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Samuel Kernell wrote in 1973 that "conventional wisdom claims that the Senate is more liberal than the House." This greater liberalism has been attributed to both institutional and demographic differences in the constituency base of each house. Confirming an hypothesis of Kernell (1973), we argue that the party composition of each branch is a central determinant of the relative liberalism of the two branches. However, even when party and demographic variables are controlled, we find a small but statistically significant institutional effect—with the Senate on average the more liberal body from 1960 to 1989. This finding is further confirmed when we examine data on ADA scores of representatives and senators from the states that elect a single representative—states for which House and senatorial constituency are identical. In these states, we find that Democratic senators are on average slightly to the left of Democratic representatives and Republican senators are also on average slightly to the left of Republican representatives.

The Senate and the House differ in a variety of ways—for example, in constituency base, in requirements for eligibility, in term of office, and in the role that the founding fathers envisioned for them. In particular, according to the *Federalist Papers,* the Senate was to be the deliberative body, taking the long-term view; the House was to be close to the people. What difference will these institutional effects have on the nature of representation? Recent work has looked at the relative power of the two bodies (Pressman 1966; Brams 1989), at the effects of bicameralism on logrolling and the expression of intensities of preference (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, ch. 16; Grofman 1988), and at the increasing stability of the outcomes in a bicameral system (Hammond and Miller 1987). This paper focuses on another question, the differences between the chambers in their support for liberal and conservative policies.

"Conventional wisdom holds that the Senate is more liberal than the House" (Kernell 1973,332). The clearest support for this proposition in the early literature comes from Froman (1963, Table 6.1, 73), who found that in 1961 the Senate was more supportive than the House of Kennedy's policy initiatives (57% to 51%)—initiatives that were largely assumed to be liberal ones. Froman also compared House and Senate positions on the 10 domestic welfare proposals that he regarded as the heart of Kennedy's domestic program: "the Senate was more liberal on five, the House more liberal on four, and one indeterminate" (Froman 1963,77). Concerning the eight bills that had to be resolved in conference committee, Froman (1963,77) also notes that the 'Senate is by no means more liberal than the House on all bills. On certain issues, the House was considered more liberal than the Senate (civil rights, emergency feed grains, housing, and water pollution). Second, even on bills in which the Senate or the House, overall, was considered more liberal, the other house usually had several amendments which were more liberal." Thus, the first clear empirical test of this proposition supports it, but the evidence is underwhelming.

However, Kernell (1973,362), in the most thorough examination of the evidence to date, concludes that "the Senate is the more liberal chamber by a rather sizable margin." His conclusion is based on responses to 885 domestic welfare proposals of two Democratic presidents, Kennedy and Johnson. He finds the Senate to have passed 67.8% of these proposals and the House only 56.6% (Kernell 1973,349). To strengthen support for his conclusion of greater Senate liberalism, Kernell considers (as a control) votes on certain items on which any interchamber differences would not be expected to be due to a difference in interchamber liberalism. He finds that "the two houses do in fact diverge most sharply on the issues with high liberal content" (Kernell 1973,351).

Kernell also considers the possibility that greater Senate support for liberal Democratic policy initiatives might be due to a greater tradition of acquiescence by the Senate to presidential requests. To test this hypothesis, he compares the two chambers in their support for Republican policy proposals in a variety of categories. "On only one issue, civil rights, did the number of favorable House floor decisions exceed the [number in the] Senate" (Kernell 1973,351). Kernell concludes that the Senate is slightly more acquiescent than the House to presidential requests but that such acquiescence cannot explain the disproportionate differences between the Senate and the House in disposing of liberal presidential initiatives (1973,351).

Congressional liberalism can be gauged by a number of roll-call measures; the best known are issued by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and by the Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA). In addition, political scientists (Manley 1981; Ornstein et al. 1984) have made use of the Conservative Coalition (CC) support score, which indicates the proportion of issues in which there was an alliance between Republicans and conservative southern Democrats. Kritzer (1978,492) has shown that these measures of liberalism are almost perfectly correlated with each other (as well as with the roll-call scores produced by other organizations) and essentially tap a single dimension (see also Kau and Rubin 1982; Poole and Rosenthal 1985). In 1981, for example, the correlation between ADA score and CC score was –.94 in the Senate and –.93 in the House. To simplify our exposition, we shall deal exclusively with ADA scores.

Table 1 shows ADA scores for the House and the Senate for the period 1960–89. Since the scores for each house are based on different sets of bills, a difference in any year may be the product of measurement error. Over time, however, we would not expect differences in bill selection to lead to a consistent bias in a given direction. Thus, we can take consistent differences between House and Senate ADA scores to be evidence of a real difference in the relative liberalism of the two chambers, even though the failure to find such differences may be merely a problem of measurement error. On balance, the Senate clearly is more liberal than the House. In 18 of the 28 years, the average ADA rating in the Senate exceeded that in the House. The average ratio of House ADA scores to Senate ADA scores over the period is .96[1] (see Table 1). Thus, the evidence suggests that the Senate is the more liberal body, even though on particular issues at particular periods (such as civil rights in the 1950s) the House may be more liberal.

Froman (1963), Kernell (1973), Pressman (1966), and others identify a number of explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, for the greater liberalism of the Senate. Some are historically specific and others more general.

One proposed explanation relies on the observation that liberal representatives tend to come from constituencies that have demographic characteristics—such as a high minority population or a large urban population—that are associated with liberalism. In the 1960s it was shown that the proportion of congressional districts that score high on these characteristics was lower than the proportion of states that do so. As Froman puts it, "There are more congressional districts below the state average on urbanism than above it. Since senators

TABLE 1
Mean ADA Scores and Party Composition of House and Senate, 1960–89

Year	Proportion Democrat in House	Proportion Democrat in Senate	Ratio of House to Senate Democratic Proportions	Mean House ADA Score	Mean Senate ADA Score	Ratio of House to Senate ADA Mean Scores
1960	64.9	65.3	.99	56.3	50.8	1.11
1961	60.2	64.0	.94	47.6	54.0	.88
1964	58.9	66.7	.88	46.9	49.9	.94
1965	67.4	68.0	.99	43.1	49.5	.87
1966	67.7	67.0	1.01	42.4	45.8	.93
1967	56.9	64.0	.89	38.5	41.9	.92
1968	56.6	63.6	.89	38.8	38.1	1.02
1969	56.6	57.0	.99	35.6	49.0	.73
1970	56.1	58.0	.97	39.5	44.6	.89
1971	58.6	54.5	1.08	39.6	46.7	.85
1972	58.9	54.5	1.08	34.7	38.8	.89
1973	55.8	56.0	1.00	40.6	46.7	.87
1974	56.9	56.0	1.02	38.8	47.9	.81
1975	66.8	61.0	1.10	48.7	49.4	.98
1976	66.8	61.0	1.10	42.1	43.4	.97
1977	66.4	61.0	1.09	40.8	45.6	.89
1978	66.1	61.0	1.08	38.3	42.2	.91
1979	63.4	58.0	1.09	42.0	37.8	1.11
1980	63.4	58.0	1.09	43.9	46.6	.94

TABLE 1
(continued)

Year	Proportion Democrat in House	Proportion Democrat in Senate	Ratio of House to Senate Democratic Proportions	Mean House ADA Score	Mean Senate ADA Score	Ratio of House to Senate ADA Mean Scores
1981	55.4	46.0	1.20	40.0	39.5	1.01
1982	55.5	45.0	1.23	43.5	44.7	.97
1983	61.3	46.0	1.33	50.1	43.5	1.15
1984	61.4	45.0	1.36	47.7	46.9	1.02
1985	58.0	47.0	1.23	45.3	40.3	1.12
1986	58.3	47.0	1.24	45.9	43.8	1.05
1987	59.1	54.0	1.09	50.9	52.6	.97
1988	58.7	54.0	1.09	52.9	48.0	1.10
1989	59.3	55.0	1.08	50.0	45.3	1.10
Mean	60.6	56.9	1.08	43.7	45.5	0.96
Mean 1981–86 (Republican Senate)	58.3	46.0	1.27	45.4	43.1	1.05
Mean 1960–80, 1987–89 (Democratic Senate)	61.2	59.9	1.02	43.3	46.1	.94

represent the state average, House members are by and large more conservative" (Froman 1963,4). Similarly, in 1980 the median congressional district in the U.S. had a population that was only 49% urban, while the median state had a population that was 62.7% urban.

Another explanation for higher Senate ADA scores is that representatives from more heterogeneous districts are more likely to take a broad perspective on issues, which, for the types of controversial issues of interest to the ADA, may lead them to take the liberal side. For example, Froman (1963,4) asserts that "in general, the larger and more heterogenous the areas represented, the more liberal will be that representation." Since Senate districts are more heterogeneous, on average, than are House districts, this effect would make senators, in the aggregate, more liberal than representatives (see Kernell 1973,336; Froman 1963,4; Pressman 1966,86).

It is possible to see our first two explanations for greater Senate liberalism as simply different parts of a single explanation, since contemporary liberal ideology is inextricably linked with support for government action. A representative concerned with reelection is likely to want to grease the wheels of every element of his constituency that is large enough to be a potential election threat. Most states contain a sufficient number of urban, working class, or nonwhite voters to trigger senators' reelection concerns and induce senators to support government activity that benefits the potential swing group. Congressional districts, however, tend to be less heterogeneous (and safer). Thus, we might expect that House members will, on average, be less activist, and thus less liberal, than the senators from their own state.

A third explanation for policy differences between the House and the Senate is institutional, focusing on the relative sizes of the two bodies. Senators, being more visible, may be in a better position to take credit for policy initiatives than are members of the House. Also, senators can more easily play to the national media and can look forward to a real prospect of seeking executive office (Kernell 1973,340). Furthermore, the smaller size of the Senate allows its members to have more diffuse policy concerns. Specialization in very narrowly focused areas is not carried to quite the same extreme in the Senate as in the House (Kernell 1973,346). Finally, the smaller size of the House districts, coupled with post-World-War-II changes in legislator strategies for retaining office, has given House members a constituency-service orientation, which may reduce their concern with national policy issues and thereby reduce the liberalism that often goes with such concern (cf. Fenno 1978).

A fourth explanation accounts for greater Senate liberalism in the 1960s. It combines an historically specific component with an institutionalist approach, focusing on the power vested in committee chairs in the House and the concentration of Democratic safe seats in the South. These factors, coupled with the rise of congressional careerism, are argued to have led to more conservative control of the lower chamber in this century (see especially Froman 1963,85–98, 110–21.) If this hypothesis were true, we would expect that, as party competition grew in the South and as the institutional reforms of the 1970s made both chambers loosen centralized control, the difference in the relative liberalism of the two houses would, ceteris paribus, shrink.

There is some support for this last expectation. Over the period 1960–89, the ratio of House to Senate ADA scores varied somewhat erratically. The ratio fell in the middle of this period, from its level of the early 1960s, and only recently (since 1975) has it increased.

Of course, other factors that could be expected to affect the ratio of House to Senate ADA score also changed over time. In particular, the relative proportions of Democrats and Republicans in the two houses have fluctuated, notably as Republicans made gains in the South, especially when the Republicans captured the Senate after 1980. This observation brings us to the fifth and, we believe, most promising explanation for Senate-House differences in liberalism.

As Kernell, writing in the early 1970s, puts it, "the Senate is more liberal than the House because the Senate over the years has generally known larger Democratic majorities, and Democrats on the whole are more liberal" (1973,338, acknowledging Cleaveland 1969,374). If Democrats are for all practical purposes always to the left of Republicans from the same constituency (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Bullock and Brady 1983; Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1990), then, the greater the proportion of Democrats elected, the more liberal ought a given chamber of the legislature to be.

Kernell (1973) examined four congresses, the 87th to the 90th (1961–68); in three the proportion of Democrats was higher in the Senate than in the House, and in one (the 89th Congress) the House and the Senate had almost identical proportions of Democrats. Kernell (1973, Table 5, 353) finds that the difference between the chambers in their support for domestic welfare legislation is higher the greater the difference between the Democratic proportions in each house. "During the 89th Congress, when the Senate's [Democratic] majority was nine percentage points greater than the House's, the net difference was nineteen percent, nearly twice the average. This difference decreases

dramatically to only three percentage points when the chambers enjoy identical majorities" (Kernell 1973,354).

After considering the possibility of an interactive model that synthesized a party-based and an organizational perspective, Kernell (1973,357) concludes that party is a major contributor to interchamber differences. "First and most clearly, the closer in size are the two houses' Democratic majorities, the smaller their difference in liberalism. In addition . . . when the House [Democratic] majority is large, institutional barriers are attenuated and the chances of passage of liberal legislation thereby improved."

Kernell's conclusions about the impact of party composition rest on only eight years of data. We can reexamine the importance of party composition as a determinant of the relative liberalism of the two chambers with data from an additional decade. Further, we have recently had, for the first time since Eisenhower's presidency, divided party control of Congress—data of a sort Kernell did not have and data also for an extended period in which the Senate was less Democratic than the House. Indeed, for the period 1960–89, as we saw from Table 1, in only nine of the 28 years was the Senate the more Democratic body.

Thus, for much of this period, if party control is what matters, we should expect to see the House more liberal than the Senate. Certainly, it has appeared so in votes on a number of highly publicized items in Reagan's legislative agenda. And when we look at the full range of issues on which ADA scores are based, from 1981–86, the Republican-controlled Senate is, on average, less liberal than the Democratic-controlled House (see Table 1).

More generally, we can show that Kernell's (1973) hypothesis is correct: as the ratio of Democrats in the House to those in the Senate rises, the House becomes more liberal relative to the Senate. For the period 1960–89, the correlation between the ratio of House and Senate Democratic proportions and the ratio of House and Senate ADA scores is .48 ($p < .01$).[2] Moreover, we can show that this relationship is not present only when a Democrat is president, a circumstance characteristic of all the congresses looked at by both Froman (1963) and Kernell (1973).

The size of the purely institutional effect can be estimated by looking at the regression of the ratio of House ADA to Senate ADA scores (ADARAT) with the ratio of Democratic proportions in the two houses (DEMRAT) for the period 1960–89. This regression is shown below with standard errors in parentheses:

$$\underset{(.15)}{\text{ADARAT} = .41\ \text{DEMRAT}} + \underset{(.16)}{.53}\ (R^2 = .23) \qquad (1)$$

If DEMRAT = 1 (that is, if the Democratic proportions are the same in both houses), then the mean House ADA score will still be only 94% of that in the Senate. Thus, we see what appears to be an institutional difference between the chambers, one which persists even after controlling for party differences. Now we turn to a different sort of data to try to understand what makes the Senate different from the House.

States That Elect a Single Representative

The easiest way to observe institutional effects on House and Senate voting is to examine the cases in which the constituencies are identical. Since 1960, eight states have been represented by a single House member for all or part of the period. For these states for 1960–89 we looked at the differences between senators and representatives of the same party. Across these identical constituencies, senators tended to be more liberal than House members, when we controlled for party. In states represented by three Democrats (two senators, one representative), the representatives had a mean ADA score of 48.6 (n=19) and the senators a mean ADA score of 57.7 (n=38). In like manner, in states electing three Republicans, the representatives had a mean ADA score of 21.0 (n=38) and their Senate colleagues had a mean ADA score of 24.9 (n=76).

Thus, Senate Democrats had ADA scores that averaged nine points higher than House Democrats in the states with a single congressional district; Senate Republicans scored four points higher than their House counterparts.[3] The conclusion that there is an institutional effect, with the Senate, ceteris paribus, the more liberal body, is supported when we compare ADA scores of senators and representatives from states that elect a single representative.

Demographic Correlates of ADA Scores with a Senate Dummy

Further evidence of an institutional difference between the two chambers can be obtained from a regression of ADA scores on constituency characteristics, with a dummy variable used to detect chamber effects. We initially consider four models. The first two make use exclusively of demographic factors to proxy constituency characteristics: urban population, black population, Hispanic population, military employees, public assistance recipients, per capita income,

TABLE 2
ADA Scores for 1978, House and Senate
(standard error in parentheses)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	11.5 (7.1)	11.4 (7.1)	31.8 (9.0)	31.8 (9.0)
Reagan Vote			-.31 (.09)	-.31 (.09)
Party	-28.4 (1.8)	-28.1 (2.0)	-27.1 (1.8)	-26.7 (2.0)
Constituency Characteristics				
Percentage Urban	.12 (.04)	.12 (.04)	.11 (.04)	.11 (.04)
Percentage Black	-.08 (.10)*	-.07 (.10)*	-.08 (.10)*	-.08 (.10)*
Percentage Hispanic	-.09 (.10)*	-.09 (.10)*	-.06 (.10)*	-.06 (.10)*
Percentage in Military	-.40 (.60)*	-.40 (.58)*	-.33 (.58)*	-.33 (.58)*
Public Assistance	1.49 (.36)	1.49 (.36)	1.15 (.37)	1.15 (.37)
Per Capita Income	.003 (.001)	.003 (.001)	.003 (.001)	.003 (.001)
South	-19.6 (2.2)	-19.6 (2.2)	-19.4 (2.2)	-19.4 (2.2)
Senate	8.3 (2.1)		8.6 (2.1)	
Senate Democrats		8.8 (2.7)		9.3 (2.7)
Senate Republicans		7.5 (3.4)		7.5 (3.4)
	.51 (.50)	.51 (.50)	.52 (.51)	.52 (.51)

* Not significant at .05. All other variables are significant.

and region. Models 3 and 4 add the 1980 Reagan vote as a surrogate for the ideological characteristics of the constituency. Models 1 and 3 contain a single dummy variable to test for differences between the House and Senate. Models 2 and 4 contain two dummy variables, to estimate separate chamber effects for Democrats and Republicans.

Table 2 shows the results of each of our models with ADA scores for 1978. In Model 3, we estimate the effect of the Senate variable at 8.6. In Model 4, we estimate an effect of 9.3 for Democrats and 7.5 for Republicans. Controlling for a series of demographic variables and party, senators are about nine points more liberal than representatives.

We next checked to see whether the situation had changed after Republicans took control of the Senate. In Table 3 we replicate each model, using ADA scores for 1982. In Model 3, we estimate the Senate effect at 8.5. In Model 4, we estimate an effect of 9.4 for Democrats and 7.8 for Republicans. Even with divided party control in Congress, we find that senators score about nine points higher than representatives.

Whether or not we include the Reagan share of the two-party presidential vote in the district as one of the variables and whether or

TABLE 3
ADA Scores for 1982, House and Senate
(standard error in parentheses)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	41.7 (7.4)	41.6 (7.4)	62.3 (9.4)	62.3 (9.4)
Reagan Vote			-.32 (.09)	-.32 (.09)
Party	-42.9 (1.8)	-42.7 (2.0)	-41.9 (1.8)	-41.5 (2.0)
Constituency Characteristics				
Percentage Urban	.20 (.04)	.20 (.04)	.19 (.04)	.19 (.04)
Percentage Black	-.26 (.10)	-.26 (.10)	-.27 (.10)	-.26 (.10)
Percentage Hispanic	-.34 (.10)	-.34 (.10)	-.31 (.10)	-.31 (.10)
Percentage Military	-2.3 (.60)	-2.3 (.61)	-2.2 (.60)	-2.2 (.60)
Public Assistance	1.7 (.37)	1.7 (.37)	1.34 (.38)	1.34 (.38)
Per Capita Income	.001 (.001)*	.001 (.001)*	.001 (.001)*	.001 (.001)*
South	-25.5 (2.3)	-25.6 (2.3)	-25.3 (2.3)	-25.4 (2.3)
Senate	8.2 (2.2)		8.5 (2.2)	
Senate Democrats		8.7 (3.2)		9.4 (3.2)
Senate Republicans		7.8 (3.0)		7.8 (3.0)
Adjusted R^2	.66 (.66)	.66 (.66)	.67 (.67)	.67 (.67)

* Not significant at .05. All other variables are significant.

not we separately estimate the chamber effect for each party, nothing of importance changes. Indeed it is remarkable how identical the 1978 and 1982 chamber effect findings are, despite the fact that in 1978 we had a Democratic president and Democrat-controlled House and Senate but that in 1982 we had a Republican president and Republican-controlled Senate.

Finally, in Table 4 we have estimated Model 3 and Model 4 for each of the years between 1977 and 1982. For each year, except 1979, the Senate is clearly more liberal, with values ranging from 6.4 to 9.4. When we replicate Model 4, we find a significant positive effect for Democrats, ranging from 7.4 to 12.5, in every year but 1979. For Republicans, we find a Senate effect, ranging from 6.7 to 8.1, in every year but 1981.

Discussion

We find the Senate to be more liberal than the House (1) when we regress the ratio of the ADA scores of House and Senate members on the ratio of the Democratic proportions of each body, (2) when we compare representatives and senators from the same party in states that elect only one representative, and (3) when we perform a multivariate

TABLE 4
ADA Scores for 1977–82, House and Senate
(standard error in parentheses)

Variable	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Model 3:						
Senate Variable	9.4	8.6	1.6*	7.7	6.4	8.5
	(2.2)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.2)
R^2	.61	.52	.65	.62	.70	.67
Model 4						
Senate Democrats	11.0	9.3	−2.6*	7.4	12.5	9.4
	(2.8)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(3.0)	(3.2)
Senate Republicans	6.7	7.5	7.5	8.1	0.8*	7.8
	(3.6)	(3.4)	(3.3)	(3.3)	(2.8)	(3.0)
R^2	.61	.52	.66	.62	.70	.67

* Not significant at .05. All other variables are significant.

regression of ADA scores on constituency characteristics and chamber and find a statistically significant chamber effect. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect we estimate is remarkably consistent, always in the range of six to nine points. The effect is roughly 6% from the regression analysis of relative party composition of the two chambers, six points from the paired comparison analysis of single-representative states, and, on average, seven points over the six years tested in the multivariate model with a dummy effect for chamber differences.

The hypothesis that the Senate is more liberal than the House might seem hard to sustain in the 1980s, when Republicans have often controlled the Senate even while Democrats controlled the House and when ADA scores in the House have been, on average, higher than these in the Senate. It is true that party composition appears to be the single best predictor of mean ADA scores in each chamber. Yet, as we have seen, even when party composition, presidential party and other factors are controlled, there does appear to remain an institutional factor of some sort that makes the Senate marginally more liberal on average, ceteris paribus, than the House,[4] further evidence that institutions do matter (cf. Shepsle and Weingast 1981). Moreover, this gap persists even after we introduce controls for demographic characteristics, such as the percentage of the constituency residing in urban areas, that have been hypothesized to give rise to chamber difference effects; and it persists even when we seek to control for a constituency's ideology by adding the 1980 Reagan vote as a variable.

Having controlled for factors such as party composition of the chambers, constituency demography, and ideology and having found

the same effects regardless of whether a Democrat or a Republican is in the presidency, we must look to other factors to explain our results.

Most explanations for differences in House and Senate voting behavior focus on the differences in the size and homogeneity of the constituencies in the two chambers. Yet there are a number of institutional factors that could influence congressional voting, even if constituency could be held constant.

The longer interval between elections may give senators more freedom to stake out an ideological position far to the left or the right of the state's median voter. In fact, the great media exposure given to maverick senators might make extremism a political asset when the election day finally comes. National party effects may shift Democratic senators further to the left and Republican senators further to the right than representatives, whose view might be more impervious to national party forces. In contrast, analysts claim that House incumbents are guaranteed reelection if they can avoid making big mistakes, since constituency service, pork barrel projects, and name recognition are often the main factors in voters' minds. These and other potential explanations are topics for future research to explain the significant chamber differences we find.

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NOTES

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1. The Americans for Democratic Action reported a single score for the 88th Congress (1963–64). The ICPSR did not calculate a score for 1962 or for the years

before 1960. In 1972, the ADA made a slight change in the treatment of absent members, which may result in somewhat lower scores.

2. Even within each chamber, party composition effects in the predicted direction are manifest (but not statistically significant). The correlation between percentage of Democrats in the House and mean House ADA score is .22 (n.s.). The correlation between percentage of Democrats and mean ADA score in the Senate is .29 (n.s.).

3. States with one congressional district are Hawaii (1960–62), Nevada (1960–82), Alaska (1960–89), Delaware (1960–89), Vermont (1960–89), Wyoming (1960–89), North Dakota (1973–89), and South Dakota (1983–89).

4. Compare the recent claim by political scientists that the president, as the national spokesman, will necessarily be more liberal than the legislature. As Krislov (1965,15) points out, in the nineteenth century the House of Representatives was the populist branch of government and the Congress was more "liberal" on balance than the presidency.

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