

for the excluded and unrepresented, animated by a vision of the liberal free society.

So what is the trouble here? Donohue's major charge is familiar to those who have read their Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol, or Robert Nisbet: unlimited pursuit of liberal values leads to the destruction of community by promoting unrestrained individualism. Yet here Donohue introduces a peculiar philosophical twist. Following the complex philosophical history of the meaning of "liberalism," Donohue argues that modern liberals are both hyperindividualists and totalitarian collectivists. On the one hand, the ACLU (and the "radiclibs") have promoted "hyperindividualism," a direct extension of John Stewart Mill's celebration of individual liberty as an absolute value. This is most visible in the protection of pornography, defendants' rights, and abortion. On the other, he argues that the ACLU has resorted to "collectivistic" (read: totalitarian) means to realize equality of condition. This is most visible in the support for affirmative action and programs to abolish poverty.

Which way does Donohue want to have it? Is the ACLU a group of radical libertarians or coercive social levelers? Or is it simply that Donohue doesn't like the contemporary drift of liberalism toward radicalism and, in an attempt to redraw the political boundaries, uses both charges in order to push the debate back toward the right? The latter is clearly the case. And yet I have to admire his scholarly fortitude. Stripping away the polemic, there is another book here.

*Voting Procedures*, by MICHAEL DUMMETT.  
London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. 309 pp. \$34.50 cloth.

BERNARD GROFMAN  
*University of California, Irvine*

Dummett's basic thesis is that choice of voting method matters; his concern is to identify whether or not a collective-decision making rule is fair, in the sense of reasonably reflecting the preferences of those participating in the decision. I believe him to be quite right about his central thesis, and often informative about the problems of unpacking what might be meant by such terms as "fair" or "reasonable" voting method (see especially chaps. 6 and 7). Also, he has something to say both about procedures that pick a single alter-

native from among several mutually exclusive options and about procedures for selecting a set of alternatives in accord with some norm of minority representation.

Judging by the test of whether someone who was already quite knowledgeable about voting methods and formal social choice theory could learn something new from this book, Dummett does well. With minimal mathematical formalism, the author reviews the properties of numerous well-known voting procedures including the Borda rule, plurality, the alternative vote, successive procedures, the sequential amendment procedure, the approval vote, the limited vote, the cumulative vote, and the single transferable vote. In addition, he offers an extensive discussion of the conditions in which it may be in a voter's interest to vote for a candidate who is not one's first choice, and of the general problem of strategic voting in a world of less than complete information. Dummett's major contribution, however, will ultimately rest on the usefulness of the various new voting methods he proposes.

The first of these is a practical modification of the Borda procedure for use with a large number of candidates. A second new method, called by the author the Majority Number Procedure, is intended to replace the usual majority runoff procedures. It is based on the use of what are known as Copeland Scores in the social choice literature. A third new method, called by the author the Quota Preference Score procedure, is proposed as a replacement for the single transferable vote form of minority representation in multimember constituencies. Unlike STV, QPS satisfies a condition known in the technical literature as monotonicity. (Voting methods that fail to satisfy monotonicity are held by many authors—but not by me—to be fatally flawed.) The QPS procedure advanced by Dummett is intriguingly similar to a procedure recently advocated in an article in the *American Political Science Review* by Chamberlin and Courant. A fourth new voting method, called by the author the graded SV procedure, is intended for use in the special but troublesome case when a committee may elect more than one, but need not elect any, from a set of candidates.

It is this last procedure which I find of the greatest potential interest, e.g., for annual competitions in which a decision may be reached to give no prize because of the inadequate caliber of that year's nominees. In

Dummett's graded SV procedure, voters award points, positive or negative, to each candidate, by assigning to each candidate a unique element from the set of integers 1 to K (where K is the number of candidates), and attaching to each integer a plus or a minus sign. Thus, if a voter thinks all candidates worthy of election s/he will allot positive members to all of them; if s/he thinks none worthy of election s/he will allot negative numbers to all. In general, s/he will allot positive numbers to some and negative numbers to others. A candidate may not be elected unless s/he has a positive total score; the candidates with the highest total positive scores are declared elected, up to the number of posts to be filled (252-253).

A major complaint of Dummett's, which I share, is that to most of those interested in elections, including most students of comparative parties and politics, the mathematical theory of voting remains unknown. We also share the view that it is simply impossible to understand key ideas in democratic theory—e.g., what are the properties of majority rule? What are the conflicts between majoritarianism and principles of minority representation?—without a basic grasp of the contemporary social choice literature, beginning with Duncan Black's classic *Theory of Committee and Elections* (1958).

Dummett's pedagogical aim is to construct a bridge for students of comparative election systems to the vast body of formal literature on mechanisms for collective choice. Given my complete sympathies with his aims, and my admiration for his grasp of a huge technical literature (although there are numerous lacunae in his knowledge, e.g., lack of familiarity with the important work of such scholars as M. Balinsky and P. Young, J. Chamberlin, D. Rae, W. Riker, N. Miller, R. Niemi and R. McKelvey, K. Shepsle and B. Weingast, and T. Sullivan, and with H. Moulin's work on veto games, which is listed in the bibliography but not referenced in the text); I am sorry to say that I believe Dummett's attempts to reach a wider audience are doomed to failure. The author's initial contribution to the social literature came in the form of work on strategic voting, and there is far too much emphasis in this book on matters of mostly technical interest about admissible strategies and the like. Nonetheless, the author's novel ideas about electoral innovations make this a worthwhile book for the specialist reader.

Taken in conjunction with recent work on

representative deliberations by Chamberlin and Courant, the recent book of H. Balinski and P. Young on quota systems of apportionment, work by R. Sugden on STV and the principle of free association, and work by H. Moulin on proportional veto systems, Dummett's work can be seen as part of a remarkable wave of innovative research on the formal properties of PR-like systems unparalleled since the 1880s. For the first time in roughly one hundred years, ideas about minority representation are being studied from both a mathematical and a political perspective.

*The View from Inside: A French Communist Cell in Crisis*, by JANE JENSON and GEORGE ROSS. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984. 346 pp. \$28.50 cloth.

SIDNEY TARROW  
Cornell University

Jenson and Ross, in this first-of-its-kind ethnographic study, tell the story of a small group of Parisian intellectuals in a French Communist party (PCF) cell at the end of the 1970s, when their party was going through one of its periodic returns to orthodoxy. The book follows their and their party's gyrations from the PCF's flirtation with Eurocommunism in the mid-1970s through its rejection of its Socialist allies in 1978—the moment of their possible ascent to power—to its closure at the Twenty-third Party Congress.

The Communists of the Danielle Cazenova cell moved from excitement at the party's *ouverture* in its Eurocommunist phase, to shock at its reversal, disorientation at the leadership's internal tactics, and disgust at its return to sectarianism and its subsequent organizational and political decline. The book analyzes in detail how the cell evolved during these years from enthusiastic activism to internal rumblings of disquiet to disorganization and finally to contempt and disaffection.

Jenson and Ross tell their story—at times with excessive detail—with warm attention to the characters of their subjects and to their relations with one another and with their superiors in the party. But despite thick descriptions of the wine and food that cell members seem to devour constantly, the book is happily free of the cultural stereotyping with which American work on "the French" is so often laden. What it most lacks is a theoretical guide at the outset to what the authors think it