael O’Neill.

48 See Robert C. O’Sullivan, ‘Learning from OPIC’s Experience with Claims and Arbitration’, in Theodore H. Moran and Gerald T. West (eds), International Political Risk Management: Looking to the Future (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), Annex B lists all the claims; the tabulations are mine. The OPIC is an independent US government agency that facilitates the participation of US private capital abroad – particularly in less-developed countries. Among other services, it sells political risk insurance. It was established in 1971 (from 1966 to 1970 OPIC programs were


53 Ibeanu, ‘Oiling the Friction’, p. 22.


56 ‘Companies were responsible for paying, training, and equipping the police assigned to their facilities, including providing them with arms as necessary.’ ‘Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria’, p. 5. The Shell police are part of the supernumerary police in Nigeria. These forces are trained by the state but then assigned to and paid by the oil companies. These forces only have police powers on the private property of the oil companies they are assigned to. See Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, ‘The Globalization of Private Security, Country Report: Nigeria’, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, January 2005, available at: http://users.aber.ac.rbh/privatesecurity (accessed August 2006).

57 ‘Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria’, p. 9.


63 ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’.

64 ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’.


66 Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘The Globalization of Private Security’. Given the competitive market, however, it is unclear that these appeals hold much sway – see p. 16.

67 Whether Shell’s engagement with the community is adequate has been questioned. Some have complained that the MOUs are elitist and do little to meet the ‘simple needs’ of the vast majority. See Ibeanu, ‘Oiling the Friction’, p. 29.


69 Scott Pegg, ‘An Emerging Market for the New Millennium’.


74 In other words, attend not only to short-term profits but also to environmental and social impacts. See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (accessed August 2006).


77 Anna Leander and Rens van Munster, ‘Private Security Contractors in the Debate about Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neoliberal Governmentality’, this issue, pp. 201–16.