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Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
under the Single Non-Transferable Vote
The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution

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Ann Arbor
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

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SNTV: An Inventory of Theoretically Derived Propositions and a Brief Review of the Evidence from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Alabama

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Three issues have been central in the older literature on the effects of electoral systems: (1) incentives for party proliferation, (2) proportionality of party representation, and (3) consequences for political stability (see, e.g., Hermens 1951, 1972; and Lakeman and Lambert 1955). A key debate has been between advocates of PR and advocates of majoritarian/plurality decision making. The latter argue that, because proportional representation voting schemes proportionally reflect interests in society, they (1) give rise to multiparty politics without a single majority party and (2) guarantee that extremist views are represented in the assembly; they further argue that the combination of (1) and (2) imply that in extremis (3) the lives of governments in PR regimes will be "nasty, brutish, and short." Sparked in large part by Rae (1967, 1971), there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in recent decades in the effects of electoral laws on political life.¹ At the same time, there has been a renaissance in political geography as it applies to electoral issues (see especially early work such as Gudgin and Taylor 1979, Taylor and Johnston 1979, and the review in Grofman 1982).² Completely independently, work in social choice theory based on Black's classic work on single peakedness (1958), Arrow's seminal results (1951, 1963), the Downs-Hotelling spatial model (Downs 1957), Farquharson's notion of sophisticated voting (1969), and related ideas has generated a vast body

of research that can be made directly relevant to the understanding of the properties of electoral systems (see, e.g., Cox 1987a, 1990, 1991, 1994; Robertson 1976; Katz 1980; and Greenberg and Weber 1985).³

In toto, this recent work has provided a number of important qualifications to the traditional attack on proportional representation just described (see especially Lijphart 1984, Taagepera 1984, and Lijphart et al. 1992),⁴ recognized the wide range of diversity of electoral systems rather than simply positing a dichotomy between PR on the one hand and plurality on the other (Grofman 1975; Lijphart and Grofman 1984), considered electoral systems as only one element in the broader framework of constitutional design (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Lijphart 1984), and extended the questions addressed to include topics such as intraparty factionalism (Reed 1990), optimal nomination strategies (Sawyer and MacRae 1962; Brams 1975; Glazer, Glazer, and Grofman 1984),⁵ and incentives for localism/corruption (Myerson 1993a, 1993b).⁶

The focus of this essay is on the uses of and consequences of one particular electoral system, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). SNTV permits voters only one vote, although there are m seats to be filled ($m > 1$); the m candidates with the highest vote totals are elected. In an earlier essay in this volume, I looked at theoretical comparisons of SNTV with electoral systems such as the single transferable vote (STV) that have key elements in common with SNTV. Here I offer an inventory of theoretically derived propositions about the consequences of that system and provide a brief review of relevant evidence, with a particular focus on evidence from elections and campaigns in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and some additional data on the consequences of SNTV elections in a site seemingly as dissimilar to these countries as one could find, the state of Alabama.⁷

After presenting this propositional inventory, in the subsequent sections of the essay I consider the evidence for this inventory of propositions in the context of what in the preface I referred to as the "theory of embedded institutions."⁸ I also briefly look at data on the effects of SNTV from a quite different political setting, Alabama—since data from such a most-different-systems perspective is an important piece of the puzzle in studying the effects of an electoral system from an embedded institutions perspective⁹—and look at before and after evidence on the use of SNTV in terms of "natural experiments."¹⁰ I also review how SNTV's role changed in Taiwan as Taiwan transitioned from authoritarianism toward democracy.¹¹ The empirical research I report draws

heavily, of course, on the essays in this volume and on earlier research, especially that on Japan.¹²

Inventory of Theoretically Derived Propositions about SNTV

As nations around the world seek to construct (or reconstruct) democratic institutions, the question of the link between institutional arrangements and democratic performance has attracted special attention. Putnam (1993, 3) asks: "If we transplant democratic institutions will they grow in the new setting as they did in the old?" The concerns in this essay are not as general, but they are very similar, namely: How can we identify the effects of SNTV and how do these effects vary with political and social context? In this section, I consider the first of these questions.

As I reviewed the recent electoral systems literature, I was able to identify 10 ("stylized") statements about the general effects of SNTV.¹³ These are organized in terms of hypotheses about the nature of campaigning and campaign organizations (hypotheses 1, 2, and 3), the proportionality of seats-votes (hypotheses 4 and 5),¹⁴ party and factional proliferation and interparty competition (hypotheses 6, 7, and 8), and the policy consequences of SNTV and its implications for the nature of the political process (hypotheses 9 and 10). Most are rooted in theoretical expectations derived from the idea that electoral institutions structure the incentives of players in the electoral arena, whether voters, candidates, or parties. However, I make no pretense to having provided a formalized derivation of these propositions from a set of simple axioms and a theory of electoral incentives. Rather, the propositions should be taken as heuristics for summarizing a large body of literature in a relatively straightforward fashion.

1. SNTV generates very strong *intraparty* competition within a given multimember district. Indeed, in many circumstances, a candidate's chief rival(s) will be a member (or members) of his own party.
2. Under SNTV, the combination of intraparty and interparty competition places an especially great premium on reliable voters and thus enhances the influence of groups that can "deliver" blocs of voters.
3. SNTV gives rise to quasi-permanent electoral bases and bases of

- campaign organization tied to a "segmented" electorate that allow seats to be "passed down" almost like feudal inheritances.
4. SNTV, as a multimember district, semiproportional system, permits manipulation of electoral success in terms both of population discrepancies across districts that would favor supporters of particular parties and the number of seats assigned to a given district.
 5. Over the long run, controlling for malapportionment, SNTV leads to an allocation of seats to votes that is much closer to PR than the plurality end of the proportionality continuum. However, this proportionality may be reduced by special mechanisms, such as seat bonuses, intended to superimpose majoritarian features on semiproportional (or proportional) systems.
 6. SNTV, as a multimember district, semiproportional system, provides incentives for more than two parties to compete, with the number of parties closely linked to the average number of seats per constituency.¹⁵
 7. SNTV provides strong incentives for party factionalism because of the incentives for intraparty competition at the district level and the localistic and particularistic orientation of candidates. These incentives are in part a function of m , the number of seats in a district.
 8. Parties learn to develop equilibrium strategies based on their expected levels of vote support. The long-run dynamics of SNTV competition tends to result in low levels of interparty competition since parties tend to run candidates only where there is a reasonable chance to win a seat. SNTV's quasi-permanent electoral bases tend to yield relatively low interelection volatility and insulation of seats from national electoral tides.
 9. Because candidates are competing with members of their own parties as well as members of opposing parties, SNTV fosters a strong localistic and personalistic orientation in which members compete to provide "personal" and "group-based" services to their individual constituencies and downplay wider policy issues.
 10. SNTV increases the importance of money in politics because of the need to wage both intraparty and interparty campaigns and the importance of party factions and because of the relative absence of issue-based politics and the desires of the various long-standing electoral constituencies to receive rewards for their loyalty. These features of SNTV enhance the potential for corruption.

Evidence

In line with the methodological approach to the study of embedded institutions laid out in the preface, this essay focuses on an institution that is formally identical (or nearly identical) across different settings—SNTV. In line with the desire to (initially) examine cases in which it should be most likely to find SNTV having similar consequences, most of the evidence I review is from three nations, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, that have relatively similar political traditions and political cultures (at least compared to Western European democracies), that have each made use of SNTV for parliamentary elections for some or all of the post–World War II period, and that have each had a dominant political party for most or all of this time period.¹⁶

As I review the evidence for the 10 hypotheses, I begin each section with a very brief discussion of the theoretically expected effects of SNTV and then proceed to consider the evidence from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

The Nature of Campaigning and Campaign Organizations under SNTV

Hypothesis 1 — SNTV Fosters Intraparty Competition

Because voters under SNTV have only one vote even though there are multiple candidates to be elected, it would seem inevitable that, absent both total party control over candidacies and perfect ability to forecast electoral outcomes, some candidates of each party would, in effect, be running against each other as well as against the opposition.

There have been many multimember constituencies in Japan where the distribution of voting strength in conjunction with SNTV's semi-proportionality guaranteed that the largest party does not win all the seats. In these districts, Reed and Boland (this volume) show that the LDP was likely to run one more candidate than it had previously won seats. In such a situation, while ostensibly the nonincumbent is competing with the candidates of the other parties to gain an additional seat, he or she is also competing with members of the LDP. If the LDP has won, say, three seats in the past, and runs four candidates, then if it wins only three seats again somebody has got to lose and it need not be the "new guy on the block."¹⁷ Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) find that of the 399 LDP incumbents defeated in the elections from 1960 to 1990, 48 percent were replaced by another LDP candidate.¹⁸

In Korea, the intraparty struggle over candidate nomination was not so serious for the DRP as for the LDP in Japan due to the DRP's abundance of resources, effective organization, and the strong leadership position of the president (S.-C. Lee, this volume; K.-Y. Lee, this volume; Mo and Brady, this volume). The DRP often provided alternative options (e.g., at-large assemblymen appointed by the president and jobs in the government bureaucracy and public corporations) to those who failed to obtain party nomination. For instance, in one year there were 61 incumbents who were not nominated by the ruling DRP, but none entered the race. The ruling parties never nominated two candidates except in the first SNTV election (the ninth election) in which the ruling DRP nominated two candidates in only seven of 73 districts. Despite a sometimes noisy nomination process, the opposition parties also refrained from nominating more than one candidate per district. In Korea, therefore, intraparty competition was avoided through a tightly controlled nomination process by the party leadership.¹⁹

In Taiwan, the Responsibility Zone System created by the Kuomintang is a factor that works to minimize intraparty competition. "In that zone, the Kuomintang mobilizes strong support for the candidate from party members and their families, neighbors, and friends. In each zone . . . it becomes the 'responsibility' of all party members to elect that particular party nominee. A Kuomintang nominee is allowed to campaign intensively within his or her own zone and only nominally outside it in the same district" (Liu, this volume). There are three types of responsibility zones: geographical, functional, and reserve. "Geographical zones are defined by administrative units [e.g., wards]. . . . Party units in all important organizations and groups — such as the Veterans' Association [and] the Railway Worker's Union, . . . are the units of assignment in the functional zones. Individuals belonging to these party units are excluded from the geographical zones. . . . Reserve zones are a special subset of the functional zones . . . supplemental units [that may be] . . . assigned to struggling candidates [as late as] . . . several days before the election" (Liu, this volume).²⁰

Hypothesis 2 — Under SNTV, the Influence of Groups That Can "Deliver" Blocs of Voters Are Enhanced

The combination of intraparty and interparty competition places an especially great premium on reliable voters. Because each candidate is striving for sufficient votes to win, yet the party of that candidate does not want

any candidate to win so many votes that the election chances of other candidates of the party are significantly reduced, reliable voters are at a premium in fostering the strategic calculations of candidates and parties.²¹

In Japan under SNTV, quasi-permanent electoral bases and bases of campaign organization are tied to a "segmented" electorate (Bouissou, this volume). The LDP backbenchers who are not blessed with the opportunity to inherit an established campaign machine from a father or mentor will seek to build a reliable electoral base by enlisting the support of family, friends, and elites in the district. Most candidates seek out local politicians who can claim to "deliver" the votes of their own supportive constituencies as officers in the personal support organizations (*koenkai*). Candidates compete to win the alliance of prominent local business people, leaders of agricultural cooperatives, and construction contractors (Woodall 1996). A typical LDP backbencher has 50 to 80 constituency organizations, but some senior politicians boast networks incorporating several hundred. *Koenkai* sponsor a range of activities catering to the interests of housewives, young adults, hobby and sports enthusiasts, and the elderly. The candidate is expected to pay the cost of festive gatherings, outings to resorts, and a host of other activities involving *koenkai* members. These groups are counted upon to supply a large share of the candidate's "hard vote" at election time (Thayer 1969; Curtis 1971; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1994; Bouissou, this volume; Fukui and Fukai, this volume).

In Korean districts, personal vote-gathering machines developed, parallel in form to the Japanese *koenkai*. "These personal organizations . . . were formed based mainly on personal ties such as alumni, clan, and other professional and recreational groups. . . . The candidates maintained the personal organizations by offering to the members various favors, including job opportunities, attending ceremonial occasions, and even arranging marriages. In addition, the candidates' election strategies focused on bringing, or promising in most cases, various financial benefits to their districts" (S.-C. Lee, this volume).²²

In Taiwan, as noted above (see Liu, this volume), the zone system for organizing candidate support relies heavily on groups from whom support can be expected.²³

Hypothesis 3—SNTV Allows Seats to Be "Passed Down" to a Chosen Successor Almost Like Feudal Inheritances

Hypothesis 3 builds on hypotheses 1 and 2. If there is a premium on reliable voters that leads candidates to build up strong personal cam-

campaign organizations, when these candidates retire they may be able to pass their campaign organizations to chosen successors.

Ishibisashi and Reed (1992) have done the most extensive work on the "heritability" of seats in the Japanese Diet. Jean-Marie Bouissou (personal communication, 30 April 1995) notes that in Japan in the 1980s more than 50 percent of new LDP representatives could be seen as "second generation," that is, children or other relatives of previous incumbents or staff members for them. While the JSP inheritance of seats did not work quite this way, in that party particular seats were often under the control of particular organizations (e.g., labor unions). As Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 25) note: "Inheriting a well-developed set of support organizations from a father, father-in-law, or mentor gives these members a huge advantage over their competitors beginning from scratch."²⁴ Aside from inheriting a tried and tested vote-gathering machine, these scions also take over fully formed pipelines of political money. As Woodall (1996, 87–88) explains: "This advantage is all the more significant because a large share of campaign contributions is drawn from business sources in Tokyo and other metropolitan areas, which may be far from the district."

A similar pattern of "takeover" of the previous incumbent's support group appears to obtain in Korea, but the succession may be more mediated by external forces and a newcomer brought in from outside may eventually replace campaign staff with his own loyalists (see case study discussed in Park 1988a, 1051–52). However, it is difficult to discuss the "passed-down seats" phenomenon in Korea since SNTV was practiced only rather briefly (in four elections).

While there appear to be no systematic comparisons of the success rates of "dynastic" candidates, or comparisons of rates before and after democratization, Winckler (personal communication, 30 October 1995) summarizes the evidence for inheritability of seats in Taiwan as follows:

In Taiwan, during the authoritarian period seats were passed down, usually within long-standing local factions, often family-based. There are many famous examples of relatives succeeding each other in the same post, or using a common electoral base to occupy several posts. On Taiwan, during the transition to independence, there have been many attempts at local family or factional dynasties — perhaps even more than before, as the KMT role in local candidate selection weakens. Also, large national business groups have acquired "their" seats

in the national legislature (in some cases held by members of the families owning the business), which they are likely to “pass down” to their chosen successors. However, overall, there may have been some diminution in successes in “inheriting” seats, as electoral outcomes in general become more uncertain.²⁵

Seats-Votes Relationships and SNTV as a Tool of Electoral Engineering and Party Advantage

Hypothesis 4—SNTV Permits Partisan Advantage to Be Gained Via Malapportionment and Choice of Seat Size, Especially in Small and Medium-Sized Constituencies

Virtually all electoral systems are open to malapportionment,²⁶ although the potential importance of this phenomenon is greatest when party strength is not evenly spread geographically.²⁷

Seats in the Japanese legislature in the post-World War II period have varied greatly in per capita representation, with the largest districts some three times larger than the smallest in population. Important early work on measuring malapportionment effects in Japan is found in Yamakawa (1984). As Woodall (this volume) and others (e.g., Hrebemar 1992b) have emphasized, despite population changes, meaningful reapportionment did not take place. Rather, the changes were merely cosmetic adjustments to the original order. The disparities were not random; the Liberal Democratic Party has benefited considerably from rural overrepresentation. In 1980, for example, *Asahi Shinbun*, Japan’s leading national newspaper, observed that the LDP won only 32.9 percent of the urban vote compared to 70.4 percent of the rural vote. If there had been no malapportionment, rather than winning a majority of the seats *Asahi Shinbun* estimated that the LDP would instead have fallen 26 seats shy of a majority.

The “medium district” system in Japan (primarily districts with three to five seats) also has historically worked in favor of the LDP, which has usually been able to win at least two of the three seats in most of the three-member constituencies and pick up at least one of the seats in the constituencies in which it is the minority party. Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to develop an independent measure of the importance of malapportionment in terms of its interaction with factors such as district magnitude is Christensen and Johnson (1995). They find that use of a

relatively low district magnitude has a greater impact on LDP's seat bonus relative to its vote share than does malapportionment per se (cf. Hickman and Kim 1992).

Malapportionment is a serious problem in Korea. One study of 1963–88 elections (Kim, Kim, and Kim 1991) argues that malapportionment occurred in 80 percent of all the districts examined, with 45 percent overrepresented and 35 percent underrepresented. The value of a vote in some districts was six times larger than in others. On average, a vote in an extremely overrepresented district is three times greater than a vote in an extremely underrepresented district. In addition, the average voter turnout rate of overrepresented districts is usually higher than that of underrepresented districts.

Moreover, most overrepresented districts are in rural areas where the ruling party has fared the best. S.-C. Lee (this volume) shows that the number of rural districts outnumbered the urban ones by about 3.6 times. Thus, the larger number of rural districts, combined with the *Yadoyochon* phenomenon (opposition parties receiving electoral support mostly from urban areas and ruling parties from rural areas) and malapportionment, enabled the ruling parties to achieve a relatively easy victory in elections.²⁸

In Taiwan, national representatives elected on the mainland in the late 1940s remained in office for 40 years on Taiwan. This was malapportionment with a vengeance. However, perhaps in compensation, the KMT has been scrupulous about correct apportionment at the local level. As Winckler (personal communication, 30 October 1995) summarizes the evidence:

The constitution specifies how many citizens are required for one seat in each kind of representative body, and as population has increased or shifted, the government has added or transferred seats accordingly. The KMT's electoral strength has been rather uniform across rural/urban or county/city distinctions, so it has little incentive to encourage malapportionment. Moreover (as in Japan), "metropolitanization" of the island has greatly reduced differences between urban and rural areas.

Similarly, prior to the transition toward democracy, the KMT has not sought to manipulate district magnitude for partisan advantage be-

cause such a strategy was not needed and it had other more direct and effective techniques for holding onto control. In 1989, however, there was a reduction in district magnitude for the National Legislature as seats were added to that body (see Hsieh, this volume). However, Winckler (personal communication, 30 October 1995) notes that

there were reasons for this reduction other than a KMT attempt at partisan advantage—the inconvenience for all candidates of campaigning in quite artificial multi-county districts, and the inconvenience to voters of long ballots accompanying rising district magnitude. If there was a partisan advantage to the KMT, it may have been more organizational than numerical—aligning national legislative seats with the natural bailiwicks of county-based local factions. Moreover, reducing district magnitude reduced the organizational burden of campaigning not only for the KMT, but also for the DPP—a burden that the DPP was much less able to bear. In any case there was little evidence that reducing district magnitude gave the KMT much partisan advantage, since even it regarded its performance in the 1989 national legislative elections as a defeat.

Hypothesis 5—Over the Long Run, after Controlling for Malapportionment, SNTV Operates as a Nearly Proportional System

There are various ways to determine how proportional an electoral system is, including the range of discrepancy (a.k.a. “total deviation,” analogous to the most common measure used by U.S. courts to determine the degree of conformity with the “one person, one vote” standard; see Grofman and Scarrow 1981), the Taagepera coefficient of party advantage (Taagepera 1986), and the Loosemore and Hanby (1971) coefficient of distortion, D .²⁹ To determine the latter, we simply calculate the sum of the absolute values of the discrepancies between each party’s vote share and its seat share and then normalize by a factor of two to produce an index that ranges between zero and one. Because D has both an intuitive interpretation and cross-national comparative data using it available,³⁰ I focus on D in my discussion of proportionality issues.³¹ SNTV is commonly called a semiproportional system because it is proportional only if parties are able to assure that they run the “cor-

rect" number of candidates and thus do not waste the votes of any party supporters. In practice, therefore, to the extent that candidate support is based on reliable voters (such as *koenkai*), SNTV may operate in a nearly proportional fashion.

For the 1980 election in Japan, we may recalculate from the Lijphart, Pintor, and Sone (1986, 163) data an index of distortion of 9.3 percent, which puts SNTV intermediate between PR and plurality systems but quite close to the proportionality end of the continuum. In general, the LDP's candidates claimed a share of parliamentary seats far in excess of the party's votes, and the party's rivals, especially the smallest ones, were correspondingly disadvantaged (see Woodall, this volume; and Cox and Niou, this volume), although the JSP was sometimes overrepresented and Komeito tended to be rather proportionally represented. However, as Bouissou (personal communication, 30 April 1995) points out, we must be very careful in interpreting seats-votes relationships in Japan since a substantial number of conservatives run as independents but join (or rejoin) the LDP upon being elected. When we count their votes as LDP votes, the disproportionality in LDP seat share goes down considerably.³²

In Korea, the likely near proportionality of SNTV was reduced by the special mechanism of seat bonus for a plurality party intended to superimpose majoritarian features on a semiproportional system and, in the first two elections under SNTV, a conscious strategy on the part of the ruling party to run only one candidate in each two-member district. Thus, SNTV in Korea tended to be more disproportional than in Japan (see calculations in Brady and Mo, this volume).

In Taiwan, Hsieh (this volume: table 1) shows seats and votes for the ruling party. From that table, we may estimate D , obtaining an average value of D of around 8 percent. In their detailed look at disproportionality, Cox and Niou (this volume) find that in Taiwan (as well as Japan) the largest party was advantaged. However, Lijphart et al. (1992) emphasizes that we must compare the proportionality of SNTV with that of PR systems of comparable district magnitude. When we do so, Lijphart would conclude that in Japan (and Taiwan) SNTV operates like a PR system.³³ This point is made even more strongly by Christensen and Johnson (1995, 597), who argue that the "interaction of district magnitude and strategic errors, supports the characterization of the SNTV systems as more proportional than PR systems."³⁴

Party and Factional Proliferation under SNTV

Hypothesis 6—SNTV (with m greater than 2) Provides Strong Incentives for There to Be More Than Two Parties

As a multimember district system that is nearly or fully proportional, something like Duverger's law should apply to SNTV. The threshold of exclusion for plurality, like that for SNTV, is $1/(m + 1)$. In an argument whose logic parallels that of Duverger (1955) for plurality systems, Reed (1990) treats SNTV as an " m th past the post" system, where m is again used as a symbol for district magnitude. Thus, just as plurality is argued to produce two-party competition, SNTV should tend to produce $m + 1$ parties. Reed's argument is formalized in Cox (1994).³⁵

In Japan, given an average of four seats per district in the 1947 system, this argument gives rise to an expectation of five parties. For the period 1958–93, Reed identifies the five as the LDP, the JSP (Socialist), Komeito (Clean Government), DSP (Democratic Socialist), and the JCP (Communist).

In Korea, with $m = 2$ we would expect three-party competition, although the bonus rule somewhat complicates our expectations as to how the Yushin system should operate. There was indeed a three-party system in the ninth and tenth elections: the DRP (Democratic Republican Party), NDP (New Democratic Party), and DUP (Democratic Unification Party). The DUP, a splinter party of the NDP, was formed just before the ninth election. Due to the government intervention, however, the opposition parties were fragmented in the following SNTV elections (eleventh and twelfth). For a count on the number of (effective) parties, see Brady and Mo (1992, table 4).

Moreover, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all had dominant majority parties for long periods in the post-World War II period. Clearly, to understand long-lasting one-party dominance under a nearly proportional system we must look to historical factors; of course, in the long run in Japan and Korea these parties' majority margins did shrink and eventually disappeared, and the dominance of the KMT in Taiwan has weakened as opposition has coalesced around the DPP (Winckler, "Electoral Equilibria," this volume).³⁶ Also, as Winckler (this volume) explains, despite mean district size greater than two, because the question of national identity remains overriding in Taiwan, the cleavage structure

supports only two parties (each internally divided into factions with respect to the same cleavage dimension).³⁷

Hypothesis 7—SNTV Provides Strong Incentives for Party Factionalism Tied to the Number of Seats in a District

Under SNTV, especially when there is a dominant party, competition that might otherwise be played out in interparty terms may well be fought as an intraparty contest.³⁸

In Japan, because of the incentives for intraparty competition at the district level and the localistic and particularistic orientation of candidates and their need for money to support their *koenkai*, it is difficult for LDP members to succeed without the patronage of an LDP faction. Because there are usually more factional affiliations among the candidates than there are seats that the LDP will win, and because new candidates must seek support from a faction not already represented in the district, of necessity factional competition is strong. Factions “determine which candidates receive official party endorsement, allocate campaign funds and political posts, and serve as constituency service networks” (Woodall, this volume; also see Cox and Rosenbluth 1995a).³⁹

Reed and Bolland (this volume) extend the logic of Reed’s argument about SNTV tending to produce $m + 1$ parties to the factional level, suggesting that there should be five major factions in the LDP.⁴⁰ Students of Japanese politics generally agree that there have been five major factions in the LDP. However, it is important to note that, in Japan, this “logic” took a very long time to play out; initially the LDP began with 12 factions and it took about 20 years to reduce that number to five (Jean-Marie Bouissou, personal communication, 29 April 1995).

In Korea, the fact that the DJP ran only one candidate in most SNTV two-member constituencies when that system was used certainly reduced (and perhaps even eliminated) this type of incentive for the development of factional politics in Korea within the ruling party.

In Taiwan, it might appear that the “zone” assignment system, which was largely under central party control in the authoritarian period, would mitigate the factional tendencies and intraparty rivalries that SNTV would otherwise foster. Indeed, under authoritarianism “the Nationalists prevented the emergence of overt national factions within the mainlander-dominated KMT and limited Taiwanese factions to local arenas” (Winckler, “Electoral Equilibria,” this volume). However, in

the transition period in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (TPA), where the number of seats ranged from one to 10, averaging about three seats, while the total number of strong groupings is four—consistent with the number of candidates sustainable in districts of mean size three—these groupings consist of two factions within the KMT and two within the main opposition party (the DPP), “reflecting the single main underlying cleavage—how to manage political relations between mainlanders and Taiwanese and what priority to give to independence to Taiwan” (Winckler, “Electoral Equilibria,” this volume).

Hypothesis 8—SNTV Leads to an Equilibrium in Terms of the Number of Candidates Who Contest any Seat That Results in Very Limited Interparty Competition at the District Level and a Strong Likelihood of Incumbents Being Returned to Office

SNTV operates to reduce interparty competition by capping the number of candidacies, since parties tend to run candidates only in those districts where there is a reasonable chance to win a seat and parties (minor parties, in particular) do not wish to run more candidates than their vote support would justify lest they throw away a possible victory.

In the 1986 election to the lower chamber in Japan, only 838 candidates competed for 512 seats, a ratio of only 1.64 candidates per seat despite Japan having a multiparty system. In Japan, there is evidence that parties come to learn what electoral strategies are sensible for them given their previous level of observed party support, but because there is often little cost to the largest party in running only “one too many” candidates under SNTV we saw some parties, especially the highly factionalized LDP, running one unsuccessful candidate in a fair number of contests (Reed 1990, 1992).⁴¹ Nonetheless, the LDP did not run a full slate of 512 candidates. “During the twelve elections between 1958 and 1990, an average of .70 LDP candidates competed for each parliamentary seat” (Woodall, this volume).

At least until the election of 1993, incumbents in Japan were unlikely to be defeated. Prior to the 1993 election, “nearly half of all LDP incumbents had served between four and nine terms” (Woodall, this volume). LDP incumbents have been winning reelection at slightly higher rates than incumbents from other parties, but since 1960 more than 80 percent of all incumbents who seek reelection are successful (Hayama 1992). However, these aggregate statistics conceal that the life

of the Diet member is nonetheless a difficult one, with about one-third of LDP members not having survived the five terms necessary to be considered worthy of holding a cabinet-level post and others being beaten once only to return victorious in a subsequent election (Jean-Marie Bouissou, personal communication, 30 April 1995).⁴² Still, of the nine countries reviewed in the Somit et al. (1994) study on comparative incumbency advantage, Japan falls in the middle.⁴³

In Korea, the ruling party's "nonoptimal" practice of running only one candidate for each two-member seat further enhanced the ability of SNTV incumbents to hold on to their seats for SNTV elections between 1973 and 1988 (see Mo and Brady, this volume). In Korea, the competition rate (the ratio of candidates to available seats) between the sixth and eighth SMD elections ranged from 6.5 to 3.8, with an average ratio of 5.2, while the average competition rate for the ninth and tenth SNTV elections was only 2.7 (S.-C. Lee, this volume). Also, Mo and Brady (this volume) argue that SNTV protected the ruling party from major vote swings.⁴⁴

In Taiwan, the pattern is more complex, although "overall, on post-war Taiwan, the average (effective) number of runners-up was not much further from equilibrium than in Japan." Winckler ("Electoral Equilibria," this volume) also notes that in the authoritarian period the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) manipulated the number of candidates for reasons other than seat maximizing, allowing the number to rise as a mechanism to vent political tensions. Indeed, Winckler identifies three different electoral cycles, "each involving an episode of direct political repression, followed by a compensating electoral relaxation, followed by gradual reimposition of electoral discipline (see Winckler, table 1).⁴⁵ As in Japan, in Taiwan, it appears that most seats are safe, with the bulk of the real electoral competition occurring for the last seat in the district (Winckler).

Policy Consequences of SNTV

Hypothesis 9—SNTV Fosters a Strong Localistic and Personalistic Orientation in Which Members Compete to Provide "Personal" and "Group-Based" Services to Their Individual Constituencies and Downplay Wider Policy Issues

In list PR systems, a common complaint is that representatives from multimember constituencies are not sufficiently oriented toward local

problems. Since it is their place on the party list and their party's overall record rather than their personal appeal that will decide their future electoral success, representatives are seen to have few incentives to act locally. In contrast, under candidate-focused systems such as SNTV, STV, and cumulative voting, where E is low, multimember constituencies provide strong incentives for localism. In these systems, the common complaint is that representatives are tied to the "all-consuming politics of the parish pump" and unable to concentrate "on the grander national issues on which they were elected."⁴⁶

However, the "parish pump" may have too many parochial connotations to be a fully appropriate metaphor. In Japan, for example, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 25) assert that LDP members develop what they call a "niche market strategy."

In addition to the small favors the politicians render out of party, factional, or individual funds, LDP members use government resources to woo particular groups of voters. They use their influence over specific areas of regulatory, budget, and tax policy to differentiate themselves from other LDP candidates whose influence is in other areas. For example, in a district where one LDP candidate has influence over small business policy that member may develop especially strong ties to the retailers in his district. (25)

Also it is useful to recall that not all campaign support groups are geographically based (see Bouissou, this volume) and that parties like the JSP managed a strong ideological color (e.g., for a long time, advocacy of pacifism) despite SNTV. Moreover, many scholars of Japanese politics have argued that, despite the strength of candidate-centered politics, "partisan attitudes are the dominant force in Japanese parliamentary voting" (Richardson 1988, 695).

In Korea, in the period when SNTV was in use, the limited power of the National Assembly to set policy relative to the executive and the bureaucracy, and the stable majority of the government party and its strong party discipline, created strong pressures for legislators to generate responsiveness to their constituencies via contacts with voters, the provision of particularized constituency service, and individual efforts to get government funds allocated to the district (Park 1988a, 1049-50). The end result is one consistent with our expectations of the incentives motivating legislators elected under SNTV described in earlier chapters.

SNTV elections lacked national-level policy issues; rather local-level concerns and constituency interests played a prominent role in the national agenda, and there is also evidence that the voting decisions of the electorate were based mainly on preferences for individual candidates (S.-C. Lee, this volume).

The evidence from Taiwan requires a more nuanced view of SNTV's effects. One of Winckler's strongest findings ("Electoral Equilibria," this volume) is about the progress in Taiwan in the postwar period from contests between candidates toward "contestation between parties." In Winckler's view, "SNTV has both helped and hindered this progress" since, on the one hand, SNTV lends itself to localistic candidate-centered politics but, on the other hand, it does permit minority parties to be better represented than in winner-take-all plurality settings. Moreover, Winckler emphasizes the extent to which SNTV electoral competition in Taiwan for the TPA has been embedded in the wider national policy arena, where mainlander versus Taiwanese issues are played out, as well as embedded in the wider international arena, where Taiwan's claims to be the "true" government of China are contested, especially recently.

Hypothesis 10—SNTV Increases the Importance of Money in Politics and Enhances the Potential for Corruption

Because of the need to wage both an intraparty and an interparty campaign and the importance of party factions,⁴⁷ and because of the relative absence of issue-based politics and the desires of the various long-standing electoral constituencies to receive rewards for their loyalty, money should be especially important under SNTV.

In Japan, Diet members are constantly in need of money for *koenkai* support activities and related purposes. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 24–25, internal citations omitted) summarize the literature on Japanese electoral politics by saying that "Japanese always bring large gifts of money to funerals and to weddings and so do Diet members. They are also expected to provide a large number of constituency services free of charge. They help children of supporters get into private schools or find jobs. They assist supporters in securing loans and business connections, mediate in disputes, and help people get out of minor trouble with the law. . . . According to one estimate, the average LDP Dietmember spends over 120 million yen a year in his or her district in

support of all these activities.”⁴⁸ Political analysts estimate that in the 1990 election Japan’s five major political parties together spent about U.S.\$5 billion on the election, over half of which was spent by the LDP alone (*Economist*, 24 February 1990, cited in Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 22)!

In Korea, analyzing the role of money in politics is complicated by the fact that SNTV elections in Korea were strictly regulated by the public management system to achieve clean elections (K.-Y. Lee, this volume). Stringent campaign laws indeed contributed to the reduction of campaign violations. However, they did not prevent the candidates from reverting to expensive means of campaigning or engaging in illegal activities behind the scenes. For instance, the tenth election was one of the most costly ones, with average spending of U.S.\$500,000 by successful candidates (S.-C. Lee, personal communication, 1992).

In Taiwan, Winckler (“Electoral Equilibria,” this volume) reminds us that we must be sensitive to historical nuances in evaluating the role of money in politics, since the mix of incentives the Nationalists have used to mobilize their electoral majority has gradually shifted from coercive through remunerative toward normative, reflecting the shift in the political basis of the Nationalist state—from an alien army reclaiming Taiwan for mainland China, to elite technocrats managing the successful development of Taiwan, toward local politicians representing an emerging island-focused national identity. However, Winckler also strongly asserts that “remunerative incentives have always been central because the Nationalists could not rely heavily on coercion for long and because mainlander Nationalism had little normative appeal in Taiwan.”⁴⁹

Additional Perspectives on Studying SNTV from an Embedded Systems Perspective

To return to the methodological ideas discussed in the opening paragraphs of the preface to this volume, in studying SNTV I wish to be able to draw on the comparisons across time, nation, and type (TNT) principle to make comparisons across time (but holding both setting and electoral rule constant), across nations (holding electoral rule constant), and across types (comparing the effects of SNTV with those of other electoral rules within nations and also across nations). The previous section focused on comparisons of the second (cross-national) type. In this section, I first turn to the origins of SNTV. Then I turn to within-nation comparisons

before and after the demise of SNTV or in settings where SNTV is used for some elections and other rules are used for other contemporaneous elections in that nation (comparisons of the third type). I also look at comparisons between outcomes under SNTV and those in closely related systems (more comparisons of the third type) and consider the variants of SNTV in actual use, where it may be combined with other electoral rules. Here, the mixing of electoral rules may have interesting synergistic effects. Then I look at comparisons of the first type (over time) and consider how other institutional changes might interact with the effects of SNTV. Last, I add one more piece of cross-national analysis, drawing on SNTV use in Alabama.

In Korea and Japan, the use of SNTV has been discontinued — giving us the basis for a natural experiment as well as important information about motivations for change.⁵⁰ Thus, in principle, for these two countries we have a two (Japan, Korea) by two (SNTV, mixed system) longitudinal comparative design wherein we can compare outcomes across countries holding election system constant (within-row comparisons), or can compare outcomes across election systems holding country constant (within-column comparisons), or can compare the effects of similar *changes* in election rules on *changes* in outcomes in the two countries (within-row, cross-column differences compared across rows).⁵¹ I now turn to those results.

The Origins and Demises of SNTV in Japan and Korea

As well as evidence for the use of SNTV as a tool of electoral engineering and party advantage, the perceptions of knowledgeable political actors about what SNTV's consequences might be/have been and how a change in electoral system might be expected to change the nature of electoral outcomes (and the political process more broadly) provide indirect evidence about the realism of the stylized model of the political consequences of SNTV provided in the inventory of propositions in the previous section.

In Japan, SNTV has a history that goes back to the early part of the century. According to Woodall (this volume), for the lower house: "Fearing that a single party would seize an absolute majority of seats under the existing [1889] small-sized constituency system (patterned after the one- and two-member districts in Great Britain), oligarch Aritomo Yamagata spearheaded the effort to create a 'one man, one vote' for-

mula⁵² combined with large districts. . . . The 1900 law established an SNTV electoral formula and created 97 constituencies that elected between one and 13 representatives. SNTV was joined to a middle-sized constituency in 1925."⁵³

SNTV in Japan's upper chamber was ended in 1983. One reason for the change was dissatisfaction within the LDP about the difficulty of coordinating vote shares among its candidates in a national constituency that had to fill 50 seats in each election. There were also some anticorruption elements in the movement to reform the upper chamber. A strong reform movement with corruption as one of its chief concerns, along with the tidal wave of electoral change in 1993 that triggered a split within the LDP, finally forced LDP politicians to live up to earlier (always-broken) promises to reform the electoral system in the lower chamber as well.

The strategic problem facing the LDP was an interesting one. Clearly, in the short run, as the largest party, it would be strongly favored by the use of SMD elections; thus, it might appear that it should prefer as many single-member districts as possible. But, no longer the majority party, the LDP feared that other parties would form winning alliances against it in the districts (as had begun to occur in the prefectural components of the House of Councilors elections). To make this less likely, the LDP wanted to include in the electoral system incentives that would split the opposition and prevent a very strong single party (or electoral alliance) from emerging as its real opponent. To do this, the LDP favored large-district PR as a second, separate component of the electoral system. The desire of parties to retain their independent identities for purposes of the PR lists would presumably deter them from submerging themselves in any alliance that might provide a credible threat to LDP dominance in the SMD plurality elections.⁵⁴

The strategic incentives of the other parties were somewhat different.

As the second largest party, the Socialists would potentially benefit from single-member districts. In a straight single-member district system, they could expect to absorb the smaller parties as voters abandoned a hopeless cause. But the party list portion of the ballot gave smaller parties the ability to survive on their own, and reduced the attractiveness of the new system to the Socialists. . . . By contrast, the smaller parties—the Democratic Socialist Party, for example, or the Komeito and the Communist Party—welcomed the party

list element . . . but object to a high ratio of single-member to party list seats. (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993: 198)

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 198) go on to suggest that the LDP probably had "room for compromise" and that, by increasing the ratio of party-list seats to single-member districts, it might "buy off one of the smaller parties." Clearly, something like that occurred in 1993–94. However, Jean-Marie Bouissou (personal communication, 30 April 1995) has pointed out that the actual change agreed upon was not in the interest of a majority of LDP backbenchers and was not particularly in the interests of the opposition parties, either.

As Woodall (this volume) views the choices of LDP members:

[I]nternal wounds inflicted in the 1993 election gave reason for rethinking the party's intransigent stance on a compromise reform formula. Particularly keen toward the idea of change were LDP incumbents representing largely urban and suburban prefectures. . . . This category of loyalist were defeated at an alarming rate and otherwise received a painful beating at the ballot box. In addition, fear of voter retribution absent meaningful reform and the diminished credibility of credit claiming, as well as reduced prospects for positional influence, rendered it rational for LDP backbenchers as well as party strategists to flip-flop on an acceptable formula for electoral engineering.

As noted earlier, SNTV with two-member districts was adopted in the Republic of Korea as a replacement for an SMD system in the 1970s. Why the change was made raises interesting questions. As Sung-Chull Lee (1992, personal communication) puts it:

The $m = 1$ system seems to have many features which would work to the ruling party's advantage. For example, $m = 1$ is more likely to result in one-party domination than $m = 2$. $M = 2$, on the other hand, often leads to a stable two-party system. . . . This means that President Park and his ruling party might have faced the emergence of a strong opposition party. Also, the ruling party could easily take advantage of the benefits of gerrymandering and disproportional

representation under $m = 1$. In addition, the DRP under $m = 1$ did not have to deal with the coordination problem of over and under nomination of candidates, which arises inevitably under the SNTV. Finally, it was not certain as to how $m = 2$ would work to the electoral benefit of the DRP, since it had never been applied to the Korean Assembly elections, while $m = 1$ was proven to work well for the ruling party.

Indeed, in the two elections after the switch to SNTV occurred, the percentage of (elected nonbonus) seats dropped almost 20 percent (S.-C. Lee, this volume), suggesting that the ruling party had simply made a mistake. Lee, drawing on arguments in Choi (1973), however, argues that Park “did not choose SNTV for electoral benefits.” Indeed, Lee points out that the DRP pursued a policy of running only one candidate in each two-member district, thus guaranteeing that it could not get more than 50 percent of the seats in those districts and explaining the poor performance of the DRP under the SNTV component of the election system. Park could afford to be cavalier about his party’s vote share in the SNTV component of the election because the electoral law was rigged. The rules for the first two SNTV elections provided that one-third of the Assembly seats be appointed by President Park. Thus, “the DRP needed only to win one-quarter of the district seats in order to maintain a majority in the Assembly.” Both S.-C. Lee (this volume) and Mo and Brady (this volume) accept as plausible the argument of Choi (1973) that the DRP’s concern was to increase its urban representation, which running as the second-place party enabled it to do under SNTV when the DRP only nominated one candidate. Moreover, the system enabled Park “to control the system in a personal and effective way by making elections mere symbolic ritual” (S.-C. Lee, this volume).

The decision to replace SNTV with a mostly SMD plan in Korea in 1988 reflected (1) the unpopularity of SNTV with voters;⁵⁵ (2) the breakdown of electoral reform talks between the DJP and the RDP, the chief opposition party, which had some interest in perpetuating a two-member scheme that would probably preserve its place as the major opposition party; and (3) a calculation on the part of the ruling DJP that it might actually benefit from SMDs because of the expected “balloon effect” of overrepresentation in seats for the party that was the largest vote getter (see Brady and Mo 1992; and Mo and Brady, this volume).⁵⁶

Comparing Electoral Results under SNTV with Those under Its Successor Electoral Regime: The Case of South Korea

The governing party (DJP) did not receive an absolute majority of the seats in the thirteenth Assembly election (1988) for the first time in the 40-year history of the Republic.⁵⁷ S.-C. Lee (this volume) suggests that this result would not have occurred under the previous SNTV system: The fact that the ruling party came in second in most (115) of the 137 districts in which it did not come in first suggests that the DJP could have performed much better in district contests if the election had been held under the old rule. What makes this result of particular interest to rational choice theorists is that it was the DJP, then the majority party, that consented to the change. How could it have miscalculated so badly? Brady and Mo (1992) and Mo and Brady (this volume) show that a more careful analysis of the geographic distribution of each party's support base should have warned the DJP to be more cautious in endorsing electoral change. Indeed, under SMD, as expected by theory, the Korean parties "with more concentrated vote support, the PDP and the NDRP performed better than those with normally distributed voter support, the DJP and the RDP" (Brady and Mo 1992; Mo and Brady, this volume).

Sung-Chull Lee (personal communication, 1992) notes that Korea's 1988 election also has some other important lessons for students of electoral systems. First, the failure of the DJP to capture a majority of the district seats led the special bonus provision in awarding at-large seats to apply; thus, the DJP got 50.7 percent of the at-large seats compared to 38.8 percent of the district seats. Because of this bonus, the at-large component of the 1988 system was considerably less proportional in its seats-votes relationship than the SMD component of the system: for the SMD component, I have calculated D to be 19.3, while for the 75 at-large seats D was 37.4 and for the system as a whole D was 23.9.

Second, as may happen under plurality voting in multiparty settings, the ranking of parties in terms of seat share was not the same as that according to vote share. In particular, the PDP, with only 19.3 percent of the vote, got 23.4 percent of the seats, while the RDP, with 23.8 percent of the vote, got only 19.7 percent of the seats.

Third, as we have come to expect from SMD multiparty systems, while the largest party achieved a greater seat share than vote share, the

smallest party won fewer seats than was proportional to its vote. The NDRP came in fourth in the voting, with 15.6 percent, but only received 12.1 percent of the seats at the district level and 11.7 percent of the total seats.

Fourth, while the most striking consequence of the 1988 elections was a loss of seats for the ruling party, the relative importance of opposition parties also changed from what it had been previously. In the previous SNTV election, the PDP had held only 22 seats; in 1988, it won 70. While the RDP gained seats from 1983 to 1988, its gains (from 52 to 59 seats) were not sufficient for it to keep its place as the leading opposition party.

Fifth, South Korean experience buttresses the view that electoral systems do not operate in a political vacuum and that, when an electoral system change disturbs the existing political order in ways that may have been unanticipated, "the empire strikes back."

On 22 January 1990, President Roh and two of the three opposition party leaders (Y.-S. Kim of the RDP and J.-P. Kim of the NDRP) stunned the country by announcing that they had secretly negotiated to merge their parties into a giant conservative alliance controlling more than two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly.⁵⁸

The new coalition was obviously patterned after Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, then still firmly in control of Japan. It was even named similarly: the Democratic Liberal Party. While the 1990 joint statement of Roh and his allies asserted that over the last two years "the nation has learned the very costly lesson . . . [that the] present four-party setup has been incapable of effectively meeting domestic and international challenges confronting the nation," S.-C. Lee (this volume) argues that the real reasons for the alliance were the governing party's failure to secure a legislative majority, the RDP's loss of status as the largest opposition party, and the NDRP's frustration at being a marginal party.⁵⁹ However, the new Democratic Liberal Party has been rent by dissension among its three components and repeatedly came close to dissolution soon after its founding.⁶⁰

Comparing Electoral Outcomes in Japan's Upper Chamber under SNTV with Those under the Successor Electoral Regime in That Chamber, a Mixed System

When a national party list elected under PR replaced the SNTV component of Japan's upper house in 1983, the LDP's performance improved.

“The LDP’s biggest problem before 1983 was in dividing the vote among candidates at a nation-wide level” (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 206, n. 29, with internal citation omitted; see also McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1994).

Comparing Contemporaneous Electoral Outcomes under SNTV in Japan’s Lower House with Electoral Outcomes under the Mixed System in Japan’s Upper Chamber since 1983

In the lower house, the LDP had gained a roughly 10 percent higher seat share than its seat share in the party list portion of the upper house ballot; in contrast, in the component of the upper house elections that consists of prefectural elections that are, in effect, single-member districts (because of the staggered election system),⁶¹ the LDP has “performed extremely well, except for 1989.” In that election, for the first time, “the opposition parties managed to unite behind a single candidate in a number of districts” (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 35, n. 29, with internal citation omitted).⁶²

Comparing SNTV with Electoral Outcomes under Closely Related Electoral Systems

If we wish to better understand the mechanisms whereby SNTV produces its political effects, it is useful to look at whether similar effects are found in polities that make use of electoral systems to which SNTV has a family resemblance. Lijphart, Pintor, and Sone (1986) compare and contrast SNTV in Japan with the results of limited voting in Spain, and Lijphart (this volume) extends this comparison to STV in Malta. Bawn, Cox, and Rosenbluth (this volume) compare the stability of party vote shares at the district level in Japan under SNTV with that in the United States under an SMD system. We now briefly review some of those findings and suggest a few additional considerations by comparing data from various single-country studies.

For Spain in 1982, we may calculate from the Lijphart, Pintor, and Sone (1986, 164) data an index of distortion of 20.7 percent, much higher than the SNTV value of 9.3 percent their data gave us for the 1980 Japanese election to the lower chamber. This is not surprising given that Spain uses limited voting in which, for almost all the districts, $k = 3$

and $m = 4$.⁶³ Lijphart (this volume) uses the Gallagher index of disproportionality rather than the Loosemore and Hanby index of distortion. Thus, the numbers he reports in table 1 of his essay are not directly comparable to those given here. Nonetheless, we can conclude from his data that STV in both Malta and Ireland are more proportional than SNTV in Japan.

When Bawn, Cox, and Rosenbluth (this volume) compare the stability of party vote shares at the district level in Japan under SNTV with that in the United States under an SMD system, they find outcomes more stable in the former than in the latter.

It is remarkable to what extent the complaints by reformers about SNTV, namely, that it fosters localism and parochialism, entrenches incumbents, and gives rise to very expensive campaigns and the potential for corruption, are mirrored by the complaints of reformers about STV and SMD systems.

Illustrative are the views of a former legislator in Ireland, John O'Donoghue (ca. 1991), who asserts about STV in Ireland that:

The present electoral system has outlived its usefulness. In fact it is now the single greatest factor inhibiting the development of the Dail as a strong parliamentary chamber. As they are elected at present, deputies do not have the incentive nor the time to impose upon government the checks and balances which the constitution intended. Clientalism was spawned and has been nurtured by multi-seat proportional representation. . . . All of the evidence from electoral results over the past decade points to the clientalism specialist as the one who best survived the vagaries of an increasingly fickle public.

Moreover, just as we saw that SNTV and STV shared three of four important characteristics with one another, if we look at the mechanisms by which STV is "corrupted" they appear virtually identical to what has been written about SNTV in Japan: organized groups that can play off one legislator against another, on the one hand, and intraparty competition on the other.

In O'Donoghue's portrait of STV in Ireland:

Clientalism is not just confined to servicing the needs of individual voters. Organized groups from residents' associations to the commit-

tee of the Twirling-Majorette-Marching-Bands will use their perceived muscle to “play-off” the multi-TDs against one another. It does not matter how outrageous or hare-brained a demand is, they smilingly imply, your colleagues are supporting it. Turn a deaf ear to sufficient of the veiled messages and you may as well ride home from Leinster House on your kamikaze motor-cycle. It is not, indeed, the TDs [members of Parliament] of *other* parties that present the most problems to our hero. It is the intraparty jockeying for position that requires of the nationally elected deputy that he act like a local councillor. If he does not, then it is the local councillor, joining him next time out on the Dail electoral ticket “to win the extra seat,” who will become the new deputy. And the former deputy reverts to being the local councillor. And so the roundabout continues.⁶⁴

The Changing Effects of SNTV in a Changing Political Culture: The Case of Taiwan

In a setting such as Taiwan, where SNTV in some form has been in continuous use, other profound changes in the political system have been taking place in the postwar period. Thus, we can use Taiwan to examine how SNTV's effects are mediated by regime type and the general political order, as in the essays by Winckler (this volume).

Winckler has noted that use of SNTV had only limited impact on policy until the recent period of emerging democracy in Taiwan and that its consequences for electoral competition varied greatly across the different regime eras, from the initial period of the flight of KMT leaders from the mainland to the era of transitional authoritarianism to the present democratization period, ranging from a tool for the co-optation of local elites to a genuine instrument of mass organization. During Taiwan's transition toward democracy, SNTV's political and economic impact shifted. In the 1945–60 period of consolidating authoritarianism, the main function of local elections was to bolster the Nationalist state by placating both American and Taiwanese demands for local democracy. In the heyday of authoritarianism in 1960–75, SNTV helped maintain political stability, allowing co-optation of local elites and defusing of mass opposition. In 1975–90, SNTV's main political effect was to give opposition politicians some access to platforms from which they could demand democratization. However, as Taiwan approaches real democ-

racy, as noted in the introduction, democratization has begun to shift the fulcrum of SNTV from “local elites to local masses.”⁶⁵

SNTV as an Embedded Electoral Component

When an electoral rule like SNTV is a component of a hybrid electoral system, its political implications can be profoundly affected. The 1970s Korea experience with SNTV illustrates this point dramatically — the electoral strategies used in the SNTV component of the election were totally changed by Park’s ability to appoint one-third of the Assembly members. In Japan, the interest of the LDP (and the other parties) in replacing SNTV with SMD elections depended upon the ratio of SMD and list PR seats. For the LDP, it was not just proportionality considerations (or, rather, disproportionality considerations) but also the anticipated incentives for other parties to form electoral alliances against it (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). The same point is laid out for the case of Taiwan by Hsieh (this volume), who reviews the decisions made by KMT strategists in deciding when and whether to adjust district magnitude.⁶⁶

Most Different Systems Perspective: The Effects of SNTV in Alabama

Clearly, predictions about SNTV’s effects must be modified when the elections are nonpartisan, as they are for most of the Alabama local elections now using SNTV. But in Alabama the really critical difference is not whether there is a party label attached to a candidate’s name, but whether each of the party candidates is equally attractive to different racial segments of the electorate. In particular, *ceteris paribus*, are the black candidates more attractive to the black electorate and less attractive to the white electorate? In Alabama, SNTV (like cumulative voting) is a tool for racial representation.

Because blacks line up behind the black candidate, SNTV permits a concentrated black vote to elect one representative in settings where blacks are not a majority of the electorate.⁶⁷ In the localities that have adopted SNTV or cumulative voting, because the size of the black electorate is known and same-race bloc voting is well over 80 percent, it is readily possible to calculate how many black candidates stand a chance of election. Because these are very small jurisdictions, where social consensus processes can operate within the black community, in practice

only the "optimal" number of black candidates seek office. Semi-proportional systems have rarely failed to elect at least one black legislator in the Alabama jurisdictions in which they have been adopted. Because white voters have often split their vote among "too many" (white) candidates, blacks have been successful under SNTV and cumulative voting in electing one of their own even in Alabama and other jurisdictions where the black population was slightly below the threshold of exclusion (Still 1992).⁶⁸

Discussion

The 10 hypotheses in our propositional inventory are all true for Japan. However, because the 10 hypotheses were initially suggested by empirical analyses of the Japanese case, as well as by theoretical considerations about the likely impact of SNTV, it is perhaps not that surprising that they fit the Japanese case so perfectly. When we turn to the other two countries, we find that all but two of the propositions are supported in Korea, while all but four are reasonably supported in Taiwan. Thus, looking at SNTV as an institution that creates particular incentives for politicians and parties and provides crucial insights into the electoral and policy effects of SNTV can take us a long way.⁶⁹ However, these counterexamples to our theoretical explanations are important ones, and, in reviewing the evidence for the 10 hypotheses and the other evidence from natural experiments involving SNTV described earlier, it becomes clear that other variables (especially party system, issue cleavage structure, geographic vote distribution, and regime type) interact with SNTV in important ways.⁷⁰

Hypotheses 1 and 7 are two that need to be completely reconsidered in the light of evidence from both Korea and Taiwan about the importance of embedding. In both Korea and Taiwan, strong party systems operated to mitigate intraparty candidate competition. In Taiwan, we have the Responsibility Zone System. In Korea, what was in effect a DRP decision not to contest a second seat in the two-member SNTV districts effectively forestalled intraparty competition in the dominant party. However, in both countries there have been pressures behind the scenes involving factional disputes about the SNTV nomination process and (in Taiwan) intraparty contests for voter allegiance. In Taiwan, the existence of a fundamental national cleavage line regarding Taiwanese independence and the divorce (until quite recently) of national-level

issues and local factional organization meant that the proposition in hypothesis 7 about the link between SNTV district magnitude and number of party factions was not realized. In Korea, the existence of bonus seats operated to distort electoral incentives, since the DRP could be assured of victory even without a sweep of the SNTV seats. Again, hypothesis 7 was falsified.

Hypotheses 4 and 6 are confirmed for Japan and Korea but not for Taiwan. In Taiwan, the artificial division between Taiwanese and national (i.e., mainland) politics that was maintained for 40 years meant that the KMT, having perpetuated its national control, did not feel the need to malapportion the local legislatures. Even more importantly, perhaps, in Taiwan, unlike Japan and Korea, KMT support was reasonably evenly spread across urban and rural areas, dramatically reducing the potential for systematic, strategically beneficial malapportionment for the dominant party. In Taiwan, the existence of a single structuring (albeit submerged) cleavage line has helped define national party competition in the democratizing period and reduced the number of parties from what we might have expected from SNTV mean district magnitude.⁷¹

There are three other points I want to emphasize.

First, the impact of SNTV on electoral politics may change over time (where time can be shorthand for interaction with other factors such as regime type and democratization pressures), as exemplified in Winckler's discussion ("Electoral Equilibria," this volume) of Taiwanese politics as it transitioned toward democracy.

Second, when we look at party preferences among electoral systems in order to understand the origins and demises of particular electoral systems, models that take short-run vote maximizing as the principal concern of parties (or even candidates) can be quite misleading.⁷²

Third, when we consider SNTV as an embedded institution, one way in which it is impossible to divorce the electoral system from the context in which it is/has been embedded, is exemplified by the fact that the system is viewed quite differently in different countries that have used it. The use of SNTV (and related semiproportional systems such as cumulative voting) as successful voting rights remedies for black and Hispanic vote dilution has led to a highly positive view of SNTV among civil rights specialists in the United States (such as Lani Guinier), while in Taiwan, the strategic (and quite positive) role played by SNTV in Taiwan's democratic transition has left it strongly entrenched. In contrast, in Korea SNTV is associated with a period of autocratic rule and

electoral manipulation, and its use was ended. In Japan, it has been blamed for various undesirable features of Japanese electoral politics. With its elimination, a long-desired goal of reformers has finally been achieved.

As emphasized in the introduction to this volume, scientific research is a collective endeavor, and one study (or one edited book) cannot hope to delimit and test a fully general theory of electoral systems as embedded institutions across multiple settings and time periods. This essay should be seen as a compressed summary of what is known about SNTV and an open invitation to further work that would: (1) view electoral systems choice as a component of a multilevel game; (2) develop a more fully articulated model of electoral system impact that would subsume/extend/reformulate its 10 central hypotheses; (3) refine and develop ideas of embeddedness by better identifying the levels within which embedding can occur;⁷³ and (4) provide much more specific hypotheses about interactions across institutional types and levels.⁷⁴

NOTES

I am indebted to Vicki Ronaldson and Tu Duong, formerly of the School of Social Sciences Word Processing Center, for manuscript typing of earlier versions of this essay and to Dorothy Green, Jesse Knepper, and Chau Tran for bibliographic assistance. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the conference Elections and Campaigns in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, held at the University of California, Irvine, 23 February 1992, funded by a grant from the Pacific Rim Program of UCI (to Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Rein Taagepera, and Brian Woodall) and by a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF Grant SES 91-13984 to Russell Dalton, Harry Eckstein, and Bernard Grofman) and at the annual meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Bordeaux, France, 28 April-2 May 1995. I am indebted to the coeditors of this volume, to both sets of conference participants (especially Steve Reed and Jean-Marie Bouissou), and to Gary Cox and Masaru Kohno for helpful suggestions on this essay. Errors remaining are solely the responsibility of the author.

1. See, for example, Lijphart (1980), the various essays in Lijphart and Grofman (1984) and Grofman and Lijphart (1986), Taagepera (1986), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Lijphart et al. (1992), or any issue of *Electoral Studies*.

2. There has also been a renewal of interest in redistricting issues among political scientists in the United States and Canada almost as great as in the years immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1962 *Baker v. Carr* decision and subsequent enunciation of the "one person, one vote" standard (see, e.g.,

Grofman, Lijphart, McKay, and Scarrow 1982; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; and Courtney and Smith 1992).

3. These are only a few illustrative citations from what could have been a very long list.

4. A useful quick overview of the present state of the debate can be found by comparing the summarized views of Arend Lijphart in Lijphart (1991a, 1991b) with those of Lardeyret (1991) and Quade (1991).

5. For implications of the U.S. Electoral College for optimal campaigning strategies, see Brams and Davis (1974).

6. Also see the discussion in the introduction to this volume.

7. For details on the use of SNTV in these settings, see the introduction to this volume and various essays in it. The propositional inventory was first developed in early 1992 and revised thereafter.

8. The term *embedded institutions* has been used by authors with similar, but not identical, meaning to what I intend. I use it to refer to the notion "that (1) a given institution is embedded in a wider institutional and social framework, and thus seemingly identical institutions may not always yield similar behavior once we recognize contextual factors and constraints, and (2) the choice of institutions is not independent of context, thus longitudinal historical analysis is important if we are not to mistake the nature of causality" (Grofman, preface to this volume). The issue here is: what is the *independent* effect of political institutions and how can we separate the dancer from the dance? In the words of Robert Putnam (1993, 3): "How do formal institutions influence the practice of politics and government? If we reform institutions, will practice follow? Does the performance of an institution depend on its social, economic and cultural surround?"

9. As noted in the preface to this volume, I see the central elements of the study of embedded institutions as consisting of four steps:

Stage I

1. Identify a particular institution (or practice) found in more than one place.

2. Develop a theory about the "independent" consequences of that institution that can be operationalized and tested (at least in terms of "stylized facts").

3. Look at sites where that institution is in place that are otherwise as similar as possible and determine whether the posited independent effects of the institution are observed in all these sites.

4. Look at sites where that institution is in place that are otherwise as different as possible and determine which of the posited independent effects of the institution are observed in each of these sites.

5. Look at sites that permit before and after comparisons of situations where the institution was found but is no longer, or was not found but is now present to see if predicted changes in behavior occur.

Stage II. Look at institutions that are similar in critical ways to the

institution under study and try to generalize the model of that institution's effects to apply to a broader class of institutions and to more precisely specify mechanisms through which effects are realized.

Stage III. Try to understand how the effects of the institution vary across the sites in terms of the characteristics peculiar to those sites.

Stage IV. Look at institutional arrangements that are very different from the one previously focused upon to further develop and test theories of institutional impact.

As noted in the preface, the first of these stages involves the logic of classic experimental design, while the second and third stages involve the logic of discovery, where research is more intuitive — oriented toward hypothesis formation rather than hypothesis testing. (The fourth stage is not represented in this volume.)

10. Recall that in Korea SNTV was replaced in 1988, while in Japan SNTV was replaced in the upper chamber of the Diet in 1983 and has been eliminated in the lower chamber as well. In Japan, we can evaluate changes in upper chamber results with and without SNTV and compare upper chamber results to contemporaneous results for SNTV elections in Japan's lower chamber.

11. Here we largely summarize the work of Winckler ("Electoral Equilibria," this volume). In principle, we could also look at the inclusion of some PR seats in Taiwan in the 1990s as a "break-point" in that electoral system, creating another natural experiment, for before and after study, but these PR seats were set up primarily for so-called national (i.e., mainland) constituencies and for "overseas Chinese" and can be thought of as a kind of appendage to the Taiwan National Legislature and the Legislative Yuan that did not fundamentally change the election rules for them (see Hsieh, this volume).

12. While I have spent several weeks in Japan as a scholar in residence at Kansai University (through the courtesy of Professor Katsumi Yamakawa), I am in no way a specialist on Japanese politics, much less the politics of Korea or Taiwan. However, this essay has been reviewed by various country specialists, and I have had the benefit of detailed suggestions about wording from my coeditors in a number of instances. Thus, although there may well be areas discussed where my ignorance of the details of the political context has led me into errors of interpretation, I am confident that the overall portrait of the operations of SNTV in this essay is in broad brush an accurate one.

13. The synthesis to follow, although an original one, draws heavily on the previous literature on SNTV in Japan, for example, Thayer (1969), Curtis (1971), Sone (personal communication, August 1991), Yamakawa (1984), Richardson and Flanagan (1984), Baerwald (1986), Reed (1990), Kohno (1992), and Cox and Rosenbluth (1993). Thus, its propositions fit best for the Japanese case. It also benefited from suggestions by Sung-Chull Lee (18 September 1992), Edwin Winckler (17 September 1992, 30 October 1995), Jean-Marie Bouissou (27 April 1995), and Brian Woodall (26 September 1995).

14. As noted earlier in the volume, SNTV is usually referred to as a "semi-proportional" election system because any bloc with at least $1/(m + 1)$ fraction

of the vote can be assured of electing at least one representative only if it properly coordinates the votes of its supporters (see also Grofman 1975). This terminology is sometimes disputed. See, for example, Lijphart, this volume; and Lijphart et al. (1992). Cf. Rose (1984).

15. It may also be linked to the maximum number of seats per district and to the geographic distribution of party voting strength.

16. The factual and historical background on the use of SNTV in each of the three countries is sketched in the introduction to this volume.

17. Indeed, because the distribution of partisan voting strength may be well known, SNTV may impose a kind of stasis on interparty political competition (see the discussion of hypothesis 8).

18. There is some difficulty in deciding who has replaced whom when incumbents of more than one party lose in a single district. As it turns out, in the vast majority of districts in which an LDP incumbent loses, only LDP incumbents lose (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993).

19. However, some members of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) split away from the party out of their displeasure over the nomination process and formed the Democratic Unification Party just before the 9th election.

20. Liu (this volume) notes that some zones are more "reliable" than others in their vote-producing ability; thus, candidates may compete to be assigned "good" zones. Moreover, the assignment of candidates to zones is far from random, with "existing ties" taken into account.

21. There is some dispute in the Japanese political literature over the importance of the "floating vote," that is, voters not associated with *koenkai*, but there seems to be agreement that the floating vote has grown in importance.

22. While Bouissou (this volume) has suggested that interactions between candidates and their *koenkai* have served a democratizing function in Japan, in Korea, when SNTV elections were used, perhaps because the restriction on competition made the district party machine largely identical with the candidate support group, Park (1988a, 1051) argues that the district party can best be thought of as "a political machine based on patron-client ties" and "a personalized instrument in the quest for political power." Park (1051, n. 5) further notes that "Korean scholars have treated personalism as an aspect of authoritarianism."

23. SNTV's requirement for strategic allocation of votes among candidates provides strong incentives to strengthen constituency organizations (whether candidate, faction, or party based). The same is true for the limited vote. Berrington (1975, 24-25) observes that, paradoxically, the use of limited voting in three-member constituencies in Great Britain (between 1867 and 1884) helped strengthen the already strong Liberal Party even though the use of limited voting was designed to provide representation to the weaker party. The Liberals calculated that they could still capture all three seats in a number of the (12) three-member constituencies by "persuading their supporters to cast their two votes according to a central plan" (24-25). While this strategy was not successful everywhere, this need for coordinating voters forced the party to strengthen its organization in these constituencies.

24. As Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 25) point out: "Building personal loyalty is the key to the LDP electoral strategy. The personal bonds that develop between support group members and their Dietmember aid the LDP in apportioning the vote efficiently among competing LDP candidates." Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (25–26), as rational choice theorists, also emphasize the role of continuing "inheritable" support organizations as the solution to what is called in game theory the "last period" problem. Both voters and politicians can now make credible commitments to one another that are multiperiod in nature.

25. There is an important further qualifier, namely, that "the same local factions compete for local executiveships under single-seat majority districts, and local executiveships are also sometimes 'passed down' (as was, indeed, the national presidency from father Chiang Kai-Shek to son Chiang Ching-kuo" (Winckler, personal communication, 30 October 1995). Of course, as I suggested in my earlier essay in this volume, in terms of personalism SNTV and SMD elections may have much in common, especially once we control for strength of party system.

26. An exception is a national party list.

27. Also, any system with a mix of districts of different sizes opens up the potential for a peculiar form of electoral engineering in which the dominant party may seek to assign seat magnitudes in such a fashion as to advantage itself. This potential is greatest when the districts include ones that are small or medium sized in terms of seat magnitude, and thus open to lumpiness effects in which degree of proportionality varies significantly across district, and to situations in which party strength is not evenly spread geographically. Mair (1986) examines this phenomenon in Ireland, where STV is used in small and medium-sized districts.

28. Unfortunately, meaningful reapportionment has not taken place, despite numerous changes in the electoral system in Korea.

29. We may also think of concepts such as the threshold of representation and the threshold of exclusion as being not simply analytic expressions for theoretical limiting cases but also having calculable values derived from actual data on systems in use or simulated from assumptions about overall party strengths and their probability distributions (across constituencies). I will not pursue that idea further here.

30. For 116 postwar European elections, using the Loosemore and Hanby coefficient of distortion, Rae (1967) found an average distortion from a proportional allocation of seats and votes of only 2.39 percent. In comparing this figure with average interelection shifts in popular vote, Rae (1967, 87) asserts that the effect of election systems upon the competitive positions of political parties is "marginal in comparison to the effect of election outcomes." Basing their conclusion on data drawn from Rae (1967), Loosemore and Hanby (1971, 477) assert that party list systems exhibit an actual distortion that is only about 20 percent of their potential maximum distortion. As we would expect, Rae also finds that the average deviation is higher for elections under plurality compared with those under party list systems (see Rae 1967, 1971, chap. 5).

31. Only if we make simplifying assumptions, for example, by assuming a worst-case scenario of exactly two parties with each party having sufficient information about its probable vote support to run the "optimum" number of candidates and sufficient control over its supporters to be able to assure that they evenly divide votes among its candidates, can we calculate measures like the Loosemore-Hanby coefficient of distortion (Loosemore and Hanby 1971) or Dodgson's own closely related index of nonrepresentation on a purely theoretical basis for all electoral systems. Such calculations are provided in Loosemore and Hanby (45) for four systems and in Grofman (1975, 315-22) for several others. For the systems I have compared in this essay, their results parallel those for the threshold of exclusion: SNTV, D'Hondt, and the cumulative vote all have an identical index of distortion, with the highest value of the index for plurality systems and with the limited vote ($k > 1$) intermediate in distortion between plurality and D'Hondt.

32. The importance of this qualification is discussed in Christensen and Johnson (1995) and Cox (1996).

33. In Taiwan, disproportionalities are not perfectly monotonic with m . Hsieh (this volume) suggests that this nonmonotonicity may have occurred because of the problems opposition parties had in coordinating how many candidates to run. Also see Cox (1996).

34. A further important contribution to this debate is Cox (1996), who considers evidence from Japan and Taiwan on the supposed "superproportionality" of SNTV.

35. See also Kohno (1997).

36. However, Japan and Taiwan still have an effective number of parties that is less than mean district size.

37. Edwin Winckler (personal communication, July 1995) also has noted that in the early twentieth century "large district SNTV in Japan, in conjunction with a very restricted franchise, produced a two-party system in which both parties were under *genro* [nobility] tutelage." Here we cannot understand the operation of the electoral system without understanding the nature of the constraints within which the Japanese electoral arena was circumscribed.

38. A direct parallel is to the role of factional competition in one-party (Democratic) politics in the U.S. South in the first half of this century that played itself out via party primaries (Key 1949).

39. For elaboration of the role of LDP factions in public policy domains, see Woodall (1996). There is an extensive literature on factions within the LDP (the recent literature includes Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 1994; Kohno 1992; McCubbins and Thies 1995; and Kohno, 1997; see also Kato 1995). A useful overview of factions within the JSP is Stockwin (1992). Leiserson (1968) is perhaps the first attempt to formally model the evolution of party factions in Japan.

40. See also Cox and Rosenbluth (1993).

41. The data from Japan and Taiwan on considerable (long-run) optimality of party strategies contrast with the failure of parties to follow optimal strategies

when cumulative voting was used in legislative elections in one state in the United States. In Illinois, which used cumulative voting for its lower house, the Illinois General Assembly, for 100 years, ending its use only in 1980. Sawyer and MacRae (1962) consider whether party calculations as to how many candidates to run were *ex ante* optimal in the game-theoretic sense identified earlier. Brams (1975, 118, table 3.3) offers a retabulation of their data, showing that in only 39 percent of all elections did *both* parties adopt their minimax strategies, although in 95 percent of the elections one party *or* the other did so. However, what is particularly “astonishing about the nomination strategies and election results is that in more than half of the elections (56 percent), the minority/majority parties chose the strategy pair ‘run 1/run 2’ which can *never* be optimal for both parties whatever the outcome of the election” (Brams 1975, 118, emphasis in original). As a possible explanation for this peculiarly bashful electoral behavior on the part of the majority party, Sawyer and MacRae (1962, 939–45) suggest that bipartisan agreements may be reached that in effect cede one seat in each district to the minority party. (We may note that in competitive districts no such agreements are needed since the optimal strategy pair for both parties [run 2/run 2] leads to an outcome in which the minority still gets one seat.)

42. Calder (1988, 66–70) provides some interesting data concerning the relatively greater electoral vulnerability of Japanese incumbents compared with their counterparts in some other advanced democracies. (I am indebted to Brian Woodall, personal communication, July 1995, for calling this reference to my attention.)

43. These aggregate statistics conceal the fact that Japanese incumbents suffered a comparatively high proportion of their defeats from members of their own parties (Gary Cox, personal communication, September 1995; see also the discussion of hypothesis 4).

44. However, by measuring the difference in vote share between first- and second-place finishers for single-member districts and between second- and third-place finishers for two-member districts, Mo and Brady (this volume) concluded that elections at the district level in Korea were more competitive under SNTV than under a single-member-district system.

45. As Winckler (“Electoral Equilibria,” this volume) reminds us, the “KMT faced not just a one-shot, one-level game but a multi-shot multilevel one.” For a very useful general discussion of multilevel games, see Tsebelis (1990).

46. The quote is from a question asked in a 1991 newspaper interview with a Fianna Fail deputy, John O’Donoghue, that was reprinted in the December 1991 issue of *Representation*; while O’Donoghue is being asked about STV in Ireland, the question could just as easily be about SNTV (see Grofman, this volume).

47. Gary Cox (personal communication, September 1995) notes that in Japan the changing nature of campaign financing has “impacted the degree to which the electoral fates of the LDP factions were tied together.”

48. Using 1994 exchange rates, this is about one million U.S. dollars. For a

general discussion of the role of money in Japanese party politics, see Hrebenar (1992a, 1992b), and for a discussion of "under the table" money, see Woodall (1996).

49. In terms of policy consequences of SNTV, Winckler ("Electoral Economy," this volume) emphasizes that SNTV had a different impact at different points in Taiwan's history, with only minor effects in the immediate post-World War II period when Nationalist economic policy—agricultural recovery and import-substituting industrialization—was more influenced by American advice than by domestic politics, and had only marginally more important consequences in the heyday of authoritarianism when it facilitated state autonomy in economic policy both for better (promoting export-oriented industry) and for worse (neglecting welfare and the environment). Indeed, SNTV had limited economic importance in the period of transitional authoritarianism as well—mostly particular politicians obtaining small favors for themselves, their clients, and their constituencies. However, with real movement toward democratization, the political-economic effects of SNTV become more pronounced, "inflating money politics and providing businessmen more direct and more comprehensive access to economic influence through legislation."

50. Here I am referring to the change in electoral system in the Japanese upper chamber in 1983 and in Korea's National Assembly in 1988. The first election under the 1994 change in electoral system in Japan's lower chamber had not yet occurred when this essay was written.

51. Also, as noted previously, because Japan until 1994 had in place a different system for the upper and lower chambers of its legislature, this, too, permits a type of natural experiment.

52. Elections under Japan's 1899 rules, like those in the mid-nineteenth-century Great Britain, had a very restrictive franchise (Woodall, this volume).

53. "In the backdrop, the 1925 law created a system of universal manhood suffrage" (Woodall, this volume).

54. See Woodall (this volume). Cf. Kohno (1997) and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 194–95). For recent studies of fissiparous tendencies in the LDP, see Anderson (1995) and Kato (1995).

55. Relatedly, Edwin Winckler (personal communication, June 1995) has argued that in Japan and Taiwan SNTV was supported by elites because it was what we might call an "opaque system," that is, one that can be manipulated "behind the scenes."

56. In fact, the election was widely perceived as victory for the PPD and the NDRP and as a defeat for the DJP and the RDP. The former was no longer a majority party and the latter no longer the leading opposition party (Brady and Mo 1992; Mo and Brady, this volume).

57. S.-C. Lee (personal communication, 1992) notes that South Koreans refer to the results of this election as *yosoyadae* (small government party, big opposition) politics.

58. S.-C. Lee (personal communication, 1992).

59. S.-C. Lee (personal communication, 1992) notes that the PDP, left out

in the cold and dwarfed by the giant ruling party, denounced the merger as “a political coup d’état aimed at holding on to power.” All PDP members decided to resign from the National Assembly.

60. Based on evidence from Japan, Italy, and the United States, my colleague A Wuffle (personal communication, 30 April 1995) has jokingly suggested that ruling parties whose names contain the word *Democratic* have been especially jinxed in the early 1990s. The evidence for the term *liberal* is more mixed: while in the United States the term *liberal* has now become a curse word, the Liberal Party in Canada partly returned to its days of former glory when Canada’s voter revolution of 1993 did in the Conservative Party.

61. In the upper chamber, 100 of the 252 members are elected from a list, with staggered elections for 50 members every three years.

62. In the 1992 election, the strong (LDP plurality) showing in the upper chamber seemingly gave the LDP “a new lease on life” (Takabatake 1992, 426) but one that proved quite short-lived. Takabatake (426) notes the extremely low turnout in this election.

63. Lijphart, Pintor, and Sone (1986) confine their analyses to the districts where $k = 3$ and $m = 4$; they note (156) that there were only a few districts of a different type: three three-member districts ($k = 2$, limited voting), two two-member districts ($k = 2$, plurality bloc voting), and seven one-member districts (SMD).

64. See, more generally, Farrell (1985). However, we must be careful; localism under STV in Australia seems less pronounced than that under STV in Ireland (Shaun Bowler, personal communication, 30 April 1995).

65. In this context, we might also note that Jean-Marie Bouissou (this volume; personal communication, 30 April 1995) has emphasized that contrary to the popular view of *koenkai* as “feudal remnants,” the *koenkai* have served a democratizing role in Japan as an agent of mass influence on elites.

66. Hsieh’s (this volume) hypotheses 3 and 4 are as follows:

Hypothesis 3—The strategist of a large party will advocate the adoption of a less proportional system only to the point that he is sure the small parties or their supporters will not turn to his party’s main rival(s)

Hypothesis 4—The strategist of a small party may not be opposed to a less proportional system if he sees that his party may attract significant support from other small parties and their supporters

67. On occasion, even if voting is highly polarized, when whites split their vote among more than m (white) candidates, blacks in a nonblack majority jurisdiction in the South will succeed in electing a black candidate in a nonpartisan at-large (plurality bloc voting) election by a practice called “bullet voting” (or “single shotting”) in which they vote for a single (black) candidate and do not use $m - 1$ of their m ballots. In my courtroom testimony in a voting rights case involving a challenge to multimember districts in both chambers of the North Carolina legislature, I provided some statistical estimates of the average number of ballots cast by white and black voters, showing that black voters

voted for considerably fewer than m candidates in contests in which there were black candidates. In contrast, white voters tended to cast nearly a full ballot (Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello 1985).

68. The same is not true for Latino representation at the local level when we use population share to measure equity—almost certainly because of lower participation rates among eligibles and lower proportions of Latino than non-Latino citizens of voting age.

69. This finding has a direct parallel to the finding of Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1987, 1993) that roughly 80 percent of the votes in the U.S. Congress from 1792 to 1990 can be modeled as if legislators were making choices along a single policy dimension. There, as here, this is not to say that simplification tells us everything, but that simplification can tell us a great deal.

70. Another potentially important institutional factor, not really discussed in this volume, is the various restrictions on campaigning imposed in the three countries. Japan, for example, has prohibited door-to-door canvassing, restricted campaigning to a designated election period, and set severe limits on campaign techniques (e.g., each candidate may have only one campaign office, one campaign car, and one campaign loudspeaker) that seem bizarre to those used to American-style campaigns (see e.g., Usaki 1990, 139–41). These constraints impact some parties more than others by preventing parties with “people power” from using volunteer labor to compensate for lack of funds. The 1994 change in electoral system for the Japanese lower chamber was accompanied by changes in campaign regulations and campaign funding rules whose impact will also need to be taken into account in assessing the consequences of that change in election laws.

71. Cf. Taagepera and Grofman (1985), who suggest that Duverger’s law should be reformulated in terms of cleavage structures rather than electoral system type or even district magnitude. In particular, they hypothesize that the effective number of parties (using the Laakso-Taagepera index) will be one more than the number of major cleavage lines in the society.

72. We must judge deviations from ostensibly vote-maximizing strategy choices in the light of two points. First, given incomplete information as to vote strength, some parties that are retrospectively seen as having pursued a “suboptimal” strategy may have been pursuing a strategy that at the time, and in light of their available information, appeared optimal (see the discussion of the case of Korea in 1988 in Mo and Brady, this volume). Second, and even more important, politicians may be well aware of optimality considerations and yet choose not to act accordingly. This may occur because of “understandings” with their opposite numbers in the other party, as in Illinois, because of intrafactional competition within a party (Reed and Bolland, this volume), because of concerns about the fate of particular incumbents who might be displaced by an otherwise favorable electoral reform (Hsieh, this volume), or for reasons such as those of President Park in Korea in 1973 (S.-C. Lee, this volume). As Brams (1975, 120) puts it: “This is not to say that politicians act irrationally, but rather that other considerations may displace the minimax logic.”

73. Winckler has long argued for the need to specify the configuration of

political forces within a country that conditions the choice/maintenance of the electoral system, and, as noted in the introduction, he has suggested that the electoral system is supposed to express and maintain what he calls the "political order" — a level of analysis that he sees as intermediate between regime type and party system. In Winckler's view (personal communication, 3 June 1995), the concept of "such an 'invisible controlling overlayer' is necessary for authoritarian and even transitional systems, at least in 'statist' East Asia, where elites really had no intention of leaving major political outcomes entirely to something so capricious and democratic as popular sovereignty."

74. Woodall (1996), in his discussion of the concept of "institutional synergy," observes that SNTV's effects are produced in a cycle of mutually reinforcing feedback with institutions both inside the electoral arena and outside the immediate electoral context such as government bureaucracies and business groups (cf. McCubbins and Thies 1995). More specifically, Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) argue that LDP factionalism is due to a combination of the effects of SNTV and the majority-runoff method for the election of LDP leaders. Along somewhat different lines, Masaru Kohno (personal communication, 27 September 1995) has suggested the intriguing hypothesis that the "underdevelopment" of party organizations in Japan might be attributed not to SNTV per se but to the fact of "institutional incongruity" of electoral system type across different levels of government." He notes that "Japan, for a long time had a strange (perhaps unique, except for France) combination of different electoral systems for various levels of polity: namely, lower house (SNTV), upper house (partially PR), prefectural governors (majoritarian), prefectural assembly (SNTV), etc., with obviously different sized districts."