Candidate Evaluations and Turnout
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In this article, we consider the relationship between voter turnout and voter evaluations of the candidates. Using thermometer data and the 1976 voter validation study, we investigate the magnitude of indifference, alienation, and satisfaction effects. Overall, we find candidate-based abstention in 1976 to be minimal, suggesting that nonvoting in American presidential elections must be understood in terms of factors unrelated to parties’ choices of nominees.

To what extent is nonvoting due to short-term forces associated with attitudes toward the candidates running for office? Much casual and some scholarly thinking about turnout in American elections supposes that many people choose not to vote because of their feelings about the candidates. In particular, the rational choice literature has formalized the notions of abstention due to indifference toward the candidates (Downs, 1957) and abstention due to alienation toward all candidates (Garvey, 1966; Hinich and Ordeshook, 1969). The main empirical analysis of these effects is in two articles on the 1968 presidential election. Brody and Page (1973) found indifference and alienation effects on voting turnout in that election, with indifference having the greater effect, while Hinich’s (1978) spatial analysis found support for the indifference model among Republicans and the alienation model among Democrats.

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However, the full range of candidate-based effects on turnout has never been systematically analyzed. One more potential source of abstention can be posited—abstention due to satisfaction with all the major candidates. Once abstention due to satisfaction is taken into account, and the interrelationships between alienation, satisfaction, and indifference are considered, it becomes clear that previous studies misestimated the effects of alienation and indifference. A joint effects model is proposed in this article which permits a more accurate computation of all of these effects. Additionally, the effects of how much more one likes one’s preferred candidate than the other candidate, and of cross-pressure between partisanship and candidate preference, are examined. These several effects will be estimated for the 1976 election, using high quality validated measures of whether the person actually voted, rather than the usual survey question measuring whether the person claims to have voted. Candidate evaluation-based abstention is found to be minimal, suggesting that nonvoting in American presidential elections must be understood in terms of factors unrelated to the parties’ choices of nominees.

CANDIDATE-BASED ABSTENTION

In the “candidate-set model of turnout,” nonvoting is regarded as purposeful abstention due to the characteristics of the limited choices available to the citizen. According to the formal version of this model, the citizen compares the utility expected from voting for the Republican candidate to the utility expected from voting for the Democratic candidate to the utility expected from not voting, and then chooses the alternative which provides the greater utility. Four different mechanisms can lead to candidate-based abstention: when voters see no difference between the candidates (“indifference”), dislike both candidates (“alienation”), are pleased with both candidates (“satisfaction”), or dislike the candidate of their own party while liking the candidate of the opposite party (“cross-pressure”). Each of these potential effects is analyzed in detail in this article.
First, if the citizen expects identical benefits from all the candidates, then the outcome of the election makes no difference to the citizen, and the rational citizen would abstain rather than pay the costs entailed by voting, such as time spent going to and from the polls and waiting to vote. This is abstention due to indifference (Downs, 1957). Since voting consumes time and energy, in the absence of countervailing forces such as psychic benefits from performing one’s citizen duty (see Niemi, 1976), rational voters who are indifferent about the candidates should abstain. An important implication of this indifference argument is that abstention should be related to the gap between how much the citizen likes the most favored and least favored candidates. If such perceived net costs of voting and perceptions of closeness of election are randomly distributed across voters, the larger the difference in perceived benefits from the election of the different candidates, the more likely the benefits will outweigh the costs and the more likely the citizen will vote. On the other hand, a smaller gap is more likely to lead to abstention.

Second, if the citizen is dissatisfied with the position of all nominees, then the net benefits from voting will probably be negative if the act of voting incurs positive costs. This is abstention due to alienation (Garvey, 1966).

Third, if the citizen feels reasonably satisfied by all the major candidates, there is no concern about actually casting a ballot. This is abstention due to satisfaction, a form of rational nonvoting not previously described in the literature.

Fourth, although Downs (1957) does not distinguish between parties and their candidates, a voter may identify on a long-term basis with one party but like the other party’s nominee better in a particular election. Long-term party considerations and short-term candidate considerations are sometimes in conflict. Abstention due to this form of cross-pressure can result.

These four types of candidate-based abstention are not totally separate effects, so their interrelation is a matter of special concern if their effects are to be estimated correctly. The joint effects of alienation and satisfaction will be presented next, after which the added effects of indifference and then cross-pressure will be examined.
Alienation and Satisfaction

The simple effects of alienation and satisfaction can be stated in terms of a two-factor model. Let F represent the citizen's first choice candidate and let the last choice candidate be labelled L. Additionally, let P represent a positive evaluation of a candidate and N a negative evaluation. Let > be interpreted as the relation “have a higher probability of turnout.” The two factors are then:

i) PF > NF) Citizens who like their first choice candidate have, ceteris paribus, a higher probability of turnout than those who dislike their first choice candidate.

ii) (NL > PL) Citizens who dislike their last choice candidate have, ceteris paribus, a higher probability of turnout than those who like their last choice candidate.

This model posits two simple bivariate relationships—that, ceteris paribus, turnout rates are directly related to attitudes toward F but inversely related to attitudes toward L. Taken together, these two factors imply the model displayed in Figure 1: (PF, NL) > (PF, PL) and (PF, NL) > (NF, NL). Citizens who both like their first choice candidate and dislike their last choice candidate (whom we shall label the “concerned” citizens) have a higher probability of turnout than those who like their last choice candidate and hence must like their first choice candidate (the “satisfied”) or than those who dislike their first choice candidate and hence must also dislike their last choice candidate (the “alienated”).

It is essential to note that the combined effects model of Figure 1 is not identical to the simple effects, in which each factor is examined in isolation. Say, for example, that equal thirds of the electorate are concerned, alienated, and satisfied, and say that 70% of the concerned vote compared to 60% of the alienated and 30% of the satisfied. In this case, 50% of those who like their first choice candidate (the concerned and the satisfied combined) would be voting compared to 60% of those who dislike their first choice candidate (the alienated). Thus, the joint effects model can hold even when one of the two simple effects is violated.
Indifference effects are inherently joint effects. They can hold only in conjunction with alienation or satisfaction, since concerned citizens cannot (by definition) be exactly indifferent between the candidates. Given the theoretical discussions in the literature (Downs, 1957), we would expect that indifferent citizens are less likely to vote than citizens who prefer one candidate to another. The most accurate estimate of indifference effects would be obtained by contrasting probabilities of voting among indifferent and nonindifferent citizens, controlling for alienation or satisfaction.

The models presented so far have made no allowance for the possibility of citizens being neutral toward F or L. Let neutrality be denoted by O. When this possibility is taken into account, three more categories of citizens are produced: partly alienated citizens who dislike one nominee and are neutral about their first choice (Of, Nl), partly satisfied citizens who like one candidate and are neutral about their last choice (Pr, Ol), and citizens with neutral feelings toward all candidates (Or, Ol). Adding these three categories to the model yields the representation of Figure 2.5.
Our model contrasts with previous studies of the effects of alienation and indifference. Brody and Page (1973) follow the typical procedure of measuring alienation by comparing the turnout of those who evaluate their most favored candidate negatively or neutrally (the partly alienated and alienated categories of Figure 2) with the turnout of those who evaluate their most favored candidate positively (the concerned, satisfied, and partly satisfied categories), rather than simply contrasting the pure alienated and concerned categories of Figure 2. Also, in measuring the added impact of indifference on alienation, they contrast the turnout of the indifferent whose evaluation of their favored candidate is neutral or negative (the alienated but indifferent category and also the no opinion category) with the
turnout of those who see a difference between the candidates but evaluate their favored candidate nonpositively (the partly alienated and alienated), rather than contrasting only the alienated but indifferent category of Figure 2 with the pure alienated category. Our more precise delineation of attitudes toward candidates permits a more accurate estimate of the effects of alienation and indifference (see also note 4).

Effects associated with the gap between the evaluations of most favored and least favored candidate might also be expected to be relevant to turnout. Ceteris paribus, presumably, the larger the difference in evaluation of first choice and last choice candidate, the higher the voting rate. By definition, such gap effects can exist only in the top five cells of Figure 2. Of particular interest is the gap effects among the concerned. These are the citizens expected to vote with the greatest frequency, and the concerned with the greatest gap could be expected to have the highest turnout rate.

**Partisan Cross-Pressures**

Finally, cross-pressure effects can be incorporated into the model. Cross-pressures can be posited as simple effects—partisans who like their own party's candidate would have a higher probability of voting than those who do not, and partisans who dislike the other party's candidate would have a higher probability of voting than those who do not. However, we believe it would be more appropriate to view cross-pressures as joint effects, with those who like their own party's candidate more than the candidate of the other party being expected to vote with a higher probability than those who prefer the other party's candidate.6

Candidate preferences in a two-party system can be analyzed in terms of how the partisan reacts to each party's nominee. We shall graphically represent citizens' views of the nominee of their own party along the horizontal axis and their views of the nominee of the opposite party along the vertical axis. The various abstention conditions can be located in Figure 3. The 45° line represents indifference, liking (or disliking) the two nominees.
Figure 3: Abstention Due to Alienation, Satisfaction, Indifference, and Cross-Pressure
equally. Reactions above the 45° line involve cross-pressures—preferring the candidate of the opposite party—while those below the 45° line do not. Alienated citizens are in Quadrant III, satisfied in Quadrant I, and concerned in Quadrants II and IV. Figure 3 shows the full 13 categories which result when cross-pressures are added to the effects already discussed.

Now that the four types of candidate-based abstention have been described and their interrelationships have been developed, we shall attempt to estimate their importance in the 1976 American presidential election.7

THE EVIDENCE FOR CANDIDATE-BASED ABSTENTION IN 1976

Data

In order to study candidate-based abstention, it is necessary to select survey measures of turnout and of attitudes toward the candidates. Since more survey respondents claim to have voted than actually did (with Traugott and Katosh (1979) finding a 14% misreporting rate for 1976), we are concerned that certain categories of citizens may be more likely to misreport their turnout than others. Fortunately, the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies 1976 national election survey included a special vote validation study in which the actual turnout of respondents was checked against the official voting records in the local communities, and it is this validated vote measure which we shall use as the dependent variable.8

Following the suggestion of Brody and Page (1973), the "feeling thermometer" in the CPS surveys can be used to operationalize the abstention conditions. Respondents are asked to rate the presidential nominees on a scale from 100° for very warm feelings to 0° for very cold feelings. The categorizations described in previous figures are obtained by interpreting scores above 50° as positive, those below 50° as negative, and 50° as neutral.9
TABLE 1
Validated Voter Turnout Rates in 1976: Simple Effects of $P_L$, $N_F$, Indifference, Gap and Partisan Cross-Pressures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>turnout rate</th>
<th>percent of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_L$</td>
<td>Rate least preferred candidate above $50^\circ$ 63%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate least preferred candidate at $50^\circ$ 55%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate least preferred candidate below $50^\circ$ 65%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_F$</td>
<td>Rate most preferred candidate below $50^\circ$ 58%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate most preferred candidate at $50^\circ$ 57%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate most preferred candidate above $50^\circ$ 63%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifference:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate the two candidates differently 62%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate both candidates equally 64%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate candidates $1^\circ$-$24^\circ$ apart 60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate candidates $25^\circ$-$49^\circ$ apart 64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate candidates $50^\circ$-$74^\circ$ apart 65%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate candidates $75^\circ$-$100^\circ$ apart 57%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-pressure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate own party's candidate below $50^\circ$ 71%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate own party's candidate at $50^\circ$ 53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate own party's candidate above $50^\circ$ 65%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-pressure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate above $50^\circ$ 65%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate at $50^\circ$ 62%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate below $50^\circ$ 66%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-pressure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate above own 63%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate same as own 67%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate other party's candidate below own 65%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validated turnout rate:</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>N=2218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simple Effects

The simple effects of the various abstention conditions are reported in Table 1. The effects are uniformly small and not always in the predicted directions. Alienation decreases turnout by 5%, but only 2% of the sample are alienated. By contrast, 39%
of the sample are satisfied, but satisfaction decreases turnout by only 2%. Indifference does not decrease turnout, nor is the simple gap hypothesis supported. Cross-pressure effects are small and inconsistent. Table 1 suggests that candidate-based abstention was unimportant in 1976, but joint effects must be examined before reaching final conclusions.

Alienation, Satisfaction, and Indifference

The joint effects of alienation, satisfaction, and indifference on the 1976 validated turnout rates are shown in Figure 4.\textsuperscript{10} As expected, there is a high turnout rate among the concerned who like one candidate and dislike the other (65%), and the respon-
dents who give neutral scores to both nominees have the lowest turnout rate (52%). The difference of only 13% between the turnout rates of these two extreme categories already suggests that candidate-based abstention is small even in the joint effects model.

Alienation—disliking both candidates—is extremely rare. Only 1% of the sample falls into the pure alienation cell. The turnout rate for this group is 4% below that of the concerned, but the practical importance of this effect is mitigated by its low frequency.

Satisfaction—liking both candidates—is far more common. The turnout rate for this group is also 4% below that of the concerned. Since 29% of the sample fall in the pure satisfaction cell, more abstainers fall in this cell than in any other cell except for the concerned cell. Satisfaction is the most important type of candidate-based abstention in 1976.

The turnout rates for the partly alienated and partly satisfied do not fit the hypotheses of Figure 2. The partly alienated do not vote at a lower rate than the concerned, although this result is based on too few cases to matter. However, there are enough cases to show that the partly satisfied do not vote at a higher rate than the satisfied, a result which we interpret as showing that neutral feelings toward even one presidential nominee reflect a lack of knowledge and involvement in politics that leads to a lower turnout rate. Still, the full interpretation of the findings for these categories is unclear, so we shall not emphasize these categories in the remaining analysis.

Indifference—liking (or disliking) the candidates equally—has mixed effects. When combined with alienation, it further depresses turnout by 6%, but this affects only 1% of the sample. On the other hand, it seems to increase turnout by 7% when combined with satisfaction. Those respondents who are both satisfied and indifferent actually vote at a higher rate than the concerned. This unexpected direction for the effect of indifference combined with satisfaction holds not only for the 1976 validated turnout data but also for the 1972 and 1976 reported turnout data (not shown). Thus, this anomaly seems real, and
calls into question the effects of indifference postulated by Downs (1957).

A gap size hypothesis would expect highest turnout among those who are the least indifferent, those who rate one candidate much more favorably than the other. The data (not shown) do not support this hypothesis. Among the alienated and partly alienated, those who rate their preferred candidate 25°-50° above the other candidate actually have a substantially lower turnout rate than those who rate him only 1°-24° higher. Among the satisfied and partly satisfied, those who vote their preferred candidate 25°-50° above the other candidate do have a higher turnout rate than those whose rating is only 1°-24° higher, but it is only a 2% higher turnout rate. Even more disconcerting for a gap model is the fact that the concerned citizens who rate their preferred candidate 75°-100° higher than the other candidate have a turnout rate of only 57% in contrast to 67% for those who rate the candidate closer. Degree of indifference does not affect turnout in the expected direction even in the joint effects model.11

Partisan Cross-Pressure

The possibility of abstention due to conflict between long-term partisan identification and short-term views of the candidates is introduced for partisans in Figure 5. The cross-pressure effect seems mixed. Cross-pressure reduces turnout among the satisfied by 7% (65% v. 58%) but increases it among the concerned by 5% (66% v. 71%).

Controlling on cross-pressure does help clarify the satisfaction effect. For those without cross-pressure, satisfaction has no effect. Those citizens still vote in high proportions, presumably for their party's candidate. The effect of satisfaction is instead concentrated among the cross-pressured. They vote 13% less than do the concerned (71% v. 58%). When partisans prefer the other party's candidate to their own but are satisfied with their own, nonvoting becomes a means of resolving the cross-pressure dilemma.
Figure 5: Validated Turnout Rates in 1976 (with proportion of sample shown in parentheses)
By contrast, controlling cross-pressure does not help clarify the alienation effect, but this may be due to the low number of cases (15). Still, it is interesting to see that alienated partisans have higher voting rates than comparable groups of concerned partisans. Alienation does not suppress turnout of partisans.

If cross-pressure had effects in 1976, one might expect those effects to be most evident among Democrats. After all, the incumbent Republican president might benefit from some incumbency effect, and it would not be surprising if many Democratic identifiers preferred the known Republican president to the relatively unknown candidate of their party. Indeed, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to prefer the candidate of the opposite party to the candidate of their own.

However, the empirical evidence of cross-pressure effects for Democrats is actually weak. The Democrats who preferred Ford to Carter actually voted with 8% greater frequency than the Democrats who preferred Carter to Ford. Once citizens actually decide they prefer the other party’s candidate to their own, there is little reason to avoid the polling booths. The most cross-pressure would be evident for concerned Democrats who like the Republican nominee while disliking the Democratic nominee, but their turnout rate is actually higher than that of Democrats who like the Democratic nominee and dislike the Republican nominee.

The only trace of a cross-pressure effect among Democrats is the interaction with satisfaction already found in Figure 5. Noncross-pressured Democrats turn out at the same rates, regardless of whether they are concerned or satisfied. However, satisfaction decreases turnout among cross-pressured Democrats. That is, among Democrats who preferred Ford to Carter, those who disliked Carter were more likely to vote than those who at least liked him. Cross-pressure has a role in affecting turnout, but a minimal one.

**Independence and Indifference**

If indifference has effects on turnout, those effects should be most prominent for political independents. Partisans might go to
Figure 6: Validated Turnout Rates for Independents in 1976 (with proportion of sample shown in parentheses)

the polls to register a party preference even if they are indifferent between the candidates in a particular election, but citizens without either party or candidate preferences would seem to have less reason to vote. Indeed, pure independents (those who do not consider themselves closer to either major party) were more likely than partisans in 1976 to like (or dislike) the two nominees equally, and also more likely to be satisfied with both candidates and more likely to be alienated from both.

Figure 6 shows the turnout rates among pure independents along the classifications presented in this article. Alienation and satisfaction effects are evident, but indifference works in the opposite direction from expected. Citizens who like the candidates equally vote as often as do concerned citizens. Even independents who rate both nominees at the neutral 50° point vote at the same
rate as concerned independents who like one candidate and dislike the other. Analysis of gap effects (not shown) indicates that independents who prefer one candidate much more than the other do not necessarily turn out at a greater rate than those who like one candidate just a little more than the other.

The 1976 election is one in which candidate differences did not seem to be large, so indifference could have been important. However, there is little evidence of indifference effects on turnout. Indifference does not depress turnout among independents, either in the dichotomous sense (whether they like the candidates equally) or the continuous sense (how much more they like one candidate than the other). The only indifference effect found in this study is its interaction effect with alienation shown in Figure 4—citizens who disliked both candidates equally voted at a slightly lower rate than those who disliked both candidates unequally. Even here, the number of cases is so small as to render this effect of little practical importance.

In sum, our results show little candidate-based abstention in 1976. There are effects associated with alienation and with indifference when combined with alienation, but they only affect a very small portion of the citizens. Satisfaction has effects, too, but indifference actually neutralizes those effects. The degree of indifference taken alone does not affect turnout, nor do cross-pressures necessarily reduce turnout. Candidate-based abstention does not seem to be an important explanation of variation in turnout across the entire electorate. If it has any importance, it must be one which is isolated among particular subgroups of the population.

Habitual Nonvoters

One final hypothesis about candidate-based turnout effects can be tested using the model developed in this article. Studies of the Nazi electoral victory in 1930 focus upon the support Hitler received in that election from chronic nonvoters (Converse, 1964). This leads to the hypothesis that chronic nonvoters will be drawn to the polls if they perceive real stakes in the election—if
they like one candidate and dislike the other. Certainly the 1976 election does not provide a test of the electoral pull of a demagogue, but the effect of candidate evaluations on chronic nonvoters can be studied.

The Center for Political Studies survey contains a question asking respondents who are old enough to have voted in at least one presidential election whether they have voted in all, most, some, or none of the presidential elections since they became old enough to vote.

Candidate-based turnout effects did exist for those respondents who claim not to have voted in any prior presidential elections. We show these in Figure 7. Of the concerned habitual nonvoters, one-third voted in 1976. This amounts to an increase in the total national turnout level of only 1%, but it is an
important demonstration that candidate-based turnout exists. The concerned citizens voted at a greater rate than those who liked both candidates. None of the habitual nonvoters who disliked both candidates or rated both at 50° voted in 1976. While alienation and satisfaction effects are evident here, there are no indifference effects or gap effects (not shown). However, direct cross-pressure effects exist. Habitual nonvoters who prefer the other party's candidate to their own are 13% less likely to vote than those who prefer their own party's candidate. All in all, there is more evidence of candidate-based effects on turnout among the chronic nonvoters than among any other group examined in this article.

CONCLUSIONS

Page and Brody (1973) found that the effect of alienation on voting turnout was small in 1968 and was less than the effect of indifference. The present study has attempted to provide a more complete classification of causes of candidate-based abstention, but the increased precision has not led to higher estimates of the importance of such abstention.

The most important cause of candidate-based abstention seems to be satisfaction. Citizens who like both major candidates are less likely to vote. The effect is not huge, but enough citizens like both candidates (at least in 1976) that this does depress overall turnout. The effect is most noticeable among partisans who are cross-pressured, among political independents, and among chronic nonvoters.

Alienation also has an effect, but that effect is minor since few citizens disliked both candidates in 1976. A larger alienation effect might well be found if both parties nominated candidates who were unacceptable to a large portion of the American electorate. In any event, alienation had its strongest effect among pure independents and chronic nonvoters.

There is very little indication of indifference being related to turnout in 1976, either in terms of citizens who like both candidates
equally voting at a lower rate, or in terms of the gap hypothesis that citizens who like one candidate much more than the other vote at a higher rate. The combination of indifference and alienation does suppress turnout below that for citizens who are just alienated, but the small number of cases renders this effect unimportant.

There is also very little indication of partisan cross-pressure being related to turnout in 1976. Citizens who preferred the other party’s candidate to their own did not have lower turnout rates. The combination of satisfaction and cross-pressure does reduce turnout, and cross-pressure reduces turnout among chronic nonvoters, but no broader cross-pressure effects were found.

Overall, the evidence indicates very limited effects of the candidate choice on abstention in 1976. The bulk of the abstention simply cannot be explained by the candidate set. If we are to understand abstention, we will have to switch to a model in which abstention does not depend on the candidate choice. This model can be formalized as a two-stage process in which the citizen first chooses whether or not to vote (based on legal restrictions such as whether residence requirements are satisfied, personal considerations such as weather and illness, and psychological motivations such as long-term lack of interest in politics) and then, if the decision is made to vote, next chooses whether to vote Republican or Democrat. This can also be viewed as a “nonchoice” model, since the citizen may not confront a real decision as to whether or not to vote in a particular election (because of not satisfying legal requirements, inability to get to the polls, or an earlier permanent decision against voting). Conversely, some other citizens according to this model may not confront a real decision on whether to vote in a particular election since they have previously made permanent decisions to vote in all important elections. Separate analysis we have conducted (Grofman and Weisberg, 1980) indeed shows that the best available model for predicting nonvoting in 1976 is based on the person’s previous history of voting or not voting. Overall, the vote decision seems less a matter of making a new decision based on the current candidates than continuing a previous decision to vote
or not to vote in presidential elections. Abstention is predominately exogenous to citizen evaluations of the candidates.

NOTES

1. This reflects a crucial difference between economic and political markets. In the economic market, the consumer decides which product to purchase, but obtains no product without actually purchasing it. By contrast, citizens receive some elected leader from an election even if they do not bother to vote.

2. Some readers might view satisfaction as merely a subcase of indifference. But consistency would then require also viewing alienation as a subcase of indifference, which is contrary to how those terms are usually employed. A possible response is that alienation is meant to denote being far from both candidates for opposite reasons—viewing one candidate as too liberal and the other as too conservative. However, the same construction can be given to satisfaction—liking one candidate even though a bit more liberal than the citizen would ideally prefer while liking the other candidate even though a bit more conservative than the citizen would ideally prefer. Satisfaction has as much justification for being viewed as a separate category as alienation does. Abstention through alienation and abstention through satisfaction can also be thought of as forms of satisficing—when no candidate is above a certain threshold of minimal acceptability, or when both candidates are, the voter abstains even though one candidate may be perceived as considerably better than the other.

3. Only three of the four possible like-dislike combinations are feasible, since it is logically impossible to dislike one’s first choice candidate while liking one’s last choice candidate.

4. This point affects the estimation of alienation and satisfaction effects more generally. The simple effects model would lead to an estimate of the alienation effect by the probability of PF voting minus that of NF voting. This puts the satisfied in the PF category. If the satisfied do indeed vote less than the concerned, such an estimate necessarily underestimates the alienation effect based on the joint effects model, which should obtain by comparing the probability of (PF, Nt) voting with that of (NF, Nt) voting. By a similar logic, the simple effects model also leads to an underestimate of the satisfaction effect, which should be estimated by subtracting the probability of (PF, NL) voting minus that of (PF, PL), rather than comparing the PL and NL categories, since the latter category includes alienated voters as well as concerned ones.

5. Figure 2 assumes that neutrality toward a candidate would have intermediate effects on turnout in equations i and ii. If neutrality arises from lack of knowledge and interest, then neutrality might lead to lower probabilities of voting than either alienation or satisfaction. The data reported support this interpretation rather than that shown in Figure 2 (see Grofman, 1977, in which two alternative axiomatizations of the effect of neutral evaluations on turnout are considered).

6. Cross-pressure arising from conflict between candidate evaluations and partisan preference is only one of several kinds of cross-pressures which can arise, but it is the only kind which we shall analyze in this paper. Sociological and other forms of cross-pressure are discussed in Sperlich (1971).
7. An additional possible effect not considered in this article is the possibility of
different positivity and negativity effects. We shall consider a citizen's net attitude toward a
candidate, rather than testing whether the number of positive attitudes toward a candidate
and the number of negative attitudes toward that candidate have separate effects.

8. The respondents included in this analysis are those with postelection interviews
and validated voting information. Those who actually voted are counted as having voted,
while those who are not recorded as voting, who did not register, or who did not have files
are counted as not having voted, in line with Traugott and Katosh (1979). The previous
discussion has focused on the probability of categories of citizens voting. Turnout rates are
being used as surrogates for those probabilities in this analysis, even though this involves
some slight shift in the definition of probability.

9. Citizens with missing data on the thermometers ("don't know," "no attitude," or
"not ascertained") are omitted from this analysis.

10. It might seem that the separate effects of alienation, satisfaction, and indifference
could be estimated on the basis of a regression or probit analysis using as predictors the
scores given to the respondent's most preferred candidate (alienation), least preferred
candidate (satisfaction), and the range of scores used for the candidates (indifference).
However, those predictors would be perfectly collinear (the third variable being the
difference between the first two), so the separate effects could not be determined.
Therefore, these have been treated as presence-or-absence effects, which has the incidental
advantage of largely avoiding the interpersonal comparison of utility problem.

11. It is useful to investigate what difference our choices of dependent and
independent variables make in this analysis. Had we used the unvalidated reported turnout
as the dependent variable, the turnout rates would have been 78% for the concerned, 69%
for the alienated, 65% for the alienated but indifferent, 72% for the satisfied, and 73% for
the satisfied but indifferent. Alienation would be found to have a greater effect than
satisfaction, but in any case the extent of candidate-based abstention would be minor. An
alternative measure of attitude toward the candidates is also available: the open-ended
likes and dislikes obtained on each presidential nominee (Yarnell, 1975). The comments of
respondents can be combined to see if their net reaction to a particular candidate was
positive (more likes than dislikes), neutral (equal numbers of both), or negative (more
dislikes). Using the unvalidated vote as the dependent variable, we can analyze 1952, 1956,
1960, 1964, and 1976 data, the two-party races in which CPS coded five likes and dislikes
on each nominee. Unregistered southern blacks are excluded from the 1952-1964 studies
for this analysis. Averaging across the five studies, the turnout rates are 83% for the
concerned, 78% for the alienated, 71% for the alienated but indifferent, 82% for the
satisfied, and 73% for the satisfied but indifferent. Alienation has a greater effect than
satisfaction, while indifference has a more uniform effect (although these conclusions do
not hold in each election taken separately). Still, alienation was much less common than
satisfaction, and indifference was also not very common. Most of the abstainers were
concerned citizens. While we feel that the values in Figure 4 are the most valid estimates of
the effects of candidate-based abstention, it is clear that candidate-based abstention would
be found to be minimal regardless of the choice of variables.
REFERENCES


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