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Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences

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Introduction

Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart

The aim of this book is to provide an overview of recent research on electoral laws and their political consequences by scholars who have helped shape the field. After several decades of virtual neglect (except for Douglas Rae's seminal work), the comparative study of electoral systems is undergoing a lively revival. In the past five years, over a dozen books on electoral systems have been written by scholars from many nations and from many disciplines (see reviews of a number of these in Lijphart, 1984a). Political geography, long moribund, is undergoing a remarkable renaissance (see reviews in Grofman, 1982d; Taylor, Gudgin, and Johnston, this volume). Social choice theorists have begun to link axiomatic criteria for representative systems to practical political issues in choosing an election system (see especially Brams and Fishburn, 1983, 1984a, 1984b; Fishburn, this volume). In the United States, sparked in large part by the efforts of the section on Representation and Electoral Systems of the American Political Science Association, the history of American electoral experimentation with proportional representation, weighted voting, and limited voting is being rediscovered (see Grofman 1982a; Weaver, this volume).

This renewed scholarly attention to the study of electoral systems is long overdue. The late Stein Rokkan wrote as recently as 1968, "Given the crucial importance of the organization of legitimate elections in the development of the mass democracies of the twentieth century, it

is indeed astounding to discover how little serious effort has been invested in the comparative study of the wealth of information available" (Rokkan, 1968, p. 17). The long past neglect of electoral systems by social scientists is especially surprising since election rules not only have important effects on other elements of the political system, especially the party system, but also offer a practical instrument for political engineers who want to make changes in the political system. Indeed, Sartori aptly characterizes electoral systems as "the most specific manipulative instrument of politics" (1968b, p. 273).

No single volume can do justice to the range of issues which ought to be dealt with in a complete study of the political consequences of electoral laws. For example, the independent variables analyzed by Rae (e.g., ballot structure, election type, number of representatives to be elected from each district, and total number of representatives in the legislature) are only a partial inventory of those that can have a critical impact, and the principal dependent variables he considers (proportionality of party representation and creation of legislative majorities), while among the most important elements of a proper analysis of electoral laws and their political consequences, omit a large number of relevant concerns. In particular, in addition to

1. Electoral formulas [e.g., proportional representation (PR) vs. majoritarian systems; for alternative typologies see Rae, 1967, 1971; Grofman, 1975]
2. Ballot structure (e.g., nominal vs. ordinal)
3. District magnitude (number of seats)
4. Size of legislature
5. Number of candidates/parties

we should consider (cf. Fishburn, 1983):

1. Suffrage and registration requirements
2. Ease of voter access to the electoral process (e.g., availability of bilingual ballots, polling hours, number and location of polling stations, and enforcement of voter rights against intimidation)¹
3. Ease of party/candidate access to the political process (e.g., candidate eligibility requirements, signature-gathering rules, nominating fees, party-slating procedures, and bans on "antisystem" parties)
4. Structure of political competition (e.g., partisan vs. nonpartisan ballots and availability of intraparty preference voting)
5. Special features of ballot format (e.g., office block vs. party check-

- off, machine vs. paper ballot, open versus secret, and sequencing rules for candidate/party ballot position)
6. Special features for transforming votes into outcomes (e.g., the U.S. electoral college and electoral thresholds in PR systems)
 7. Districting procedures (e.g., rules which constrain districts to satisfy equal population guidelines or compactness norms, or to provide representation of ethnic or other communities of interest)
 8. Campaign financing rules (limits on donations and spending, nonconfidentiality of information on donors, and provisions for public financing)
 9. Campaign timing rules (e.g., fixed vs. variable interval elections and length of term in office)
 10. Other features of campaigning (e.g., rules on media access, rules prohibiting "unfair" advertising, rules on sites where campaigning is forbidden, and restrictions on the period during which a campaign can be conducted)
 11. Number and type of offices which are subject to electoral choice (e.g., appointive vs. elective vs. administrative mechanisms for various policy domains, number of different elections voters are expected to participate in annually, and regularity of election dates)
 12. Degree of "bundling" of elections (e.g., sequencing of dates for local, state, and national elections and for executive and legislative elections; and regularity of election dates)
 13. Mechanisms for voter intervention (e.g., initiative, referendum, and recall)

Similarly, while the degree of seats-votes proportionality and facilitation of majority legislative control are among the most important political consequences of electoral laws, also relevant are (1) the effects on ideological polarization of the electorate; (2) the structure of party organization; (3) intraparty versus interparty competition; (4) regional and national integration; (5) the interaction of political and economic "cycles"; (6) voter participation and sense of voter efficacy; (7) incentives to strategic voting; (8) perceived regime legitimacy; and (9) representation of racial, ethnic, and other group interests.

Since we could not cover all the variables and issues enumerated above, our selection of topics has been guided by three principles. First, we commissioned review essays on topics where there is a substantial body of research which could usefully be summarized and which may not be well-known to specialists in comparative election systems. Thus Engstrom and McDonald write on the effects of at-large

elections on minority representation; Cassel writes on nonpartisan elections; Weaver considers PR in the United States; Taylor, Gudgin, and Johnston take up political geography; and Fishburn reviews social choice approaches. Second, we commissioned articles on various electoral institutions which are not well researched, as a spur to further work. Included are Lijphart, Lopez-Pintor, and Sone on limited voting in Spain and Japan; Lijphart on proportionality by non-PR methods; Scarrow on ballot format and cross-endorsement in plurality systems in the United States; Katz on intraparty preference voting; and Keech on the length and renewability of electoral terms. Finally, we sought to avoid duplication of the literature surveys in such excellent compilations as Butler, Penniman, and Ranney (1981), Cadart (1983), and Bogdanor and Butler (1983).

Effects of Election Type on Political Competition

We are especially pleased to begin this volume with a set of three complementary essays on one of the most important issues in the analysis of the effects of electoral laws: the relationship between type of electoral system (e.g., simple plurality, plurality with double ballot, and various forms of proportional representation) and the number of political parties contesting elections. All three articles take as their starting point the formulation in Duverger (1951a) that the plurality system favors the two-party system, commonly referred to as "Duverger's law," while PR methods and the double-ballot system favor multipartyism, referred to as "Duverger's hypothesis."

The first of these chapters is by William Riker, "Duverger's Law Revisited."² After discussing the ambiguities in Duverger's original formulation concerning the deterministic or probabilistic nature of the claimed relationships, Riker reviews evidence unfavorable to both Duverger's hypothesis and Duverger's law and then seeks to reformulate the latter so as to be able to account for the apparent counterexamples of Canada and India. His proposed modifications focus on a distinction between localized versus national two-party competition, on the one hand, and the presence or absence of a party capable of regularly commanding a majority against any probable *single* opponent, on the other. Riker then goes on to discuss the rationally grounded motivations for voter and party leaders which could explain the empirical fit of Duverger's law.

Sartori's chapter, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?" deals with the scientific status of assertions about the link between election type and party number. After first clarifying

Duverger's own original formulation of his laws, Sartori goes on to question their imprecision as to causality, determinism, and variable operationalization. This analysis leads him to grave skepticism about the possibility of their empirical verification, at least in the form initially stated. Sartori then reviews two proposed modifications of Duverger, those of Rae (1971) and Riker (1982a, excerpted in this volume), and finds neither author's attempt to reformulate Duverger to be satisfactory.

Sartori asserts that PR does not multiply the number of political parties. In particular, "whenever the introduction of PR happens to be followed by the surge of new relevant parties, we are not really pointing at the effects of PR, but at the *side effects* resulting from the removal of preexisting obstacles." On the other hand, "a plurality system cannot provide by itself a nationwide two-party format, but . . . it will help *maintain* an already existing one." Sartori's analysis of the effects of election type hinges upon the geographic distribution of partisan support and upon the presence of a structured party system. Sartori goes on to relate election type (ideological or other) and party polarization (defined as the distance between the most distant relevant parties) to the nature of the system of party competition that can be expected to emerge. He concludes by referring to necessary and sufficient factors that he feels contribute to a two-party format, as well as two other laws about the reductive or maintaining effect of election type on party number.

The third chapter in this volume is by Maurice Duverger. In "'Duverger's Law': Forty Years Later," Duverger traces the history of his own work, beginning with its earliest formulation in 1946, and then, responding to his critics, considers the presently available evidence on the tendencies he pointed to in *Political Parties* (1951a). Duverger reminds his readers that he has long recognized that

the relationship between electoral rules and party systems is not mechanical and automatic: A particular electoral regime does not necessarily produce a particular party system; it merely exerts pressure in the direction of this system; it is a force which acts among several other forces, some of which tend in the opposite direction.

Duverger points to specific social and cultural features (as well as electoral features) which can help explain the tendencies of Ireland, Austria, and Germany to a two-party system despite their use of forms of proportional representation. He concludes his essay with a very preliminary but nonetheless suggestive discussion of the struc-

tural factors which may lead to "bipolar multipartyism," a multiparty system where political conflict is shaped by two opposing blocs.

Richard S. Katz's essay, "Intraparty Preference Voting," calls attention to an important and too often neglected feature of electoral systems, the available mechanism for within-party choice of candidates. As Katz reminds us, "all candidates of a single party are not alike." Moreover, a party leader or supporter "might prefer the representatives of a particular area, interest, or faction to be proportionately stronger within the party even at the expense of overall party strength." Thus, in systems with partisan elections, we may think that electoral competition takes place on at least two levels: between party and within party—with interdependencies between those two types of competition. For example, "voters may exert an indirect influence on party-nominating decisions by demonstrating a differential willingness to support the party based on the identity of its candidates."

Katz identifies the diverse mechanisms for intraparty preference voting in fifteen election systems, including ones using list PR, STV (the single-transferable vote), and plurality. Among the party list systems, Katz identifies a wide range of options. At one extreme, in some party list systems the order of elections is determined solely by the preference votes cast for individual candidates. In several systems the special features of panachage and cumulation permit an unusual degree of voter flexibility. At the other extreme are systems in which the party list order prevails unless changed by a very large number of voters. Among plurality systems there are also a wide range of options ranging from challenge primaries, where only candidates who receive a minimum level of support in their own party's caucus or convention can challenge the decision, to blanket primaries, where all the candidates for each office are listed together regardless of party. Using recent elections from each of his fifteen polities, Katz identifies the effects of within-party and between-party competition on the reelection success of incumbents, and looks at the relationship between incumbent reelection success and election type and at the implications of his findings for party unity.

The concluding chapter in this section, William R. Keech's short essay on the length and renewability of electoral terms, is intended to stimulate interest in another important, but neglected, topic. Keech begins by noting that "those who see elections as a positive good and an effective guide for the behavior of public officials are likely to favor frequent elections and unlimited renewability of electoral terms. Those who see elections as necessary evils which interfere with the deliberations of statesmen tend to favor infrequent elections and limits

on the possibility of reelection." Beginning with a discussion of the arguments advanced in *The Federalist Papers*, Keech then turns to recent statistically sophisticated models of the interaction between election timing and the timing of economic policies intended to be politically advantageous to incumbent politicians, and goes on to consider the implications of variable rather than fixed election terms. While Keech's analysis is intended to be only preliminary, based on models which dramatically simplify reality, this line of research has potentially important policy implications; for instance, for the desirability of imposing limits on reelection such as these in the Twenty-second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (which limited presidents to two terms).

Proportional and Semiproportional Systems

Section II contains five chapters which are case studies or comparative analyses of proportional and semiproportional systems. Included are essays on list PR formulas, the limited vote, and mechanisms for PR-like representation by non-PR methods, such as separate ethnic lists.

Arend Lijphart's brief but comprehensive essay, "Proportionality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe," which begins this section, discusses the use of quotas, ethnically designated election districts or election rolls, and other special election features whose aim is to provide enhanced religious or ethnic representation. His examples offer a comparative analysis of several little-known systems. Lijphart considers the advantages and disadvantages of PR versus non-PR methods, with a conclusion largely favorable to the former. For example, he notes that even if the ethnic groups entitled to special modes of representation are specified, it may still be difficult to determine ethnic identification, especially in multiracial societies. Moreover, "the very principle of officially registering individuals according to ethnicity may be controversial or even completely unacceptable to many citizens," although this problem can be mitigated by making ethnic registration optional or by permitting voters a choice of slates, or by using geographic concentrations of ethnically identifiable voters to determine districts.

Jack F. Wright's essay "Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems," reviews in detail the relatively little-studied Australian use of the single-transferable vote (STV) (referred to by Wright as the quota-preferential method or, also following

Australian usage, the Hare-Clark system) and of majority-preferential voting (commonly known as the alternative vote). Australia pioneered the use of an early form of STV in the state of Tasmania in 1896, and the use of majority preferential voting in the state of Queensland in 1892. STV was adopted for the Australian Federal Senate in 1946. Australia's national electorate of over 8 million voters is the largest to make use of STV. Tasmania's experience with STV, employed with only minor changes since 1896, is the longest continuous example of the use of STV for legislative elections.

Wright's description of seats-votes outcomes under majority-preferential voting shows that it is closer to plurality and majoritarian methods than to PR or semiproportional methods. On the other hand, Wright points out that the use of STV in Tasmania (and for the Australian Federal Senate) has led to effective proportional representation of voter preferences and has not led to a fragmentation of the party system.

Leon Weaver's comprehensive overview of "The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the United States," discusses the adoption of STV in municipal elections in nearly two dozen U.S. cities in the first part of the century and the reasons for the abolition of PR in all but one of those cities by the mid 1960s. Weaver shows that "one of the important reasons for the abandonments was the opposition of party organizations and their leaders." Rather than affected by the issues which have preoccupied political scientists (e.g., the merits of seats-votes proportionality vs. the demerits of factionalism and immobilisme), in the United States, Weaver shows that STV rose (and then fell) with the ability of the various political actors who felt they were advantaged or disadvantaged by STV, to rouse voters on their behalf or against their opponents. Weaver also emphasizes that rumors of the end of STV in the United States have been exaggerated. It remains alive and well in Cambridge municipal elections and (since 1971) in New York City school board elections.

In seeking to derive lessons from the United States use of STV in local nonpartisan elections, Weaver makes the general point that the potential political consequences of any change in electoral laws must be understood in the context of the political system in which it is embedded. Weaver also shows that many of the claims made about the political effects of STV in the United States have failed to disentangle STV from other structural features which were often adopted simultaneously with it, such as the council/city manager system. It

does appear, however, that STV had a significant effect on styles of personal campaigning.

The third chapter in this section—by Arend Lijphart, Rafael Lopez-Pintor, and Yasunori Sone, “The Limited Vote and the Single-Non-transferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples”—a tricontinental collaboration, again deals with election data which has been rather neglected, in this case data on limited voting (and its polar case, the single-nontransferable vote, SNTV) drawn from national elections in Spain and Japan. Limited voting (like cumulative voting) can be characterized as a semiproportional system; that is, it combines some of the features of both plurality and PR. The limited vote uses multimember districts in which each voter has fewer votes than there are seats at stake in the district. Lijphart, Lopez-Pintor, and Sone characterize the limited vote as “both the most important kind of semiproportional system and the most straightforward and logical compromise between the plurality and PR principles.” Under the SNTV system (used in Japan’s lower house since 1900), voters in 3-, 4-, and 5-member districts have 1 vote each. In Spain’s Senate since 1977 the basic arrangement is that voters in 4-member districts have 3 votes each. Lijphart, Lopez-Pintor, and Sone analyze the theoretical proportionality features of the limited vote as a function of district magnitude and of the number of votes each voter is entitled to cast, and then analyze recent elections in the two countries. They find that, as expected, in terms of the matchup of vote share and seat share, the limited vote is “intermediate” between PR and non-PR systems but leans more toward the plurality end. They also find that, because a party which overestimates its strength and nominates “too many” candidates will be severely penalized by electoral setbacks, most parties (especially the larger ones which are likely to suffer the greatest disadvantage from miscalculation) are conservative in how many candidates they nominate.

Lijphart’s concluding chapter in this section, “Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas,” deals with the proportionality of six standard PR formulas. He finds the largest remainder formula the most proportional, and the Imperiali highest average formula the least so. Further, he unifies (and corrects) earlier work on this topic.

Plurality and Pluralitylike Systems

Section III of our volume deals with plurality and pluralitylike sys-

tems. It begins with a comprehensive and integrative review essay by the three authors whose works have spearheaded the recent renaissance in political geography in Britain: Peter J. Taylor, Graham Gudgin, and R. J. Johnston, "The Geography of Representation: A Review of Recent Findings." The starting point of the research they review is the study of elections as it represents the interaction between two spatial distributions: the pattern of voters and the network of constituency boundaries. Taylor, Gudgin, and Johnston inventory findings on seats-votes relationships for single-member plurality elections. Key variables which enter these analyses are district size; the number, average magnitude, and partisan homogeneity of the clusters of partisan concentration of voter support; and the geographic pattern of clustering (spatial autocorrelation). This research provides important new insights into issues such as the likely empirical realism of the "cube law" of electoral representation, the proportionality of representation for third parties, and the relative power of political parties.

Peter Fishburn's essay, "Social Choice and Pluralitylike Electoral Systems," discusses a literature whose relevance to the analysis of comparative election systems has only recently been recognized by political scientists (see esp. Riker, 1982b). Fishburn focuses on the effects of electoral systems on matters such as candidate strategy (especially ideological positioning), voter behavior (e.g., the incentives to vote for candidates whom the voter prefers but who have little or no chance of election), the accuracy with which voter preferences are represented, and the structure of within-party competition. Election systems analyzed by Fishburn include simple plurality, plurality with runoff (the double-ballot system), double plurality (not to be confused with the double-ballot system; double plurality gives each voter exactly two votes, but, as in simple plurality, the candidate with the most votes wins), and approval voting (a new method permitting voters to vote for each candidate whom they regard as "satisfactory" for them, rather than merely voting for their first choice).³

The essay by Richard L. Engstrom and Michael D. McDonald, "The Effect of At-Large versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities," deals with a topic which has become increasingly important in the past two decades—the opportunities for racial and linguistic minorities to obtain representatives of their choice in single-member district systems as compared to at-large (multimember district) elections held under a plurality (or plurality with runoff) rule. Engstrom and McDonald focus on U.S. municipal elections, and begin by reviewing the history of local election practices in the United States, finding an early twentieth-century wave of "reform" which led

to the adoption of at-large systems and then a more recent trend (also labeled "reform") away from at-large elections and back to single-member districts. This new reform has been motivated by the argument that multimember plurality elections (with their winner-take-all nature) tend to submerge minority voting strength.

Engstrom and McDonald conclude that the electoral format has a major impact on the number of black elected officials: "In cities in which all of the members of the council are elected from districts, the relationship between the black population and the black membership on the council is virtually proportional. . . . If at-large elections are used, however, blacks can be expected to be underrepresented." Engstrom and McDonald also look at the modifying effects of features (e.g., socioeconomic variables, political context, size of black population, and geographic region) which might be expected to affect the relationship between election type and the proportionality of minority representation. Their careful review of the literature shows that the dilutive effect of at-large elections on minority representation in U.S. municipalities persists even when other factors are controlled. They conclude with a discussion of the rather inconclusive data testing the hypothesis that municipal responsiveness to black concerns increases as the level of black city council representation increases.

Carol A. Cassel's chapter, "The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States," complements the Engstrom and McDonald chapter which precedes it, since at-large elections and nonpartisan ballots were two of three elements of the tripod on which the municipal reform movement of the early twentieth century rested (the third element being the professional city manager). As Cassel points out, early reformers saw nonpartisan elections as a critical tool to "limit the power of corrupt party machines, insulate local elections from the influence of state and national party politics, facilitate more efficient and business-like administration of local government, and encourage recruitment of superior candidates." As with at-large elections, one generation's reforms may become the next generation's errors that must be corrected. Although there is no current crusade for the reform of partisan city politics comparable to that now calling for a return to single-member districts, post-World War II scholarship has suggested that nonpartisan elections have a number of undesirable properties; for instance, it has been claimed that they tend to be "issueless in nature, that incumbents are advantaged and less accountable to the public in nonpartisan systems, that nonpartisan bodies lack collective responsibility, and that channels for recruitment to higher office are restricted by nonpartisanship."

Cassel's essay offers a thorough and balanced treatment of the available empirical evidence examining the alleged pros and cons of nonpartisan elections. Her intriguing conclusion is that "neither the reformist nor the revisionist theory of nonpartisan municipal elections is generally supported by empirical studies. The differences between partisan and nonpartisan systems appear to be less than both the proponents and critics of nonpartisanship argue," although "there are some discernible and measurable differences."

Howard Scarrow's two brief essays touch upon structural features of U.S. election systems which have been relatively little researched: ballot format and cross-endorsement/cross-filing procedures. His first essay reviews the strong evidence supporting the claim that the office-block ballot increases the incidence of split-ticket voting as compared to the party-column ballot. Scarrow, however, calls attention to some important and customarily neglected distinctions between office-block arrangements which facilitate straight-party voting (e.g., all of a party's candidates being located on a single horizontal row) and those which do not. Scarrow concludes this essay with an examination of the literature on ballot position and election success.

Scarrow's second essay is on cross-endorsement (a practice in which a candidate may run as the nominee of more than one party) and on cross-filing (in which a candidate may simultaneously seek the endorsement of more than one party) and compares and contrasts the effects of these two practices. He also notes that in both cross-filing and cross-endorsement, however, usually a candidate's name will appear more than once on the ballot; thus *both* practices may be contrasted with the related phenomenon of electoral alliances in European multiparty systems, in which the candidate's name will appear but once. Scarrow attributes to the state of New York's peculiar cross-endorsement rules the growth of a five-party system in that state, despite a single-member district plurality system. This essay thus provides an instance where analysis of state and local election systems in the United States may suggest modifications of generalizations (about election system and number of parties) based on studies of national parliaments.

Redistricting

The fourth and final section of this volume deals with redistricting issues. The lead chapter in this section, by Gordon E. Baker, looks at "Whatever Happened to the U.S. Reapportionment Revolution?" In the 1960s federal courts stepped in as guarantors, first of periodic

reapportionment and then of "one-person, one-vote" standards for state and federal redistricting. Baker points out that adherence to the standard of "one person, one vote" was achieved in a remarkably record time after judicial intervention, despite the fact that population discrepancies across districts were (in 1960) widespread and extreme. The reform ideas which drove political scientists (and others) to demand reapportionment were the desire for fair and effective representation, and, in particular, the need to end the chronic underrepresentation of urban (and more liberal) interests. Among the consequences of the reapportionment revolution discussed by Baker are gains for the Democratic party in state legislatures outside the South, a shift of Republican strength from rural to suburban districts, and an apparent reduced likelihood of divided party control at the state level—although direct policy consequences appear to have been very limited and remain hard to measure. However, although it achieved some of the earlier aims of reformers, the reapportionment revolution has left as yet largely unsettled a number of fundamental issues—including the problems posed by multimember elections and partisan gerrymandering. Indeed, in Baker's view, "by 1969 the Supreme Court had paradoxically encouraged the potential for widespread gerrymandering by developing a single-minded quest for mathematical [population] equality."

R. J. Johnston's chapter, "Constituency Redistribution in Britain: Recent Issues," provides us information on which to base a comparative analysis of the U.S. and British redistricting experience. Johnston points out that a mismatch between partisan vote share and partisan legislative seat share can occur both intentionally and unintentionally. He argues convincingly that the moves in Great Britain (beginning in the 1940s) to ensure equality in constituency population and to take the decision-making responsibility regarding boundary delimitation out of the hands of politicians, have ensured a "fair" procedure but do not necessarily ensure a "fair" result—although he does assert that "it is unlikely that a neutral procedure will perpetrate a major gerrymander. In Great Britain, as in the United States there has been debate over the importance of "representation of place" (i.e., counties and boroughs) relative to "representation of people," and these issues have gone to the courts; however, in Britain (unlike the United States) judicial intervention has not really taken place, and exact numerical standards have not been laid down.

Our concluding essay by Peter Mair, "Districting Choices Under the Single-Transferable Vote in Ireland," shows that reapportionment is not an issue exclusive to single-member districting. Mair first reviews

the operations of STV in Ireland and then discusses its accessibility to partisan manipulation, particularly that which is achieved through variations in district magnitude (number of seats to be filled per district). Mair also calls attention to the extent to which STV's multi-member districts are subject to "intraparty bailiwicking," an arrangement in which party voters in different areas within the same multimember district are instructed to place different candidates at the top of their preference ordering.

Mair concludes that there is considerable potential for partisan political gerrymandering under STV in the Irish system because of the feasibility of altering district magnitude and the ability to predict probable election results. Mair makes the important point that "while in theory proportionality should increase as constituencies become larger . . . , smaller districts will not necessarily favor larger parties. Rather, depending upon its *precise* vote, a large party may prefer a 4-seat to a 3-seat constituency or a 5-seat to a 4-seat constituency." His analysis of redistricting under STV provides a nice counterpoint to the earlier chapters in this section, which deal with redistricting in plurality systems.

Conclusions

Compared to even as recently as a decade ago, we know a great deal about the political consequences of electoral laws, and the scope of study has been considerably broadened. Until quite recently, the literature on the political consequences of electoral laws has, in our view, too often been marred by the following:

1. An unnecessary divorce between Americanists and comparativists, in which the former study the United States, treating it as *sui generis*, while the latter focus on political institutions in Western Europe and other industrialized nations, with only an occasional mention of data from the United States;
2. An unnecessary divorce between the work on formal models of social choice and the study of comparative election systems, with each group of scholars writing largely in ignorance of the work of the other group;
3. A similar unnecessary ignorance by political scientists of the highly sophisticated and highly relevant work being done by political geographers;
4. A view of the domain of study which is too narrowly focused on

the issues of seats-votes relationships such as those so elegantly analyzed in Rae's *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (1967, 1971).

As noted, that situation, happily, now appears to be changing rather dramatically. We are optimistic that this renewed scholarly interest in electoral institutions will continue and that it marks a permanent recognition of the fact that institutions can constrain and structure political choices in a fundamental way.

Notes

1. No analysis of elections can be complete without at least mention of the degree of honesty of the political process (e.g., existence of ballot-stuffing and voter intimidation).
2. Riker's chapter is excerpted, with revisions, from his 1982 article in *APSR* (see Riker, 1982a). We first heard this paper as it was delivered at the International Political Science Association Meeting in Rio de Janeiro in August 1982, and it helped convince us that the present volume was a feasible project. Thus it is appropriate that Riker's essay should be the lead chapter.
3. Approval voting has been proposed by Brams and Fishburn (1983) as a way of improving the traditional (single-member district election) methods used in presidential and other U.S. primaries.