The second sense of trust is at once more relevant and more ominous in respect to the autonomy of the citizen. In politics it arises from recognizing that those in authority have the wisdom, skill, or rectitude to decide issues that arise in a manner the citizen will approve. The advantage of this understanding of the relationship between the citizen and those in authority is two-fold. First, the official, as recipient of the trust, acquires a duty to be faithful to it. Second, the citizen has undertaken no obligation (expressions of trust are not performatives) and has liberty to withdraw the trust when it is no longer deserved. Thus “one ought to obey the state to the extent to which he trusts those in political authority.”

Abbott's objective in this argument is to find a conceptualization that makes continuing critical assessment of the performance of the state internal to the process of deciding whether to obey it. But the concept of trust is a poor choice for this purpose. Trust renders critical scrutiny unnecessary if not inappropriate. Moreover, Abbott exaggerates both the extent to which being trusted is conducive to trustworthiness (especially in impersonal relationships) and the ease with which genuine trust will be withdrawn when not deserved. Numerous liberals have thought that trust is exactly what ought never be placed in anyone who “has the shotgun behind the door.”

But there is a more fundamental problem here. Trust must be a derivative not a constitutive feature of the relationship between citizens and those in political authority. Critical assessment of the actions of the latter may with time and good performance warrant a kind of grudging trust in them. But officials must have authority before they can warrant trust in themselves qua officials. Thus either there is no authority (in which case Abbott's problem disappears) or “trust” cannot be the basic concept in terms of which to understand authority and how to relate to it.

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Condorcet was a mathematician, philosopher, political pamphleteer and occasional politician, advocate of social rationality, and eventual victim of the Terror for his Girondist sympathies. Until quite recently he has been best remembered for his posthumously published fragment Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progres de l’esprit humain. This title has become synonymous with the idea of progress and the infallibility of men. Recent scholars (notably Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge, 1958; Gilles-Gaston Granger, La Matematique Social du Marquis de Condorcet, Paris, 1958; and G. Th. Guilbaud, “Les theories de l’integre general et le probleme logique de l’agregation,” partially translated as “Theories of the General Interest and the Logical Problem of Aggregation,” in Readings in Mathematical Social Science, ed. Paul R. Lazarsfeld and Neil W. Henry (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1966) have rescued another of Condorcet's works, his Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendres à la pluralité des voix from the neglect to which its opacity and lack of mathematical elegance have long condemned it (Baker, p. 227); and in my view it will prove to be the Essai rather than the Esquisse on which Condorcet's claim to distinction will rest in the long run.

The Esquisse is credited with considerable influence on figures such as Saint-Simon and Comte (the latter of whom hailed Condorcet as his “spiritual father” [p. 475 n. 41]). The Essai, on the other hand, can be regarded as the first work of mathematical political science, with direct influence on scholars such as Poisson and Cournot. It introduces two ideas of central importance to contemporary democratic theory: the notion of the paradox of cyclical majorities (which has been called by Guilbaud “L’Effet Condorcet”) and the notion of a pairwise majority winner (now often referred to as the “Condorcet Winner”) as the sine qua non of democratic choice. A third element of the Essai, in which Condorcet connects together the logic of majority rule with his probabilistic notions of truth, is present less well known, but is crucial to an understanding of Condorcet's thought. Condorcet's jury theorem (which can be shown to be a corollary of the law of large numbers) asserts that, for a group whose individual probabilities of reaching a correct judgment on some issue are each greater than one-half, the group's majority verdict approaches one as the size increases—what appears to be a demonstration of a case of the law of large numbers. More generally, under the Condorcet jury theorem the tradeoff between special judgment and group decision is the most efficient. Baker's book is the first full-length biography in the usual sense of intellectual history. Baker provides a rounded portrait of Condorcet's life and work for the first time, links of the Esquisse with the other works of Condorcet, and of the Essai—relating Condorcet's career to his “vision of a rendered rational through mathematics” (p. 370). It is important because the treatment of Condorcet is an excellent exposition of the doctrine of public opinion. The Essai is a powerful (if not original) and well-researched work on the sociology of the creation of science; in the tradition of a natural science, and is an important contribution to the history of political thought.
greater than one-half, the probability that the group's majority verdict will be correct approaches one as the size of the group increases—what appears to be a mathematical demonstration of a case of "vox populi, vox dei." More generally, under certain assumptions, the Condorcet jury theorem permits a calculation of the tradeoff between elitist claims to special judgmental competence and majority rule.

Keith M. Baker's *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* is not a biography in the usual sense, but rather an intellectual history. Baker, an historian, provides a rounded portrait of Condorcet which, for the first time, links together the Condorcet of the *Esquisse* with the Condorcet of the *Essai*—relating Condorcet's philosophy of history to his "vision of a democratic society rendered rational through the power of social mathematics" (p. 370). Such an analysis is important because

the treatment of Condorcet in the standard histories of sociology—such as it has been—has almost invariably rested on a brief characterization of the doctrine of progress found in the *Esquisse* as a powerful (if flawed) anticipation of the historical sociology established by his successors, Saint-Simon and Comte. Neglecting as it does the conception of social mathematics that has in recent years been recognized as lying at the heart of his idea of social science, this traditional view is clearly inadequate ... and misleading (p. 344).

Baker is at his best in showing how Condorcet's views in the *Esquisse* have been misrepresented, misunderstood, and simply mistakenly rejected by those who claimed to follow in his footsteps. Baker's *Condorcet* is a work of thorough and indeed loving historical scholarship (nearly 90 pages of notes, over 600 references) which demands a fundamental reassessment of more traditional views of Condorcet, although its interpretation of Condorcet's career and views is not at variance with the basic outline sketched by Granger in his recent article on Condorcet in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. In *Condorcet*, Baker discusses in detail virtually all of Condorcet's writings and casts important light on such neglected works as the *Tableau général de la science qui a pour objet l'application du calcul aux sciences politiques et morales*.

Condorcet was "remarkable, even in an Encyclopedic age, for the wide range of his interests and activities" (dust jacket). Anyone interested in the history of ideas; in the sociology of science; in the interplay between science, technology, and politics; in the origins of "modern" notions of social scientific explanation; and, indeed, in the birth of the idea of social science itself, will find Condorcet a treasure trove. Students of comparative public administration will find both amusing and instructive Condorcet's run-in with the ancien régime's department of bridges and roads. More generally, those interested in the social scientist as social engineer and in the complex interplay between gnosticism and praxis will be fascinated by Condorcet's remarkable career(s). Those interested in the philosophy of social science will marvel at the "modernity" of Condorcet's views on the probabilistic nature of social science knowledge and on the role of mathematics as a tool for social understanding and social change.

Robespierre remarked of Condorcet that he was "a great mathematician in the eyes of men of letters and a distinguished man of letters in the eyes of mathematicians" (cited p. 383). Baker notes (p. 383) that "this remark had just enough truth to be really vicious." Baker's careful scholarship (particularly when combined with that of other recent work on Condorcet as social mathematician) gives the lie to Robespierre's canard. Baker's work is a major contribution to that "revaluation of the whole Condorcet's theory of politics" called for by Granger (cited p. 444 n. 4), which we believe is needed to provide the balanced portrait of Condorcet which that neglected and misunderstood figure justly deserves.

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The authors of this book want to say something quite simple: that the efficiency of an organization depends in part upon administrators knowing how well their subordinates work, a systematic gathering of information on the organization, and well-defined jobs appropriate to the situation. While this all seems obvious, it is not an unimportant intellectual task to demonstrate these points with empirical data. Unfortunately, on the way to the bank, something happens to obscure the obvious, to distort the findings, and to diminish the worth of the book.

The first part of the book, about 100 pages, purports to describe an entrepreneurial theory of organizations and a model of organizational