“It is well that there has been in the world some good and some bad; without that, one would be driven to leave this life.”

The bulk of the book examines *The Spirit of the Laws*. Books XIV–XXI are discussed first in order to proceed from nonpolitical to political. Since Merry contends that Montesquieu believes the latter does and must reflect the former, he treats the subpolitical first in order that politics may be better understood. He argues that Montesquieu seeks to establish the independence of economics, religion, and civil law from politics and political law in order to unleash the activity stimulated by greed and checked by fear of God, and to replace natural by civil law as the standard of political law.

Read in the light of Montesquieu’s treatment of nonpolitical things, books II–X, which have traditionally been regarded as a discussion of forms of government, are interpreted to be an examination of the capabilities, roles, and relations of the three main social classes. Their purpose is to show the need for and foundation of a mixed government that reflects social forces and does not require austere virtues.

The final three chapters, which discuss the books on liberty (XI–XIII), seek to show that both civil and political liberties are primarily nurtured and secured by the proper distribution of political authority among the three social classes rather than by legal separation of powers. Professor Merry finds that the famous discussion of the English Constitution is not central to *The Spirit of the Laws*, but deals with only one kind of political liberty and that not the most important. Furthermore, Montesquieu’s natural government cannot be understood, and is distorted, by looking at its end of liberty. A spirit of moderation is more to be sought by mixed government than even liberty.

Professor Merry’s book is best when it is closest to Montesquieu. He reminds us of the breadth and subtlety of Montesquieu, and gives us the fruits of reflective hours spent in the baron’s company in many provocative interpretations. He has an easy time in rescuing Montesquieu from legalistic Americans, though one might wonder whether there was not some truth in the old prejudices. For if the ends of government are given, is there a more important question than how these ends are achieved? It is true that Montesquieu writes about the spirit, but it is the spirit of the laws.

Merry would have Montesquieu read in our times by showing that he speaks like our times. The use of social science terminology confuses the interpretation and makes Merry say less than he knows. For example, to say that moderation is higher than liberty in Montesquieu’s value hierarchy is to neglect the fact that neither moderation nor liberty is a value for Montesquieu, but one a
Rules} is parliamentary procedure and using any other manual would be sacrilege. Indeed, it has been seriously suggested that only the Bible has had a greater influence on the organizational behavior of Americans. Almost three million copies of Robert's various editions have been sold since 1876, which has made it one of the all-time nonfiction best-sellers.

Although General Henry M. Robert has been dead for nearly half-a-century, Robert's Rules of Order lives on; and within its pages the ideas of the long-dead general are perpetuated. The present edition, edited by the General's daughter-in-law with the assistance of several others including the General's grandson, is the first complete revision since 1915 and the first new edition in nearly twenty years; but there is nothing in it that would be new to General Robert. It supersedes previous editions, but has been written to be "in complete harmony" with them. Nonetheless, in the words of its inside front cover dustjacket, this edition is "more modern, more complete, more comprehensive, better organized, more clearly presented, more efficient, and far easier to use than any earlier edition," a description with which I am in complete accord.

Robert's Newly Revised is several hundred pages thicker than the 75th Anniversary Edition which it replaces. It incorporates material from General Robert's earlier works, Parliamentary Practice and Parliamentary Law, so as to provide for the first time answers to various esoteric questions of procedure in one definitive reference work. Earlier editions of Robert's Rules had charts which were impossible to use, with bars, asterisks, footnotes, and fine print enough to confuse even an experienced parliamentarian. This new edition has a forty-eight page center section of charts and tables, readily set off by a different color and heavier stock paper, which is an absolute delight to use for the student seeking quick reference as to form, precedence, and applicability of motions. This new edition also has the pleasant distinction of being reasonably well written and exceptionally well organized. Logical arrangement of material has replaced the old paragraph format and the order of presentation has been designed to be in accord with the natural flow of business at meetings. The ambiguous classification of certain motions has been remedied and the basic classification scheme clearly explained. For each motion, a section in outline form clearly and succinctly sets forth the motion's basic operational characteristics and its uses. All in all, the new edition is far superior to any of its predecessors.

Robert's Rules has an importance to the social scientist which goes well beyond its possible immediate relevance to him as a concerned participant in various group decision processes. Parliamentary procedure, especially that distillation of it which has entered into parliamentary law—those common principles of procedure which are held by the courts to be the applicable to every organization as being essential to legal action or for the protection of members in their individual rights—has been important in shaping and refining basic American notions of due process and majority and minority rights as applied to group activity. Indeed, Robert's Rules has been cited as authoritative in a number of court cases. More generally, however, Robert's Rules may be regarded as an implicit theory of democracy. For many Americans its procedures are synonymous with practical democracy. In fact, the inside jacket cover calls Robert's the "book you will want...the book you will need, to help get things done in accord with the American spirit (emphasis mine)." Contrasting the procedures in Robert's with those practiced by Quakers and with the Quaker inspired "participatory democracy" procedures of the New Left reveals quite different priorities assigned by such to values such as speed of deliberation, unanimity, intensity of preference v. majority rule, mass participation, etc.—raising questions which should be of great interest to any student of democratic theory. Robert's Rules is also important to the student of public policy concerned with the impact of rules on outcomes, and is, of course, particularly relevant to the student of legislative behavior. Finally, for the mathematically oriented political scientist, Robert's Rules offers for study a remarkable and fascinating system of queuing rules.

In an era where faculty meetings, student-faculty meetings, and mass meetings abound, we do not wish to neglect consideration of Robert's as a guide to the parliamentarily perplexed. It is possible for someone to learn parliamentary procedure by reading Robert's Rules of Order from cover to cover, but we would certainly not recommend it.* Despite the stated intentions of the editors of this edition to combine in it a definitive reference work and a teaching manual, it is only the former which has been achieved; although this edition is far superior to its predecessors in its accessibility to the parliamentarily uninitiated. Despite vast improvements in organization and in prose style, Robert's Newly Revised is, like its predecessors, marred by an archaic terminology (e.g., previous question, lay on the table), some unnecessarily complex and confusing rules (e.g., reconsider, committee of the whole v. informal consideration), and some rules which could be dispensed with (e.g., move to reconsider and enter on the min-
utes, object to consideration) which fealty to the
dead General Robert and a desire to maintain ter-
tinological accord with the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives have unfortunately frozen into place.
While this new edition is a vast improvement in
so many ways, it is also a great disappointment to
those who had looked for a genuine revision and
modernization of American parliamentary prac-
tice. For example, the discussion of procedures
which could be adopted in either very small or
very large gatherings when ordinary parliamentary
procedure becomes unduly cumbersome (either
because it is too formal or because it becomes
bogged down in the weight of large numbers of
participants) is woefully inadequate, despite a
considerable improvement in the section on mass
meetings; and in general we found some lack of
sensitivity to the need to vary procedures in ac-
cord with the size and nature of the group. Also,
the section on voting procedure reveals no knowl-
edge of recent work on committee election proce-
dures, such as that of Duncan Black, which is
highly relevant to a consideration of selection of
an appropriate and fair voting procedure. Regard-
less, however, of its shortcomings, Robert’s Rules
of Order Newly Revised is definitely a book with
which most political scientists should become ac-
quainted.—BERNARD N. GROFFMAN, State Uni-
versity of New York, Stony Brook.

The Origins of Socialism. By GEORGES LICHTHEIM.
$8.95.)

The purpose of Professor Lichtheim’s book is
not merely what it seems to be. The purpose is to
“clarify the origins of socialism, both as a world-
view and as the specific response of workers and
intellectuals to the twofold upheaval of the
French Revolution and the Industrial revolution.”
(p. vii) This is achieved by presenting socialism as
originating in French and English thought but re-
ceiving its “classical formulation” in Marx “with
the help of German philosophy.” This theme ex-
plains the tripartite division of the book, entitled
respectively “Heirs of the French Revolution,”
“Critics of the Industrial Revolution,” and “Ger-
man Socialism.” The author himself, however, ren-
ders this explanation questionable. Although “so-
cialism’s greatest thinker” did his “real theoretical
work as an economist” after 1848, “technical rea-
sons” forced concluding the book with that date.
This strange omission suggests that the “technical
reasons” in question are of more than passing im-
portance.

Even without this problem, the book’s structure
is “peculiar and somewhat daunting” since “Ger-
man Socialism” is not congruent with the other
titles. His explanation: the book was originally in-
tended as “the opening section of a general history
of socialism and communism.” The author is
not say why its structure was not properly
justified, since that would require changing only a
title. This omission raises the question why
broaches the structure at all? And why is this
problem relevant to the reviewer? The ans-
swer have to do with what the reviewer understand
be a conclusion reached by the author in
course of his “general history.”

Although there are no further statements as to
why the original plan was not completed, there
other reference to “technical points” (p. vii). These
have “for the most part” (i.e. not com-
pletely) been relegated to the Notes. The situ-
ation that the Notes have some unusual rele-
vance is supported by the author (p. xx): “The dis-
cussing reader who takes the trouble to consult
Notes . . .” However, the Notes’ dimensions k
“been swelled by the attempt to cite as m
resources as possible.” This reason explains nei-
their size nor their importance for the “discuss-
reader.”

What does the author mean by such pecu-
laries explained by weak reasons? He disclaims “in-
tention beyond the obvious one of providing
student with a concise analysis of the subject:
a critical introduction to the literature” (p. vii).
But “the discerning reader,” not “the student
told to consult the Notes. The discerning re-
notes the proportion (1:3) between Notes text. The number 3 recalls the “peculiar and so
what daunting” external arrangement. Part 3 is
its peculiar attention especially since the au-
said (p. 98) Part 3 is “The Marxist Synth-
rather than “German Socialism.”

“The Marxist Synthesis” asks whether the
threshold of our concluding chapter coincides
with “the summit of our theme?” The ans-
“depends on what one expects from an ana-
cal account of socialist origins.” The ans-
ever becomes explicit. But we can glean an
swer which explains the “technical reasons” w
puzzle this reviewer.

The original theme must be qualified. Marx
not merely a socialist writer who “combined
man philosophy with British economics
French socialism.” He was a philosopher ci-
entially concerned with “the genesis and func-
of modern society.” By 1848 Marx transcended
socialism as such. This synthesis may contin-
be of importance to the historian of philo-
long after socialism has taken its place, with i
alism and conservatism, as one particular ren
the twofold upheaval of the industrial rel
and the French Revolution.” And as
he done that Marx abandoned philosophy.

I suggest the major technical reason for ac-
this study with 1846 is the author’s conclusion

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