NOTICE - Warning Concerning Copyright Restrictions.

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement.

This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of Copyright Law.
Domestic Perspectives on Contemporary Democracy

Edited by PETER F. NARDULLI

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
Urbana and Chicago
This chapter focuses on the potential for electoral engineering to serve as a tool to foster democracy, with a central concern being the role of electoral systems in mitigating ethnic conflict. With democracy's "third wave" having produced a large number of new (or "renewed") democracies, and numerous countries aspiring to become democracies, electoral systems are presently an especially hot topic in the study of democratization. They promise to remain so for a good part of the twenty-first century. As a potential lever of political and social change, electoral systems possess two important features. The first is that they can be changed without totally changing the nature of the political system. While electoral systems tend to be "sticky," they are still certainly easier to modify than other central aspects of constitutional design—such as presidential versus parliamentary systems or unitary versus federal systems. This is true because, in most countries, the structure of electoral systems is not constitutionally embedded; this allows for change by legislative action.

The second reason is that changes in electoral systems may be expected to have important effects on political behavior. A large body of literature claims that electoral systems impact such things as party proliferation; the balance of intraparty versus interparty electoral competition; incentives for legislative parochialism and pork-barrel politics; and the likelihood of extremist parties achieving representation, cabinet durability, political stability, and the like. Moreover, a newer literature argues for specific policy consequences of
electoral rules in areas such as size of government, budget deficits, and policies affecting income inequality. There are also strong theoretically grounded reasons to expect choice of electoral systems to have especially important consequences for descriptive representation and ethnic accommodation in plural or divided societies.3

While what we have to say in this chapter will generally be relevant to the study of electoral systems as a democratizing force, our special concern will be for the relationship between electoral systems and ethnic accommodation. As Williams (2003, 36–37) observes, few countries are essentially monoethnic or monoreligious in character. Ethnic and religious diversity arises from many causes. These include

- Conquests of native peoples by outsiders who settle/colonize a territory;
- Multiple waves of settlement within the same territory by non-native groups prior to the definition of present state boundaries;
- Shifting of boundaries as a result of war or the breakup of empires that redefine boundaries in ways that create multiethnic composite nations and/or irredentist residues;
- Individual migrations of refugees or job-seekers (either legal or illegal), many of whom do not leave and who, together with their descendants, cumulate into a substantial minority presence;
- Importation of slaves;
- Change of religious affiliation by a ruler that affects the religious affiliations of some, but not all, of his subjects; and
- Religious proselytizing.

In the post–World War II period, transnational migration, including an influx of people into the home countries of their former colonizers (e.g., Algerians into France, Indians and West Indians into Britain), international refugees (whose recent impact, relative to total population, has been especially marked in Scandinavia and the Netherlands), and economic migrants (including those from the former Soviet Union) has led to significant changes in the ethnic composition of a number of industrialized nations. Perhaps even more important, the ending of colonial empires, including most recently the breakup of the Soviet Union, has created a multiplicity of states whose borders do not coincide neatly, or at all, with ethnic territorial boundaries, but where powerful former colonial regimes are no longer in place to suppress ethnic conflict.4 Thus, it is increasingly important that countries find ways to accommodate their ethnic and religious diversity. Electoral rules are
often proposed as tools for institutional engineering in multiethnic societies to assure fairness of treatment across groups, to reduce the potential for ethnic conflict, and to promote or strengthen democracy.

We begin with some introductory material on each of the two research areas, electoral systems and ethnic conflict, whose intersection lies at the heart of this chapter. These two sections situate electoral system choices in the broader literature on ways to mitigate ethnic antagonisms in multiethnic societies. We then turn to a set of more specific questions about the possibility of institutional design ameliorating ethnic tensions, the appropriateness of Western political institutions for tribal societies, and the likely effects of different electoral rules. We conclude with a discussion of electoral system reform issues in two of the small island nations of the South Pacific, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. These Melanesian nations are deeply divided societies—the former because of permanent settlements of guest-worker populations, the latter due to ethno-linguistic hyper-fractionalization and tribal rivalries across language groups.

**Approaches to Electoral Systems**

**in Political Science: A Brief Overview**

Most early literature on electoral systems was couched in terms of a dichotomy between first-past-the-post (plurality or majoritarian) rules and proportional representation (PR). There are two main forms of proportional representation. In one, citizens vote for a given party and party elites completely control the nominating process. In the other, voters rank candidates and can directly determine which candidates of a given party are elected. In the pure form of list PR, parties present a list of candidates and voters must choose to vote for a single party. Each party is then entitled to elect the k highest candidates on its list, where k is determined by the level of voter support for that party. In contrast, the single transferable vote form of proportional representation requires voters to rank order the candidates. Initially, any candidate who has at least one quota of first place votes (where a quota is defined by the fraction, \(\frac{1}{(m+1)}\) of the electoral turnout, with \(m\) the number of seats to be filled) is elected. If fewer than \(m\) candidates are elected in this fashion, the candidate with fewest first-place votes is dropped, and ballots that listed that candidate first are then reallocated to the next highest nonelected candidate still eligible for office. This process continues until \(m\) candidates are chosen. Ballots "used up" in electing a candidate (exactly one quota's worth) are, in effect, discarded. We omit the technical details of how to reallocate the votes a winning candidate may receive in excess of quota.\(^5\)
The publication in 1967 of Douglas Rae’s Ph.D. dissertation, *The Political Consequence of Electoral Laws* (2d ed., 1971) marked a sea change in the study of electoral systems. Its theoretically grounded and far-ranging empirical analysis largely supplanted the more polemic approaches characteristic of an earlier generation of research. With this book, the study of electoral systems moved into the mainstream of comparative politics research, making first steps in drawing on analytic tools from game theory, and making use of quantitative analyses. For example, it showed how electoral systems could be characterized in terms of thresholds of representation and exclusion, thus allowing us to replace nominal classifications in terms of the names of electoral rules with quantitative continua along which different rules could be arrayed.

In the 1980s, the growing maturity of the electoral systems field was signaled by the publication of a number of important books offering summaries and syntheses of data-oriented research findings as well as new analytic perspectives: for example, Katz (1980); Bogdanor and Butler (1983); Lijphart (1984); Lijphart and Grofman (1984); Grofman and Lijphart (1986); and Taagepera and Shugart (1989). Much of this work concerned three empirical issues: the impact of electoral rules on the proportionality of seats-votes relationships for political parties; the link between electoral system choice and party proliferation; and the consequences of electoral rules for political stability. Moreover, there was important work on seats-vote issues and redistricting done by political geographers such as R. J. Johnston, M. Taylor, G. Gudgin, and F. Shelley (Johnston, Shelley, and Taylor 1990; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Gudgin and Taylor 1979; see review in Grofman 1982b). Also, and perhaps even more important, during this period the international journal *Electoral Studies* was founded. In addition to de-polemicizing the debate, this new research cast doubt on the simplistic notion that the only relevant electoral choice is based on a dichotomy between plurality and proportional representation systems (see, e.g., Taagepera 1984; Rose 1984; cf. Sartori 1968). It also cast strong doubt on the empirical claims made about the inherent political instability of PR systems as compared to plurality systems (see esp. Lijphart 1984).

The renaissance of the electoral systems field continues. In the past decade or so we have seen the publication of Lijphart’s *Electoral Systems and Party Systems* (1994), Cox’s *Making Votes Count* (1997), and numerous detailed studies of particular electoral systems and their effects (e.g., Davidson and Grofman 1994; Reynolds 1999; Grofman, Lee, Winckler, and Woodall 1999; Bowler and Grofman 2000; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Lijphart and Grof-
man 2002), with various of the essays in Colomer (2004) forcing us to rethink claims often made about the causal impact of changes in electoral systems. Electoral system research has moved into the political science mainstream and established itself as an important subfield. A host of authors, many of them young scholars only recently attracted to the field, publish lively and important research in the pages of Electoral Studies and other major journals, including the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Party Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, and the European Journal of Political Research. What had been a dearth of work on electoral arrangements has recently become a flood.

Moreover, strong links have been forged between electoral systems research and the study of party systems, on the one hand, and constitutional design, on the other (see e.g., Shugart and Carey 1992). The most important aspect of this body of work is that electoral systems and their consequences are seen as embedded in a larger political and institutional framework (see Grofman 1999). For example, Shugart and Carey (1992) and others have begun to look at how the presence of a presidential system, the rules for electing the president, and the timing of parliamentary and presidential elections interact with choice of electoral system for parliamentary elections to produce political consequences.

Another important very recent change is the entry of economists into the comparative politics field, where they have examined electoral systems and constitutional design in terms of their impact on public policy. Major contributions to understanding the electoral system effects on political economy (e.g., overall size of government and size of the welfare state component, incentives for pork-barrel politics, political corruption, budget deficit levels, rates of inflation and unemployment, levels of economic inequality, rate of economic growth) have been made by economists associated with the "new public economics," such as Alberto Alesina, Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini (Alesina 1994, 1995; Persson and Tabellini 1999, 2000; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2000). These topics are also being investigated by political scientists such as Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1999) and his students (see esp. Crepaz 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2001; Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Crepaz and Moser 2004). However, there remain ongoing controversies about, for example, whether PR systems are more conducive to high overall levels of government spending, and high ratios of both welfare expenditure and pork-barrel spending to total spending, than are single-member district systems. While such positive correlations are well established, and even validated in multivariate modeling, skeptics doubt the causal nature of the linkages, argu-
ing that they may be explained by selection bias connected to variations in cultural patterns and economic development that cannot be fully addressed with only cross-sectional data.

Mathematical modeling of voting rules has also grown apace, exemplified best in the ever-expanding literature on social choice springing primarily from the earlier work of pioneering scholars such as Anthony Downs (1957), Kenneth Arrow (1962), and Robin Farquharson (1969). The neo-Downsian literature deals with questions such as the nature of the incentives different electoral rules provide to vote-share maximizing parties to pick policy platforms that are similar to differentiated from one other. The Arrowian literature deals with issues like axiomatic characterizations of the "normative" properties of different voting rules, while Saari (1994, 1995) has shown how to generate preference profiles that will give us all possible differences in outcomes across a wide class of voting rules. The literature inspired by Farquharson makes use of game theoretic tools to look at strategically motivated choices, e.g., voters, parties, and sometimes interest groups as well (see e.g., Cox 1997, 2000). Finally, we have the sui generis modeling work of Taagepera (see e.g., Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993; Taagepera 1999a, b), which makes use of ideas from statistical thermodynamics based on expectations under a principle of insufficient knowledge. This work offers a rich network of interlinked statistical propositions about electoral system effects based on only a handful of key institutional variables. For example, in a constituency from which m legislators will be elected under a proportional representation rule, Taagepera’s work shows why we might expect that the number of seat-winning parties will be roughly proportional to the square root of m (see review in Grofman 2004).

Institutional Design and Ethnic Antagonisms in Multiethnic Societies

The most common dichotomy in the ethnic accommodation literature is that between recognizing differences across ethnic groups by various forms of multicultural recognition and accommodation, and policies that encourage assimilation and control. Our preferred approach (see esp. Grofman and Stockwell 2003) has three components. First, rather than a dichotomy between assimilation and recognition of communal difference, we prefer to think of options in terms of two crosscutting dimensions of choice, giving rise to a four-fold (2 x 2) categorization. The horizontal axis represents communalist versus integrative perspectives and the vertical axis is the degree of
emphasis on institutional mechanisms that primarily affect representation as compared to institutional arrangements that affect general social and legal arrangements (see table 1, taken from Grofman and Stockwell 2003, 110). Second, following the perspective of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) on optimal institutions, we do not believe that, in general, the best solution is one that is "all of a piece," i.e., one all of whose elements are located within a single cell of table 1. In other words, we are open to the possibility of arrangements that mix different options. Third, we do not see institutional design for ethnically divided societies as one size fits all, that is, we believe very strongly that institutional arrangements for ethnic accommodation must be tailored to the specific historical circumstances that brought different ethnics together within the same polity and to their history of interaction.

We make no effort to plumb the depths of the vast literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in this overview. Rather, in what follows we briefly address three topics that bear directly on the relevance of electoral system design to ethnic accommodation. The first has to do with the possibility of sustaining democracy in deeply divided societies. A second issue has to do with the applicability of Western models of representation to more tribal societies. A third important area of disagreement in the ethnic relations literature involves both sharply contrasting normative perspectives and an ongoing empirical debate about the likely consequences of different electoral systems.

**PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES**

"Is democracy possible in deeply divided societies?" This debate is alive and well and living in Iraq and Afghanistan, among numerous other places. One camp argues that democracy is inherently unstable in plural societies because conflicts over division of resources will inevitably be fought primarily along ethnic lines, and thus will be inherently irresolvable, especially if the ultimate question is "Who owns the state?"

Pessimism about plural societies is empirically grounded in the large number of ethnically or religiously divided societies that have failed to sustain democracy, or suffered repeated crises; an abbreviated list includes Burundi, Fiji, Guyana, Lebanon, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Suriname, and Sudan, and now, of course, several of the parts of the former Yugoslavia. Quantitative research examining the link between ethnic diversity and degree of democracy often suggests a negative relationship (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Diamond 1992; Hannan and Carroll 1981; Muller and Seligson 1994; Powell 1982). Recent investigations under the auspices of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development have suggested,
### Table 5.1: Categorizing institutional approaches to fostering stable democracy in plural societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass-oriented</th>
<th>Institutions that seek to minimize the importance of ethnicity and/or foster a multi-ethnic character to the state (integrative institutions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Separate (communal) legal systems</td>
<td>• A legal system with a strong emphasis on individual rather than group rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specific provisions for group rights</td>
<td>• Political distributions that are not tied to ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Separate (communal) school systems</td>
<td>• Requiring a single common language or requiring multilingualism of all citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnically based allocative rules for jobs, etc. that draw on the norm of proportional representation</td>
<td>• Forbidding certain markers of group distinctiveness (e.g., the veil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bans on ethnically based political parties or rules requiring a given regional spread of voter support</td>
<td>• STV in multi-ethnic constituencies (Reynolds &amp; Reilly 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The alternative vote in multi-ethnic constituencies (Horowitz 1985) with optional ranking of preferences and without above-the-line ballots</td>
<td>• Forms of federalism that either do not coincide with ethnicity or that divide up ethnic blocs into multiple units so as to diminish prospects of ethnic solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• STV in multi-ethnic constituencies (Reynolds &amp; Reilly 1999) with optional ranking of preferences and without above-the-line ballots</td>
<td>• The alternative vote in multi-ethnic constituencies (Horowitz 1985) with above-the-line ticket options in lodging ballots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
<td>• Forms of federalism that either do not coincide with ethnicity or that divide up ethnic blocs into multiple units so as to diminish prospects of ethnic solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The alternative vote in multi-ethnic constituencies (Horowitz 1985) with above-the-line ticket options in lodging ballots</td>
<td>• The alternative vote in multi-ethnic constituencies (Horowitz 1985) with above-the-line ticket options in lodging ballots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representational</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnically rooted (territorial) federalism with considerable autonomy for subunits</td>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mono-ethnic electoral constituencies (or, in the extreme, communal rolls), or full or partial quota systems for the nomination of electoral representatives</td>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elite power-sharing mechanisms (e.g., grand coalitions, minority veto, ethnically based political or in the extreme, ethnically based office holding)</td>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electoral rules that foster centralized elite control (e.g., list PR)</td>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of a parliamentary rather than presidential system</td>
<td>• First-past-the-post electoral systems—where used to promote stable governments via seats/votes bonuses parties, and discouraging third party contestants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
however, that it is not ethnically multi-polar or hyper-fractionalized states (such as India, Tanzania, or Papua New Guinea) that face the greatest difficulty in sustaining democracy, but rather ethnically tripolar or bipolar states (such as Fiji, Guyana, Malaysia, or Bosnia) where two or three large ethnic groups compete for control over the state. Even here, the trajectory is not inexorably downhill, as the examples of Fiji and Malaysia indicate (Bangura 2004). Of course, a correlation between ethnic diversity and state failures and violence does not mean that positive outcomes cannot ever occur in the presence of ethnic heterogeneity. Indeed, Thomas, Ramirez, Meyer, and Gobalet (1979) find no statistically significant linkage between state failure and ethnic diversity once other factors are controlled.

Another troubling claim is that democracy, or at least attempts at democracy, might exacerbate conflicts in deeply divided societies, as for example with the dispute over the timing of the first post-Saddam election in Iraq. As the distinguished student of ethnic conflict, Brendan O’Leary, observed in a panel broadcast on BBC radio in April 2000: “Democracy can cause conflict because it nationalizes territories, suggesting exclusive rights for one people, the Staatsvolk, the nation. . . . Unchecked democracy . . . can drive conflict.” Ultimately, as Siak (1996, ix) observes, “democratic practices offer greater promise for long-term peaceful conflict management,” even where articulating grievances through democratic channels threatens in the short term to jeopardize stability.

In defense of a more optimistic appraisal, one can directly point to multi-ethnic societies that have achieved long-term democratic accommodation (e.g., Belgium, Canada, India, and Switzerland), and others that seem well on their way (e.g., South Africa and Mauritius). The case for at least partial optimism is bolstered by the fact that the latter set of countries lacks the level of wealth that is often held to be a prerequisite of stable democracy.

But, most important for present purposes, those who hold out hope for democracy in divided societies are virtually unanimous in their belief that constitutional engineering is the key to avoiding disaster (see, e.g., Reynolds and Reilly 1999). There are three choices that are most often identified as critical: parliamentary versus presidential system, federal versus unitary systems, and choice of electoral system.

Prominent scholars of comparative politics (perhaps most notably Juan Linz) have asserted that presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) systems are not suited to plural societies and must be replaced. The existence of a president and the inevitable winner-take-all conflict for that office allegedly exacerbates ethnic tension, on the one hand, and provides a power base to the winner to
use for ethnic subordination, on the other (Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Because, in plural societies, ethnic issues are likely to be “trump” cards in the quest for votes, and radical outbidding on divisive ethnic issues is pervasive (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Sisk 1996, 32), majority rule in such societies often ends up in permanent control over the political process by the largest (or most warlike) ethnic group, and permanent exclusion of minority ethnic groups. The issue of whether presidentialism is, per se, a destabilizing force has triggered an ongoing debate in the comparative politics literature that would take us beyond the scope of this essay (see e.g., Lijphart 1992; Horowitz 1985).

Another key issue (see table 1) is federalism (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). Elsewhere, one of us (Grofman and Stockwell 2003) has argued that useful lessons can be learned from Nigeria’s experiments with federalism, despite its failures, and from federalist practices in India. The view that federalism is highly desirable for multiethnic societies is widely held but not without dissenters; space limitations make it impossible for us to pursue this topic here. Instead, our concern in the remainder of this chapter will be limited to electoral system choice.

**Conflict between Traditional and Imported Forms of Representation**

In most colonial states, the choice of electoral laws for legislative assemblies was initially strongly influenced by the model bequeathed by the colonial power. Hence, most British colonies adopted plurality (aka first-past-the-post) systems, and the U.S. territories also embraced plurality or plurality bloc voting, while the French colonies used double ballots or list proportional representation for territorial elections. But there are also some intriguing anomalies. In particular, if we focus on the South Pacific, whose island nations have been characterized as “natural laboratories for constitutional and electoral experimentation” (Reilly 2002), we find some interesting exceptions.

For example, Nauru’s unique voting method is in the same family of scoring rules as the Borda rule, involving a ranked ballot with successive preferences counted as a diminishing fraction of the first-choice vote (Reilly 2002), while Vanuatu is one of the few remaining countries in the world with a single-non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. Papua New Guinea (PNG) initially copied practices of its Australian neighbors in adopting the alternative vote and, although that method was abandoned at independence in favor of a British first-past-the-post system, PNG is now returning to use of a variant of the alternative vote. The alternative vote has also recently been implemented in Fiji, another former British colony.
In some island nations (Samoa, Tonga), indigenous forms of authority provided the bases for the postcolonial order. Tonga's monarchical system, in which the king appoints twelve members of parliament, thirty-three nobles select nine representatives, and nine are elected by a common suffrage, is a legacy of the nineteenth century, although significant reforms occurred in 1914, strengthening the power of the king against the nobility (Campbell 2004). Samoa's system initially restricted both suffrage and office holding to those holding matai-titles. Since 1990, the Samoan franchise is no longer restricted to matai alone; although it remains the case that only matai may stand as candidates for parliament. In other cases (the Marshall Islands, Fiji), customary leadership was initially incorporated by way of establishment of bicameral legislatures that provided a special role for chiefs in the upper chamber.

In recent years, in different Pacific countries, ambitious reform efforts have aimed at strengthening political parties, stabilizing governments, and encouraging moderation and compromise amongst competing ethnic groups. Much recent concern with electoral reform in the South Pacific has centered on Melanesia, because of coups in Fiji (1987, 2000) and the Solomon Islands (2000), and high turnover of incumbent MPs and government instability in PNG New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu (see e.g., Steeves 1996; Roughan 2004).

Thirty or so years after independence, the issue of the appropriateness of "imported" institutions still plays a significant role in discussions of electoral reform in many Pacific Islands, as do claims that democracy may be a "foreign flower" unsuitable in the Pacific context (Larmour 1994). In some states, voting rules that draw on European practices that eliminate or downplay the role of chiefs and the importance of communal consensus have been challenged by indigenous groups as inappropriate given Pacific Island traditions. In particular, states with British-influenced Westminster-style systems of parliamentary government have been widely and frequently criticized.

Nonetheless, customary chiefs have less political or institutional power than they had during the earlier postwar years, and (especially in Micronesia) are less likely to hold elective office (Crocombe 2001, 490). For example, reserved parliamentary seats for chiefs set up during the Trust Territory era have been abandoned, although the Marshall Islands retains a rather inactive Council of Iroij (chiefs) as its upper house (Crocombe 2001, 597–9). The Marshallese 1999 and 2003 elections both saw a "commoner" president, Kessai Note, and his United Democratic Party (UDP), elected in preference to a coalition centered around support for high chiefs. Even in Vanuatu, where the role of chiefs is often extolled in dealing with grassroots social discontent, customary leaders have fared poorly in postindependence elec-
tions (Patterson 2004). Moreover, the incorporation of indigenous forms of authority into the postcolonial era forms of government has sometimes been discarded. For example, in the Solomon Islands, initial efforts to establish a more communally oriented system of representation were abandoned under local pressure despite the belief of the British colonial government that the Westminster system was unsuitable in the Solomon Islands due to exceptional ethnic diversity and the absence of party-based politics (Ghai 1983, 27). Thus, even for tribal societies we think it reasonable to focus on representational choices that come from the standard "Western" kit-bag.

Electoral Engineering for Mitigation of Ethnic Conflict: Minority Accommodation and Representation

When we turn back to table 1 to look at the repertoire of electoral rules we have identified that might help us mitigate ethnic conflict and foster democracy, there are two interlinked critical choices: (1) choice about the degree of ethnic homogeneity in electoral constituencies, with communal rolls or ethnic quotas anchoring one end of this continuum, and (2) choice of electoral rules. A key choice is between multi-seat constituencies using some form of proportional representation (PR), on the one hand, and single-seat constituencies, on the other.

If we opt for single-seat constituencies there are two quite distinct routes that have been identified for ethnic accommodation. One requires manipulation of constituency boundaries to achieve ethnic homogeneity within constituencies as a means of guaranteeing at least some ethnic representation in situations where voting is polarized along ethnic lines; the other requires use of the so-called alternative vote in constituencies with a multiethnic composition, with the aim of encouraging cross-ethnic coalitions. In most societies where achieving proportional ethnic representation is a concern, methods such as list PR or the single transferable vote are employed. In the United States, because of the long tradition of first-past-the-post voting, while there have been limited uses of PR and semi-PR methods (such as the cumulative vote), the common remedy for minority vote dilution is the creation of single-member districts in which the minority population has been concentrated.

The exact expected impact of simple-plurality voting in single-member districts on the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is hard to characterize, since expected effects are mediated by how geographically concentrated the minority is, by how polarized along racial or ethnic lines is the
electorate, and by whether drawing districts in which the minority population has a realistic chance to elect candidates of its choice is favored or disfavored by those doing the construction of constituency boundaries. Nonetheless, a rough generalization is that, *ceteris paribus*, minorities can achieve substantial (even near proportional) descriptive representation under single-member district plurality elections, if the following three conditions are met: (1) their voting-eligible population is substantial, (2) they are highly geographically concentrated, and (3) if districts are deliberately drawn to preserve those concentrations (or at least, not intentionally fragment them). However, absent extreme geographic concentration, single-member district plurality methods will systematically underrepresent minorities—with the degree of underrepresentation greatest when the minority population is small and dispersed (see Grofman 1982b).

For PR systems, the greater the number of seats to be filled, m, the easier it is, in principle, for a party to nominate a diverse array of candidates rather than only candidates from the dominant group among a given party's activists—a group that may be predominantly male or predominantly of one racial or ethnic or religious persuasion (Grofman and Reynolds 2001). Arend Lijphart, for example, advocates the use of pure-list PR in divided societies because it facilitates proportional descriptive representation for minorities at the same time as it allows strong party leaders (perhaps from ethnically based parties) to broker interethnic deals. Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977, 1991, 1996) also argues that stable democracy in plural societies requires power-sharing arrangements, where by power sharing is meant "practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society" (Sisk 1996, vii). To achieve this end, the most clearly articulated form of power-sharing arrangements, consociationalism (Lijphart 1977), has a particular constellation of institutional features as its hallmarks/defining characteristics: in addition to PR-based elections, "(1) grand coalition arrangements that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy" (Lijphart 1996, 258). Lijphart (1991, 503) mentions "the inseparability of these four characteristics: Power-sharing is not complete unless all four are included, and it cannot work well—and certainly not optimally—if one or more are missing."

However, the claim that PR (especially pure-list PR) is the best method for divided societies has been disputed. An important alternative view is that list PR encourages ethnically based voting and tends to encourage eth-
nic entrepreneurs to divide amongst themselves the spoils of office. Among mainstream political scientists, the most forceful critic of consociationalism is Donald Horowitz (see e.g., Horowitz 1985, 1991a, b, 1993). Horowitz questions the consociational focus on accommodation at the elite level and is concerned that consociational arrangements reinforce the importance of ethnic or religious cleavages. He argues for an integrative approach that seeks to deal with ethnic conflict potential through fostering political arrangements that will lead to bridging or transcending ethnic group differences. The goal of the integrative approach is to structure politics in such a way as to provide incentives for interethnic cooperation and the creation of pre-election coalitions between ethnic parties or broad multiethnic parties based on interests (e.g., region or common economic interests) that transcend ethnic identities (Sisk 1996, 5). In particular, Horowitz wishes to create incentives for pan-ethnic coalitions and/or candidates who make cross-ethnic appeals. To achieve these ends, Horowitz (1985, 1991a, b, 1997) has been rather insistent that the alternative vote is the best electoral rule to foster voting patterns that will cross ethnic lines and coalitions that will adopt accommodative or moderate policies designed to solicit support across the ethnic divide.

Where Horowitz and Lijphart would agree, however, is in rejecting plurality, and especially plurality bloc voting methods (i.e., plurality in multi-seat constituencies, with each voter given as many votes as there are seats to be filled (m), and the m candidates with highest votes elected). In the United States, in elections at all levels of government, plurality bloc voting rules (the extreme form of which, the at-large election, makes use of a jurisdiction-wide election) have been shown to be especially pernicious to minority electoral success in areas where there is a substantial minority presence (Davidson and Grofman 1994). The reason for this is that African Americans, Hispanics, or other minority groups that are sufficiently concentrated so as to constitute a majority in at least one single-member district, were such smaller constituencies to be drawn, may end up having their voting strength swamped by white/Anglo voters in larger multi-member districts that use plurality bloc voting in situations where voting is polarized along racial or ethnic lines.

Now we turn to two mini-case studies on the choice and impact of electoral rules in the South Pacific: Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

**FIJI**

Fiji is a society divided between its native Fijian population and a very substantial settler population largely descended from Indians brought in by the British to work on plantations. In Fiji in 1965, the British colonial authori-
ties introduced a so-called cross-voting system. This was a grand plan to reconcile Indo-Fijian calls for a common roll with ethnic Fijian attachment to separate ethnically reserved constituencies. The system was extended at independence in 1970 and survived until the 1987 coup. As a result, we can examine a run of six elections over twenty-two years.

In this system, all registered citizens could cast four votes. Each chose a "communal" candidate, but in addition cast a further three votes in common franchise constituencies. Ethnically demarcated electorates selected the communal candidates. In the "cross-voting" or "national" electorates, all registered voters regardless of race cast ballots for candidates whose ethnicity was "Fijian," "Indian," or "general." In these contests, it was the ethnicity of the candidates, rather than the voters, that was legally predetermined. After 1970, twenty-five MPs were returned from cross-voting/national constituencies, and twenty-seven from communal constituencies.

The "cross-voting" system, influenced by similar colonial experiments in Tanzania and elsewhere, was intended to encourage the emergence of national statesmen (or, infrequently, women) who could successfully appeal across the ethnic divide. In the Fiji context, the system was no doubt thought to advantage the Alliance Party, which had been founded on a common political front forged by Fijian and European members against the more narrowly Indian-backed Federation Party.

But the cross-voting system did not work as expected. After a period of adjustment, the larger political parties all became adept at finding candidates from other ethnic groups whom they could field in the ethnically reserved seats. The Federation Party, although it at first faced difficulties in securing reliable allies, soon found sufficient "Fijian" and "general" candidates to stand on its platform and renamed itself the National Federation Party (NFP). Yet its support always remained solidly Indo-Fijian. The NFP won elections in April 1977 and, in coalition with the Fiji Labour Party, in 1987. In the first case, a constitutional crisis and in the second case a coup halted the largely Indo-Fijian-backed parties from assuming or retaining office.

In nearly all constituency contests between 1965 and 1987 (when the system was abolished), it was the ethnic composition of the national constituencies that determined outcomes under cross-voting. In other words, a seat with a majority Indian electorate returned an MP associated with the NFP (or NFP-FLP in 1987), whereas a similar seat with a majority European or indigenous Fijian electorate tended to return an MP from the Alliance Party (see further details in Fraenkel 2003). Moreover, as NFP leader A. D. Patel had predicted, the system encouraged the emergence of "Uncle Tom" or "stooge" type Fi-
jian and Indo-Fijian politicians, whose legitimacy relied on party affiliations with the other community. The cross-voting system did not facilitate the emergence of national leaders able to appeal across the ethnic divide. Nor, as it turned out, did it guarantee the Alliance Party’s hold on office. Rather, its main effect was to strengthen political party organization in Fiji and encourage ethnic loyalties to become expressed via votes for ethnically defined parties and policy platforms, rather than votes for individuals on account of their ethnicity.

Where this system might have been expected to best promote moderation or greater cooperation across the ethnic divide was in seats where registered voters from the two main ethnic groups appeared in more or less equal proportions. In Fiji, these were the regions around the capital, Suva, in eastern Viti Levu. Everywhere else, the cross-voting constituencies were either overwhelmingly ethnic Fijian or Indian. Yet eastern Viti Levu has, since independence, been the area of the sharpest racial antagonism in Fiji.

In the light of this history, Fiji’s mid-1990s Constitutional Review Commission suggested that postindependence electoral institutions possessed a “divisive effect” and set out to “break down the barriers which force ethnic parties to take a narrow, communal view of their best interests” (Reeves, Vakatora, and Lal 1996, 277, 20). Changes in electoral laws were identified as the “main stimulus for the emergence of a multi-ethnic political culture” (ibid., 9–10). A new electoral system, it was hoped, would facilitate greater cooperation and moderation among leaders of the 44 percent Indo-Fijian and 52 percent indigenous Fijian communities. The commission eventually recommended the alternative vote system (AV). By requiring victors, in single member electorates, to obtain 50 percent +1 of the vote, it was hoped that politicians would adopt more moderate stances on ethnically divisive policy issues to appeal across the ethnic divide. With its provisions for parties to swap preferences, AV, it was claimed, would offer stronger “electoral incentives to moderation and compromise” (ibid., 11–12, 312, 317).

As part of the new 1997 constitution, Fiji introduced the alternative vote system. Fiji’s choice of the alternative vote system was strongly influenced by debates in the international political science literature about appropriate electoral institutions for ethnically divided societies, as well as by the use of that system in elections to the lower house in neighboring Australia (see e.g., Horowitz 1997, 2000). The new constitution also had some provisions for mandatory power sharing. All parties with more than 10 percent of seats in the house were entitled to cabinet portfolios.

Yet, as with its predecessor, the system did not work as proponents hoped
it might. At the May 1999 polls, the centrist coalition that initiated the constitutional compromise found itself heavily defeated. Instead, the Fiji Labour Party (relying mainly on first preference support from the 44 percent Indo-Fijian community, coupled with transfers of lower-order preference votes from closely or loosely allied parties) found itself with an absolute majority. The country’s first ever Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, took office, at the head of a coalition including several small Fijian-backed parties. Precisely a year later, that government was overthrown in a coup perpetrated by indigenous Fijian extremists—a coup supported by many rank-and-file members and backbench MPs from parties whose leaders had joined the coalition government.

After the May 2000 coup, the constitution was restored by a decision from Fiji’s Court of Appeal, paving the way for fresh elections, again held under the alternative vote system. At the 2001 polls, two exclusively ethnic-Fijian-backed political parties, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) and Matanitu Vakavanua (CAMV) secured the largest number of seats and formed a coalition government. Ironically, given the hoped for pro-moderation effects of the electoral system, the self-styled “Moderates Forum” obtained only a single seat in the 2001 election.27

Even strong enthusiasts for the adoption of AV have acknowledged that Fiji’s system proved faulty, although they hold the continued use of a large number of communal seats and curious provisions governing split-format ballot papers responsible (see e.g., Reilly 2001a, 2001b; cf. Horowitz 2000). Some still argue for the retention of that system, no longer upholding enthusiastically its supposed moderating effect on ethnic divisions, but rather on the thinner grounds that electoral systems should rarely be changed lightly. Others, however, argue that Fiji’s alternative vote system is likely to continue to generate disproportionate results and ethnically based governments (e.g., Arns 2004) and propose that it be replaced.28

In our view, Fiji’s electoral system has shown itself to be an odd and unwieldy construct, which generates outcomes very different to those envisaged by its architects or supporting theorists. Combining a majoritarian electoral system with a proportional multi-party cabinet is unlikely to yield either sturdy government (one of the key supposed benefits of majoritarian systems) or governments that proportionally represent different strands and alignments within the electorate (the intended advantage of proportional systems). Moreover, the continued usage of a large number of communal constituencies alongside a minority of open or “common roll” constituencies has done little to assist ethnic accommodation.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG)

Prior to independence, Papua New Guinea briefly made use of the alternative vote system at elections in 1964, 1968, and 1972, before switching to plurality voting in single-member districts at independence (Reilly 1996; 1997; 2001a, 2001b). When the alternative vote system was abandoned in 1975, the PNG Electoral Commission argued, in line with the experience in Ireland and some of the Canadian provinces, that with optional marking of preferences, outcomes differed little from those under first-past-the-post systems.

Papua New Guinea is a hyper-fractionalized society, with over 850 separate ethno-linguistic groups, and lacks a truly political party-based system. As a result, under the post-1975 first-past-the-post electoral law, increasing numbers of candidates contested elections and victors emerged with a continually declining share of the vote. Over the period from 1977 to 2002, the average number of candidates contesting each constituency rose from eight to twenty-seven, and the number of constituency victories obtained on the basis of less than 20 percent of the vote rose from 0 percent to 58 percent (see Fraenkel 2004). In past decades, Papua New Guinea’s so-called unbounded politics (Steeves 1996) has been associated with a weak party system, a high degree of government instability, and an extraordinarily high rate of incumbent MP turnover. Some 70 percent of sitting parliamentarians failed to get reelected at the 2002 PNG elections. In PNG (and the Solomon Islands as well), so-called yo-yo or rubber band politicians frequently switch parties while serving in office, and parliamentary proceedings become engulfed in perpetual “no-confidence” conspiracies. Under perpetual threat, beleaguered prime ministers restrict parliamentary sittings to a minimum to avoid no-confidence votes, in the process frustrating the needed initiating and reviewing of legislation. The result is gridlock and political paralysis (see Okole 2002).

Politicians in PNG, and elsewhere in Melanesia, behave as the “big men” of politics much like the traditional “big men” within localized, clan-based Melanesian society. That is, they compete by dispensing favors (Steeves 1996). Kaima (2004) argues that candidates obtain support by direct distribution to voters, rather than offering alternative policy platforms likely to promote local or national development. Moreover, cash-strapped MPs in PNG face extraordinary pressures to recoup expenses involved in their elections, which include payments to their supporters, which in turn leads to corruption.

In PNG, recent electoral reforms have aimed at addressing perceived defects in the inherited Westminster system. These reforms have attempted to strengthen political party organization through funding provisions for
campaigns and by outlawing party switching by incumbent legislators. The goal of avoiding continual government instability has led to efforts to restrict parliamentary “no-confidence” challenges. Also, a form of preferential voting within single-seat constituencies has been adopted for future elections. It requires voters to mark their top three preferences; the objective of this reform is to encourage candidates to broaden their support and appeal to voters outside their immediate clan. It remains to be seen whether this form of limited preferential voting will generate a more moderate and broadly acceptable genre of MPs, or whether feverishly competitive and highly fractionalized elections in PNG will simply assume new forms.

The current transition to limited preferential voting in PNG is intended to arrest the proliferation of candidates and vote splitting, particularly in the Highlands of PNG. Yet accurately assessing the repercussions of that reform requires a key question to be addressed: Why do so many candidates currently stand in PNG elections (an average of twenty-six candidates contested each constituency in 2002)? Why do some not stand aside to allow ideologically like-minded allies to defeat powerful adversaries?

The answer is surely that there is (or perhaps there is as yet) no ideologically unifying dimension(s) to the political process encouraging candidates to group themselves along a left-right or any other such ideological axis. Little at present restrains candidate proliferation. If so, the response to the introduction of a limited form of the alternative vote may, if no new organizing dimension to the political process emerges, simply be to further increase the number of candidates contesting elections. Indeed, a contestant may choose simply to add to his campaign two closely allied “dummy” candidates from other geographic areas within the constituency to gather preferences that are then redistributed towards them later in the count. Dummy candidates may also be used to split rival candidates’ votes.31

Conclusion

Stemming from Arrow’s (1962) “Impossibility Theorem,” it has become one of the clichés of the literature on social choice theory that “no voting rule is uniformly best” with respect to all plausible normative criteria. Ethnic impact is only one aspect of electoral system choice; there are other competing desiderata that may lead us in different directions than the approaches favored by either Horowitz or Lijphart. Also, in general, choice of electoral rules raises questions of what will happen, and not just normative issues of what should happen. Frequently, normative and empirical considerations are
hard to separate. Beliefs about what should be done may be highly contingent on what the expected consequences of any choice will be. Further, no change is likely to have just one consequence. Thus, we would emphasize that, in judging an electoral rule, we must look not merely to its abstract theoretical properties, but how it is likely to operate “on the ground” in the historical and socio-political context in which it is being embedded.

Much of the attraction of modern electoral engineering formulae arises from claims that they might provide mechanisms for (1) challenging the power of vested interests and/or the elite; (2) mitigating ethnic tension or promoting moderation; and/or (3) forcing aspiring parliamentarians to keep their promises or reduce corruption. Yet these are political tasks, which are unlikely to succeed unless popular support can be mobilized behind them. Furthermore, electoral systems may also matter in ways that differ from those envisaged by their architects—as we saw when we considered the history of electoral reform in Fiji. Also, we would emphasize that “the devil is in the details.” Rules that seem identical when viewed in terms of their large-scale properties may operate quite differently from one another when we consider more fine-tuned details. These details include such things as the nature of the candidate selection process, the number of seats per constituency, and, for preference-based rules such as the alternative vote and STV, whether complete rankings of all preferences must be submitted. Still, despite these important caveats, electoral systems do matter. They do have important direct and indirect impacts on voter loyalties, alliances, and coalitions, party strategy, and the composition of legislative chambers. Political culture is not “everything.”

Notes


1. A much different, singly authored version of the first half of this paper was presented at the “Conference on Democracy in the Twenty-first Century: Prospects and Problems,” University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, October 2004. The discussion of Pacific Island states in the second half of the paper draws heavily on the insights of participants at the conference “Political Culture, Representation, and Electoral Systems of the South Pacific” in July 2004, organized by the second author of this chapter, sponsored by the University of the South Pacific and held on its Vanuatu cam-
It also draws heavily from the paper presented at that conference, and expands on ideas in Freik et al. and Grofman (2000). We are indebted to Peter Nardulli for specific editorial suggestions, to an anonymous reviewer for some ideas about structuring this argument, and to Clever Behrend-Guthard for bibliographic assistance. The first-named author is indebted to helpful discussions over the years with his long time co-authors/co-editors/friends Rein Taagepera, Arend Lijphart, and Chandler Davidson, but the views expressed are solely those of the authors.

2. In some countries, however, while electoral details are not fixed, there may be constitutional language about a "principle" of proportionality.

3. Following Williams (2000) and the work of other sociologists, we use the term "ethno" or "ethnic group" to designate groups that are viewed by themselves and by nongroup members as having a defined identity that allows members of the group to be clearly distinguishable from other citizens in terms of genotypic or phenotypic, or language, or religion, or other cultural markers. Nations with more than one ethno but in which ethnic differences have been minimized in importance are commonly referred to as pluralistic. In contrast, deeply divided societies are those where politics is organized largely or entirely along ethnic lines, and two or more ethnics compete for power at the center of the political system. Of course, individuals may have multiple ethnic identities and part of the political struggle will be to determine which of these becomes the most politically salient (see e.g., Posner 2004, 2005).

4. Here we paraphrase Grofman and Stockwell 2003.

5. See Tideman 2000 for a consideration of alternative methods for this purpose.

6. Other early important work on electoral system effects includes that of Giovanni Sartori (see esp. Sartori 1968) and Stein Rokkan (see esp. Rokkan 1968).

7. The threshold of exclusion is the maximum support that can be attained by a party while still failing to win even one seat in a district; the threshold of representation is the minimum support that can be attained by a party while winning at least one seat in a district (Loosemore and Hanby 1971).

8. See also Boix 1999.

9. The discussion here is adapted from Grofman and Stockwell 2003. See also Sisk 1996.


11. Unfortunately, much of the literature suffers from inadequate awareness of the difficulty of measuring ethnic cleavages and/or from circularity. The conflicts may fuel the perceptions of ethnic difference. For example, Somalia was often considered ethnically homogeneous until it collapsed; from then onwards, it was categorized as hyper-fractionalized.

12. In its classic articulation, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 75) writes, "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." The mechanism proposed is that high levels of wealth provide resources that mitigate the tensions produced by political conflicts. Also, economic development brings about
higher rates of literacy and education, urbanization, and the development of mass media, factors conducive to democracy. A large number of empirical studies have generally supported Lipset's thesis (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994). The strength of the association led Robert Dahl (1971, 65) to conclude that it is "pretty much beyond dispute" that the higher the socioeconomic level of a country, the more likely that it would be a democracy; but recent work has suggested the need to restate this claim as: "If a rich country becomes democratic, it is likely to stay that way." Moreover, recent work by various scholars (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003) has suggested the need for important modifications of the argument about the impact of wealth to reflect factors such as the tax base of the state and the nature of resource distribution. Indeed, unpublished work by one of the present authors (Grofman) on this topic argues that the degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth (and related factors such as high levels of citizen literacy) are far more important in predicting sustainable democracy than mean GDP per capita, per se. Such results help explain some otherwise puzzling cases of unsuccessful democracies, as well as why oil-rich Arab countries are not democracies despite high average wealth.

13. The present authors are rather less certain of this point.

14. See Levine and Roberts 2005. These nations exhibit both a wide range of electoral system choices and a wide range of levels of democratization and of inter-ethnic harmony. While we briefly consider whether the cultural distinctiveness of these societies implies that modes of representation drawn from Western practices are undesirable, space considerations prevent more than touching on other important topics, such as spillover effects of past cultural practices into new institutions ("old wine in new bottles"); and the way in which both cultural practices and situational realities affect both institutions chosen and how they work once in place ("political embeddedness").

15. The Borda rule requires voters to rank-order their choices. In each voter's preference ranking of the alternatives, one point is awarded to an alternative for each choice to which it would be preferred. For each alternative, these points, summed over all voters, give us the Borda count of that alternative. The Borda rule is to pick the alternative with the highest Borda count.

16. SNTV has been abandoned in Jordan and Japan, but continued to be used in Taiwan (see Grofman et al. 1995) until its use was ended very recently; it has recently been adopted in Afghanistan. In SNTV elections, each voter has one vote and the candidates with the most votes win, just as in plurality, but there is more than one legislator elected from each district. Thus, SNTV, although sometimes called a semi-proportional system, can be viewed as operating as a type of proportional method, with its threshold of exclusion the same as the most common form of list PR, the D'Hondt method.

17. The alternative vote is the single transferable vote restricted to single seat election. Thus the quota is one half (see the preceding note), and this procedure will operate analogously to a majority runoff. Indeed, in the United States the alternative vote is known as the "instant runoff."
18. See further discussion of Fiji and PNG below.

19. *Matai* is often translated as "chief," although the expression "chief" means very different things across the Pacific. In Samoa, many adult males (but very few women) carry matai titles, whereas Tongan nobles are very much a minority in the population.

20. For many long-time observers of the South Pacific, the important issue is not finding new ways to institutionalize customary authority. Rather, it is that the conduct of contemporary elected Melanesian politicians and prime ministers is unworkably modeled on the customary feast-giving "big man," thus diverting assets and financial resources from the state into the dispensing of personal favors to associates, clients, and clan folk.

21. Among the *ceteris* that would need to be *paribus* would be suffrage eligibility and turnout levels across ethnicies (Brace, Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1988).

22. In a particular polity, some consociational features, e.g., group autonomy and minority veto, may not be desired by any of the various ethnicies. It is critical to distinguish between imposed and voluntary/negotiated forms of power sharing.

23. The debate between Horowitz and Lijphart parallels an earlier and still ongoing debate about whether it is best for political compromises to take place at the constituency level (by choosing rules that will make it more likely that ideological moderates will be elected) or in the legislature itself (with the legislature intended to be a microcosm of the society, mirroring the full range of political viewpoints, including extreme ones).

24. Relatedly, various authors (e.g., O'Leary et al. 1993; Reynolds 1999) familiar with the use of the single transferable vote in Northern Ireland have argued for its use in preference to list forms of PR. The single transferable vote, in addition to opening up the possibility of proportional representation of an ethnicity's voting strength, also has been posited by some scholars to provide incentives for cross-ethnic choices by voters and the formation of cross-ethnic pre-electoral alliances by parties.

25. "The idea uppermost in the voter's mind when he considers the candidates of other races is which one is likely to help his racial group most, so that instead of erasing the racial outlook it will intensify it. Every race will be looking for the stooge or puppet from other communities who is likely to help their race" (A. D. Patel, NFP leader, cited in *Pacific Review*, Aug. 25, 1965, p. 7). The Alliance lacked "in any district the chance of creating a firm base for continuing interaction between a leader and his community. Trying to achieve rapport with Indians through Indian parliamentarians elected on national seats with Fijian support and utilizing them in building a party with an ardent Indian following was like attempting to build an edifice roof first" (Ali 1977, 195). This author, Ahmed Ali, was one such MP. He was an Indo-Fijian parliamentarian regularly elected by ethnic Fijian voters in the Lau noncommunal constituency.

26. We will only briefly summarize the story here (see Fraenkel 2001, 2003; Fraenkel and Grofman 2006).

27. At the close of counting in August 2001, it had obtained two seats, but one was reversed on appeal, after a recount and a determination of invalid votes.
28. For Fiji, one of us, Fraenkel, has suggested that an MMP system with a mix of single-seat constituencies and proportional representation ought to be preferred to pure-list PR.


31. However, as Ron May (2004) shows, using ballot box data from a portion of PNG, even under the about-to-be-replaced plurality system, victors apparently do successfully widen their support across regions. It is rather the losers whose support is confined to own-clan. Also by-elections under the new system have already occurred, and do seem to show evidence of cross-village alliances.

32. We can illustrate this point with a few examples from the South Pacific. For one, there can be no doubt about the effect of Tonga's appointment-based institutions in propelling up the monarchy. Under Samoa's matai-only system, political power remains closely tied to the customary hierarchy. Electoral laws in French Polynesia and New Caledonia, including recently the requirement that party lists alternate men and women (the parity law), have ensured that the French territories have the highest share of women members of parliament in the region.

References


