This book of essays examines the philosophy of philanthropy as expressed in Andrew Carnegie's 1889 essay, "The Gospel of Wealth," which happily is reprinted in this volume. Carnegie believed that responsible philanthropy was required for social stability and that responsible philanthropy involved the active participation of the benefactor in his lifetime in supporting those institutions such as schools, libraries, hospitals, and churches that fostered individual self-reliance. The mere giving of alms to the poor was irresponsible. The best essays in the book critically evaluate Carnegie's philosophy of philanthropy. One of the major underlying critical themes is the elitist nature of Carnegie's philosophy. Both Barry Karl and Jonathan Riley essentially ask whether it wouldn't be more democratic if society decided what was in the public interest and then taxed wealth at a sufficiently progressive rate to provide it. Whereas Karl merely raises the question, Riley's use of a liberal philosophy of philanthropy to answer that question in the negative is an excellent piece of philosophical analysis. Louise Knight paints a contrasting picture with her account of Jane Addams's view that emphasizes the benefits of philanthropy to the philanthropist. Meanwhile, Kenneth Fox argues that Carnegie was less of an elitist than other philanthropists at that time. This volume raises some interesting ethical questions about a practice not often discussed by ethicists.

N. E. B.


Craven's Social Choice is a useful book for someone interested in a general overview of social choice and is a "must buy" for those interested in the connections between social choice theory and mainstream ethics. It provides relatively elementary proofs of all its results, provides a broad coverage of issues that have been central in the developments in social choice theory following from Arrow's Theorem, provides a unified treatment of Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulability result that shows how the latter is a dual of the former, and provides the clearest discussion that I have yet read of the link between Arrow's Theorem and Sen's Dilemma of the Paretian Liberal as well as presenting both Rawls's difference principle and utilitarianism within an Arrowian framework.

While I would have appreciated some treatment in the book of the important results about spatial social choice, my only real caveat is that this book, like virtually everything else written in this area, overstates the practical implications of Arrow's Theorem and related results for democratic decision making by paying far more attention to what might happen than to what can realistically be expected to happen. For example, contrary to a conjecture in the book (p. 95), we can have transitive majority preferences even when all possible preference orderings are present in the society.

B. G.


Bhargava reanimates the once-lively but now-moribund debate between methodological individualists and methodological holists. The compromise effected between these two parties to the dispute still leaves important issues unresolved. Indeed, it is those principles which the compromise deems trivially true which turn out to remain controversial. The real disagreement in this dispute is whether the capacities which transform a biological organism into a human being can be realized without certain sorts of interactions with others. Individualists are committed to an affirmative answer to this question, holists to a negative one. The question becomes whether intentionality can be given a naturalistic account or whether it requires the existence of a community of at least two individuals. Thus Bhargava brings the individualism-holism debate into contact with the internalism-externalism debate in the philosophy of psychology, by expounding a Davidsonian analysis of intentionality and the recently popular one due to Putnam, Kripke, Burge, and others. Because he endorses the view that intentions require language and language requires the division of labor, Bhargava eventually finds his sympathies with the holists. Even those who demur from his conclusions will find this the best recent treatment of the dispute about individualism versus holism in social science.

A. R.


Gellner tells us "an old joke about the Edwardian lieutenant, asked at his military examination—what is the role of the cavalry in modern warfare? He replied: Sir, it is, I suppose, to add a touch of class to what would otherwise be a mere vulgar brawl." He goes on to remark that, in a similar way, "Hegelianism confers metaphysical depths on European history which might otherwise be a mere sordid scramble for power" (p. 21). If you like that kind of thing, you will like this book, since there is much more of the same. It has to be said, however, that a number of the targets of these essays (written in the mid-1970s) such as Garfinkel and Feyerabend scarcely seem as substantial as they did a quarter-century ago. Apart from book reviews, there are several essays on contemporary politics. Although subsequent events have not made Gellner's analyses seem foolish, it is inevitable that twelve years of Mrs. Thatcher and the dissolution of communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact countries give discussions of Britain and Czechoslovakia a purely period interest. The decision to reprint such time-bound pieces seems to call for explanation,